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THE CHRISTIAN LIFE.

A POPULAR TREATISE

ON

CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

BY

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PREFACE.

THAT I should vindicate myself for presenting to the public this treatise on Christian Ethics in addition to the bounteous store of treatises already extant in the literature of German theology, many of which are very excellent, I do not consider necessary; for the theologians of Germany are not acquainted with the requirements that spring from the peculiar position of our country in ecclesiastical matters, and hence could not consider them in their treatises on Christian Ethics. To be sure, it is generally, and therefore also in Germany, to the interest of the Church, that cultured Christians learn to know the manifestations of the religious and moral life intelligently—that is, according to their nature and inherent relation—but in this, the country of political freedom and mutual independence of Church and State, the country in which the laity greatly influences ecclesiastical polity, it is an imperative necessity that not only the clergy, but also the laity, have opportunity to acquaint themselves with the principles of Christian morality, and thereby be enabled to judge independently the manifestations of the moral and religious life, as well as the social and political questions of the day, from the stand-point of Christianity.

This want, which has thus far been ignored, I have endeavored to meet in a brief, clear, and synoptical treatise on Christian Ethics.

In treating this subject, I have therefore essayed, not only the greatest possible clearness and transparency in the arrangement of the subject matter, but also the greatest possible freedom from scientific phrases that are

difficult to comprehend, and the expression of abstract thoughts in the simplest and clearest language.

Inasmuch as there has been no universally valid form established for the presentation of Christian Ethics, so that every ethologist follows his own course in the arrangement of the subject matter, I have the more felt myself justified in pursuing my own course. On the other hand, I willingly confess that, in treating my subject, I often consulted the works of others. This is especially true of the excellent works of Ph. T. Culmann, A. Von Oettingen, and H. Martensen, to whom I am indebted for many a productive incitement, which is particularly manifest in the execution of special parts (for example §§ 28–31, 35, 43, 44, 66). Yet it will be evident to the reader capable of judging, that my treatise is an independent one.

Although this book is intended for the general public, it is well adapted for use in higher institutions of learning on account of great perspicuity in the arrangement of the subject matter. I have used the manuscript in my classes with great success.

I do not expect my readers to agree with me in all particulars; my position in the application of general principles to particular phases of moral, religious, social, or political life especially, may be unsatisfactory to many. But I can not evade that; I must be governed only by my Christian and moral convictions, not by the accidental humor of my readers.

Well aware am I that this treatise does not meet every want; yet I indulge the confident hope that it will be to many a reader a source of blessing, and a welcome guide in the domain of moral and religious life.

C. F. PAULUS.

Berea, Ohio, February 1, 1890.

CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

PAGE.

Definition and Purpose of Christian Ethics, ... 13
The Moral View of the World, ... 16
Optimism and Pessimism, ... 18
The Norm of the Moral, or the Moral Law, ... 20
The Free Will as Basis of the Moral, ... 26
Love as the Fundamental Principle of the Morally Good, Selfishness as the Fundamental Principle of the Morally Bad, ... 31
The So-called Fundamental Moral Ideas, ... 34
Empirical Sinfulness and the Necessity of Redemption as Presupposition of Christian Ethics, ... 36
The Christianly Good, or the Christian Life, as Subject Matter of Christian Ethics, ... 38
The Place of Christian Ethics in Theology, Especially Its Relation to the Doctrine of Faith, ... 41
Summary, ... 42

PART I.

THE NATURAL LIFE.

I. THE MORAL ENDOWMENT OF MAN.

Man as the Image of God, ... 47
Man as Natural Being and Personality, ... 49
Freedom of Choice as Moment of the Moral Faculty, . 55
The Innate Moral Law (Conscience) as Moment of the Moral Faculty, ... 58

II. MAN IN THE SINFUL STATE.

1. The Innate Sinful Condition of the Natural Man.
The Nature of Sin, ... 64
The Universal Derangement of Human Life by Sin, . 68
The Responsibility of the Natural Man, ... 73
Wrong Views of the Condition of the Natural Man, . 77

PAGE.

2. BARRIERS TO THE SINFUL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATURAL MAN.
The Natural Law, ... 80
The Revealed Law, ... 84
3. SINGLE SINS.
Temptation and Sin, ... 87
Passion and Vice, ... 90
Differences of Single Sins, ... 92
4. THE BRANCHING OF SIN OVER THE VARIOUS SPHERES OF LIFE.
Sins Against the Own Personality, ... 95
Sins Against God, ... 98
Sins Against Fellow-man, ... 102
5. VAIN ATTEMPTS AT RESCUING MAN.
Intellectual Culture—Æsthetic Culture—Moral Conflict, ... 106
Civil Virtue—Righteousness According to the Theocratic Law, ... 108
6. VARIOUS PHASES AND STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE SINFUL STATE.
Innocence of Childhood—Carnal Safety—Viciousness, . 112
Moral of the Golden Mean—The Emancipation of the Flesh, ... 114
Hatred of the Good, ... 116
The Sin Against the Holy Ghost, ... 119

III. DEATH OF THE NATURAL MAN.

GUILT AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT, ... 123
PUNISHMENT OF SIN—SPIRITUAL, PHYSICAL, AND ETERNAL DEATH, ... 124

PART II.

THE CHRISTIAN LIFE.

FIRST DIVISION.

THE CHRISTIAN LIFE OF THE INDIVIDUAL.

I. THE BEGINNING.

SUMMARY, ... 133
1. CONVERSION.
A. Conviction, ... 134
B. Repentance,
(*a*) Course of Repentance, ... 136
(*b*) Form and Nature of Repentance, ... 139

c. Faith. PAGE.
(a) Nature of Faith, ... 141
(b) The Moment of Freedom in Faith, ... 145
2. REGENERATION.
Relation of Regeneration to Conversion—Nature of Regeneration, ... 147
3. DANGERS OF THE BEGINNING.
A. Imperfect Repentance (Obstinacy), ... 150
B. Timidity, ... 153

II. THE PROGRESS.

1. SANCTIFICATION.
Nature of Sanctification—The Christian Character, . . 155
Wisdom, Holiness, and Blessedness as Fruit of the Christian Life, ... 161
2. THE CHRISTIAN'S RELATION TO THE LAW.
A. The Binding Force of the Law, ... 164
B. The Individual Differences of the Demands of the Law, ... 169
C. Divine and Human Volition in Their Relation to Each Other, ... 172
3. DANGERS OF THE PROGRESS.
A. Habitual Piety, ... 174
B. Spiritual Pride and Faint-heartedness, ... 176
C. Wrong Liberty and Conformity to the Law, ... 180
4. MEANS FOR AWAKENING AND PROMOTING THE CHRISTIAN LIFE, OR THE MEANS OF GRACE.
Significance and Purpose of the Means of Grace, . . . 185
The Word of God, ... 186
The Sacraments.
(a) Baptism, ... 189
(b) The Lord's Supper, ... 194
Prayer, ... 199
The Fellowship of Them that Believe, ... 211
5. THE EXTERNAL FORM OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE, OR THE CHRISTIAN VIRTUES.
The Imitation of Christ, ... 214
Holy Love as Fundamental Virtue, ... 217
a. The Christian Virtues in Their Relation to the Own Personality.
Christian Self-love — Sincerity — Self-knowledge—Meekness—Self-control, ... 219
Temperance—Chastity—Moral Self-culture, ... 223

PAGE.

b. The Christian Virtues in Their Relation to God.
Child like Mind — Keeping the Name of God Holy—The Oath, ... 228
Testimony for God in Word and Deed, ... 233
c. The Christian Virtues in Their Relation to Fellowman.
Friendliness.—Reconcilableness—Brotherly Love, . 237
Veracity.—Uprightness—Concealing the Truth—The Necessary Lie—Keeping One's Word, . . 240
Justice.—Justice of the Disposition—The Manifestations of Justice—Chastity—The Necessary Right—The Necessary Defense, ... 249
Mercy.—Combating Temporal Need—Combating Spiritual Need, ... 255
d. The Christian Virtues in Their Relation to the Objective World, ... 262
6. THE CHRISTIAN IN VARIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES OF LIFE.
The Christian in the Enjoyment of Temporal Things.
The Inner Independence of the Christian, ... 265
Temporal Possessions, ... 265
Honor, ... 272
Health, ... 275
The Suffering Christian, ... 276
The Christian in Temptations and Trials, ... 283
Work and Recreation in the Christian's Life, ... 289

III. THE CONSUMMATION OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE.

THE CHRISTIAN'S POSITION TO LIFE AND DEATH, ... 295
DEATH AND ETERNAL LIFE, ... 299

SECOND DIVISION.

THE MOLDING OF SOCIETY BY THE CHRISTIAN LIFE. (SOCIAL ETHICS.)

SUMMARY, ... 303

I. THE FAMILY.

1. MATRIMONY.
Idea and Nature of Matrimony, ... 305
Marriage, ... 310
The Pedagogical Significance of Matrimony—Celibacy—Morally Forbidden Marriage, ... 315

PAGE.
The Consorts, ... 319
Indissolubility of Matrimony—Divorce—Second Marriage, ... 323
2. THE MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY—PARENTS AND CHILDREN—MASTERS AND SERVANTS, ... 325

II. SOCIETY.

FRIENDSHIP, ... 333
SOCIETY AND SOCIAL AMUSEMENTS, ... 336
THE CULTURAL PURPOSE OF SOCIETY, ... 342

III. THE STATE.

1. NATURE OF THE STATE.
Idea and Origin of the State, ... 347
The Christian State, ... 351
Authorities and Subjects, ... 354
2. THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY.
Castes, ... 358
The Differences of Castes Perverted by Sin to Inimical Opposites—Socialism, ... 361
The Labor Question, ... 364
3. THE STATE AND PUBLIC MORALITY.
State Legislation, ... 370
The Executive Power of the State—Capital Punishment, ... 374
4. THE STATE AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, ... 381
5. THE STATE IN ITS RELATION TO OTHER STATES, ... 387

IV. THE CHURCH.

1. ORIGIN AND IDEA OF THE CHURCH—CHURCH DENOMINATIONS, ... 392
2. CHURCH POLITY—CLERGY AND LAITY—CHURCH DISCIPLINE, ... 394
3. RELATION OF CHURCH TO STATE, ... 398
4. THE MISSION OF THE CHURCH, ... 400
CONCLUSION—THE CONSUMMATED KINGDOM OF GOD, ... 404

The Christian Life.

THE CHRISTIAN LIFE.

INTRODUCTION.

§1. Definition and Purpose of Christian Ethics.

Of all questions that can agitate the human soul, the most important is, What is the purpose of my existence—what my task, if I would obtain peace within and true rest of soul? He who has never awakened to an earnest consideration of this important question is dead, though he live. And how many there are in this condition! As a dancer under the intoxicating influence of sensual excitement forgets the seriousness of life, nor heeds the swiftly passing hours until the early dawn of day ends his amusement, so many thousands waste their lives in a wild chase after the transitory things of this world, until the unrelenting hand of death plucks them out of the midst of their plans and enjoyments, and puts them face to face with the Just Judge. What then remains to bear witness to the fact of their previous existence? Alas! nothing—nothing at all of permanent value! Their lives were as so many bubbles that suddenly burst. And if the short duration of our earthly existence is but a time of trial and of preparation, what an awakening must await those whose life has thus been wasted.

Man is not like the beast of the field that has fulfilled its mission, if it has been born, has existed for a brief space of time on the surface of this earth, and then has

vanished again; he has a divine mission on earth. And without fulfilling his divine mission, he must, by the very nature of his being, be eternally unhappy. But in what does this divine mission consist?

The answer to this question constitutes the subject-matter of ethics in general; for the moral, or the morally good, is the realization of the divine mission imposed upon an individual being. Ethics in general is therefore *the science that treats of the moral as the life-mission of man.* But as the moral constitutes an organic unity and appears only in part in isolated actions, ethics must not be restricted to compiling a code of precepts of morality or virtue. The purpose of ethics is rather to present in a systematic way the sum total of moral action; hence the moral life.

Christian ethics embraces the moral life in its connection with the redemption of Christ Jesus; *i. e.*, as it appears under the regenerating and sanctifying influence of the Holy Ghost. This life we designate the "Christian life."* Hence the purpose of Christian ethics is *the presentation of the Christian life.*

But it is to be remarked that Christian ethics is not to present the Christian life in its casual manifestation, but in its ideal state; not as it appears in special instances, but as it should appear in all instances, according to the Divine will. This Christian life is never fully exhibited in the life of any one Christian. It is not only rendered incomplete by many imperfections and errors,

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*The original has the word *Heilsleben*, for which there is no equivalent in the English language. The import of the German term could best be expressed by the compound "salvation-life." The term lays special stress upon salvation through grace as a factor in the Christian life. But since that is an essential factor of Christian life, and the latter term is never properly used without including that factor, we believe the term "Christian life" to be fully adequate. In § 9, however, we use the term "salvation-life" in one or two places, as it could not be avoided there. F. W. S.

but is also restricted and individually molded by nationality, social position, the character of the times, etc., so that the ideal Christian life can never be fully manifested by a single human being. Even the example of Christ, the absolutely perfect among the children of men, must be a limited one, inasmuch as there are many phases of life into which he did not enter—*e. g.*, that of husband, parent, and others—hence can not be an example for us in such special circumstances, to say nothing of the fact that he, being free from sin, could not experience conversion nor the conflict with indwelling sin.

As Christian ethics is to present the Christian life in its ideal state—that is, as it should be according to the will of God—it is not only of scientific, but also of practical importance. For him who strives to lay hold by faith upon Christianity it is to be a "manual," a guide, by the help of which he may acquaint himself with the various stages of Christian life, with the cliffs and dangers of each stage, and the successive goals to be reached in each.

Remark 1.—The word *sittlich* [translated above "moral"—F. W. S.] is related to *Sitte*, "habitual practice, custom." In their general application these words signify the customary habits of life, both of the individual and of societies, families, clans, and nations. In its more limited application, *Sitte* signifies the habits of a life that is civilized and accustomed to milder forms of intercourse; hence *Gesittung*, "politeness of manners, civilization." In its most limited application, the word *Sitte* concurs with the idea of "the moral" or of "morality," by which is meant, in general, a deportment regulated according to moral principles. We sometimes speak of morally bad actions, applying the word "moral" to all actions that comply with the form of the moral; that is, all free actions. But this application of the term is only a derived one; according to the real meaning of the term, the "moral" is synonymous with the "morally good."

Remark 2.—Every created free personality has, as such, a moral mission. Leaving out of consideration sin, as the culpa-

ble perversion of the moral, all have essentially the same mission. It is a mistaken belief that a moral life exists only as long as the conflict lasts (Schleiermacher); for, in that case, the life of the angels that have completed their probation would no longer be moral, because the conflict is over; Christ would be a moral example only in the state of his humiliation, but not in the state of his exaltation; and the redeemed in heaven could no longer be morally good, because no longer tempted. Morality must certainly assume a different form when the conflict has ceased; but, after all, the morally good, which was the aim of conflict and endeavor here below, remains the aim over there—certainly no longer the aim of conflict, but of joyful execution. But as the science of ethics is intended for man, and is to be a guide to moral perfection for him, it treats of the moral only, inasmuch as it is the life-mission of man.

§ 2. The Moral View of the World.

Every treatise on Ethics is based upon the supposition that man has a moral purpose to accomplish in life. It is therefore founded on a moral view of the world. To this view there is opposed another, which we may call the mechanical, or physical. The latter is the view of the world taken by the naturalist.

This view beholds the world simply as the product of eternal matter and crude forces of nature working unintelligently. It makes no distinction between a physical and a moral world. According to it, human life is, like life in nature, governed and determined by fixed laws. Hence there is no definite end in the progress of the world. The whole history of the human race is a wild wrestling of dismal forces and blind passions, an eternal rising and falling of social and political organizations, which has neither plan nor purpose. As the waters of the Charybdis, so organizations of society and state rise only to be devoured again by the earth, which gave them birth.

The moral view, on the contrary, sees in this world the realization of the idea of an almighty, wise, and holy Creator, whose love would call into existence not only an

irrational creation, but also free rational beings, related as such to himself, and capable of being partakers of his blessedness. This view of the world, therefore, distinguishes two realms—the physical and the moral world.

In the physical world the divine idea of the world is realized by the so-called natural forces, which act according to immutable laws. Since these laws are not mutually independent, but all act toward the realization of a common purpose, they are often, as a whole, called Nature's Law. Hence this law is the eternal thought of God, which determines all physical development, and governs with inexorable necessity all things, from the heavenly bodies that revolve through unlimited space, to the minutest particle of dust on the street.

From the physical world the moral view distinguishes the world of free rational beings, or the moral world. In this moral world the divine idea of the Creator reigns also; yet not with inexorable necessity, but in the form of a moral requirement, which is to be realized by man's power of self-destination. This moral requirement we designate the moral law, or the moral order of the world. The end of the development of our race desired by God consists, for the individual person, in the image of God (Genesis i, 26), and for the whole race, in the glorified kingdom of God (Matt. vi, 10), in which his will shall be done on the new earth, by blessed children of God, as it is done by angels in heaven. To co-operate with God in the realization of this divine thought is the moral mission of every individual person, as well as of the whole human race. Inasmuch as he is a free rational being, man can ignore this mission and disobey the moral law; but he is not able to annul the divine order by which he can be happy only in harmony with that law, and must be inexpressibly miserable and unhappy if he is in opposition to it. Hence the divine order of the world reigns with

compulsory power even in the moral world, inasmuch as every one that will not do the will of God must suffer it. Heaven and hell, the two ends of human development, are therefore the necessary consequences of the sovereignty of the moral law. The choice, however, between the two is committed to man's power of self-destination.

Remark.—The only possible moral for the physical (materialistic) view of the world is that of eudemonism, which denies the existence of a moral order of the world, and considers enjoyment to be the real end of life, "According to this moral, cunning is the supreme virtue. One must be chaste and temperate for the sake of his health; honest, for the sake of his credit; one must be governed by the predominating custom, because he is in need of other people if he would make progress in this world," etc. Even that which is generally considered bad is here permitted, if it only be not dangerous and do not bring to harm. It is permitted, *e. g.*, to be dishonest in business transactions, if one only be sly enough to guard against such actions by which he should come into contact with the civil law; it is permitted to appease the sensual desires crookedly, if one but do not allow himself "to be caught!" etc. Where such principles predominate, a treatise on Ethics, in the Christian sense of the word, is certainly impossible.

§ 3. Pessimism and Optimism.

One product of the physical view of the world is pessimism, which declares the world in which we live to be the worst one imaginable, and life to be a dreadful, irremunerative misfortune, so that it were more desirable not to be in this world, than to be. The mind of this school, whose leading representatives are Arthur Schopenhauer and E. Von Hartmann, is strikingly voiced by the former in the following lines:

"If thou hast lost thy temporal possessions,
Be thou not grieved about it, it is naught.
If thou hast gained by temporal accessions,
Be thou not gladdened by it, it is naught.
They soon pass by, those sad, those glad impressions;
Pass thou the temporal by, for it is naught!"

As the pessimists of this stripe consider all human choice necessitated by nature, and deny any moral destiny of man, they can but pity and despise him, the miserable creature, who thinks himself a free, moral, and responsible agent, whereas he is tossed to and fro at the mercy of blind necessity. Disregard for humanity can not be separated from pessimism. With a scorn not unlike that of Mephistopheles, the pessimists look down upon their fellow-men, and aim especially at those who actually lay claim to a considerable degree of virtue. The latter are generally regarded by them as weak-minded, or rather as hypocrites; and whenever one of this class allows himself to be deceived by the carnal nature, as is not seldom the case, it is a new and convincing proof to the pessimist that all boasted human virtue is absolutely nothing, and that "the whole of the human race is but a worthless brood." (Palmer.) In practical life we meet with a milder form of pessimism, whenever people, with a resignation that looks ever at the dark side of things, assert the incorrigibility of the natural defects of man, and thereby cripple every moral effort.

The opposite extreme of pessimism is optimism. The optimist, playing about on the surface of life, views only the fantastical, sunny side of life, and deceives himself and others with the erroneous opinion that all evil is but "the fleeting shadow of a cloud, which tends to increase the beauty of the landscape rather than to disturb it." According to the optimistic view of the world, man in his very nature is good; and the evil which clings to his weak, temptable nature, seems easy to conquer. Optimism, therefore, misjudges the fact of the organic corruption of humanity by sin. In the history of the Christian Church this view of the world appeared especially marked in Pelagianism (see § 19) and later in that school of pedagogues to which Henry Pestalozzi and

related minds belonged. But in practical life we meet with optimism wherever people, biased by pharisaic self-delusion, try to color sin, or even excuse it as an amiable weakness, and think they can overcome it by good precepts and virtuous resolutions. As optimism does not perceive the deep-lying corruption of human nature, but maintains, notwithstanding the actual existence of sin, that it is incorrupt, it believes it possible to lead humanity forward to its moral glorification, and to establish a heaven on earth by a simple "return to nature" (Rousseau), which hope will certainly not be realized.

Christian ethics acknowledges the moments of truth in both extremes—in pessimism the moment of the bondage of natural man in sin, of relative servility; in optimism the moment of man's relative liberty and the possibility of his redemption—and unites them harmoniously in the doctrine of the redemption of fallen humanity through Christ Jesus.

Pessimism has not and can not have a treatise on ethics, for to it all moral efforts are as hopeless as those of Sisyphus, and will never gain their end; optimism likes to moralize, but is founded upon mere abstractions, and hence is universally a sorry failure in practical life; Christianity alone meets the real wants of the human heart, and hence is alone able to lead man forward to his moral destination.

§ 4. The Norm of the Moral, or the Moral Law.

The norm of the moral can, according to § 2, be nothing else than the moral law, in which God reveals his will to rational creation. The moral law makes itself known to us subjectively by the voice of conscience, while it is objectively made manifest in the divine government of the world. In this sense, the history of

the world is the judgment of the world. The moral law manifests its divine character: (*a*) In that it decidedly opposes our depraved nature, and requires of us the greatest self-denial; hence can impossibly be the product of our own thought and volition; (*b*) In that it forces itself upon us with supernatural authority, so that we can by no means evade its requirements; and lastly (*c*) In that each and every violation of this law revenges itself by disquietude and unhappiness within, and often even by outward distress in which we can but see a divine retribution.

If the moral law is of divine origin, it follows naturally that it is "holy, just, and good." The question has been raised, whether God wills the moral law because it is good, or whether it is good because God wills it. We answer, in accordance with the above, the moral law is good because God wills it. For, if we should say God wills the good because it is good, we assert that the good, as such, exists independent of God, and thereby reach a dualistic point of view that is incompatible with the Christian conception of God. "There is none good but one, that is God." All that we otherwise call good has its origin in God. Hence the moral law is right and good, only because it is the expression of the divine will and nature. For this very reason, God can neither do nor will anything contrary to the moral law; for then he should will what contradicts his own nature. Therefore Holy Writ says that God is right (Deuteronomy xxxii, 4): "A God of truth and without iniquity, just and right is he."

From the recognition of the validity and binding power of the moral law, duty arises, which is subjectively felt as obligation. The law, as such, is of general importance; duty is always something special and personal. This is already intimated by the fact that we do not say,

My law; whereas we do say, My duty. What is duty for me, may be violation of duty for another. It is the unconditional duty of him, who is able to save a drowning person, to do so; but upon him who is not able, such a duty does not devolve. There is no third possibility. Even for one and the same person, that which is not duty to-day may at some other time become duty. "The commandment, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,' is universally valid as to its moral capacity; but in what manner this love should manifest itself, to what special duties it may lead, depends upon various conditions that are not contained in the commandment itself. The love I owe a husband or parent is different from the love I owe a stranger, and the same self-sacrificing love will manifest itself toward a moral person in a manner quite different from that in which it manifests itself toward an immoral person." (Wuttke.)

The relation of duty to law makes it possible that, in certain cases, two incompatible modes of action may simultaneously appear as duty. We then speak of conflicting duties. A real conflict of duties, that has its foundation in the moral order of the world, is certainly not conceivable, if there be a proper apprehension of the moral; for the commandments of the moral law can not possibly contradict each other, else the moral order of the world would be destroyed; neither could there be a contradiction of duties, for they follow from the application of the general commandment to special cases. Hence, as far as the ethical law itself is concerned, only one of two contradictory actions can be duty. The higher duty annuls the lower. It is, for instance, the duty of every Christian to be obedient "to the higher powers;" but when the demands of such higher powers are in direct opposition to the express will of God, it behooves the Christian to say: "We ought to obey God rather than men."

Nevertheless there are conflicts of duties in practical life; for (1) On account of adhering sin, and the imperfection of our knowledge, it is often difficult for us to decide which is the higher duty; (2) There may be conflicts of duties, because of the low state of Christian development of character, which would of themselves disappear if a higher state of development had been reached; and (3) A person may, by fault of his own, be brought into circumstances out of which it is absolutely impossible for him to extricate himself except by means of sin. (Compare Matt. xiv, 6–10.) Hence it is true that conflicts of duty occur. These, however, are not founded in the moral order of the world itself, but were introduced by sin and the derangement of social life as caused by sin.

Duty assigns to each one a definite sphere of action. This sphere of action, which is sanctioned by the moral law, must be respected by moral society. Thus the moral right becomes the correlative of duty. Whoever has a duty has also a right; for all that is conformable to duty is right. Duty and right are therefore the two essential moments of moral life.

The fulfillment of duty, as it is made known by the moral law, depends, according to § 2, upon the free self-destination of man. Opposition to the moral law is therefore not only a misfortune, but a wrong. From this point of view we involuntarily judge all our actions. If they accord with the moral law, we call them good; if not, we call them bad. Nor do we judge single actions alone, but also the whole tendency of human life, according to these opposites. Hence all mankind is divided into two classes—the good and the bad. "Even children classify people thus; and if perchance they hear of a renowned man of the past, the first question usually is, whether he was a good man or a bad one. And according to the answer they will love him or hate him."

The moral law is of the same import for all, although its application may be different for individuals. Every one has a divine mission to fulfill, if his life is not to be a failure. For God does not determine the value of a human life by the external results that may have gained for it the honor and respect of its own and later ages, but by its having been good or bad, its having reached or not reached its moral destination; and even this is not decided by external achievements. "Man looketh on the outward appearance, but the Lord looketh on the heart." The attitude of the heart toward God and his law determines the value of our actions. Therefore God values the mite of the poor widow in the gospel more highly than the large gifts of the rich.

The objective existence of a universally valid moral law has often been denied in times past and present. It has been claimed that nothing can of itself and universally be termed good; that the moral judgment of man accommodates itself to circumstances; that climate, country, nationality, and the progress of the centuries change the whole system of morality; that there is no one law that is valid at all times and at all places; that theft, unchastity, parricide, and infanticide, all have found a place among the virtues. True it is that such objections are not to be ignored. True it is that the moral judgment of man has greatly changed, and that many things, considered right and laudable by our forefathers, are to-day condemned as crime. But this proves only that man's knowledge of the moral law is unreliable, and often errs most grossly. It by no means refutes the existence of the moral law. Notwithstanding the uncertainty regarding the requirements of the moral law, man has never been able to withdraw from its influence. Even those who deny the reality of the moral law, involuntarily judge their own actions and those of

others by that law; and he certainly would not be judged a human being who could commit murder with the same inward tranquillity and approval with which he could feed the hungry or clothe the naked. There is, indeed, no conception that exerts a more powerful influence upon the life of man than that of good and bad, right and wrong. The sun may be hidden behind clouds, nevertheless it shines. Likewise the moral law. One may err in regard to its requirements, or even ridicule the belief in its existence. In life, however, no one can avoid its influence. Everybody feels that he has a moral purpose to fulfill. If that were not true, if there were no moral destination of man, morality itself would be a chimera, a mere illusion.

Remark.—The Bible knows nothing of a conflict of duties. The sacrificing of Isaac was no such conflict, for there was no law for the pious Abraham save the revealed will of God; hence he did not swerve, even for a moment. Inclination and self-interest certainly often contradict duty; but that is not a conflict between duty and duty. "The cases of conflict, if viewed from a Christian stand-point, are resolved into mere semblances. The questionable case of the two men who, in a shipwreck, seize a board that will bear up only one of them, has, from the time of Cicero to the present day, been very zealously treated, and often singularly answered. (According to Cicero, he who could be of greatest service to the State should be saved; according to others, the wiser should be saved; according to Fichte and others, nothing should be done; but then both are lost. According to Rothe, it depends upon individual principle,—whoever has heroic principle will sacrifice himself, but whoever has cautious principle will persevere; but there is no decision in that.) The question itself is vain; for if the board bear up two persons long enough that each can consider the question, it will bear them up longer, and an answer to the question is not necessary; but if there be no such time, all moral decision is at an end. Whether it be permitted to thrust another person into the water in order to save one's self is out of question, because that would simply be murder. But whether anybody is obliged to sacrifice himself in order to save another, can not be answered in gen-

eral at all, much less can it be generally affirmed, because there would be a contradiction contained in it, as in that case both must sacrifice themselves." (A. Wuttke.)

§ 5. The Basis of the Moral, or Man's Freedom of Will.

The moral, as the life-mission of man, is based upon the self-destination of the personal, that is, free, rational will. We speak in a certain sense of animals expressing their will; but it would not occur to any one to call an animal moral; for it is neither free nor rational. It is not free, because in its actions it is not self-destining, but is destined of necessity by impressions from without or by impulses from within; nor rational, because it wants the conscious relation to the moral law as the purpose of its actions. It is not thus with man. He not only knows his moral purpose, but also has the power of choosing freely one of the various possible modes of action. Hence he can place himself into a definite relation to the moral law; that is, he is capable of moral action. Liberty is the necessary presupposition as well as the form of all that is moral; there is no morality that is not based upon free self-destination. Hence this statement is valid: All that is moral is free. And since, at every free decision of his will, man either is in harmony with his divine destination, or places himself in opposition to it, this statement can be reversed, and it can truly be said: All that is free is moral; that is, either morally good, or morally bad.

In the naturalistic fundamental view (see § 2), determinism (psychological) is opposed to the Christian idea of liberty. The fundamental tenet of determinism is, "As man is, so he acts;" that is, the physical and spiritual organization (individuality) of man predestines how he must act in certain circumstances. It may seem to him that he is free and self-destining, yet in reality he can not possibly act otherwise than he does act. As water

can rise in mighty waves during a storm, rush as a swift torrent along the bed of a river, leap as a cataract into the deep, or even ascend freely into the air as a jet driven from a fountain, etc., yet does all this only in accordance with the laws of nature; even so, says Schopenhauer, can man do divers things, but only inasmuch as his individuality and outward circumstances determine his actions. But that to which he is thus determined he must of necessity do; he can neither abstain from such actions, nor destine himself to something else.* If such suppositions were true, man would often be brought into many sorry predicaments (similar to that of Buridan's ass, which starved to death standing between two hay-stacks of equal size; simply because it could not decide of which to eat), if two equally strong motives should influence him in opposite directions; if, for example, he should go to market and there have two or more equally large pieces of the same goods in view, or if at dinner two equally large vessels with the same contents should be placed before him. But such is not at all the case. Even animals have, in reality, the power themselves of deciding in such circumstances,—how much more should man have such ability! But if this be conceded, absolute determinism is out of question.

Furthermore, our inner consciousness is strongly opposed to the pretensions of determinism. It may be proven, even beyond a doubt, that the belief in the liberty of man is a delusion, an absurdity; nevertheless, our self-consciousness will bear witness to the contrary, and our conscience will hold us responsible for our actions. The consciousness of our moral liberty is as indelibly impressed

* Upon these suppositions are based the excuses so often brought by morally indifferent persons: "I can not act otherwise; that 's my nature;" "Why did God create me thus?" etc.—words with which man seeks to stupefy conscience and justify his sins in his own sight and the sight of others.

upon us as the consciousness of our existence. Thus La Fontaine writes:

> "It is my will that doth determine me;
> It can nor instinct nor the object be.
> The tongue doth speak, the foot direction take;
> I feel within what doth to action wake."

To be sure, there is a true thought at the bottom of the tenet of determinism: "As man is, so he acts;" namely, that there is a close connection between the being and the doing of man, that one can not "gather figs of thistles" or "grapes of thorns." Nevertheless, if the above named tenet is not to contain a colossal lie, there must be a complemental tenet added; namely, "As man acts, so he becomes." This fact is completely ignored by determinism. It wants to know nothing at all about the possibility of a change of character by free self-destination. And if a man has experienced such a change, the determinists say: "We have thus far erred regarding the true character of this person; or, he is exactly as he formerly was; the end toward which he strives is the same, but he now endeavors to gain it by other means, etc. Here we must call attention to the fact that the conviction of the ability of man to mold his character, and even to change it, is so deeply impressed upon us that even the most incarnate determinist would not, in bringing up his children, fail to exhort them to a noble and virtuous life. And it would certainly be difficult to prove to the good sense of an unbiased observer that no change has been wrought in the character of a vicious, vulgar, selfish person, who, by virtue of a thorough conversion, has become a humble, virtuous, self-sacrificing Christian.

Remark.—Moral Statistics: The results of moral statistics have of late been frequently used as proof for the correctness of determinism. These statistics have shown that for every specified number of persons there is, the year round, a certain con-

stant per cent not only of births and deaths, but also of the so-called voluntary actions; as, marriages, divorces, illegitimate births, suicides, and crimes; and that there is a certain per cent for every kind of crime, every country, every station of life, and every age. From this it has been concluded that the seemingly voluntary actions are not products of free self-destination, but of a natural law, conditioned by time and space, by natural organization and outward circumstances. And there is no lack of people who entertain the bold hope that these new discoveries will breathe into human society and the legislation of criminal laws a "more humane spirit," and that henceforth criminals will be "objects of pity rather than of punishment." It is manifest that this apprehension is more deeply rooted in the minds of people than the most are willing to admit. This is sufficiently shown by the actions of the legislative bodies and of the courts of justice.

Let us devote a few moments to the consideration of these statistical tables. What do they not prove, and what do they prove?

First of all, we must call attention to the fact that moral statistics are the statistics of sin and vice, the statistics of crime only, and therefore are restricted to a class of people who certainly can not be a true criterion in the question whether the will of man is free or not. True it is that the statistics of divorces and female prostitution in large cities, of crimes and suicides, show us the Satanic depths of human depravity. They cast a dark shadow upon the whole of social life, and fill us with forebodings of mysterious, dismal powers, whose influence causes thousands to drift toward the abyss of perdition. But they do not prove that the will of man is not free, or at least prove it only as far as Christian ethics is willing to admit—nay, even to claim most decidedly that it is not free.

Furthermore, we must not lose sight of the fact that moral statistics do not record criminal tendencies and criminal resolutions, but only criminal deeds. But between the resolution and the deed there is ample time

for an individual member of human society to be exposed to the many influences of his surroundings. These influences will make themselves felt more or less according to the social and moral condition of the society in which he moves, and will either expedite or hinder the execution of crime. Thousands that are inwardly qualified for being criminals are kept from being such by purely external considerations; as the consideration of honorable relatives, of public opinion, or the stern hand of criminal justice, etc.; but these are not moral considerations. It is therefore true that the actual execution of crimes is dependent upon the social condition of a country at that time. And as a change in the social condition of a country takes place slowly, requiring decades, or even centuries, it is evident why the per cent of crimes in one and the same country remains almost the same for many years. But this is true only of the actual execution of crimes; the statistics of inward tendencies and resolutions would perhaps show up a result quite different. Hence, moral statistics do by no means justify a conclusion as to whether the will be free or not in its decisions, but only whether it be free or not in its manifestations.

Besides, Christain ethics willingly admits that man's freedom of will, in his fallen state, is not an absolute one, but that in consequence of his innate sinfulness there is a predominating inclination for evil. And if Christian ethics also teaches that, by continually satisfying his passions, man finally can become a slave to them, we must certainly seek such unfortunate beings in the world of criminals, which affords the material for these statistics.

Finally, the regularity of crimes shown in moral statistics is by no means a perfect one. The considerable degree of fluctuation appearing in the number of crimes justifies the conclusion that the number of crimes is not determined by a law of nature alone, but that an-

other determining factor must step in; namely, individual freedom. This is further demonstrated by the fact that the number of crimes can be lessened by education, by ordinances of governments; as, for example, more stringent criminal justice, or religious-philanthropic endeavors, especially those of home mission; hence by exerting an influence upon the self-destination of the will. Thus, for example, in France and Belgium, where the schools are in a comparatively poor condition, the number of juvenile criminals is incomparably larger than in Germany. Thus murders accumulate at a terrible rate in those States whose rulers have no death sentences executed on account of a misapprehension of their right of pardoning criminals.

§ 6. Love as the Fundamental Principle of the Moral, or the Moral Itself, and Selfishness as the Fundamental Principle of Evil.

Having acquainted ourselves with freedom as the form, and the moral law as the norm of the moral, we are now ready to pass over to the consideration of the central idea of ethics—to the idea of the morally good and its guilty perversion, the morally bad. We are well acquainted from early childhood with the difference between good and bad, and every one judges his own actions as well as those of others by these opposites. But if we ask, What is common to all that is good, what the virtue common to all virtues, the sin common to all sins? there are various answers given. In one point they all agree; namely, that the morally good lies essentially in the good will. But now the question arises, When is the will good? Concerning this question, opinions differ very greatly. The will is good, says the first, if one act according to reason; another, if one strive to live in accord-

ance with nature; a third, if one be governed by the feelings of human dignity; a fourth, if one live so that his actions may serve as norm for all others; a fifth, if one act according to his convictions. But these answers all defer the problem by another step. For the question now arises, What is that which is according to reason, or nature? What do the feelings of human dignity require? What actions can serve as norm for all others? What conviction shall be the foundation of my actions? For there are people who, out of principle, are wicked. Hence we find ourselves compelled to submit the idea of the morally good to a more minute investigation, in order to determine what the fundamental principle of the moral is, or what the morally good itself is.

1. In general, we call that good which is adequate to an idea or a definite purpose. Thus, a painting is said to be good if it is a true picture of the object which it should represent; a clock, if it keeps proper time; a fruit-tree, if it bears good and abundant fruit; in short, all that is as it should be, is good: and all that is not as it should be, is not good, or is bad.

2. Consequently, all is morally good that should exist in the domain of moral life, that is, the domain of the free will. And there should exist there nothing but that corresponds to the moral law; for the moral law is the expression of the divine idea of a moral world. Hence, the morally good can be designated as the accordance of the human will with the moral law. But even this does not take us further than to the term of the morally good, and does not name the inherent principle from which the accordance of the will with the moral law springs. The divine norm of the good—the law, as such—can not establish the good as moral power and reality. The moral law must have become one with the will, if the good is really to be achieved. We must therefore inquire after some material, fundamental

principle, in which the unity of the moral law and the freedom of the will is to be found. Such a material, fundamental principle, is love—certainly not worldly, selfish love, but holy love. This love is on the one hand the sum total of all commandments (Matt. xxii, 37–40); on the other hand it controls the innermost impulses of the will, and is the highest power for the fulfillment of the commandments (Rom. xiii, 10; Gal. v, 14). "It binds us most stringently to filial obedience, and yet makes us preciously free, as all that is holy does if it has passed over into our will. It unites again the broken tie of communion between God and man, and makes felt the idea of humanity as God's large family on earth." In love, bondage and freedom, possibility and energy, meekness and firmness, toleration and decision, compassion and joy, truth and gentleness, fear of God and self-dependence, humility and courage, faith and hope, are gathered together as to a focus. It is the one fundamental virtue, the root of all other virtues, the true likeness of God. "God is love." (1 John iv, 8.) Hence we may rightly designate holy love the principle of the good, which principle lies at the bottom of all manifestations of the good, and is the morally good itself.

As holy love is the principle of the morally good, so unholy love, or selfishness, is the principle and nature of the bad. Holy love is the uniting, gladdening power of the moral life; selfishness, on the contrary, is the opposite of love—it is the principle of disunion and destruction. It is selfishness that severs God and man; that incites the human will to rebel against the divine order of the world; that causes disunion between the individual and society, thus destroying all regulated association.

§7. The So-called Fundamental Moral Ideas.

According to the result of our previous investigation the moral may be considered from a threefold point of view, out of which arise the so-called fundamental ethical ideas: (*a*) Viewed from the stand-point of moral law, the moral appears as duty. The requirements of the moral law confront us in our consciences as a "must"—as a "categorical imperative." Conscience demands obedience to the moral law. No one can ignore this demand; no one trangress, unpunished. This demand has an eminently personal character—that is, it addresses itself to each individual specially; hence the realization of the moral (the good) appears to each one as his own personal duty. From this point of view, ethics assumes the form of a treatise on duty. (*b*) If the nature of the will, which lies at the bottom of moral action, is the point of view, the moral appears as virtue. This is the power or the ability of the will to do the good, to bring it forth, or to appropriate it to one's self; for "every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights." From this point of view, ethics assumes the form of a treatise on virtue. (*c*) Finally, "to the thoughtful mind the good presents itself as the realized purpose, as the ever-present ideal of his efforts and actions, as the end of his most earnest longings," as the state of perfection which, for the individual, is vested in the restored image of God; but for human society, of which the individual is a member, in the kingdom of God. From this point of view the moral appears as the highest good; and, hence, ethics has often been treated as the science of the good, or the science of felicity.

But each of these three distinct methods of presentation is based upon a one-sided apprehension of the sub-

ject. In order to meet its purpose fully, ethics must combine all three points of view (Schleiermacher); besides, by treating ethics as the science of duty, virtue, or the good, the proper regard for the specific character of Christian morality is lost.

All of these deficiencies are avoided by taking the idea of holy love as the central idea in our presentation of ethics. Holy love comprises the three fundamental ethical ideas. Inasmuch as holy love is the divine ideal which is to be realized through the moral will, and to be perfected in God's kingdom, the kingdom of love, it is the highest good; inasmuch as it is the sum total of the moral law, the fulfillment of which is our moral task, it is the highest duty; and inasmuch as it is the only potent free motive to moral action—which motive enables us to practice all virtues, and hence is the source of them—it is the highest virtue.

And as the three fundamental ethical ideas unite in love, so their opposites are united in selfishness. If we consider the consequences of selfishness—namely, offense against God and eternal damnation—it is the greatest evil. Thus Schiller wrote:

> "This life is not the highest good of all;
> The greatest of all evils, though, is guilt."

With reference to the law it appears as the greatest disloyalty, inasmuch as, with malicious levity, it disregards all bounds of the divinely instituted order of things and follows its own dictates. In opposition to virtue, it appears as vice—that is, as the habitual satisfying of selfish desires—and hence is the source of all other vices, itself being the greatest vice.

On account of this all-embracing significance we designate holy love, realized in the Christian life, the central idea of Christian ethics.

§ 8. The Empirical Sinfulness of Man, and the Necessity of His Redemption, as Presupposition of Christian Ethics.

It is an undeniable fact that humanity has fallen from its state of holiness imparted at creation, and that the morally evil—that is, the selfish will—reigns supreme in every natural man. The universality of sin, as well as the fact that the first sinful emotions appear in earliest childhood, and that there is coincidence between them and the awakening of self-consciousness, points to the inheritability of sin, passing from parent to child (inbred sin). On account of this inheritability it was possible that a single sin committed by the first parents (Gen. iii) could place the whole human race into a state of sinfulness and slavery to sin (Rom. v, 12; Psa. li, 7). The natural state of man is slavery to sin in the fullest sense of the term; for the bad, as sinful inclination, exerts such a powerful influence in determining human resolutions, that man is materially bound, although his formal freedom can not be denied. But the destructive influence of evil not only makes itself felt in determining the will, but even reason, and hence also the moral judgment of man, is clouded and perverted, and his whole emotional life is poisoned by a selfish desire for the bad.

But evil appears not only in each individual person; it appears also in the masses of people as a mysterious, demoniacal power; it appears in human society, with which each individual is organically connected, as universal sinfulness. Besides this universal sinfulness, special manifestations of evil appear, governing smaller circles of society. Hence we speak of a spirit of dissoluteness, of dissension, of negation, of revolution, that controls a people or an age. This usage is not a mere rhetorical figure of speech, but is rather the expression of a justified feeling,

that back of the outward manifestations of evil there lies hidden a dismal spiritual power, influencing the masses. Holy Writ designates this power as the kingdom of Satan, who "now worketh in the children of disobedience." (Eph. ii, 2, vi, 12).

The consequence of this sinful state is the incapability of the natural man to accomplish his moral purpose without divine communication of salvation. (Rom. iii, 12, 23.) This incapability is proven by the history of heathen morality, which shows an incessantly progressing moral decline, a process of moral decomposition. (Rom. i.) In the Jewish nation this process of decomposition was retarded by the intervention of new revelations of God, which imparted to the Jews a purer knowledge of God and his will. But this purer knowledge of God, and the revealed law, are unable either to free the burdened heart from the morally debilitating feeling of guilt, or to impart to man the requisite power for bursting asunder the fetters with which selfishness holds him captive. The sole effect of the law is, that man, striving in vain to do the revealed will of God, is the more deeply convinced of his utter sinfulness and moral incapability, and is finally brought to despair of all possibility of saving himself. (Heb. x, 4; Gal. ii, 16; Rom. vii, 7–25; Rom. viii, 3, 4.)

If, therefore, the natural man is to be delivered from the supremacy of evil, and enabled to accomplish his moral purpose, it is necessary that he experience a radical transformation, a regeneration. (John iii, 3.) This transformation can never be accomplished by man himself; a "reformation" founded solely upon personal moral endeavor will never gain the end. It is necessary that God implant into man, who is in despair and is yearning for redemption, the new moral life-giving principle of holy love, which shall overcome the principle of selfishness. But this can be done only upon the merits of the redemp-

tion wrought by Christ Jesus, which has put away guilt, the severing barrier between God and man, and has made the impartation of God's self to man possible. (2 Cor. v, 19–21; Rom. viii, 1, 3, 4, 9; John xvi, 7.)

This empirical presupposition gives to the morally good in Christian ethics a peculiar character, that we shall depict more minutely in what follows.

§ 9. The Christianly Good or the Christian Life as Subject Matter of Christian Ethics.

The "Christianly good," in the general sense of the term, is identical in its nature with the morally good, inasmuch as the moral law is the norm, freedom the form, and holy love the fundamental principle of both; yet Christian morality is to be distinguished from pre- or non-Christian morality by the peculiar manner in which the ideal of holy love is achieved under the gracious influence of the power of the Holy Ghost and in the conflict with controlling sinfulness. Hence Christian ethics does not consider morality mere obedience to the divine law or an imitation of the example of Christ; for the natural man wants the power for both. His free will has become self-will, which manifests itself in opposition to all that is truly good, in a selfish disdain of God and fellow-man.

This self-will can assert itself in a twofold manner; namely, as conscious, wanton rebellion against God's will, and as self-chosen, merely external obedience to it. The more consciously man strives to exercise his freedom in opposition to God's will, the farther does he withdraw from his moral ideal, the more demoniacal does he appear in his iniquity. But if he attempt to place himself into harmony with the correctly perceived will of God by the efforts of his own will without the life-giving power of grace, he will achieve but an apparent, external morality,

or a righteousness in outward works of piety, not the righteousness that is of God. All self-wrought righteousness is but a caricature of the latter, and disappears in the light of truth as an *ignis fatuus* disappears in the light of the rising sun. But self-righteousness is not only a deplorable self-delusion; it is also the most wretched enslaving of self to which man can subject himself.

Whereas the self-wrought righteousness of man is based upon his personal efforts, the "Christianly good," according to § 1, is based upon the regenerating and sanctifying influence of divine grace, mediated through the redemption in Christ Jesus. This is the indispensable divine factor of Christian morality, which morality is realized in the Christian life. In consideration of the "salvation" (that is, deliverance from the bondage of sin) wrought by divine grace, we call this Christian life *salvation-life* (German "*Heilsleben.*") As Christian ethics treats of this salvation-life, it verifies its evangelical character in that it shows: (*a*) How this salvation-life of the individual is born of faith, active in love, developing in hope towards its perfection; (*b*) How it acquires a visible form in human society as the "fellowship of the saints" or "the kingdom of God"—but all this only through the grace wrought by Christ and promised in the gospel.

True, there is nothing more humiliating for man than the truth that he is utterly incapable of himself to do God's will, and that only as pardoned sinner he may hope to accomplish his moral life-purpose in a manner pleasing to God. This truth causes him to feel his great weakness and wretchedness, and reveals to him his complete bankruptcy. But this humiliation alone makes the unselfish virtue of Christian morality possible, which is as different from the virtuous pride of the heathen world as heaven is from earth. On the other hand, this also

shows that the Christian's striving after virtue must be a ceaseless drinking from the fount of divine grace.

It has been objected to evangelical ethics that the doctrine of the innate incapability of man to do the divine will tends to paralyze his moral power, and to deaden every earnest effort toward moral perfection; but this objection is unfounded. True, man can make of grace a pillow for his indolence, and expect of God what it is his own personal duty to do. But this error is no proof against Christian ethics itself. What gift of Heaven can human perverseness not abuse? What truth can human self-will not transform into error? The experience of the present, as well as the history of the past, shows that the recognition of personal helplessness, and trust in the assistance of divine grace, do not paralyze moral efforts, but rather show that such is the true basis of all morality. Where are those to be found who approached nearest to the moral ideal, whose life was an incessant service of holy love, whose moral influence moved the world most powerfully and opposed the process of moral decay in the human family most potently? Are not the heroes of the Christian Church those to whom such praise is due? Where could a man be found in the non-Christian world the equal of Paul, John, Ignatius, or Polycarp? The whole history of our race bears testimony to the moral superiority of the Christian world over the non-Christian; and where shall we seek the reason for this but in the above named fundamental presuppositions of Christian ethics, which are wanting in non-Christian morality?

Hence true Christian ethics must be theological; that is, it must recognize as its source the historically manifested Christian revelation, in opposition to philosophical ethics, which considers reason its only source, and derives from reason its idea of the moral. But the

cardinal points of Christian revelation are the facts of sin and redemption, neither of which can with logical necessity be derived from reason, but must simply be recognized as facts; for even sin is made known in its full depth and its merited damnation only by the light of divine revelation. These two facts throw the right light upon the problem of our existence. They not only explain to us the discord between good and bad, which confronts us in the history of nations as well as in the bosom of each individual person, but they also show us what is elsewhere sought for in vain; namely, how this discord can be remedied.

§ 10. The Place of Christian Ethics in Theology, and especially its Relation to the Doctrine of Faith.

Christian ethics, being theological, belongs to the system of theological sciences. Together with the Christian doctrine of faith, or dogmatics, it constitutes the principal part of systematic theology. The two not only have the same source—the revelations recorded in Holy Writ—but also treat, in part, of the same subject; namely, the Christian life. Hence it becomes necessary to define their mutual relation more particularly.

As religion and morality are different, the one from the other, and yet are closely connected—so that there can be no true morality that is not based upon religion, and no true religion that does not of necessity manifest itself in a moral life—even so the Christian doctrine of faith and Christian ethics are closely connected, and yet they are essentially different. Dogmatics, as the doctrine of the Christian dogmas or articles of faith, has more of an instructive character than ethics, which is more practical. Dogmatics proceeds from God and the objective facts of salvation in redemption; ethics, from man and

the subjective facts of experience in the Christian life. The former shows what God has done in the moral world for the realization of his thoughts of love, and what the free creature has done in opposition to these thoughts of love; the latter, on the contrary, treats of the divine thoughts of love as the task for the free creature, and shows what they shall do to realize these thoughts of love. The precepts of dogmatics are presuppositions in ethics, and the practical demands of ethics are the complements of dogmatics. "Wherever Christian truths become pointed, so that they prick conscience as javelins or nails, there the domain of ethics begins." (Culmann.)

Remark.—As a voucher for the indissoluble connection of morality and religion, we would here quote the Darwinist Jaeger, who certainly is impartial. Jaeger says: "Morality without religion may seem good enough as paradox; but when a man is in an emergency, and would draw his sword, he draws instead a peacock's feather that neither can cut nor pierce. If you have children, tell them to be good and virtuous! You will soon find that it is of no use. But tell them of a dear Father in heaven who can see that which is secret, of a Holy Christ who makes them presents, and of angels who protect them. You will then notice by the light beaming from the eye that your words enter the heart, and that religion is the only means to bring up man to be man."

§ 11. Summary.

The Christian life is not the normal development of the life of a personality, holy and undefiled by sin; it is the life of a pardoned and regenerated sinner, in whom the image of God, darkened by sin, is to be restored. The presupposition of the Christian life is, therefore, the natural life, deranged by sin, and without this presupposition the Christian life can never be correctly understood. Hence it becomes necessary that Christian ethics first treat of the natural life before it can properly pre-

sent the Christian life. This is a necessary evil which, however, we can by no means evade.

As in life generally we can distinguish an inner and an outer element, so we must also distinguish a twofold in moral life—the inner states of development, and the actual manifestations of these states in practical life.

The former, upon which the disposition of man is based, are, so to speak, the trunk; the latter, the fruit of the tree—those, the source; these, the stream flowing therefrom. In presenting the moral life it is necessary that we consider both.

But, finally, moral character is not to be ascribed to the life of individuals alone, but also to the life of the sum total of humanity—to society. Hence, in considering the natural as well as the Christian life, we must regard, first, the individual, and then society. But as the Christian life is developed only in battling against sin, and as the derangement of social life caused by sin must necessarily be spoken of again in considering the sanctification of society by Christian love, we shall, in the first part of our treatise, only touch upon the influence of sin upon social life; and leave the fuller consideration of the abnormal manifestations and the disturbance of social life, caused by sin, for the last part, which treats of the sanctification of society by the Christian life. Hence the following main division of the subject matter obtains:

PART I. The Natural Life.

PART II. The Christian Life.

a. The Christian Life of Individuals.

b. The Sanctification of Society by the Christian Life.

Part I.

THE NATURAL LIFE.

I.

The Moral Endowment of Man.

§ 12. Man as the Image of God.

According to his nature, man belongs to two worlds. Physically he is related to the earth (Gen. ii, 7), and, as a member in the organism of the mundane creation, is dependent and restricted in many ways; spiritually he is related to God (Gen. ii, 7; i, 27), is free, elevated above nature, enabled and destined to have communion with God and the invisible world. As the most perfect of all natural beings, uniting in himself all lower stages of life, he is of himself a small world (microcosm); as the only natural being that by virtue of its spirit rises above nature and is related to God, he is a small God (microtheos). This intermediate position between God and the world distinguishes man from all other earthly creatures, makes him the crown and lord of creation, the representative and image of God. (Gen. i, 27, 28.) This image of God, already mentioned in Gen. i, 27 and 28, as the characteristic signature of man, forms the basis of his moral endowment.

The concept image of God includes a twofold: (*a*) The eternal destination of man to blessedness in God, which comprises his spirituality (reason and freedom) and immortality, as well as his religious and moral endowment (conscience). In this sense the divine image is essential to the concept man, and hence was not lost through sin; in the very subsistence of this image is rather to be sought the cause of the pangs of conscience that accompany sin. (*b*) The second moment

comprised by the divine likeness is the original righteousness; that is, the positively good moral condition of man at his creation. This condition has been lost through sin. According as the one or the other phase of the divine image is considered, man is either said "to have lost the divine image through sin," or that, even though fallen, "he is the offspring of God, and still bears God's image." Christian ethics, the purpose of which is to show to natural, that is to fallen, man the way to fulfill his moral mission, must naturally proceed from the first phase of the divine image, from the eternal destination of man.

Remark.—The psychological controversy, whether man is composed of two constituent parts, body and soul; or of three, body, soul and spirit,—will be determined according to the conception that one connects with these divisions. If the soul is conceived of as a self-existing being, wholly independent of the spirit, we must deny the threefold division all Biblical authority. After death—that is, after the separation of man into his constituent parts—the Holy Scriptures distinguish only a twofold division, the body and the spirit, or the soul. "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was; and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it." (Eccl. xii, 7; compare Psa. cxlvi, 4; Luke viii, 55; Acts vii, 58.) Hence, spirit and soul appear to be one and the same, and the two terms are frequently used synonymously in the Holy Scriptures. (Matt. vi, 25, 37; Phil. i, 27; Heb. iv, 12.) This view is also corroborated by the Mosaic account of creation, according to which man went forth a "living soul;" that is, a living being (compare Rev. xvi, 3) out of the material body, and the spirit emanating from God. Before God breathed the divine breath, the spirit, into the body made of dust, the body was dead. (Jas. ii, 26.) It was quickened to life by the spirit. Hence the animating principle of the body, the soul, is bound to the spirit; in other words, the spirit itself in its relation to the body is "soul." Therefore the twofold division of man appears as the Biblical view. But since the human spirit was destined by the Creator to be connected with the body, and, hence, has the quality of existing as soul at the same time—for which reason the spirits of the departed dead are still called "souls"—and since, furthermore, we must clearly distinguish the bodily conditioned unfree soul-

life from the free spirit-life elevated above the natural connection, we may also justly speak of a threefold division of man, as it occurrs in 1 Thess. v, 23, where the sanctification of "body, soul, and spirit" is spoken of. The apostle, however, does not in that place distinguish three different constituent parts of man, but only three different spheres of life—the corporeal life proper, which purposes the formation and perpetuation of the bodily organism; the soul-life in its more limited sense, that is, the life of involuntary conceptions, desires, and emotions; and the conscious, free spirit-life. But the vital force active in all these spheres is one and the same rational human soul, whence it is to be explained, that the various spheres of life have the closest reciprocal relation to one another.

§ 13. Man as Natural Being and Personality.

Considering the peculiar character of the human soul-life, we easily distinguish two spheres of life which correspond to the twofold relation of man to the world and to God; namely, an unfree, variously conditioned natural life (psychical-corporeal life), and a self-conscious, free, personal life (spiritual life). These two spheres, however, are reciprocally related; for one and the same life-principle lies at the bottom of both, although we designate it "soul" inasmuch as it appears in the natural life, and "spirit" inasmuch as it manifests itself in the personal life.

(*a*) *The Natural Life of Man.* As a creature of God, man is, above all, conditioned by the Creator himself—that is, by God—and is dependent upon him. This dependence upon God manifests itself in the involuntary emotions of the religious and moral impulses, or of conscience, of which emotions man can not rid himself. As a sentient being, he is conditioned on the one hand by his own psychical-corporeal organization (that is his constitution), upon which is based the corporeal life in the more restricted application of the term; on the other hand he is conditioned by surrounding nature. The thus conditioned natural foun-

dation of man forms the basis not only for the so-called "unconscious soul-life"—the abundant contents of which is for the greatest part concealed from our observation, and projects into the conscious life in isolated conceptions and moods only—but also for the great sphere of conscious but unfree emotions of our psychical-corporeal life. To the unfree natural life, therefore, belong all involuntary sense-perceptions, observations, and psychical reproductions, as well as the unfree desires and impulses—to which also the religious and the moral impulse (conscience) belong—and, finally, the (instinctive) sensibilities as the cognizance of the condition into which our psychical life is placed by these desires and impulses.

The peculiar determinateness of the natural life is imparted to it by the psychical-corporeal organization of man, which is innate and wholly independent of the will, and which we designate the natural disposition. This natural disposition determines the type of the various families, nations, and races; it appears in the peculiar constitution of the sexes—the sexual characteristics—and in the various temperaments, and produces the great variety in the natural endowment of all individual persons. These peculiarities imparted by the natural disposition form the basis of individuality, which gives to the life of each individual its special stamp. In this variety of the natural endowments lies not only the force that constrains to the mutual co-operation of individuals for the realization of common ends, but also the source of the great satisfaction afforded us by social life.

(*b*) *The Free Personal Life.* In the personal life man rises above the bounds of the state in which he is conditioned by nature, and manifests his divinely related character. At the time of his entrance into this world he appears altogether as natural being; but, nevertheless, there lies even

in the babe the power of the spiritual personal life.* Hence there is no period in human development of which we could say, Now the spiritual life has appeared in addition to the natural. In every normal human individual the self-conscious power of the spirit, the power that forms the personality, appears gradually, step by step. Man learns to distinguish himself from all purely natural beings, as a self-conscious, self-destining ego. He becomes a person. In this lies the indestructible essence of his divine likeness. The personal life embraces the whole sphere of the conscious free manifestations of life. To it, therefore, belongs the higher faculty of perception which rises, through consciousness of the world and of self, to consciousness of God, as well as the faculty of the self-destining will. The former faculty enables man to know his moral life purpose; the latter, to fulfill it in moral activity. The personal life is, therefore, the sphere proper of moral activity. Both spheres of life—the natural life and the personal life—have their point of conjunction in the "heart," as the common life-hearth of the psychical-corporeal as well as the spiritual life. In the heart are united all the impressions made by the outer world upon the inner life of man; from the heart all free activity proceeds. The heart is the seat of all the higher emotions—of joy, of sorrow, of hope, of trust, and of love. There the disposition of man is formed as the basis of his moral conduct; hence there is the seat of piety, but also of sin. The heart, therefore, is the quintessence of personality, the true ego of man; and God's request, "Give me thine heart," means nothing more and nothing less less than "Give me thine own self."

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*Therein lies the great difference between the life of the babe and that of the animal, that in the former there lies dormant the germ of personality, which is developed day by day, whereas the life of the animal remains captive under the restraint of its connection with nature.

The moral significance of the spheres of life described above is essentially different. The natural life, being independent of the will, and hence unfree, is morally indifferent, that is, disinterested. "Whether a person have been born into this world, and move in it, as male or female, with much or little talent, sanguine or melancholy, genial or critical; whether he have come into existence crippled or well, beautiful or homely, a brunette or a blonde, rich or poor,—appears first of all to be his fortune," and is of no importance to morality, as such. It is not thus with the personal life, the basis of which is the disposition founded upon self-destination. All is dependent upon this disposition. "Whether a man be selfish or self-sacrificing, charitable or uncharitable, diligent or indolent, faithful or unfaithful, pious or impious, sincere or insincere, etc., decides as to whether he is of moral worth or not." (Oettingen.)

Through free self-destination man acquires, upon the basis of the innate natural disposition, a character. Hence, character is the natural disposition developed by self-destination; in it natural disposition and personality, psychical-corporeal and spiritual life, are joined, in closest reciprocal relation, to a unity. Since the natural disposition is indestructible, Christian morality must in each individual person always appear in the form of Christian character, whereas the diversity in the natural disposition of individuals, even regardless of the moral opposites, good and bad, begets the greatest variety in the formation of character.

Having now learned to know the peculiar nature of man and the two spheres of his activity in life, it yet remains to consider more particularly the chief moments of his moral endowment. Since all that is moral has freedom as its form and the moral law as its norm, we will designate as these chief moments, (a) the power of

free self-destination, which takes root in the personal life (that is, the spirituality) of man; and (b) conscience, or the innate moral law, which belongs to the natural life, and reminds man of his divine destination.

Remark 1.—"The temperament is, so to speak, the *tempo* of life; that is, the increased or moderated degree of its susceptibility for impressions and of its power to retain and counteract them." Following the example of the ancients, we usually distinguish four temperaments—the sanguine, the phlegmatic, the choleric, and the melancholy—although this division really only establishes certain extreme poles within which the temperaments lie, the latter scarcely anywhere appearing pure, but almost always variously mixed. The sanguine temperament is full of lively mobility, yielding and ductile, sensitive and irritable, susceptive, but lacking firm power of resistance or spontaneity. The opposite of the sanguine temperament is the phlegmatic. The latter is difficult to move, less sensitive to external impressions, and hence without lively sensations, but manifests patient perseverance in that which has been begun. As the sanguine temperament is peculiar to childhood, so the phlegmatic is peculiar to old age. The choleric temperament is ardent and strong in its sensations, quick and energetic in its actions. Receptivity and spontaneity are equally developed. The melancholy temperament resembles the choleric in the depth and force of its sensations; yea, it even surpasses the choleric in this respect, but does not equal it in its energy of resistance. The melancholy temperament favors the inwardly directed contemplative turn of life; the choleric, on the contrary, favors the calling of energetic outward activity.

The sexual character expresses the natural contrast of the sexes in physical and spiritual respect. The active side of life is predominant in man, the receptive in woman. Hence the life of man is directed more to the outer world; the life of woman is more inwardly directed, tenderly fashioning and maintaining.

In regard to the fundamental type of the various human races, it is easily shown that the Negroes are predominantly the sanguine, the Mongolians the melancholy, the Indians the phlegmatic, and the Malays and Caucasians the choleric people of the earth. (See Guthe, Text-book of Geography, § 27.) The various nationalities also have their own peculiar type (national character). Who could not see at a glance the differ-

ence between the mobile, ardent Frenchman, the haughty, formal Englishman, the good-natured, thorough, and in his thoroughness often awkward German, and the eminently practical American? (See Lemke's Popular Æsthetics, pp. 209–243.) Finally, there is even in single families a definite type expressed, not only in respect to the physical, but also to the spiritual. Hence we speak not only of "family traits," but also of a "family spirit." There is, besides these differences, an extraordinarily great difference in natural endowment, by which man appears equipped for the most manifold achievements and activities in the arts and sciences, etc.

Remark 2.—To the above given definition of the heart, the general usage also corresponds, which in one instance ascribes to the heart the functions of the unfree natural life, and in another instance the functions of the free personal life. We most frequently use the expression "heart" to designate the "sensibilities," in opposition to the "head," or intellect; hence to designate the innate determinateness and the unfree manifestations of the human soul-life, in opposition to the functions of conscious and free thought. Thus we say of a person that "he follows the dictates of his heart instead of following his intellect," or that "he has a good heart but little head." In a more restricted sense, we understand by "heart" the sympathizing feelings and inclinations, and thus use the expressions "heartily," "heartless," etc. But there are also expressions in which, on the contrary, "heart" is used to signify the conscious, free activity of the spirit. This is even true of our German expression "*zu Herzen nehmen*" (to take to heart), whereas in foreign languages—for example, the French and English—expressions are used in which there is even ascribed to the "heart," what we in German ascribe to the "head" in opposition to the heart; for example, the term "*apprendre par cœur*," "learn by heart."

Remark 3.—As unfree, involuntary manifestation of the moral inclination, conscience has been assigned by us a place in the natural life. Thus Culmann also says: "As the spirit has its basis in the cerebral system (brain), the soul, however, in the ganglionic system, it is natural that at night, when the activity of the brain ceases, and the ganglions become predominantly active, conscience awakes so easily. Hence the hours of the night are the most agonizing for the criminal; for the remembrance of long-forgotten sins overtakes him like an armed man, and frightens him from his couch."

§ 14. Freedom of Choice as Moment of the Moral Endowment of Man.

The freedom of man can not be an unconditional freedom, like that of God, who comprises in himself the basis of all his volition, but only a conditional, that of a limited creature. For, as was stated in the previous section, man is individually destined and limited, not only by his dependence upon God, but also by his natural disposition, as well as by his surroundings and his circumstances in life.

Hence the activity of the human will appears, first of all, in the natural life in the form of the unconscious and unfree impulse (unconscious will). The impulses, however, which are but the peculiar nature of a finite being, striving toward development, strive to pass over into the conscious will. It therefore becomes necessary that the conscious will choose from the different impulses, and destine itself for the one or the other of them. Hence the unconscious, unfree impulse is the presupposition of our will.

Corresponding to the twofold relation of man to God and to the world, the manifold impulses may be summed up under two chief impulses: the worldly impulse and the spiritual, or religious. The worldly impulse aims, first of all, at the possession and enjoyment of temporal things, but also incites to energetic work in this world. Man strives to build up for himself a new, own world from the material given him of the old world. With this is connected not only the mechanical impulse, but also the impulse to reign. In this mode of manifestation, the worldly impulse has pre-eminently the character of egotism. But it often appears also in a quite different phase, manifesting itself especially toward ideal things; for example, toward liberty, toward the native country,

etc., or also toward persons as the impulse of devotion, making man capable of the greatest sacrifices. The religious impulse, or the impulse to a life in God, is directed toward God as the highest good, for which man is desirous as the "proper, imperishable food for the soul." While the worldly impulse aims at happiness in the world, the aim of the impulse directed toward God is blessedness in full communion with God. In the religious impulse lies the reason, why man can never find complete contentment in the world, so that in spite of all enjoyments and all possessions of temporal things, he ever yet feels a vacancy in his heart which can be filled by nothing but communion with God.

Whatever affords the impulses lasting satisfaction we call good. The satisfying of the impulses is connected with a feeling of pleasure; the non-satisfying thereof, with a feeling of displeasure. Inasmuch as the impulses, together with their corresponding good, exert a determining influence upon the decisions of our will by means of psychical representations and feelings, they are called motives; that is, the reasons for motion. The opposite to the motives are the quietives, or reasons for remaining quiet. Thus the motive of inordinate ambition or desire for power, for example, may incite a ruler to conquest, while the impulse of self-preservation, fear of the uncertainty of war, or the moral impulse, conscience, acting as quietives, can restrain him from the dangerous and criminal undertaking, and quench in his bosom the fire of passion.

The motives do not compel the will to make a certain choice; it is rather left for man himself to choose whether or not he will yield to the constraining motives, and in how much. Hence the final decision is the product of the inner self-destination of the will, and for this reason every decision of the will is accompanied by the conscious-

ness of having been able in just the same circumstances to act differently. In this consists the freedom of man, which, therefore, is essentially freedom of choice (or formal freedom). Hence it is proper that man's deeds be imputed unto him.

The normal exercising of the freedom of choice, the exercising willed by God, consists in man's controlling the various inner and outer motives by his sovereign will, and in subordinating them to his divine destination, so that his whole life becomes a harmonious presentation of the divine will.

But man is enabled to do this, only by making God the center of gravity and the focus of his life, and by continually receiving from communion with God new forces of life and love, which shall make it possible for him to become master of the natural basis of his life and make it the basis of his freedom. If the human will is then continually subjected to the divine will, the formal freedom is changed more and more to a real freedom, because then the will acquires in holy love a tenor of its own, and is no longer destined by changeable outer motives, but by the permanent fundamental principles of a pious disposition. In as far as this is realized, in so far does man approach his original image, God. Thus loving consecration to God becomes the basis of our true freedom.

In as far, however, as man withdraws from God, the will loses its sovereignty and becomes the servant of the impulses and desires, which it should control. In him the word of the Lord is verified: "Whosoever committeth sin [that is, whoever destines himself for a life of selfishness, a life without God], is the servant of sin."

§ 15. The Innate Moral Law, or Conscience, as Moment of the Moral Endowment of Man.

If the moral order of the world instituted by God is the norm of the morally good, the realization of which is the divine purpose of man's life, every individual must have an organ by which he is able to gain knowledge of this divine law. Such an organ is conscience. In conscience the moral order of the world makes itself felt in every human heart as "the demand which establishes a standard for demands, as a law of obligation." The view which restricts conscience to the condemning witness against alienation to God, and hence denies its having existed previous to the fall of man, is decidedly wrong. The judiciary sentence, although in the sinful state it occupies a predominant position among the manifestations of conscience, is not the essential part of the functions of conscience; the essential part is the obedience-demanding self-attestation of the divine law in the spirit of man. But it is evident from Genesis iii, 2, 3, that this self-attestation existed in our first parents before the fall. Hence we hold that conscience belongs to the original being of man, although in the state of innocence it does not manifest itself as judiciary sentence, but only as moral sense (analogous to the æsthetic sense) and as moral impulse.

The question now arises: How is this wonderful fact of conscience to be explained? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to consider more minutely the various manifestations of conscience.

As often as a definite case presents itself to us, which appeals to our will and demands of us a decision of the will, we are confronted within by a norm which is independent of our consciousness of the ego, and not conditioned by it, to which we must, of inner necessity, refer

the case appealing to the will. This psychological fact forms the essential basis of all manifestations of conscience. Hence conscience, considered only empirically, is the peculiar definiteness of the human spirit, by virtue of which we find ourselves obliged, in every decision of the will that takes place, to bring the respective case appealing to the will into relation to an inner given norm of our moral action.

The norm of conscience, however, does not appear as a law that gives general precepts for various possible cases. "No man has in his conscience an ever-ready register of all that is good or evil;" conscience attests only in the individual case appealing to the will, whether or not it meets the requirements of the moral law. Conscience does not say to the thief in a general way, "Thou shalt not steal;" but it says to him only in the individual case, when he is in the act of stealing: "What you purpose is not right." Hence the norm of conscience is always brought into notice in the form of an affirmative or a negative predication. "Yes" and "no" are the only words that the lexicon of conscience contains. Reflecting reason then makes general formulas of law from the repeated predications of conscience that refer to similar cases.

The constraint to measure the individual case that appeals to the will, by the unconditioned inner norm, is an absolute one. As soon as we begin to will, not only the objective norm, but also the relation of the case in question to this norm, is brought to our notice; and the more we strive against the consciousness thereof, the more intense this consciousness becomes. We are, indeed, not physically forced to obey the norm; but we can not ignore it. In every doubtful case we feel uneasy until we finally have found the right, that of which conscience approves. If this has been found,

conscience demands that we abide by it; every further deliberation seems then to be an attempt to avoid the known demand of conscience.

Conscience demands absolute subjection. Hence it always appears to man in the shape of duty. Duty to conscience can not be annulled by any other law. Whoever allows himself to be destined by a foreign authority against his conscience, acts unconscientiously. No other person can decide for you. For you a certain thing may be a matter of conscience, for another it is not. You must determine by your own conscience what you may do, and what you must forbear. Conscience is the last resort in the domain of duty.

The witness of conscience forces itself upon us with overpowering authority, as something elevated above us. What is brought to man's notice in conscience is something superhuman and supernatural, whether he will acknowledge it or not. The workings of conscience do not bear the self-testimony of being something divine, and are indeed nothing but functions of human reason; but they contain something that can not be explained from the nature of the human spirit and the natural basis of our individual-personal life alone. The key to the solution of this problem is given us in the divine origin of man. "We are the offspring of God." The relation of God to man exists even there, where man is not conscious of it; and the human spirit has, even in the sinful state, an organ by means of which God makes his will known unto him, and the activity of which is independent of human caprice. That organ is conscience.

Conscience is therefore a mirror, as it were, in which the eternally valid, objective divine order of the world is reflected. Now, as a mirror, when it is dusty, soiled, broken, or bent, reproduces things of the objective world indistinct, partially effaced, or even distorted, so the

reason of man, being darkened and perverted by sin, is able to reflect the moral order of the world only imperfect, darkened, and distorted. Hence the appearance of an "erring conscience."

Conscience, as the consciousness of an unconditioned norm, is not a consciousness of the unconditioned Author of this norm—that is, of God. A conscience can be thought of devoid of consciousness of God. But we are involuntarily led to infer from the unconditioned law that there is a Lawgiver. "The manifestations of conscience have something so overpowering that we arrive at the question: Why is it that I can not rid myself of these torturing thoughts? Why am I inwardly so totally defeated, and do not know how to help myself, even though no one can do me injury; perhaps, even, no one has knowledge of my sin? Pangs of conscience are like pangs of death; why, then, do I not shake them off, since no executioner threatens me? Whom do I fear thus, since nobody and nothing in the world frightens me? And why, when I have borne the pangs of conscience for a considerable time, can I not think I have made atonement for my guilt? Why does judgment yet continue within me? To what sentence does that point?" (Palmer.) All this must awaken apprehensions that a higher, a mightier, an invisible Judge is back of conscience. In this way only can these pangs of conscience be explained. Thus conscience is the tie, and we can say the only tie, that binds man in his sinful and degraded state to God. As among the ruins of an old temple there sometimes remains a slender pillar pointing heavenward, and reminding of past magnificence, so conscience stands amid the ruins of degraded human nature as a lone witness of past splendor, as the last remainder of the original righteousness, but at the same time as the hopeful earnest of a possible redemption.

Remark 1.—The Greek word *suneidos*, or *suneidesis*, which is used in the New Testament for conscience, originally signifies joint knowledge—as well what a person knows jointly with another, as what a person knows of another as eye or ear witness—hence, in general, exact knowledge; further, also, what one knows in regard to himself, consciousness; and, finally, both expressions are used to designate the moral form of consciousness which we designate in German by the word *Gewissen*, "conscience." Hence the moral idea is not the original one, but was later ascribed to a word of general import. Hence, etymologically, the idea "conscience" can not be definitely explained.

Remark 2.—It has been tried to explain conscience from the stand-point of materialism, as a purely psychological phenomenon. Spiess, for example, says: "Conscience is not a distinct faculty within us, by which we can unerringly distinguish the good from the bad, the beautiful from the not beautiful; it is nothing at all different from our empirical ego: least of all is it a direct voice of God in us; it is our entire empirical ego itself, the connection of ideas and matter as it has been formed by and by, with the co-operation of arbitrary attention, out of the two factors—the innate physical organization, and the external human impressions mediated by the senses." Here we must first remark that Spiess extends the idea "conscience" into the domain of æsthetics, where there is no case appealing to the will. This arbitrary extending of the idea can but confound. As regards the assumption that conscience is "our entire empirical ego," it is simply refuted by the fact that conscience often—yea, even in most cases—does not at all agree with our empirical ego, but "is opposed to our feelings, inclinations, and thoughts." If conscience is my whole empirical ego, how is it that I do what does not agree with my conscience—that is, with my ego? Or can it be "the impressions mediated by the senses" that force me to do it? If so, how is it that my conscience—that is, my empirical ego—reproaches me because I did what I was, by my innermost nature and against my will, forced to do? These questions are simply unanswerable from the stand-point of materialism.

Directly opposed to this materialistic view there is another, which holds that the human spirit is not active in conscience, but God alone. Here there are two different views to be distinguished: First, conscience is thought to be a kind of divine substance which is embodied in the human spirit by nature. The voice of conscience is then an attestation of God in man;

hence, God's voice. By such an embodiment of a divine substance in the human spirit, however, the unity of the human spirit would be destroyed; and yet our self-consciousness witnesses to nothing more lively and definitely than to just this unity of our personality. Besides, the fact of an erring conscience could not be explained at all according to this view. Secondly, conscience is thought to be a self-attestation of God, not *in* the human spirit, but *to* it. This view is held by v. Hofmann, when he says: "Conscience, according to its nature, is not something in man, nor a production in him, that he could ascribe to himself, but it is direct self-attestation of God to man." This view is refuted by what Paul says in Romans ii, 14, 15, concerning conscience: "For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves; which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another." This plainly declares that the norm of conscience lies in the heart of man, hence is something belonging properly to the spirit of man.

II.

Man in the Sinful State.

1. The Innate Sinful Condition of the Natural Man.

§ 16. The Nature of Sin.

The normal condition of man, who was created in the image of God, consisted in God's being the center of his life, as he is the author of his existence and the source of his happiness. As the planets revolve about the sun as the central body of the whole solar system, so man found in God, the central sun of the spiritual world, the center of gravity toward which all his thinking, feeling, and willing tends. It was innate love that drew him so powerfully toward God, the original source of love. In this life- and love-communion with God, man possessed not only the strength to control the unfree impulses of his psychical-corporeal life and make them subservient to his divine destination (§ 14), but also the entire fullness of happiness, for the enjoyment of which his elevated, divinely-related nature makes him capable. In his innocent state, therefore, man was wise, holy, and happy.

With the fall of man, as the first rebellious act of the human will against the will of the divine Creator (Gen. iii), a complete revolution was brought about in this relation to God. Instead of love, selfishness now reigns, and in consequence thereof the center of gravity of the human life is no longer in God, but in man himself. All must now center, not about God, but about the own ego. But turning thus from God, man becomes the slave of worldly lust; for in seeking to appease his infi-

nite divine hunger in the created world instead of in God, he makes some earthly good his "idol;" that is, the highest good and end of his life, to which he then subordinates all other ends. In this dependence upon finite things consists the substance of worldly lust,—thus the centripetal force of love to God being annulled, the centrifugal force of selfishness hurls men forward with irresistible power along the downward course of flight from God, toward the abyss of perdition. This is the tragic significance of the catastrophe introduced in the development of man by his fall. For the consequences of the original sin were not restricted to our first parents, but were transmitted to all mankind.

Since it is one and the same life-principle that appears in the personal life as free spirit, and in the natural life as soul, restricted by the body, it is evident that sin, generated first of all in the personal life, must at once impart itself to the (psychical-corporeal) natural life, and thus must become the natural condition of man. As such it was transmitted (in consequence of the natural connection of the single individual and the begetting parents) from the first parents of our race to their descendants, and reigns, even at the present day, over all naturally begotten children of Adam, as "selfish" inclination or "evil lust." "That which is born of the flesh is flesh." (John iii, 6.)

Evil lust includes both an abnormal condition of the natural life (which latter has been corrupted by sin), and an evil tendency of the will; that is, a tendency that passes beyond the bounds of the divinely instituted order of the world. For although sin appears in the natural life of the carnally begotten person—and even before the personal life is developed to its full power as unconscious selfish desire—nevertheless it can not be denied that the awakening free personal will shows a

decided inclination toward evil. The heart—which we learned to know in § 13 as the hearth and center of the inner life of man—is the seat of evil lust. Hence all individual sins spring from the covetous self-will of the natural heart. This is corroborated by our Lord himself in the words, "Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphemies" (Matt. xv, 19); and James describes the genesis of individual actual sins in chapter i, 14 and 15, as follows: "Every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed. Then, when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin; and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death." Thus there arises out of innate evil lust the individual actual sin as the conscious transgressing of a divine commandment. The actual sins, however, end in deliberate hardening of the heart, which begets eternal death.

The view that sin is a necessary factor in the development of man hardly merits to be mentioned here; for it actually annuls the idea of the morally evil. If evil is necessary, it is founded in the divine order, and therefore as much authorized as the good. Hence it can not of itself be called evil, but only relatively; that is, inasmuch as it becomes unpleasant or harmful to society. Besides it is not free, and therefore not morally determinable. To this must be added that this view makes God himself the author of evil; for, with the divinely willed development of man, evil were already appointed and willed by God.

More worthy of our notice seems the view which seeks the nature of sin in sensuality, and declares that the preponderancy of the impulses of our sensual nature over reason is the final cause of all sin, and the nature of evil lust. That sensuality preponderates reason in the present condition of man can not be denied, nor can it

be denied that evil lust manifests itself in the domain of sensuality. But this does not at all prove that sensuality of itself is the source of sin. The following facts rather prove the opposite: (*a*) We generally hold the condition of children to be a state of relative innocence, and our Lord corroborates the same in the words: "Except ye become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven"—and yet sensuality reigns most unlimited in childhood. (*b*) Further, it is true that many sins can be explained by the fact that sensuality preponderates reason, but by no means all of them. If he who is possessed with an inordinate desire of power exposes himself to the greatest dangers and privations, and assumes the severest self-denial, in order to make himself lord of the earth; if the covetous man sacrifices wealth and time and enjoyment of life and health—in short, all that can satisfy sensuality to his proud plans—it can certainly not be explained by the predominance of sensuality over reason. (*c*) From the "evil heart" proceed not only "adulteries, fornications, and thefts, but also "evil thoughts, false witness, and even calumny." (*d*) Finally, every one who knows himself feels that his position toward evil lust is by no means that of "tolerating innocence" which opposes a pure, undefiled will to the evil emotions, but rather that the conscious will itself is involved in the evil lusts. "We discover within us not only a weak, but also a defiled will, in which egotistic motives are intermixed with those of duty." Hence the final power of sin lies not in sensuality, but in the spirit, in the free personal life. What was designated above as the substance of the first sin—namely, that man of his own free choice made himself, instead of God, the center of the actions of his life, briefly stated, selfishness—is the nature and substance of all sin.

Remark 1.- Man went forth good—that is, with a definite endowment for the good - from the hand of his Creator. (Gen. i, 31.) To this innate good endowment belonged also the natural love for God. At first, indeed, this love existed only in the form of involuntary impulse, analogous to the natural love of the parent, which is to be found even in animals. It now became the task of man to transform this natural love into an act of free self-destination; namely, into moral love, by overcoming temptation.

Remark 2.- The first sin must have been committed in the beginning of the history of the first parents; for if it had been committed in the later history of the development of mankind, only a part, and not the whole, of the human family would have become sinful. This lies also in the very nature of things. The question about his relation to God is the first and most important for man. A definite decision regarding this question was necessarily the first step, the step preceding all further development of his bodily and spiritual powers. Of their own free self-destination, without any outer compulsion, our first parents followed the purely irrational titillation of deifying their self will, of making the ego the center of life. This deed, proceeding from the will of the creature, was the origin of sin in humanity.

Remark 3.- "The sinful disposition, although springing from the spirit and not from the sensual nature of man, necessarily manifests itself in every carnally begotten child of Adam first of all as lust of the flesh. The spirit of man, being alienated from the divine original Spirit, has become the prey of the low powers. Sin has found a dwelling-place in the corrupted bodily nature of man, inherited from the first parents by way of generation, so that the germ of death is implanted in his nature by his being begotten in iniquity." (Oettingen, Social Ethics, p. 431.)

§17. The Universal Derangement of Human Life by Sin.

The condition of the natural man in consequence of sin is a desperate one. Severed from God, he wants the proper life-element; he is like a fish that has been drawn from the cool waves of the brook and hurled upon the sand, where it must wretchedly perish, if it be not replaced into its quickening element by a merciful hand

Disharmony and dissension have taken the place of inner harmony and peace. Not only the free personal life has fallen into the slavery of selfishness, by which the will has enslaved itself, but also the unfree natural life (as we saw in the preceding section) has been poisoned and perverted by selfishness. The selfish will is no longer able to control the psychical-corporeal impulses; these have rather emancipated themselves, and control the will, which has become defenseless because of its separation from God. Thus the natural life becomes the point from which innumerable temptations proceed, and reacts misleadingly upon the spiritual life; just as, on the other hand, every new sinful act of the will effects an increased corruption of the natural life. Therefrom results the pitiable condition which the Scriptures call "flesh." "That which is born of the flesh is flesh." (John iii, 6.) Hence "flesh" is synonymous with "the old man" (Eph. iv, 22–32; Col. iii, 8–10), and designates the sum total of the sinful condition into which man has fallen in consequence of original sin.

This sinful condition is revealed above all in the wrong relation of the natural man to God; in his selfish efforts toward independence, which we may briefly designate unbelief. Unbelief is manifested in alienation from God, instead of communion with him; in mistrust, instead of trust; in indifference toward God, instead of child-like love,—in short, in an unfilial deportment. As unbelief is the original form in which the innate sinfulness makes itself known toward God, it can be termed the real tap-root of sin. "Whatsoever is not of faith is sin." (Rom. xiv, 23.) Hence the natural man is simply called a "child of disobedience" (German version, "child of unbelief.")

But man's relation, not only to God, but also to the world, is entirely wrong. The disturbing of his relation

to God consists in wrong efforts towards independence as they are expressed in unbelief; in his relation to the world the opposite is true. The world, over which man should rule, holds him captive under its terrible ban. This appears, first of all, in the darkened understanding (Eph. iv, 17, etc.), which is taken captive by sensuality. What the natural man can not see or grasp is of no value to him. In every tree and every rock he finds more reality than in God and in heaven with all its angels. Only the visible seems real to him, and the invisible things of eternity vanish from his vision as in a dense fog. Hence his heart is bound by a thousand ties to the transitory things of time, and thus deceives itself regarding the imperishable things of the invisible world. There is a mysterious, dismal power blinding his eyes, so that, surrounded by the manifestations of God and the invisible spiritual world, he yet remains the captive of sensuality. In this condition it is impossible for him to find the way of salvation, or to see the things of the supernatural world in their proper light; hence the apostle says: "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God." (1 Cor. ii, 14.)

From the fatal deception concerning the reality and value of the visible world, there results a perversion of the will, an estrangement from the true life in God; man sinks deeper and deeper into the bog of worldly-mindedness and of sin. The love of the world—which is reflected in the three rays: lust of the eyes (avarice), lust of the flesh (greediness for enjoyment), and the pride of life (longing for honor or power)—becomes the leading motive of the selfish will. Hence the phantom of this world's goods has such an irresistible charm for the natural man. He is unable to break the spell, and in striving after the visible he wanders farther and farther from God and the things of heaven. True, it is but a phan-

tom that he pursues, bubbles that burst in his hands at the moment that he thinks he has grasped them; but what does it avail? He believes them to be real, and as long as this delusion continues he is captivated by their charm, and remains the slave of sensuality; so that he sells his claim to heaven for a mess of pottage.

This deplorable error of the natural man destroys the harmony of his emotional life, and makes him inexpressibly unhappy. Man is created by God and for God. His destination is blessedness in communion with God. Hence the heart remains unsatisfied, despite all enjoyment of earthly things and earthly pleasures. Nowhere in the world does true inner satisfaction greet us. From all centuries lamentations about the sorrows of life are wafted over to us, and often they come from the lips of those who were supposed to be the happiest. Even Goethe, the favorite of fortune, is heard to lament upon the very pinnacle of human fame:

> "Ah, I weary of these doings!
> Why this pain, this pleasure, why?
> Come, sweet peace, O come, my heart to satisfy!"

And there is scarcely an unregenerated human heart to be found on earth in which this lamentation does not vibrate in full, sympathetic chords. Not time, but eternity is our home. We are created for God, the Infinite; and the Infinite One alone can satisfy our infinite longing. In this lies the source of the inexpressible agony that tortures the poor human heart. It is undeniably a tragic fate of fallen man—this bondage in freedom of choice; this restless, vain search without finding; this vacancy in the human heart in spite of all enjoyment; yet it is but the bitter fruit of the rebellion of the selfish will against the will of the Creator, God, which rebellion was propagated from generation to generation, and now forms the fundamental disposition of all natural mankind. For

this very reason their condition is such a deplorable one. True, there is yet salvation for them. God's grace is the pitying hand that can restore the unhappy sinner, dying in his separation from God, to his life-giving element of communion with God, out of which he has been hurled by sin. But in his blindness man flees from grace, because he flees from God himself, to whose will he does not wish to subject himself.

Remark 1.—The fact that the Bible uses the term "flesh" to designate the natural condition of man, seems to favor the view refuted in the preceding section, namely, that sensuality is the source of sin. But if the parts in which the expression "flesh" occurs be examined into more closely, it becomes evident that such is not the case. Scripture uses the word "flesh" to designate not sensuality as such, but the sum total of the sinful state of man bodily and spiritually. This appears from Gal. v, 19, where not only "fornication and revelings," but also "idolatry, envyings, strife, hatred, seditions, and murder," are classed among the "works of the flesh." It also appears from 1 Cor. xv, 50, "Flesh and blood can not inherit the kingdom of God," where the apostle Paul, who saw in the article treating of the resurrection of the body a fundamental doctrine of Christianity, certainly wishes to say nothing else than that humanity in the sum total of its present condition, into which it has come through sin, can not enter into the kingdom of God. Compare also Gen. vi, 3: "My Spirit shall not always strive with man, for that he also is flesh," and further John vi, 63; Gal. vi, 8; Eph. ii, 3; Gal. iii, 3.

Remark 2.—"Here is the door of the great misery. We are held prisoners for the abyss, and the power of its charm is greater than that of heaven. We live and grow toward the former, and are not aware of it; for our eyes are held as long as we dwell in the body. This earthly visionary world, which, like the rainbow, is indeed a token of divine grace, yet, like it, is but a passing refraction of light and darkness, we suppose to be the permanent world; the primordial kingdoms of heaven and hell, between which this visionary world rose like a glittering bubble, we declare, with the mien of apodictical certainty, to be a mere fancy of religious fanaticism. Because we do not drop dead the moment we sin, we think there is no danger. Man feels a physical burn. The brands of conscience, however, do not annoy him. He can toil along from year to year under

the load of unrecognized and unforgiven sins without anticipating what a burden he is heaping upon himself." "Alas the terrible blindness of man, that he does not consider the things that belong to his peace, and that could rescue him from his perilous condition! Alas! that he counts the earnest monitions of God folly, that he takes the semblance for truth, and truth for the semblance!" (Culmann, Christ. Ethics, page 79.)

§ 18. The Responsibility of the Natural Man.

The question now arises, How about the imputability of the natural man? Can he be held responsible for his actions, since without his concurrence he has been placed by birth into such a state of bondage and sinfulness? Is it just to make him responsible for a state that he could not possibly escape? We answer: (*a*) Neither the Scriptures nor his own consciousness makes the individual responsible for the fact that he has been born a sinner, for the very reason that the individual never had the choice between existing sinless and entering into this world as a member of humanity in its abnormal state. His will was abnormal and selfish before it came to be a "conscious will." (*b*) On the other hand, the consciousness of responsibility appears with the awakening of the conscious will and its first inclination to sin. And since, as experience teaches, this universally takes place in the early years of childhood, there rests upon all, even from youth, a general sense of guilt. (*c*) Further, the Scriptures, as well as man's own consciousness, do most definitely hold him responsible for single evil actions. For even though we acknowledge that it was utterly impossible for the natural man to live without sin, every man's consciousness tells him that he was not compelled to commit so great and so many sins as he actually committed. (*d*) Since, furthermore, every actual sin reacts upon the condition of man, poisoning and destroying, and since evil lust grows in strength in the measure

in which it is satisfied, the natural man is responsible for the degree of his servility to sin. For this degree is not determined by Adam's actions, but by the actions of each individual; that is, by the use of the yet remaining part of his freedom of choice. (*e*) But the remainder of this freedom of choice consists in that the decision concerning the position which he wishes to take toward God and the influences of his spirit lies, even in the sinful state of man, wholly in his own hands. And since with this decision the possibility is placed to be saved from this servitude of sin, every grown person is responsible for his actions; and whoever is lost in sin is himself the cause of his ruin. Here everything depends upon the proper or improper use of this remainder of our freedom of choice.

But is this remainder of the freedom of choice equal in all individuals? Are there not people whose natural disposition and surrounding circumstances make a moral development of life impossible for them? And must this deplorable lot not be fatal in this life as well as for their condition in the beyond? It can not be denied that not only morally indifferent peculiarities—as, for example, the temperaments, certain inclinations, fancies, and especially certain talents (for example, talent for languages, or music, or a taste for art)—but also certain sins, as drunkenness, voluptuousness, etc., are propagated in certain families; from which fact we can conclude that, besides the general sinfulness, also a predisposition for certain sins is inherited from parents by their children. If we should deny this transmission of an inclination to certain sins, and ascribe the above mentioned appearances solely to the influence of bad example and of social conditions under which a child grows up, we yet can not help admitting that just these conditions establish a great difference regarding the opportunity given to the indi-

vidual for a moral development of life. It is indisputable that for the son of pious parents, who grows up in the sunshine of a Christian training and godly example, it is far easier to become a virtuous man than for the son of criminal parents, who is born in a notorious quarter of some metropolis, and grows up in the midst of low, godless surroundings, in the infectious air of vice and moral depravity, in a quarter where nearly every house is a den of iniquity, and every cellar a den of murderers.

But do these unfavorable circumstances cancel personal responsibility? We answer, By no means; and appeal to the testimony of innumerable criminals who had grown up in the mire of sin. They, too, feel responsible and guilty; and they are; for, firstly, sin is inherited only in the form of impulse, and only in consequence of continuously being appeased by man through self-destination it grows gradually to the strength of passion, which man must serve in abject slavery. Hence, even in the most unfavorable circumstances, it is the individual person's own fault that this development begins. Secondly, it still remains for man to decide what position he wishes to take toward his conscience. Even in the dens of iniquity conscience is not silent, but apprises him of the requirements of the divine law. Obedience, however—or at least an earnest endeavor to be obedient to this witness of conscience, however stinted it may be—forms the starting-point of a moral development of life.

Finally, the question whether this deplorable lot, that is assigned to thousands from their birth and without their fault, is yet not fatal in regard to their eternal welfare, is answered by our Lord himself in the words: "That servant which knew his lord's will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes. But he that knew not, and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with

few stripes. For unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required." (Luke, xii, 47, 48.) From these words, as well as from Matt. xi, 20–24, where the Lord pronounces "woe" unto the cities of Galilee in which most of his mighty works were done, and declares unto them that it shall be more tolerable for the former inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon, yea, even for those of Sodom, at the day of judgment, than for them—it is evident that the standard according to which the eternal fate of each individual person is decided, is dependent upon the better or worse opportunity given him for his conversion and moral perfection.

Remark 1.—That the Scriptures do not hold the individual person responsible for the corrupted nature imparted to him by birth, appears from the circumstance that, without placing any condition, Christ promises the kingdom of heaven to children who have not yet with a conscious will chosen the evil. This by no means implies that children, as such, are qualified for heaven. They are rather, in consequence of their organic connection with the sinful race, partakers in the sum total of the guilt of humanity, which is inseparable from the sinful natural state, and are of themselves not fit for heaven. But this innate guilt is neutralized by the atonement of Christ. For "as by the offense of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life." (Rom. v, 18.) Upon this fact Christ bases his promise that children shall inherit the kingdom of heaven. These, which have not sinned with their own co-operation—that is, of their own choice—become partakers also in the fruits of the atonement without their own co-operation, and if they die at the age of childhood at which they are non-imputable, they are cleansed from inbred sin, and received into heaven by virtue of the merits of Christ.

Remark 2.—"The temperaments are ethically adiaphorous (neutral), and as such not endowments for evil. The sanguine person is, as such, not yet given to anger, and the phlegmatic person, as such, is not yet given to indolence." "Every temperament can be sanctified in the service of Christ (compare the sanguine Peter, the choleric Paul, the melancholy Thomas, and the phlegmatic Nathanael), and is by no means destroyed

by the spirit of Christ, as if it were of itself something evil; as, for example, the hankering for strong drink is destroyed by the spirit of Christ. It is true that a certain evil disposition stands in closer relation to one temperament than to another—for example, anger more with the sanguine and choleric than with the melancholy and phlegmatic—and it is further true that if man permits the temperament to control the will, instead of controlling the former by the latter, the temperament leads directly to certain sins (for example, the phlegmatic, to indolence). Of themselves, however, the differences of temperament belong to the good and necessary organization of the total of mankind into various and variously endowed personalities." (Ebrard, Dogmat., Vol. I, p. 427.)

Remark 3.—Even in the best natural disposition, in one quite free from prominent inclinations to gross sins, there lies the germ of all sins. "Who is shielded by his natural endowment from anger, envy, temptability to strong drink, debauchery, etc.? Why have people sunk, often suddenly and rapidly, from the most honorable and respectable life, even to murder? Who must not admit, at the sight of one who has become insane through some passion, that there have been moments in his own life in which the bridge to insanity was made, or that there is at least no want of tinder in him for this feverish fire?" "The natural man walks about on the lava-crust of a volcano, and this volcano is the discordant psychical-corporeal life which he has inherited from his parents." (Ebrard a. o. O., p. 426.)

§ 19. Wrong Views of the Condition of Natural Man.

The task now remains to justify the view developed above of the degenerated condition of human freedom in the sinful state as opposed to the two extreme views—that of Pelagianizing indeterminism and that of religious determinism.

1. Pelagianizing indeterminism looks at sin as something purely casual. Man, it holds, is yet in his normal state, and has at every moment an unrestricted freedom of choice. Sin does by no means exert a determining, or destining influence upon the human will; the latter is independent of the various motives to action, and its de-

cision is in every case as free as that of Adam and Eve in Paradise.

In meeting this argument, it is necessary, first of all, to call attention to the fact that experience shows every decision of the will to effect a condition of the will by which all its later decisions are influenced, and hence sin manifests itself as an ever-active power that subjugates the will. Hence the deeds of man correspond to his being. "How can ye, being evil, speak good things? Out of the abundance of the heart, the mouth speaketh. A good tree can not bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. The tree is known by its fruits." (Matt. vii, 18; xii, 33–35.) These words of our Lord express clearly that the sinful conduct of man springs from a sinful natural basis. Now, since there exists an organic connection between parents and children, and the begotten must always inherit the nature of the begetter, the sinful determination of the will of the parents must be present in the children as germinal disposition. This is, indeed, the case, and can be denied by those only who purposely close their eyes to experience. Whoever knows himself, knows that from early youth there was in him a predominant inclination toward evil, whence he always found it easier to do evil than to do good; and not one naturally begotten child of Adam has succeeded in keeping wholly free from sin, although every one must inwardly approve of the good. This would simply be incomprehensible if man's freedom of choice were perfectly unrestricted. The moral conflict required by the exercising of the good, and the dismal power of passion, which impels man on toward evil despite his inner resistance (compare Rom. vii, 15, 24), clearly show that the natural man is by no means free as to the motives that influence him, as indeterminism claims, but that he possesses a decided predisposition for

evil, which under certain circumstances can assume the form of total servility to sin.

2. Religious determinism is directly opposed to Pelagianizing indeterminism. The latter ignores the organic connection of the individual with the sin of mankind as a whole, and the former misjudges the fact "that the individual is not only a member of the race but that the center of his life is within him, although in relative dependence upon the race." Religious determinism denies all individual freedom of action, and holds man to be incapable of all moral self-destination. Even though man possesses a certain freedom of choice in "civic," that is, in worldly things, he is an involuntary agent in the domain of morals and religion, and hence can do no more toward his conversion than a "pillar of salt" or a "clod" can. This view, although it is based upon a deep conviction of the dismal power of evil as well as of the bondage and corruption of the human will, annuls the moral imputability and responsibility, and hence, also, the morality of man itself, despite all its efforts to avoid such consequences. But as long as there exists a conscience in the bosom of man, his moral consciousness will oppose a view that leads to such consequences.

Remark 1.—Religious determinism must be distinguished from psychological determinism spoken of in §5; the latter is in the service of infidelity and religious indifferentism, the former in the service of a Church dogma, namely, the dogma of the innate corruption of human-nature. In their immoderate endeavors to assert this doctrine, even the reformers, Zwingli, Calvin, Beza, Luther, and Melanchthon, fell into religious determinism. The latter has even been given a place in the *liber concordiæ* of the symbolical writings of the Lutheran Church. In his celebrated Leipsic disputation with Dr. Eck, Luther compared man to a saw that must suffer itself to be moved back and forth by the hand of the work-master. Later he compared fallen man to a pillar of salt, a log, a clod, and a lifeless

statue that can not use its eyes, its mouth, nor any of the senses, nor either its heart. (Luther, in Genes. c, xix.) The *formula concordiæ* declares (Sol. decl. II, de lib. arb. § 44), that fallen man does not possess as much as the faculty of hearing God and his Holy Word, or of willing to the extent of his knowledge thereof; and at another place (I, de peccat. orig. § 9) it says that fallen man can think, believe, and will nothing relating to divine and spiritual things, that he is quite dead to all that is good, and that he does not possess even a small spark of spiritual power (whereby we must particularly think of freedom of choice.) The *formula concordiæ* attempts to evade determinism by acknowledging that man has yet the power to move from place to place and lend the word of God his physical ear, even though his spiritual ear remains closed. (Sol. decl. II, de lib. arb. § 19.) But this attempt can by no means give satisfaction, for in that acknowledgment it places upon the feet and ears—in a word, upon the body—a moral responsibility that can be ascribed only to the self-conscious spirit.

2. BARRIERS TO THE SINFUL DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE: THE NATURAL LAW AND THE REVEALED LAW.

§ 20. The Natural Law.

In Paradise man stood between the attracting forces of heaven and hell. By his first sinful act he turned toward the latter, hell, and must therefore, after severing his communion with God, be precipitated vertically into it. That such has not happened, that there is yet a sinful development and a possibility of redemption, is due solely to the grace of God, who, by his measures of grace, changed the perpendicular fall into perdition to a gliding down along an inclined plane.

To these measures of grace belong, first of all, the natural (innate) moral law, or conscience, which we have learned to know as a moment of the moral endowment of man, and the revealed law.

(*a*) From the conscience of the individual we must distinguish a public conscience (conscience of society,

collective conscience), the demands of which appear in the form of customs or statutes, and are acknowledged justified and binding by the individual conscience; whence the individual can not disregard prevailing custom unpunished.* In both the public and the individual conscience the innate moral law opposes the human self-will, placing barriers for it and demanding obedience. Hence no man can develop in the innate sinful bent of his life without coming in conflict with this law. As it condemns and prohibits the sinful impulses of the selfish heart, it creates conflict and disquietude in the bosom of man (Rom. ii, 15); and as it holds him responsible for his actions, it awakens a feeling of guilt and forebodings of a threatening judgment, if its demands are not met. By this double activity it tends to stay the sinful bent of the will and of the development of life.

As law merely (categorical imperative), conscience is not able to awaken genuine enthusiasm for the good, much less to effect a real renewing of the heart. But nevertheless it is the preserving element in social life as well as in the life of the individual. Without conscience a regulated cohabitation of people would be utterly impossible. When the unfettered passions of the rabble drown the voice of conscience—for example, in a revolution—the words of the poet are true:

> "Now naught of sacredness remaineth,
> Nor the restraints of pious awe;
> The good is hushed, the evil reigneth,
> And vice defieth every law."

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*The only exception to this is to be found in cases where an enlightened individual conscience feels inwardly bound to oppose the degenerated and darkened public conscience with the light of a higher moral knowledge. Such is the case wherever Christian missionaries try to convert heathen nations, and to open the way for a different view of the world, and a different bent of life, by preaching to them the gospel of Christ Jesus.

Conscience reminds man of his moral destination, brings all of greatness and imperishableness that human power and reason is capable of into connection with this absolute life-purpose, and thus gives life, even that of the heathen, who have not the revealed law, a higher import.

Since the same God is author of both the natural and the revealed law, the contents of the natural law must, in its essentials, harmonize with what is contained in the so-called Ten Commandments, which are the substance of all of God's moral demands. Hence the demands of reverential awe of God, based upon the natural revelation of God (Rom. i, 19), the recognition of the fundamental rights of human society as well as of the individual, especially due regard for the property, honor, and life of man, and also for the "life-begetting institution of marriage," form the fundamental pillars of the family regulations as well as of the municipal laws of heathendom. But it must be borne in mind that these single moments of the moral law are not everywhere recognized and emphasized with the same clearness. It is rather known to be true that the most enlightened heathen nations have constantly swerved, and often lived in terrible darkness as to moral knowledge, so that they could not attain to a deep and correct apprehension of the moral mission of man. This brings us to the fact of the darkening of conscience by sin.

As conscience is a faculty of the human soul, its functions are placed in close reciprocal relation to the other activities of the soul. Now, several activities of the soul can not take place at the same time and all come to our consciousness; therefore, whenever one activity predominates, all others are forced back. Hence the possibility of darkening and drowning conscience, though it can not be silenced. Thus, for example, the

sensualist drowns conscience by plunging into worldly pleasures and enjoyments; the miser, by harboring the unhappy desire for money and possessions; he who is desirous of honor, by being completely absorbed in the struggle for honor and influence in this world, etc. In short, wherever the reaction of the natural self-will or of the sinful public will against that inner attestation of guilt becomes constant or lasting, there must result a darkening and blunting of conscience, which can degenerate into moral rudeness.

But not only a darkening or blunting, but also a perverting, of conscience is possible; and hence we can properly speak of an erring conscience. It may even be the case that a person feels bound by conscience to do what is directly opposed to the demands of true morality. (John xvi, 2; Acts xxii, 3, 4; xxvi, 9; Romans x, 2, 4.) Thus the Hindoo mother, bound by conscience, throws her child into the sacred river (Ganges), and the Hindoo widow permits herself to be burned to ashes with the body of her dead husband. From these facts arises the necessity of an objective, trustworthy norm of the moral conduct of man—the necessity of a revealed law.

Remark.—In the case of an erring or perverted conscience there has evidently been a false norm of conscience substituted for the original one. An objective law, a general custom, or even the word of some authority, may serve as such a false norm. Conscience then executes the same functions with this substituted false norm as with the original. Hence conscience does not really err, but operates according to a foreign criterion. That this view is correct is evident from the fact that an erring conscience can be cured in no way except by investing the original witness of conscience with its former authority. Here all arguments avail nothing, as long as conscience itself does not speak again. When the original witness of conscience has rent asunder the cloud of foreign authority, and legitimates truth again, then, and not till then, will the erring conscience cease demanding and accusing; yea, the enlightened conscience then condemns what the erring demanded.

The question now arises, whether the erring conscience is also binding in regard to our conduct. We answer, yes. It is better to follow your erring conscience than to act unconscientiously. The moral worth of man is determined by his will; hence he who wills to do his duty, even though he err regarding the true demands of the moral law, undoubtedly ranks higher, morally, than he who is not at all concerned about his duty. Man, therefore, is not to be blamed for the individual case in which he follows the erring conscience, but the erring of his conscience may be his own fault.

§ 21. The Revealed Law.

The revealed law we understand, first of all, to be the Mosaic code of law, in which God has expressed his will as the inviolable norm of human action. With the words, "I am the Lord thy God," which introduce the revelation of the law, God places himself as the lawgiver into the front, whereby the demands of the law assume a decidedly religious character. Man now feels responsible, not only to the judge in his bosom, but, above all, to the Eternal Judge in the beyond. Hence the significance of the office of conscience to inflict punishment becomes doubly terrible through the thunders from Sinai.

In regard to the contents of the revealed law, it must not be forgotten that this law figures in the history of salvation, and also has a pedagogical purpose to accomplish, and therefore it appears in theocratic national form. It therefore contains articles the sole purpose of which is to regulate the national and the religious life of Israel, the bearer of the divine revelations of grace, and to prepare the way for the complete revelation of the divine will through Christ. To these articles belong the theocratic-civil rules of life and the instructions for public worship (ritual or ceremonial law). But even these elements must not be viewed as a purely human or useless veil; they have a pedagogical purpose, and as far as this purpose is accomplished they are not put aside,

but are lifted to a higher plane, are spiritually transfigured or fulfilled, whereby, indeed, the external pedagogical veil is lifted away. The eternally and universally valid essence of the revealed law are the commandments concerning morals (the so-called moral law). These are made prominent in the Old Testament by the two tables of the Decalogue (or the "Ten Commandments"), and in the New Testament our Lord himself confirms the universal and eternal validity of the same. (Matt. xix, 17, etc.) But all commandments touching upon morals may be gathered to a focus in the fundamental demand of love to God and fellow-man, wherefore this demand is called the Great Commandment. (Matt. xxii, 40.)

If we direct our attention more closly to the Decalogue as the summary of all moral demands of the law, even the division into two tables of five commandments each shows an "order, wonderful and comprising all human conditions." The sanctification of life through love is the end of each commandment, although love itself is not expressly mentioned in the Decalogue. The central thought contained in the first table is the sanctification of our relation to God. God is to be loved and honored,—1. As the only true God; 2. In the proper manner; 3. With regard to his name; 4. With regard to his day; 5. With regard to parents, upon whom, as his representatives, he confers a part of his honor. As the relation of children to parents—that is, the family—forms the basis of social life, the Fifth Commandment appears a natural transition to the second table, which treats of the sanctification of our relation to our fellow-man. The commandments of this table touch upon,—6. The bodily life; 7. Marriage; 8. Material possessions (worldly goods); 9. Spiritual possessions (the good name); and close, 10, with the demand of heart-sanctification through love ("Thou shalt not covet") as the indis-

pensable condition of true fulfillment of the law. The separation of this one fundamental demand of love into the single positive and negative commandments of the Decalogue is in perfect harmony with the pedagogical purpose of the law.

The revealed law shows itself a hindering barrier to sinful development,—(1) In that it establishes a fixed norm of moral action in the midst of the turbid and uncertain fluctuations of human opinion, and in that it awakens the slumbering conscience, and enlightens the erring by destroying the illusions with which the thoughtless rock themselves to sleep, and the indolent excuse their sin; hence it serves in general as a regulator for swerving conscience; (2) In that it exposes the dreadful depths of the selfish human heart by the positive demand of love toward God and fellow-man to such an extent as they could never be exposed by conscience alone; so that it can properly be said that, without the revealed law, man attains neither to a true knowledge of self nor to a deeper knowledge of God. True, it is just as impossible for the revealed law as for the innate to beget true inner obedience springing from love, because, as mere request, it lacks the power that impels to a regeneration of the will. Hence it remains an enslaving power that begets only fear, and passes unrelenting judgment on the sinner by giving in every commandment the verdict: "Thou art guilty of death!" But just therein lies its morally preserving and educating significance. It forces man to a knowledge of self, makes conscience more acute, and leads him to despair of his own strength and to desire redemption by disclosing to him his great servility to sin. Thus the revealed law is not only a barrier for sinful development, but also a "school-master to bring us unto Christ."

Although, as we saw above, neither the innate nor the revealed law is of itself able to prevent the sinner's

sinking into hell, nevertheless these divine measures of grace are a potent trigger, and, for those who subject themselves to them, a means of education by which the way is prepared for their salvation. But whosoever acts contrary to the known will of God, and, disregarding the admonitions of his conscience, remains in the paths of sin—whether it be among Jews or Christians who have the revealed law, or among the heathen who have not the revealed law—seals his damnation, notwithstanding these divine counter-measures.

"Damned be whoe'er with sin doth play!
Though it hath been but playing,
In bitter earnestness will he atonement make."

3. SINGLE SINS.

§ 22. Temptation and Sin.

The single sins, in which man opposes his own will to the holy will of God with more or less consciousness, are the obvious symptoms of innate sinfulness, the single manifestations of the depravity lying dormant in every natural man. They can be classified, according to their relation to the moral law, into sins of commission and sins of omission; for the selfish rebellion of the selfish will against the divine will can manifest itself as well in the omission of good as in the commission of evil. Therefore James says: "To him that knoweth to do good and doeth it not, to him it is sin" (iv, 17).

The genesis of single sins can not be described better than it has been done by James in the words, "Every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed. Then, when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin; and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death." (James i, 14, 15.) He designates "own lust" as the starting point of temptation, by which, however, he does not deny the existence of a tempter external to man,

by whom lust is excited, or, if it awake of itself, fostered. In the case of the original sin in Paradise, and of the temptation of Christ, the temptation was obliged to originate with this external tempter, Satan himself, because Adam and Eve, as well as Christ, were free from the so-called inherited sinfulness. With us, however, it is not thus. We walk about on the crater of a volcano, as it were, whose inner heat can at any moment rend asunder the thin covering of lava and throw out the pent-up glowing masses in a destructive eruption. The volcano is our nature, which is poisoned by sin. The glowing masses are our impulses and desires, in which evil lust seeks to obtain authority and exert a destining influence upon the free will, whether they appear as positive impulses toward evil, or merely as displeasure or slothfulness in doing good. As soon as evil lust has risen within us, we are tempted.

Sin, however, has as yet not been committed. It is now left for the free will of man to resist evil and suppress it, or to consent to and follow it. This is clearly expressed in what the Lord said to Cain. (Gen. iv. 6, 7.) God's preference of the pious Abel awakened in Cain the desire for revenge. The evil lust is so strong that Cain's ill-humor is plainly stamped upon his countenance. Then the Lord said (literal translation): "Is it not thus, if thou makest thyself good (destinest thyself for the good), there is elevation (mighty raising by divine assistance) present; but if thou dost not destine thyself for the good, sin (actual sin) lies in wait at the door. It is desirous for thee. But become thou the master of it." A child is able to extinguish the spark that falls into the dry prairie-grass; but when the wind has fanned it into a flame that roars along the dry plain, man is impotent against the power of the fiery element. Thus it is with sin. It is easy for the energetic will to smother it in its first begin-

ning; later, however, it becomes from moment to moment more difficult to gain the mastery over it.

Therefore James says: "When lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin." But by what does lust conceive? We answer with Martensen: "By the imagination. For there exists a magic connection between lusts (desires) and imagination." No sooner is lust awakened than the imagination begins to play its part, fascinating the soul by seductive pictures of sensuality, honor, worldly possessions, or other "far more trifling realities," which are specially attractive for this person or that. The imagination promises man nothing but joy and happiness to result from satisfying his lust, and if he does not succeed in breaking the magic circle which it has drawn around him, he must finally succumb to the increasing power of temptation. Even the will destines itself to sin. Inexorably determined rejection of the seductive pictures of the imagination, or speedy flight out of its magic circle (example: Joseph in Potiphar's house, Gen xxxix, 13), are indispensable conditions of victory. Whoever trifles with temptation, or does not resist it with a firm resolution; whoever is pleased with the tempting pictures of his imagination, and holds fast to them, fancying that he will ever have the choice to do what he wishes to do,—is lost. The original sin in Paradise is an illustration of this sad truth. The tempter awakened lust in the woman, and induced the imagination to participate by making fraudulent promises. But instead of fleeing from the place of danger, and forcing the tempting pictures of fancy out of her thoughts, the woman remains, and "sees that the tree is good for food, and that it is pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise." Now her fancy presents the tree in such an enticing manner that she can no longer resist. Lust has conceived; that is, fecundated by the imagination, it has become the destin-

ing motive of the will. With the acceptance of lust into the free will, sin has been committed inwardly, and there is but a short step from this to the sinful deed. Therefore we read further: "She took of the fruit thereof, and did eat; and gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat." (Gen. iii, 1–6.)

§ 23. Passion and Vice.

"This is the curse of evil deeds,
That, breeding on, they constantly bear evil."

The truth of the poet's words is verified not only by the fact that the various sins call one another forth in consequence of their inner connection (§ 17), and that, in striving to conceal his committed sin or to escape his merited punishment, the sinner is forced as by a dismal power to commit new sins, but also by the fact that, according to the peculiar construction of our sensorial spiritual organization, every single sinful desire increases in the measure in which it is satisfied. Thus it happens that in the course of time the desire is established as permanent inclination, which increases in power to such an extent that the harmony of the powers of the soul is destroyed, the soul deprived of its free self-destination, and man thereby lowered to a slave of his lust. This increased inclination we call passion, because man no longer rules over it, but suffers it, as it were.

Passion does not depend upon real requisites, but upon enticements created by man himself; namely, upon the deceptions of a lustful imagination. Therefore, passion finds no ultimate end of its satisfaction; man in his passion is more insatiable than the brute. The dismal power hurls him incessantly along the path of destruction, into which he rushes with eyes open.

Inasmuch as passion destroys the free self-destination of the will, it is a morbid disturbance of the psychical

life, which is meaningly expressed in German in naming single passions by calling them disease (*Sucht*, from *siech*—sick.) The German says *Habsucht* (literally, having-sickness—English, covetousness), *Trunksucht* (literally, drinking-sickness—English, drunkenness), *Spielsucht* (literally, playing-sickness—English, passion for gambling), etc., just as it says *Fallsucht* (falling-sickness) and *Schwindsucht* (literally, wasting-sickness—English, consumption.) In those passions that have their basis in the senses of man—for example, drunkenness—the morbid increase of the desires is connected with a morbid change in the physical organization, which makes man's subjugation to his passions doubly oppressive.

Although passion is properly termed a disease, yet it must not be forgotten that this disease is a self-imposed one. No one is born with passion; it always arises in the course of time as the consequence of repeated yielding to the tempting desires. Every slave of passion knows a time in which he was yet master of his desires. Therefore every one feels responsible for his passions.

When the satisfying of passion has come to be a habit, we call it vice. The latter fixes itself as a definite turn in man's disposition and character, and thus comes to be viciousness.

Remark 1.—"In consequence of that haste with which in worldly pleasure the selfish will strives after some relative good, any desire increases to passionate excitement. Thus the brain (as the organ of conscious thought) and the nerves are excited in a special direction, and by repetition are overexcited; the brain and the nerves then react upon the spiritual-psychical life, so that, without willing it, man is finally excited by his corporealness, as such, to single definite evil deeds. This becomes specially perceptible in the case of sensuality, of drunkenness, and of the opium-eater; but it need not necessarily be a sensual (that is, directed toward excitements that are mediated by the sensitive nerves) desire; a purely spiritual, sinful willing (as avarice, passion for gambling, for power, for honor)

can be increased by the activity of the brain to an habitual excitement which automatically awakens in man's consciousness certain lines of thoughts and ideas, and continues incessantly to present them." (Ebrard, Apologetics, p. 238.)

§ 24. Differences of Single Sins.

From the time of the Stoics to the present day there has been no lack of persons that make the paradoxical assertion, There is no difference among sins. In God's eyes all sins are alike; that is, alike culpable and punishable. Hence, they say, it is altogether unwarranted to speak of great and small sins. As he who is a yard below the surface of the water will drown, as well as he who is five hundred fathoms below the surface, just so does the sinner trespass the laws of God in like manner, whether he steal a loaf of bread or murder his father. To confirm this paradoxical assertion, James ii, 10, is quoted: "Whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all." These words, however, declare only that, according to its nature, every sin offends the majesty, not of a single commandment only, but of the entire law—yea, of the Divine Lawgiver himself—and hence merits eternal damnation. That is the moment of truth in the paradoxical sentence, With God, all sins are alike. But this does not say that among the single sins, all of which merit damnation, there is no distinction between great and small. Who would hold that Peter's denial or Thomas's unbelief was a sin as great as Judas's betrayal? Christ evidently acknowledges a difference himself when he says to Pilate: "He that delivered me unto thee hath the greater sin." (John xix, 11.)

Let us, therefore, endeavor to ascertain whereby this difference in the degree of sins, notwithstanding that they are essentially alike, is conditioned.

The difference between the so-called sins of omission and sins of commission is manifestly of purely formal

significance, and indifferent in the gradation of the guilt of sin. For the selfish rebellion of the human will against the divine will can manifest itself, as we saw above, as well in omitting the good as in committing the bad. And he that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, sins no less (James iv, 17) than he that commits a positively bad deed.

More significant is the distinction of sinning by thoughts, words, and deeds. For it can not be denied that sins committed by deeds (*Thatsünden*—deed-sins) in general require a greater intensity and energy of the will, and disturb the moral reality to a greater extent, than those sins which are restricted to words and thoughts. Nevertheless even this distinction in regard to the degree of guilt is not a decisive one; for in innumerable cases the manifestation of sin by words and deeds is prevented by purely selfish considerations.

As the nature of sin consists in the rebellion of the self-will against the divine moral order of the world, the decisive moment which determines the magnitude of a sin or the degree of guilt can not be something external. It must lie in the will of man itself, or, better, in man's disposition. We must therefore inquire whether the sin is committed consciously or unconsciously, in momentary passion or with premeditated intention; in other words, whether it is a voluntary or an involuntary sin, a sin proceeding from weakness or from malignity. In regard to this difference the following canon can be laid down: The more intense the sinful will, the clearer the consciousness that the act is contrary to the will of God; and the more conscience and outward circumstances oppose the execution thereof, the more punishable is the sin, and the more fatal its reaction upon the character of him who commits it.

This view is corroborated by the clearest statements

of Scripture. Christ himself says (Luke, xii 47, 48): "That servant which knew his lord's will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes. But he that knew not, and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes." In Matthew xi, 24, he declares that it shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom in the day of judgment than for the Galilean cities that had been the scene of his activity. The above-named measure is further used by Christ in judging sins, when he says to Pilate, "He that delivered me unto thee hath the greater sin;" and in his prayer on the cross, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do!" (Luke xxiii, 34.)*

Hence, notwithstanding the likeness of all sins with regard to their nature, there can be various degrees of the sinful will, and consequently also various degrees of guilt distinguished; and in this sense it is perfectly proper to speak of "greater" and "smaller" sins; though not of "great" and "small," for all sins are great in God's eyes.

Remark.—The difference made by the Catholic Church between certain enumerated "mortal sins" and the so-called "venial sins," seems wholly arbitrary, since it is based entirely upon the "material of action"—that is, upon the accidental contents of the sinful will—while the disposition lying at the bottom of the action is disregarded.

According to the *Canones et Decreta Concilii Tridentini*, vi, 15, mortal sins are those from which the justified can by the help of God remain free, and by which we are excluded from the realm of grace; whence it follows that venial sins are those from which even the justified can not remain free, and which do not exclude from the grace of God. (Can. xiv, 5.) This, however, does not tell us what the mortal sins are, but only what their consequences are. From the designation of its symbols it is evident that the Catholic Church bases the difference between

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Compare also Acts xvii, 30; 1 Tim. i, 13; Acts iii, 17; Rom. ii, 12; John ix, 41.

venial sins and mortal sins "less upon the disposition than upon the material of action; hence distinguishes between great and small sins according to their vulgar designation." Therefore, when the Catholic Church wishes to tell what mortal sins are, it can do so only by enumerating them, as it is done, for example, in the *Canones Conc. Trid.*, vi, 15, where the following is found: "Not only unbelievers, but also fornicators, adulterers, voluptuaries, sodomites, thieves, misers, drunkards, blasphemers, robbers, and all others [which others?] that commit mortal sins." According to Peter Lombard, the Catholic Church usually enumerates seven mortal sins, namely, "Pride, avarice, voluptuousness, anger, debauchery, envy, and indolence of heart." It is quite evident that such a distinction between sins according to the contents of the evil will is very arbitrary.

4. THE BRANCHINGS OF SIN OVER THE VARIOUS SPHERES OF LIFE.

§ 25. The Sins against Our Own Personality.

In § 15 we found the fundamental principle of sin to be selfishness, which was transmitted to all naturally begotten mankind in the form of evil lust. Through selfishness man also becomes the slave of worldly lust. (§ 15.) The latter appears under the three principal heads—the lust of the eyes, the lust of the flesh, and the pride of life. Under these three heads all single sins are comprised. Thus selfishness appears as the root from which all sins spring; and as the branches of a tree mutually interweave, so the single sins sustain to one another a reciprocal relation, one easily producing the other. Thus, for example: "Pride is not far from sensuality (pride of life); and if sensuality wishes to defend itself against the accusations of conscience, it endeavors in its pride to disregard the law." Covetousness (lust of the eyes) is the servant of both, and is followed by a multitude of other sins; wherefore it is called the "root of all evil." (1 Tim. vi, 10.)

In presenting the branching of sin in practical life, however, we will not proceed from the above division, but rather classify the single manifestations of sinful action according to their various relations to our own person, to God, and to fellow-man. In this manner the inner derangement and hopelessness of the natural man will be revealed to their full extent.

Let us consider, first of all, sin in its relation to our own person. The chief aim of the natural man is his own welfare. He wishes to be happy, but endeavors to gain this end in a manner contrary to God. In his case the words of Christ are fulfilled: "Whosoever will save his life [selfishly], shall lose it." (Matt. xvi, 25.) Separated from God and delivered over to the lower impulses of his degenerated nature, man spends all his energies in the service of sin, instead of finding his greatest happiness and his true life in the realization of his divine destination.

In the spiritually* constituted personal life, wrong love of self, which in its nature is self-deification (compare Gen. iii, 5, "Ye shall be as gods," etc.), manifests its destroying and perverting influence by hindering the healthy development of the intellect and of volition.

Therefore the natural man lacks, above all, a deeper knowledge of self. More or less intentionally, he closes his eyes to the condition in which he is; he excuses his sin, instead of repenting. "The semblance of virtue forces conscience back and strengthens sin, and the acute intellect becomes the attorney of vice. Sin leads to a blinding of self, which is a new sin." Man holds the truth in unrighteousness (Rom. i, 18), and thus, through self-delusion and intentional self-deception, he sinks deeper and deeper into the bog of error, blindness, and perverseness, which can increase to insanity.

From this want of deeper knowledge of self springs

* Spiritual is here used as opposed to physical.—F. W. S.

overestimation of self in its three fundamental forms, vanity, pride, and haughtiness.* True, whoever would accomplish anything in this world must possess a certain self-esteem. Who does not respect himself, who throws himself away, can lay no claim to the respect of others. Hence self-respect of itself is quite proper; but as soon as it exalts our own person at the expense of others, it comes to be selfishness and therefore sin. This is the case in the above-mentioned three fundamental forms of overestimation of self, vanity, pride, and haughtiness.

Vanity is that overestimation of self which is based upon the vain—that is, upon accidental superiority, beauty, finery, possessions, etc.; hence upon "what is less than man." Vanity, therefore, is at home in small minds, although, often enough, proud and even haughty people are not free from mean vanity. Pride is based upon what man is or believes himself to be. The nature of aristocracy is therefore not vanity, but pride. Hence we speak of pride of nobility, pride of knowledge, pride of nationality, etc. Finally, haughtiness (*Hochmuth*) is based upon the ability of man. "He who is proud considers himself the chief of men; he who is haughty (*hochmüthig*) considers himself a kind of superhuman being." Here man opposes even God and falls into arrogance and deification of self. When, during the battle of Waterloo, Napoleon I addressed God in the words, "You thunder up there; I thunder here below; let us see which is the mightier!" his speech reveals the highest pinnacle to which human haughtiness can rise.

The direct opposite of overestimation of self is contempt of self, to which frequently those succumb who

*The distinction between pride and haughtiness is not marked as between the German *Stolz* and *Hochmuth*. Haughtiness is the nearest equivalent that we can find for *Hochmuth* (literally high-courage). The import of the two German words will appear from the definitions given farther on.—F. W. S.

have ruined themselves bodily and mentally in the service of sin, so that they have become perfect slaves of sin, and sin itself, even in its most artful form, has lost its power of attracting them. As in overestimation of self sin reveals its perverting influence upon the own person of man, so it reveals in contempt of self its destroying influence. It is hard to be misjudged and despised by others; but to be obliged to despise one's self is intolerable. Therefore contempt of self frequently leads to suicide.

Not only the healthy activity of the intellect, but also the healthy will-power becomes a prey of the tyrannical self-will. The natural man lacks proper self-control. In sluggish natures this want is manifested in impotence of the will, in indolence, laziness, stupidity, and indifference; in passionate natures it is manifested in morbid overexcitement of the will, in hastiness, imprudence, fool-hardiness, as well as in passionate outbreaks of anger and rage, which reach their climax in madness. Finally, in sluggish as well as passionate natures it manifests itself in inability to resist sensual impulses, whence the various forms of intemperance and unchastity (gluttony, immoderate drinking, self-pollution, etc.), spring.

§ 26. Sins against God.

The fundamental form of sin against God we have found to be unbelief, which is essentially an unfilial, loveless disposition. This disposition reveals itself in practical life as obstinacy and as timidity; wherefore the prophet calls the heart an "obstinate and timid thing." (German rendering, Jer. xvii, 9.) Obstinacy appears as ingratitude, murmuring against God, rebellion against God and his will, and finally as blasphemy. Timidity appears as distrust toward God, as despondency, and despair in regard to God's love. Occasionally both extremes appear peculiarly mingled; then, again, timidity suddenly

changes to obstinacy, and the despondent lamentation changes to bitter accusation, to murmuring against God; or obstinacy changes to timidity, as in the case of Cain (Gen. iv, 9, 13), Saul (1 Sam. xv, 18, 28, 29; xxviii, xxxi), Judas Iscariot (Matthew xxvi and xxvii), and others.

As loveless disposition, unbelief makes it impossible for man to approach God with full trust and devotion, and to serve him with filial obedience. Therefore the natural man languishes under the ban of an inner fear and disquietude that impel him to flee from God. If it is true that we can know the creature only inasmuch as we love it, it must the more be true with regard to God, the Creator. The necessary consequence of unbelief is a darkening of our knowledge of God. Consequently unbelief easily changes to superstition. Sinful man, who can not help fearing God, although he will not be subject to him, fears the pictures of his own heated imagination, and the dismal forces of darkness (witch-stories, ghost-stories, etc.), or puts the terrifying forces of nature in the place of God, deifies the creature, and offers to it a self-selected worship which is offensive to God, and through which man endeavors to quiet his menacing conscience. Thus originated the heathenish worship of nature and images, the development of which ends in the bottomless morass of falsehood and moral depravity. (Rom. i, 21–32.) The darkening of knowledge reaches its climax in denial of God, or atheism.

Not only the theoretical deification of nature as it is found in the religious rites of the heathen, but also the practical deification of nature in the worship of mammon, which characterizes the modern ages of godless degeneracy, springs from want of love to God. The worship of mammon (or covetousness in its various forms) springs from an immoderate longing after enjoyment; for

money has such a charm for man only inasmuch as it is a means of enjoyment; that is, of satisfying sensual or also mental desires and wants. Nevertheless it is not the enjoyment itself that the covetous one strives after; in consequence of a peculiar confounding of means and end he contents himself with money, which serves as the representative of enjoyment. In many cases he even denies himself the cheerful enjoyment of his possessions, and, in his insatiable thirst for riches, imposes upon himself the greatest privations. In this form the worship of mammon appears as filthy avarice, which famishes in the midst of over-abundance. As the avaricious one can not trust the living God, because he has made mammon his God (Matthew, vi, 24), he is surrounded upon all sides by apparitions of future want. In order to protect himself from this want, he hoards up money, which he considers a guarantee against want. Since money at its best can procure only temporal enjoyments (and hence every one that makes temporal possessions the chief end of his endeavors, forfeits the riches of heaven), the worship of mammon seems the greatest folly—a thought that is touchingly expressed in the parable of the "rich fool." The Bible simply calls the worship of mammon idolatry (Col. iii, 5; Eph. iv, 19; v, 5), and declares that it is wholly incompatible with the service of God. (Matthew vi, 23.)

Another form of practical deification of the world is gluttony, which, in direct opposition to the worship of mammon, makes enjoyment its highest aim of life ("whose God is their belly," Phil. iii, 19), and manifests itself in the various forms of intemperance, in gormandizing, excessive drinking, and gross excesses. How far gluttony can be carried is shown by the distinguished revelers in the time of the Roman emperors, who thought of the most adventurous means for exciting their spoiled palates.

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Whereas the want of love for the Creator leads on the one hand to deification of the creature, it leads on the other hand to contempt and wanton destruction of the works and gifts of God. For whenever man, devoid of love and gratitude, clings only to the gift and forgets the Giver, the gift itself loses its higher moral signification. It is regarded simply as the means of self-satisfaction, and hence is either deified or despised. Hence in this world, which is alienated from God, we constantly find covetousness and longing after enjoyment side by side with disregard and destruction of God's world, which, according to the object, appears as extravagance, wanton destruction of trees, tormenting of animals and persons, etc., all of which show a loveless disposition toward God; for filial love honors God even in his works.

The necessary consequence of man's wrong position toward nature, as it appeared above, is that in his natural condition he is unable to govern this world according to his divine mission. Even the acquisitions of civilization, the astonishing discoveries and inventions by which he subjects the forces of nature to himself, are able to procure for him only a seeming dominion over the world. Yea, when the fear of God is wanting, they come to be a snare for him, and make him yet more the slave of matter by leading him farther away from God.

Remark 1.—It is a generally known fact that unbelief easily changes to superstition. It is impossible for man to rid himself of a feeling of dependence upon a higher invisible power. Well, therefore, does Immanuel Geibel say:

"When the door is closed to faith, a window lets in superstition; when divinity 's expelled, there enters apparition."

Remark 2.—Covetousness and frugality must not be confounded. The higher or lower degree of tenacity with which one clings to his possessions does not form the boundary between them. A covetous man may spend more money than a frugal one, and yet the former is guilty of the sin of worship-

ing mammon, while the latter is free from it. The boundary between them is formed rather by the position which a man occupies inwardly toward money. This is implied by the words of the Lord, that it is hard for "them that trust in riches to enter into the kingdom of God." (Mark x, 24.) Hence the nature of covetousness lies in man's placing his trust in money instead of in God, expecting riches to satisfy the wants of his heart, and therefore founding his life's happiness upon possessions. Thereby he makes money his God. The frugal one, on the contrary, possesses money as a trust committed to him by God, for the use of which he is responsible to God, and which he therefore has no right to squander. He enjoys gratefully what God gives him of earthly possessions; but he never forgets that his happiness is not dependent upon himself, but upon his personal position to God and his faithfulness toward him.

Remark 3.—How far gluttony can be carried, is shown by the Roman Emperor Heliogabalus, who ate only the heels of camels, the combs of cocks, the tongues of peacocks and nightingales, the barbs of the costly mullets, the brain of flamingoes, and such rarities.

Remark 4.—To show how easily deification and destruction of creatures can interchange, we simply call attention to Caligula. That monster, who, according to the testimony of Suetonius, found pleasure in wallowing in gold the whole length of his body, was at the same time so greedy of enjoyment and so extravagant that in one year he squandered for plays, banquets, and buildings the treasure of $143,000,000 gathered by Tiberius, and so cruel that, not only at the public plays, but even at his reveling banquets, he sentenced persons to be tortured to death, fight with wild animals, or be sawed to pieces alive; and only regretted that the entire Roman people had not but one head which he could cut off with one stroke—a concentrated massacre in which the monster would have found the greatest enjoyment.

§ 27. Sins against Fellow-man.

In our relation to fellow-man also, selfishness is the separating and destroying principle of life. To be sure, there are yet among sinful humanity remainders of the original creation of God, which act as barriers arresting the ruin of society. In every person there is an innate

impulse for association with other persons; and this impulse, which appears above all in the connections of consanguinity, friendship, and national fellowship, protects human society from total decomposition and dissolution, and compels the individual inwardly to live in justly regulated connection with others, and to strive toward progress in the various spheres of activity (the scientific, industrial, religious, political, etc.)

It can not be denied that humanity has, upon this basis, at times reached a wonderfully high degree of culture. But back of all the splendor of unchristian culture lies the dismal apparition of lovelessness and selfishness; and as progress in a culture whose chief motive power is selfishness always contains the germ of decay, there is no lasting elevation of mankind possible along the line of a culture that is separated from God. Selfishness poisons and makes turbid the mutual relations of mankind, notwithstanding all the external bloom of cultured life. It is selfishness that increases the unavoidable difference between rich and poor, masters and servants, princes and subjects, to irreconcilable opposites, and, through the conflict of interests, urges the individual to a war of all against all. On this gloomy basis of social life, as it has been depraved by selfishness, rises the so-called social question, which in our day has reached such threatening proportions.

In its single manifestations selfishness appears in regard to fellow-man essentially as want of love. Man estranged from God is not able to recognize nor to respect the image of God in his fellow-man. After all, people do not understand each other; and speech, which was given to man that he might make himself understood by others, becomes the means of disappointment and fraud, being used in the interest of selfishness.

This want of uprightness, or falseness of the natural

man in his spiritual intercourse* with his fellow-men, manifests itself in hypocrisy, falsehood, gossip, backbiting, calumny, perjury, as well as in the various forms of fraud in the dealings of man with man—all of which are sins that evidently are the emanation of a loveless disposition. A necessary consequence of this want of uprightness is mutual distrust, which undermines spiritual-moral† association.

The above-mentioned manifestations of the want of uprightness already intimate that, among natural mankind, the association of the will is also destroyed by selfishness. All the sins that belong here can be gathered together under the general term unrighteousness.

The germ of unrighteousness lies even in coldness and indifference toward fellow-man. The duty that charity imposes upon us is by no means fulfilled if we "have nothing against our neighbor;" not with nothing, but with a heart full of love, should we meet our neighbor, and, indeed, every one with whom Providence brings us together. This universal charity is wanting in the natural man. He is concerned about those only with whom he is connected by blood, by natural affection or selfish interests; to all others he is indifferent. He entertains no hatred toward them, but neither does he love them; and this coldness and indifference increases too often to positive unrighteousness in the feelings of ill-will, envy, mercilessness, pleasure at the misfortune of others, or in the open outbreakings of wrath and hatred, in contention, strife, and enmity.

This universal want of love not only destroys spiritual-moral association, it also undermines the permanence of the corporeal-material order of society. From loveless longing for enjoyment spring the manifold sexual

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*See foot-note, § 25. † *Id.*

excesses that feed upon the very heart of social life. Adultery, fornication, rape, incest, and pederasty—all these sins would become impossibilities if man recognized and loved God's image in fellow-man. In theft, fraud, desire for destroying, and extravagance, this want of love endangers the material possessions of fellow-man; and in mercilessness, violent abuse, manslaughter, murder, and cannibalism, even the life of fellow-man falls prey to the criminal dictates of selfishness.

Furthermore, it is worthy of notice that the selfish disregard of fellow-man does not at all exclude the possibility of a deification of man; the former easily changes to the latter, just as (according to § 25) overestimation of self easily changes to the opposite, self-contempt. We need not be surprised, therefore, that this selfish age, governed as it is by the principle of utility, is also the age of deification of men, and that genius was never more blindly and generally worshiped than in our day. Man, having lost all faith in God and an invisible world, deifies either himself or others of his kind whose mental superiority he can not deny. He must have some object for religious veneration.

Not only the moral association of individuals, but also of families, corporations, and nations, is destroyed by selfishness. It is selfishness—or, in other words, sin—that separates parents, destroys the relation of piety between children and parents, and scatters the seed of discord among the various larger social organizations; it is selfishness that defeats a universal peace among nations, and forces the governments to maintain immense standing armies; it is selfishness that makes war a necessary evil, and that celebrates its gloomy victories in privileged massacre, in battles.

Looking at the universal derangement of the personal as well as the social life—which we have learned

to know as the result of our consideration of the branchings of sin. We can, indeed, not see how a moral renovation and elevation of degenerated mankind to true humanity is possible, and how it could be brought about upon the basis of the forces which are yet at the disposal of natural man.

5. VAIN ATTEMPTS AT RESCUING.

§ 28. Intellectual Culture. Æsthetic Culture. Moral Conflict.

There has never been a lack of attempts at hindering sin and at leading individuals, as well as human society, out of the slavery of sin to moral freedom. But as long as man must rely upon his own power, all attempts at rescuing remain unsuccessful and hopeless. To complete our presentation of the natural life, however, we must also consider briefly these hopeless efforts, which can be designated as fear of the reaction of conscience against sin.

Many in our day believe, as Socrates of old, that man can be educated to moral freedom by enlightening his knowledge by intellectual culture; for ignorance alone, they say, is the source of sin. But experience teaches that the will never keeps equal pace with knowledge; it rather limps slowly after. The words of Ovid, "I see and approve the better, but do the worse," voice the experience of every natural man; nay, intellectual culture alone does not protect one from sin. The forms in which sin appears, the circumstances in which it manifests itself, the expressions by which it is palliated, may be changed and refined by culture, but sin itself remains the same. Therefore we often see men whose extraordinary talents and scholarship we must admire, fall prey to the most shameful vices.

Nor will there be a better result, if, as Schiller would have it, one substitute æsthetic culture for intellectual culture, and, by combining the good and the beautiful, attempt to awaken an inclination for the former. Even if the artistic presentation of the good occasionally give it greater attraction; even if æsthetic culture aid the moral will in battling with sin, by adding contempt of sin, as being something "ugly" to fear of sin, as being something "alien to God,"—even then the inner inclination toward evil is not vanquished. Nor must the moral value of contempt of sin as being something "ugly" be overestimated; for, as it is clearly shown by the life of many of the most celebrated poets and artists, it is only too easy to give sin an æsthetic garment; and where is then the protecting power of æsthetic taste? If sin were only a superiority of the sensual impulses, an innate rudeness, a lack of tender emotion, as Schiller thought, then the combination of æsthetic and moral education might suffice to rescue man from his moral rudeness. But back of the sensual nature is the selfish will, the evil lust, which can never be cast out by culture and refinement of taste.

Kant, who, in his doctrine of the "radical evil," acknowledges a deep-rooted inclination toward sin in every man, well felt that a moral renewal of the will could never be brought about by a "piecemeal reformation;" hence he demands a total "revolution of our inner self"—a regeneration. But instead of advancing a step farther, and acknowledging with Christian ethics that the will is hopelessly enslaved to sin, and that it can be freed only by the grace of God, he refers us to our own power, and thinks, "since the Lord looketh on the heart, one can become acceptable to God," if, by an immutable decision he renounce the low, sensual motives, and make the demands of reason the maxim of his actions. But

here is the Achilles-heel of all self-righteousness. It may be possible through moral struggle to force back single outbreaks of sin; but moral conflict will never change the impure, selfish heart. Therefore, just because we know that the Lord looketh on the heart, we never attain to true rest of soul by our own efforts. He who knows himself, knows also how much of impurity clings even to the most earnest moral endeavor, that only too often we do not deaden sin by the holy love of God, but "as in a Cyclopean battle, strangle one passion by another—voluptuousness and covetousness by pride; pride by effeminacy and indolence"—and that the good which we have done, viewed in the light of God, is too often found to spring from a higher or lower degree of haughtiness (*Hochmuth*). Even Kant acknowledges that in every human heart there dwells "a certain ill-turn" which makes it true; that even "in the misfortune of our best friends there is something that does not altogether displease us." But as long as it is not in our power to renew the source, the heart, the stream of our moral life, our thoughts, emotions, and deeds will remain impure.

§ 29. Civil Virtue. Righteousness according to the Theocratic Law.

Notwithstanding, the endeavors of the natural man to bring his life into harmony with the demands of morality are by no means to be despised. Though it lies beyond man's own power to acquire a righteousness that is valid in the eyes of God, yet in that degree in which he summons his powers and conquers the outbreaks of lovelessness and passion which his conscience has shown him to be wrong, and enthuses himself for duty and right as the fundamental pillars of human society, a certain prize of virtue can not be denied him; for virtue

is the facility, gained by practice, in meeting the demands of duty. The conscientious uprightness and honesty, faithfulness to duty, and ability for work, which are thus achieved, we designate "civil virtue."

To deny this civil virtue or integrity all moral value—as it often is done—is neither human nor Christian. An angel sent by God makes known to Cornelius that his prayers and alms were come up for a memorial before God; and Peter declares openly, that "in every nation, he that feareth God and worketh righteousness is accepted with him." (Acts x.) Here civil integrity is evidently acknowledged to be something relatively good. It is therefore by no means indifferent whether an unconverted person endeavors to lead an upright life, or lives in levity and vice. In the latter case he makes conversion more difficult by blunting his conscience, whereas in the former, as is shown by Cornelius, conscience is kept vigilant and scrupulous, the need of divine instruction and divine grace awakened, and thus the way prepared for conversion. Therein consists the relatively good, on account of which even heathen people that strive after the good with uprightness of heart are said, by Peter, to be "accepted with God."

But civil righteousness, of course, can not establish a justification before God. In the eyes of Him who searches the heart it must ever appear as a stained garment. Even the norm of civil morality (the ideas of duty and right that are prevalent in the respective social circles) remains infinitely far behind the demands of the perfect law of God; and, moreover, the innate selfishness will never be vanquished by the power of the natural will. Even repentance, as the expression of the natural moral grief at sinful deeds, and resolutions to reform, lack the power of bringing about a true renewal of the heart; and in this very respect the moral weak-

ness and bondage shows itself most clearly. But when civil virtue becomes an occasion for self-conceit, or is connected with external mercenariness and low consideration of expediency, even that pessimistic expression becomes true, that the virtues of the unconverted are but "splendid vices."

Related to "civil virtue" is righteousness according to the theocratic law, the norm of which, however, is not only the innate but also the revealed law. Nor can a relative moral value be denied it; for the Lord himself at various times demanded of unconverted persons, "This do, and thou shalt live." (Luke x, 28, 37.) Even the self-discipline and self-denial that are necessary in order to be obedient to the law, and the moral energy that is manifested in the severity of righteousness through works, merit recognition, when compared with the carnal laxity and lustfulness that are prevalent in our day. How astonishingly far unregenerated man can carry this severity is shown by the history of Jewish and Christian asceticism. Not only the rigorism of Pharisaic literalism and the denial of the world practiced by Essenian mysticism, but also the ascetic severity of the Christian anchorites and monks—which lived for the greater part under the law and not under grace—produced wonderful examples of this self-discipline and denial of the world, as it was required by the law.

But since, also, the revealed law can not grant the power of holy love, it is just as impossible for man to attain to a righteousness that is valid in the eyes of God along the line of obedience to the law as along the line of civil virtue. The deeper knowledge of the divine will must rather reveal the more plainly the moral inability of the natural man. (§ 21.) For that very reason this self-discipline required by the law serves, if it is practiced in honest dread of personal sin and in the

solemnity of divine holiness, as a preparatory school for the Christian life, in a yet higher degree than civil virtue can serve as such. In this school Paul, Luther, Wesley, and many others, came to a painful knowledge of the emptiness of their own righteousness, and to that salutary disquietude and despair that awakened the cry for redemption and grace.

The righteousness according to the law can avoid this consequence only by weakening the moral demands of the law, setting aside the "most difficult in the law," the holy disposition, and falling into the service of literalism and human ordinances. But since this is not possible without making man more or less conscious of the fact that his actions are opposed to the true demands of the law, this righteousness degenerates to mercenary self-righteousness, honor-seeking sanctimoniousness, and obdurate hypocrisy. These degenerations of righteousness-according-to-the-law are the more dangerous, the more consciously and passionlessly the feeling of obligation to the "most difficult in the law" has been forced back and hushed. Pharisaism in the time of Christ is an historical example of this degeneration of the righteousness according to the theocratic law. Hence the regardless severity of the Lord against the scribes and Pharisees; hence his assurance that the despised publicans and sinners shall sooner enter into the kingdom of God than the proud Pharisees.

Thus also obedience to the law proves to be a fruitless attempt at establishing a righteousness valid before God, since this obedience, as we have seen, either leads to moral bankruptcy and to despairing of all self-help, or degenerates to Pharisaic righteousness through works, and to hypocrisy. Thus with regard to his innate depravity man is powerless, a slave of sin, whose chains he, in his impotent fury, can occasionally shake, but never break.

From the fruitless endeavors of the natural man, who wrestles with sin, trusting in his own power, we will now turn to the consideration of the various forms and stages of sinful development.

6. VARIOUS PHASES AND STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE SINFUL STATE.

§ 30. The Innocence of Childhood. Carnal Safety. Viciousness.

As there are different degrees among single sins, notwithstanding their essential likeness, so there are also various stages of development of the sinful state, for which man is responsible, because—however much external circumstances may aid in their development—they are, after all, the result of the free self-destination of the individual. The conduct of man toward conscience is (according to § 18) here the deciding factor.

As the evil lust descends from generation to generation, a stage of absolute innocence can not be ascribed to any naturally begotten man, not even to a child. Children are only relatively innocent, namely, as far as they have not made sin a personal deed; that is, a deed of their will. Man, however, can not remain in this state of moral infancy. As he continues to develop, he must assume a definite position toward the moral demands of conscience, whence spring the various phases of the sinful state, which we must now consider.

The first and most common phase of sinful development is carnal safety. In consequence of his natural blindness (§ 17), man feels safe in the possession of his life, and supposes death to be far away. He lives careless and unconcerned about the demands of conscience, "without a law," as it were. Not that conscience is perfectly silent; but he does not hear it, or drowns its voice in the din of worldly enjoyments, cares, and endeavors.

Indifferent toward death and eternity, as well as toward his relation to the Divine Judge, he says, "Peace! peace!" where there is no true peace. Thus, like the actor on the stage, he trifles away his life in a fictitious world of delusion, till finally the curtain drops, and he is removed, unprepared, out of the deceptive world of show to the overwhelming reality of eternity. Then jest is past, and the peace of which he dreamed is succeeded by the judgment.

Moreover, man seldom remains in this state of indifference till to the end of his life; for, in consequence of his levity, which trifles with sin, he falls imperceptibly into the power of increasing passion, which precipitates him into the bog of viciousness. This development, indeed, is, as a rule, quite gradual. Man resolves to put away certain sins that he committed at different times; but the will, being torn away from God, lacks the necessary power, and thus man sinks deeper and deeper, till the sinful desire has increased to passion, which then begets vice. (§ 23.) Vice comes to be viciousness by taking possession of the disposition, thus placing its stamp upon character. Viciousness is always followed by a hardening of the heart, which, however, varies in degree according to the nature of the vices. "The more vice consists in the unfettered exercise of some sensual natural impulse—that is, the more natural it is—the more tender can the disposition remain; the more it bears an artifical character and aims at purely psychical attractions, the more hardening will its influence be. Avarice and rage for play harden the soul more rapidly and completely than lewdness and intemperance. The latter lead to a brutish, the former to a devilish nature. Those, on the contrary, more easily fix themselves in the body as morbid incentives than these, although these also can, by and by, assume the form of monomania (having fixed itself in the

brain).* The condition of the vicious one is lamentable. Disquietude takes the place of the false peace which the spiritually safe one seems to enjoy; despair takes the place of levity. The innumerable good resolutions that were never kept; the constant repetition of sin despite the reaction of conscience (which is not yet smothered); the daily experience of the weakness of his own will, and the ensuing inner disorder; and, finally, his conscious opposition to the moral order, and his isolated position in moral society, to which he is an object of contempt, or, at the best, an object of shaming pity,—all combine to make the vicious one despair. Having, then, given up all belief in the possibility of deliverance, all opposition to sin ceases, the unfortunate one sinks yet deeper in sin, even despising himself, and thus his vicious life utterly and deplorably ruins him, unless by the grace of God he should be rescued in the eleventh hour.

§ 31. The Moral of the Golden Mean. Emancipation of the Flesh.

If he who believes himself secure in his carnal state can not lastingly hush the voice of conscience, he will probably try by a morality of his own choice to rid himself of its inconvenient reproaches. We call this method the "moral of the golden mean." Man begins to compromise. He does not ignore the moral law, but weakens it and fashions it according to his personal taste. He finds its stern demands too exacting, and obedience to them impossible. He assumes the right to depart from known duty, and excuses it by saying that others do the same, and that one should not at all be expected to keep the commandments of the ideal law in all particulars. Thus he makes the narrow way of morality convenient,

* Ebrard, Pract. Theol., § 208.

and quiets his conscience, as well as he can, with the thought that, after all, "every one is saved after his own fashion," if he only "fear God and do right;" that is—according to the meaning of his own invented moral—if he be not a notorious blasphemer or an open sinner. By continuing along this line, man may again attain to a certain peace. It is, however, no longer the comparatively harmless peace that he has who considers himself safe in his carnal state, but an artificial one, a deep silence, brought about by a systematic blunting of conscience.

The above-named moral is often connected with theoretic skepticism, which leads imperceptibly toward the abysses of materialism and atheism. There is only a short step from doubting the unconditional validity of the single demands of the divine law to doubting the divine revelation in general and the very existence of God. The same sinful self-will that in the first place argued against the severity of the law, can easily do away also with the moral order of the world, and with its Originator himself. Thus arises the materialistic moral of sin, the doctrine of the emancipation of the flesh, the chief tenets of which are: (*a*) What people call sin, is not sin at all, but only the free use of the powers and the satisfying of the natural impulses and inclinations that are innate in us. (*b*) There is no God; there is only eternal matter. (*c*) There is no immortality; death terminates forever the existence of man. Life after death is only fiction. (*d*) There is no retribution; it is a ridiculous delusion that one will not follow the dictates of his natural impulse in this life because he fears punishment in the beyond.* This is the gospel of materialism, which is approved by persons of all classes, on account of its simplicity and its forbearance with sin.

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* Compare Wolfgang Menzel—*Kritik des modernen Zeitbewusstseins*—pages 96, 97.

§ 32. Hatred of the Good.

Another phase of sinful development is hatred of the good, the reverse of which is delight in evil. Here human egotism assumes more and more the form of devilish egotism. For this is the fundamental trait in the character of Satan, that in his haughtiness he raves against God, and tries to destroy his kingdom and his government. Hatred of the good, therefore, is essentially always a hatred of the "Good One," namely, of God. "For hatred as well as love is always directed toward persons." Many believe in the existence of God because they can not do otherwise; but they will not subject themselves to God; therefore they hate him, and try to smother the feeling of their responsibility and their dependence upon God by mockery and blasphemy.

It is natural that those who belong to God must share this unjust odium. They give offense, "because in the midst of the joyful dance of spirits their unnatural No! is heard." This hatred is directed against the clergy especially, as the appointed bearers of the divine message. They are called "parsons"* and "ignoramuses," who, by the institution of the Church, in which people are made stupid or kept so, purposely prevent the enlightening of the masses, etc. The hatred of the "parsons" is, of course, not always a hatred of religion; it may, in fact, be justified at times as being hatred of a degenerated, immoral, or unbelieving clergy. But too often it is nothing more than a disguised hatred of religion; and such expressions as Diderot's, "The last king must hang by the viscera of the last priest," open our eyes to the terrible depth of the hatred, not only of the servants of the Church, but of religion in general.

In our day the most common phase of this hatred of

*Pfaffen, used in German as a nick-name.

the good is unquestionably hatred of Christ, which is directed against the very center of the revelation of divine love for the world. In Christ, God and the good have been brought so near to us that we can impossibly remain indifferent toward him. Therefore Christ is to one the savor of life unto life, and to the other the savor of death unto death. Contact with him necessarily causes a crisis, a moral decision. Therefore hatred of the good is first of all directed against him and his disciples; for as long as Christ and Christianity are not put away, man can impossibly avoid acknowledging the reigning of divine love. Hatred of Christ manifests itself to-day, as also it did in the first beginning of Christianity, in the persecution of Christians, although it is not done with sword and flames now, but rather with the weapons of derision, slander, and calumny.

The real basis of hatred of Christ is the taking offense at Christ. The natural man takes offense at the humility and lowliness of Christ, because they condemn his pride; at his purity and holiness, because they reveal to him his own sin and unrighteousness; at his death, which he can not comprehend, because he lacks the knowledge of his sin and his need of redemption; and, above all, at the necessity of faith in Christ as the Savior of sinners, because he is thereby reminded of his deserving damnation and of his utter helplessness. He takes offense at the teachings of Christ, because he does not wish to be converted. He is mortified that Christ ascribes inbred sin to him as well as to all others; that he expects him to answer for his deeds; that he requires regeneration of him as the indispensable condition of blessedness; and that he even claims the right of judging him and all mankind. His proud heart rebels at the thought of being saved only through the merits of Christ; he wishes to be his own savior, to hear nothing of Christ, to have

nothing to do with him; he "will not have Christ to reign over him." Thus taking offense at Christ begets hatred of Christ.

But as Christ appeared on earth in the form of a servant, and concealed his divine majesty beneath the dark covering of human weakness, this taking offense at him can spring from the darkening of man's understanding as well as from the evil will of man. In the first case, hatred of Christ is a hatred springing from blindness, which by no means excludes uprightness and susceptibility of heart, as the life of Saul of Tarsus plainly shows; in the latter case, it is a hatred springing from malignity, which reaches its climax in consummate enmity toward God, in Satanic raving against God and the good.

In hatred of God, sin develops more and more to a Satanic character, whether it be that man destine himself against the good in general, and resolve, with Shakespeare's Richard III, "to prove a villain," or whether it be that he turns specially against Christ and Christianity, like Voltaire, who vented his hatred of Christ in the well-known "*Ecrasez l'infame*" (crush the infamous one), or like Lessing, who, in a letter to the Jew, Mendelssohn, called Christianity the "most abominable building that nonsense has erected, the overthrow of which can be promoted by the Christian only under the pretense of underpinning it."* The perfection of this development makes man a "child of the devil," whom he must serve as a choiceless instrument, and, instead of being transfigured to the image of God, he is perverted to the exact opposite—the image of Satan.

That hatred of God is a very prominent trait in the character of the modern spirit of the times is only too true. All classes of society are pervaded by an anti-

* Menzel, *Kritik des modernen Zeitbewusstseins*, page 121.

christian spirit, of which fact any one will be convinced who pictures to himself the spirit of negation which reigns almost everywhere to-day in labor-meetings, socialistic, communistic, and nihilistic congresses, or reads the shameful mockery and blasphemy that are foamed out by the ruling daily press and by the modern novel. These manifestations involuntarily remind us of the words of the apostle: "Little children, it is the last time; and as ye have heard that antichrist shall come, even now are there many antichrists."

§ 33. The Sin Against the Holy Ghost.

In its last stage hatred of God concurs with the unpardonable sin or the "sin against the Holy Ghost," against which Christ cautions the Pharisees (Luke xii, 9; Matt. xii, 31, etc.), when he tells them that, of all sins, only this one can not be forgiven, neither in this life, nor the life to come. When the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews (chap. vi, 4–8, and chap. x, 26) speaks of an irredeemable falling away, after which conversion, and hence also forgiveness, are impossible, it must be essentially identical with the sin against the Holy Ghost. The difference is, that in the Epistle to the Hebrews the falling away of truly regenerated Christians is spoken of, whereas in the Gospels Christ speaks to unconverted Pharisees, and plainly gives them to understand (though he does not accuse them of the sin against the Holy Ghost) that they are in danger of committing this greatest of all sins. From this it follows that the sin against the Holy Ghost can be committed by both the converted and the unconverted; the latter, however, must have a clear conviction of the reality of divine revelation and the gracious workings of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the Pharisees were in greater danger of committing this sin than the ignorant multitude.

The assertion that the sin against the Holy Ghost is now impossible, because we are not eye-witnesses of the deeds of Christ, we must, most decidedly, designate false. In judging of moral manifestations, the outward form is less essential than the disposition and the will. And as man can to-day, as well as at the time of Christ, resist the gracious workings of God and harden his heart to the influences of the Holy Ghost; as he can now, with just the same haughty spirit, deride the sacred Word and trample upon it; as now, as well as then, enmity toward God can increase to consummate hatred of God,—we must confess that it is yet possible to commit this greatest of all sins.

The preceding shows that the sin against the Holy Ghost is based in man's disposition. Blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is but the open outbreaking of this disposition; for "out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh." Nevertheless, this blasphemy seems to be essential to the consummation of the sin against the Holy Ghost; for the sin against the Holy Ghost is not only called "blasphemy against the Holy Ghost" in the Gospel, but also the manifestation of the irredeemable falling away, spoken of in the Epistle to the Hebrews, is said to consist in deriding the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ, and in reviling the Holy Ghost. The sin against the Holy Ghost, however, is not to be considered as a single deed, but as the climax of a gradual development. It is the fruit of a whole series of single wanton sins that have remained unrepented of; the final result of a whole series of forcible suppressions of the urgings of the Holy Ghost; total hardening in conscious enmity toward God.

But can we speak of unbounded grace if there is a sin that can not be forgiven? We answer, Yes; for grace is unbounded for all who desire grace. There is no

sin so great that it can not be pardoned, if the sinner repents and pleads for pardon. But here we find the reason why the sin against the Holy Ghost is unpardonable. In the Epistle to the Hebrews it is plainly stated that those who have irredeemably fallen away, can not be renewed again unto repentance; that is, can no longer repent, and hence can no longer find pardon. But the state of the soul at the commission of the sin against the Holy Ghost is not essentially different from that which is described in the Epistle to the Hebrews; and the reason why the sin against the Holy Ghost is unpardonable is, therefore, that after this sin, as well as the other, repentance is impossible. Whoever has committed this sin will no longer repent, nor can he be willing to repent. But the free will of man does indeed limit God's grace; for God will save no man against his will.

The question now arises, why he who has committed the sin against the Holy Ghost can no longer repent. The reason lies not in the arbitrariness of God, but in the condition of the sinner himself. By continued, deliberate opposition to the influence of the Holy Ghost his heart has grown more and more hardened, and, according to the law that every passion gains strength by being satisfied, his aversion to God has increased to hatred of God, and this hatred has taken possession of his whole being to such an extent that it is inwardly impossible for him ever to quit it. This measureless hatred of God makes all influence of the Holy Ghost upon the heart impossible, and the consequence is, that God withdraws his gracious hand, whereby the impossibility of renewal, already lying in the disposition of the sinner, comes to be an absolute one, based also upon the relation of God to him. (Exodus vii, 22, 23; compare xiv, 4.) Therein consists the judgment of hardness of heart, which we must designate the necessary consequence of consummate

hatred of God. A repentance of sin is possible even then; but this repentance is desperation, in which the continued hatred of God makes the acceptance of Christ's propitiatory sacrifice, and hence also pardon, impossible.

When this state has been reached, we can never say with certainty; only God, who tries hearts and reins, can know that. But it is certain that no one who has a desire for grace and wishes to be saved through Christ, has committed this sin. Whoever comes to Christ, he will in no wise cast out. And even if his sins were as innumerable as the sand upon the sea-shore or as the stars of the heavens, the grace of God can blot them out as a cloud and as a fog; for "where sin abounded, grace did much more abound."

ment is the reaction of the inviolable will of God against man's self-willed transgression of the law. Hence, according to its nature, it is neither a means of propitiation nor of reformation or fright. That all can and ought to be the moral result of punishment; but the nature of it remains the reaction of the wrathful will of God against sin.

This reaction consists not only in the inner discord, which is always the result of sin, but it also appears in the fate of individuals as well as of communities. "The history of the world is the judgment of the world." The innumerable psychical and physical afflictions under which humanity groans—pangs of conscience, fear, and doubt and despair, mental imbecility, insanity and madness, hunger and pestilence, and inundations and conflagrations, and war and rebellion, and the whole cloud of woe and wretchedness which have spread over this earth in consequence of sin—all these afflictions, which are comprised in the term *evil*, are such reactions of the divine will against sin. But the real essence and source of all this evil is death, this most terrible of all evils, of which the above-named evils are but symptoms and precursors. "The wages of sin is death." Death and affliction reign as universally as sin itself. For "as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned." (Rom. v, 12.)

The undeniable connection between sin and punishment can not justify the assumption that, wherever there is a special measure of affliction, there must also be a special measure of individual fault and personal sin. The Lord himself opposes this erroneous opinion of his disciples in his answer to their question, whether the blind man in the temple at Jerusalem had brought his affliction upon himself by personal extraordinary sin, or

before man has filled his measure of sins and hardened his heart in consummate hatred of God, this crisis always ends in the night of unbounded despair. This was the state of Judas Iscariot when he threw the price of blood into the temple, saying, "I have sinned in that I have betrayed the innocent blood!" and then, chased by the furies of consciousness of guilt, and filled with dread of himself, went out and delivered himself up to divine judgment.

REMARK.—A striking illustration of this state is Shakspeare's representation of the ruin of Richard III, which is also quoted by Martensen. On the eve of the decisive battle which cost him his throne and his life, the criminal king's consciousness of guilt awakes with terrible force. Awful visions trouble him in his sleep. The spirits of those whom he murdered pass sentence of condemnation on him. Even after awaking, the accusations of his conscience continue, and he expresses the anguish of his heart in the words:

> "My conscience hath a thousand several tongues,
> And every tongue brings in a several tale,
> And every tale condemns me for a villain!
> Perjury, perjury, in the highest degree;
> Murder, stern murder, in the direst degree;
> All several sins, all used in each degree,
> Throng to the bar, crying all, guilty! guilty!
> I shall despair!"

In vain does he try to master his inner disquietude; in vain does he try to disregard the accusations of conscience:

> "Conscience is but a word that cowards use,
> Devised at first to keep the strong in awe."

Despair will not leave him. For the consummate "villain" there is no salvation; he must perish in the night of despair.

§ 35. THE PUNISHMENT OF SIN. SPIRITUAL, PHYSICAL, AND ETERNAL DEATH.

After guilt, punishment ensues. The sinner who would not do the will of God must, as was previously said, suffer it. Divine justice and holiness demand it. From this we obtain the idea of punishment. Punish-

ment is the reaction of the inviolable will of God against man's self-willed transgression of the law. Hence, according to its nature, it is neither a means of propitiation nor of reformation or fright. That all can and ought to be the moral result of punishment; but the nature of it remains the reaction of the wrathful will of God against sin.

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were suffering the punishment of special sins that his parents had committed? "Neither hath this man sinned nor his parents; but that the works of God should be made manifest in him." (John ix, 1–3; compare Luke xiii, 2–5.) There are indeed temporal afflictions that are known to be the punishment of special sins. The voluptuary and the drunkard who have by their vicious life ruined their health, and must look forward to a premature death, as well as the thief and the murderer who must expiate their crimes in a dark cell, are clearly harvesting the bitter fruit of certain personal sins. But this is by no means true of all earthly afflictions. For, on the one hand, affliction, which was originally punishment, often comes, by divine providence, to be a salutary school, and, for the regenerated, evil is changed to a blessed discipline, wherefore Christ sees in afflictions a token of divine love—"Whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth;" on the other hand, the sentence, "Every guilt revenges itself on earth," contains an untruth, if the word "every" is emphasized. Many sins remain unpunished on earth. And often the godless enjoy happiness and honor until death, while many a godly person, like poor Lazarus, spends his life in sorrow, and tears, and want. But the final recompense will surely follow. Earthly afflictions are not the last punishment of sin; they are only the precursors. The punishment proper of sin is death; "for the wages of sin is death."

But what is death? The expression *death* customarily signifies the separation of the soul from the body, and the destruction of the bodily organism. In Christian ethics the idea of death has a deeper import. It is not only the separation of the soul from the body, but the separation of man from God, the source of life. Of course, a consequence of this separation from God is, that also the bodily organism falls prey to the general

process of dissolution and decomposition of all material existence. Hence the Christian idea of death comprises a threefold division; namely, spiritual, physical, and eternal death.

Spiritual death is the life of the natural man, as we learned to know it in the preceding paragraphs. This life is called death principally because it is a life apart from God, from whom alone true and eternal life proceeds; then, also, because in consequence of this separation from God it contains the germ of temporal and of eternal death; and, finally, because it seems to be blunted and insensible to all that is divine and heavenly. The apostle speaks of this death in the words: "Awake, thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee light."

Physical death is the climax of temporal punishment, the dissolution of the connection between soul and body, and the end of the temporal presence of man. Its precursors are the manifold physical afflictions and diseases which, long before death proper, were feeding upon the very center of life, and bringing the bodily organism immutably toward its final period of dissolution and decomposition. Physical death is of fatal importance to moral development, in that it terminates the time for moral decision, and robs him who thus far hardened his heart to the gracious influences of the Holy Ghost, of every further possibility of conversion. This explains why the dreadful awakening of the consciousness of guilt, spoken of above, so often takes place in the hour of death, and makes the death-bed of the godless one an antechamber of judgment and damnation.

Eternal death, or the second death, is the final consummation of the sinful development that began with spiritual death—the absolute, eternal separation of man from God, which begins with the final judgment. Hence it is not

only an outer state of punishment, but an inner condition. In Rev. xx, 14, we read: "And death and hell [*Hades*, realm of the dead] were cast into the lake of fire. This is the second death." The second death, therefore, is identical with the damnation of hell. It closes the drama of a lost life. "Now man has a future no longer; God is through with him." After the barriers that corporeality and the customs and laws of human society oppose to the bad shall have fallen, hatred of God assumes a completely demoniacal appearance. With the rage of desperation the damned one raves against God himself, "and is doomed in his impotence to swallow his own hatred." With the final consummation of the sinful development, despair and unhappiness also reach their climax. For such a soul existence is the greatest torture, and the annihilation of the *ego* that lies hidden beneath the general ruin of personality would be "kindness." But this kindness is not shown; for man is created to live eternally. If he has rejected eternal blessedness, nothing remains for him but eternal damnation.

"But some one might ask, Why does God not pardon the damned, and let them enter into heaven? We answer, If only divine pardon were concerned, God would leave nothing undone." He would receive all the damned with open arms, as the father received his lost son, if they could only come to him. "But simple pardon would not help them; they must gain heaven and get rid of hell. Heaven and hell, however, are not only two separated portions of space between which, according to Scripture, there is a great gulf fixed," but they are also, as we have seen, two different states of character to which man has developed in the course of his earthly existence. We get into heaven or into hell "not as one enters a room through an open door,"

but we live and grow into them. To do this, man needs the power of free self-destination which he has squandered in the service of sin. (§ 17.) From where shall he take the power to convert himself, to come to God, and to grow out of hell into heaven? Some one could say, God can give him the power. Well and good; but what is gained by it? Could we suppose that the damned one would make better use of this power in his hardened hatred of God than he did during his earthly existence? Certainly not. But to this must be added, that in hell man is under the direct influence of the power of darkness, which holds fast to its prey and always kindles anew man's hatred of God. Thus arises "such a waywardness of energetic, antichristian willing, that it is not conceivable how God could draw near to such a being."*

Let no one, therefore, comfort himself with the vain hope that a conversion after death is possible. Whatever the changes that the departed may undergo during the time between death and the resurrection, this is certain, that our eternal fate is not decided in the beyond, but in this life. Every one will receive "the things done in this body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad." (2 Cor. v, 10.) What we sowed while on earth, we shall harvest either in heaven or in hell. And there is no more possibility of conversion in hell than of falling into sin in heaven. Dante, therefore, properly places over the portal of hell the inscription: "All hope abandon, ye who enter here!"

REMARK.—For a proper understanding of the relation existing between sin and death, it must be borne in mind that immortality did not belong to the nature of man before his fall, so that he could not have died; he was to become immortal by eating of the fruit of the tree of life. This is clearly expressed

* Compare Culmann, Christian Ethics, § 107 and 108.

in Gen. iii, 22, where God states the reason for driving Adam out of Paradise in the words: "And now, lest he put forth his hand and take also of the tree of life and eat, and live forever." His daily eating of the tree of life, however, is nothing but the outward expression of his unintermitting communion with God, by which, through the mediation of that fruit, he received divine life-forces; these forces were destined to preserve his earthly body, which was formed out of dust and liable to perish from death, and, by glorifying and spiritualizing it, to transform it to a heavenly and eternal body. But after man had separated himself from God, he had to forfeit those divine life-forces, which he had received through the mediation of the fruit of the tree of life; and thus he became, like all other earthly creatures, the prey of decay and death.

Part II.

THE CHRISTIAN LIFE.

First Division.

THE CHRISTIAN LIFE OF THE INDIVIDUAL.

I.

The Beginning.

§ 36. Summary.

The peculiar character of the Christian life consists, according to § 9, in the connection of a divine factor, the gracious influence of the Holy Ghost, and a human factor, the self-destination of the free personality. These two factors work together in the very beginning of the Christian life in the great moral change which, in short, we often term "conversion."

Strictly speaking, the term "conversion" designates only one side of this change, namely, the subjective; that is, the change that takes place in the conscious, free, personal life, in the trend of the thoughts and the will. And, indeed, in the free personal life, where sin was born, the moral reformation must also begin.

But as sin did not remain restricted to the personal life, but imparted itself also to the unconscious, unfree natural life, and poisoned the very being of man, even so must this reformation not restrict itself to the personal life, if conversion is to be at all permanent. It must extend to the natural life, to the whole being of man. Above all, the hearth proper of the inner life of man, the heart, which, in consequence of his falling away from

God, has become the real seat of sin, must be renewed and sanctified. This renewal takes place in regeneration.

As the beginning, therefore, of the Christian life, we must consider the two events, conversion and regeneration.

1. CONVERSION.

§ 37. (A) CONVICTION.

The first impulse to conversion can not proceed from fallen man. Left to his own fate, man would rather, by an uninterrupted fall, sink into hell, to whose dismal powers he has committed himself by his emancipation from God. But no one on earth is left wholly to himself. All mankind, even the heathen, are under the influence of so-called prevenient grace, which checks the sinful development of life. This is specially true of those who have become acquainted with the facts of grace as found in Christianity. God influences them not only through the voice of conscience and the wonderful ways of his providence, but also through the revealed law and the gospel, in order to bring them to a stop in their flight from God, and to conversion.

Thus it happens that there are moments in the life of every one in which he is convinced of his disconsolate condition, is frightened at himself, and sees that there must be a change, if he is to be saved from utter ruin. At such times conscience, which, perhaps, had been hushed a long time, exercises its office as judge with inexorable severity; long-forgotten sins suddenly recur in the mind, and fill the soul with dread and despair; pious recollections of youth, which have long lain dormant in the heart as good seed, awake, and entreat the wandering one to return to his Father's house and bosom. In the parable of the "Prodigal Son" this moment is strikingly designated by the words, "He came to himself."

Following the Scriptures, which often compare the

condition of the natural man with sleep, religious language designates the event depicted above with the term "awakening" (conviction). Indeed, this sudden coming to one's self is strikingly similar to awaking from a dream. As, upon awaking, the dreamer's imaginary world vanishes, and is replaced by the real world, even so the awakened sinner suddenly sees that his whole view of the world has up to this time been wrong, and his life therefore a failure. He now sees that the visible world, for which he had lived up to this time, and which he supposed to be the true and permanent one, is vain and transitory; and the invisible world, which he had deemed to be nothing, suddenly comes to be an eternal, alarming reality. He has awaked from his long, harmful dream.

This awaking from the sleep of sin often occurs suddenly and seemingly without preparation, as in the case of the jailer at Philippi; but that does not say that it must be thus in all cases. This awaking can be brought about by influences that divine grace has made felt for years; and of many persons who have from their youth been under the blessed influence of Christian training it may be said, in a certain sense, that they have been in this awakened state all their life. There has at least been no time of their life in which conscience was silent, or they did not feel that they are poor sinners in need of grace. But even in such cases there are certain periods in which the feeling of personal sinfulness and helplessness is specially deep and strong, and which, therefore, are fitted for the beginning of conversion.

As the beginning of conversion, the state of awaking is always a critical one. For now everything depends upon "whether man remains in this state of awakened consciousness, or in his indolence rolls over and sleeps again." The latter occurs only too often. The solemn

thoughts of death and eternity are unpleasant to the natural man; he tries to get rid of them, to drown them in the dissipations of worldly life, or to quiet himself in regard to his inner depravity by doing single so-called good deeds or by practicing virtue. But here there is great danger; for "the oftener this awaking proves to be in vain, the less easily will the weighted eyelids open again." By disregarding the awakening grace of God, man inperceptibly but surely approaches the state of total hardening of heart.

§ 38. (B) REPENTANCE.

(*a*) *Course of Repentance.*—With conviction the time has come in which the free self-destination of man exerts a deciding influence upon his moral transformation. Conviction itself is independent of man's will, often even opposed to it. God approaches the sinner, and takes the first step; for no self-humiliation is too great for him when there is a soul to be saved from eternal ruin. But if conversion should follow conviction, man must abandon his flight from God, leave his self-chosen paths of sin, and enter heartily into the restoration of his disturbed communion with God, which restoration is made possible by conviction. The most natural expression of man's communion with God is prayer, which, therefore, in the very beginning of conversion, comes to have that great importance that it retains for the whole Christian life.

According to its nature, conversion comprises two essential moments: a turning away from sin, and a turning to God. The former is designated repentance; the latter, faith.

The transition from conviction to conversion consists not only in man's permitting the Holy Ghost to enlighten him, but also in his beginning of himself to meditate

upon himself and his relation to God. As over the portal of the Delphic temple of Apollo, so also over the portal of conversion, the profound demand is written, "Know thyself!" This self-knowledge can indeed not be comforting, as it robs the sinner of all rightful claim to the grace of God, and reveals to him bottomless depths of sinful depravity that fill him with anxiety and fear. But, however humiliating and terrible this knowledge may be, it is necessary for every one. Self-knowledge is one of the indispensable conditions of conversion.

"Who ventures not into the hell of his own sinfulness,
Will ne'er be lifted up by faith to feel God's kind caress."

It is indeed a "descent into hell," when man's increasing self-knowledge robs him of every hope, when every onward step shows him more clearly that his whole past life has been a failure, that in God's eyes he is a sinner laden with curses and guilt, deserving nothing but wrath and disfavor. But he must come to that. If a new man is to be born, the old man must die. Out of this spiritual bankruptcy, out of despair of all self-righteousness and self-help, that faith is born which gains the righteousness that is valid before God.

This spiritual bankruptcy has been depicted with deep psychological verity by the apostle Paul in the seventh chapter of his Epistle to the Romans. In his state of carnal safety man lived quietly and free from care. Not without sin (verse 5); but he did not regard sin, because he was not fully conscious of its opposition to the divine law (verse 7). This was changed by conviction. The awakened conscience gives the law overpowering authority. Man can no longer avoid its demands; he feels them to be a sacred obligation. Not until then does sin really revive. (Verse 9.) The obstinacy of the natural heart opposes the divine demands. We have an innate

inclination toward that which is forbidden. Sin works all manner of concupiscence. (Verse 8.) Thus it seems at the first sight that the law increases sin and completes the spiritual death, the separation from God. (Verse 10.) But the known law has another effect. It teaches us to recognize in sin a rebellion against God, a transgression of his holy will, and thereby is wrought a true knowledge of the guilt and punishableness of sin. This knowledge begets not only a "divine sadness" and remorse at past sins and misdeeds, but also that desperate struggle with the life-force of evil, which life-force, as the false norm of our actions, as "the law of sin" (or the "law in our members"), opposes the destining life-force of conscience, and the purer knowledge of reason; these latter the apostle calls the "law of our mind." (Verse 23.) This struggle is indeed a hopeless one. Being "carnal and sold under sin," man knows in this stage what is right and good, but lacks the power to do the good. Thus, although he knows and would do better, he is continually sinning and trespassing anew. (Verses 15–21.) All good resolutions are in vain, in vain the most sacred vows. A helpless slave, he clanks his chains with fierceness, until finally his strength is wasted by his fruitless endeavors, and, despairing, he gives up all further attempts. Thus he is brought to spiritual bankruptcy, to despair of all self-help, to feel his unutterable wretchedness, and finally laments longingly, "O, wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" (Verse 24.) Now repentance has reached its aim. Man has learned to know sin in its damnableness, heartily to regret and hate it; his vain self-confidence has been vanquished in the unequal struggle with sin, and, like the death-knell of his own righteousness, the stern demands of the divine law resound in his heart. He now knows that unless

God help him, he must hopelessly perish in the wretchedness of his sins. Toward God, therefore, as the sole deliverer, his longing eyes are turned; and thus the heart is prepared to accept the life wrought out by Christ.

§ 39. Repentance—Continued.

(*b*) *The Form and Nature of Repentance.*—In the experience of individuals repentance assumes manifold forms, notwithstanding the similarity of its essential moments. It is therefore equally impossible to establish a definite time for the duration of repentance, a definite form for its manifestation, and a definite degree of the intensity of the anguish or the struggle connected with it. Even the above depicted course of repentance is not always pursued in its details; the one or the other moment usually predominates. Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. Only the presumption of narrow-minded fanaticism can wish to prescribe fixed limits and definite forms here. Such directions are not valid; for the form in which repentance manifests itself is variously modified. In one case it appears mostly as an act of conscious, sober volition; in another, as the result of a mighty increase of religious feeling. In one case it is like the quiet sorrow of a loving child, that can not doubt its father's love, although it feels its guilt and punishableness; in another, it is like the anguish of wild despair, such as seizes a criminal whom the inexorable severity of the law has condemned to death. In one case the feeling of guilt and damnableness burdens the soul above all else; in another, it is the feeling of sinfulness and estrangement from God. In one case the fear of hell is predominant; in another, a longing for deliverance. In one case the beginning of repentance extends back to earliest childhood, and its course seems to be a gradually progressive, ever-widening process of renouncing sin and

the world; in another, it appears suddenly, forcibly shocking not only the mental but also the physical life, so that the struggle of repentance can increase to "convulsions of repentance."

But all of these differences touch only upon the form, not the nature of repentance. The latter remains the same in all circumstances. The purpose of conversion we know to be the reunion of the sinner with God. It is impossible to gain this end as long as man makes himself the center of his life, and consecrates his will to the service of selfishness; that is, of sin. If there be no change in this ungodly, fundamental bent of the will, all tears, struggles, and convulsions of repentance are in vain. Man must abandon his selfish will, accept the will of God, and firmly resolve henceforth not to live for himself, but for God and his kingdom. This complete and unreserved turning from sin, which can be resolved to the three elements, knowledge of sin, remorse for sin, and longing for deliverance from sin, is the real nature of repentance. But before man becomes willing to take this step, before he resolves with the prodigal son, "I will arise and go to my Father," there often arises a great struggle, and many do not abandon sin until the Omnipotent One pours out upon their souls all the terrors of judgment and hell.

Moreover the opposition of the will is not the only factor that determines the form of repentance; there is besides a double-line of determining factors: (*a*) The individuality of a person—his temperament, degree of culture, training, and former development of life in general—must have a determining influence upon the form in which repentance manifests itself. Hence there will be a difference between the repentance of the easily-influenced, sanguine person, and that of the sober, phlegmatic person; between that of the uncultured, sensitive child of nature,

and that of the thoughtful scholar; between that of the christianly-disposed youth, who has been under the influence of the gospel all his life, and that of the child of the world, who for years has not given a thought to God and eternity; between that of the moral, earnest character, and that of the vicious profligate or the low criminal. So does also (*b*) the moral religious influence of the surroundings determine the form of repentance. This explains why, in the sunshine of the congregational life of the Moravians, which is trustful and cordial, conversions as a rule take a quiet and slow course; whereas, in the thunder-storm of Methodist revivals, they often assume the character of a violent bursting forth from the slavery of sin to the glorious liberty of the children of God. Yet who would claim that the sinner can find God only in this way, and not in that? If man only arrives at that perfect abandoning of sin, and at that longing for deliverance which begets the mighty lament, "Wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" then, as we saw above, the aim of repentance is reached, and the heart prepared to accept grace in Christ Jesus.

§ 40. (c) Faith.

(*a*) *Nature of Faith.*—Repentance, as a turning away from sin, is a negative act; its positive reverse is faith. Having formerly (§ 26) called unbelief an "unfilial conduct toward God," we can now call faith "a filial conduct, which appears in man's trustful turning to God." The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews (chapter xi, 1) defines faith as "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." According to this definition, the broad basis of faith is the conviction of the reality of the invisible world, which naturally includes the entire domain of the divine revelation in word and deed.

In consequence of sin, man has lost this conviction. To the natural man that alone is real which he can see and touch. Whatever is beyond the reach of the senses seems to him more or less unreal, and hence worthless. (§ 17.)

As conviction of the reality of the invisible world is the necessary basis of faith or the filial conduct toward God, it can properly be called faith in the broadest sense of the term. In this general sense faith is connected with repentance, and even precedes it.

It is an act of faithful obedience, when man repents; for "he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him." (Heb. xi, 6.) There is a reciprocal relation between repentance and faith. The stronger faith is, the truer and deeper is repentance, and *vice versa*. "Faith without repentance, and repentance without faith, are incomplete. The faith of the devils that tremble, and the repentance of Judas Iscariot, are both abnormal." (Culmann.) The former have faith without loathing of sin; the latter repents without turning to God.

The question now arises, why, if there is this reciprocal relation between repentance and faith, the Scriptures always give repentance a priority to faith. It can not be denied that this is the case. In the demands of the Scriptures, repentance precedes faith. It is always, "Repent ye, and believe the gospel," and not *vice versa*. Repentance is certainly the condition and preparation for accepting grace by faith. Hence, inasmuch as faith mediates the acceptance of grace—that is, inasmuch as it is justifying faith—it necessarily presupposes repentance; and in this sense it is true that repentance precedes faith.

But what is the relation of justifying faith to faith in its general sense, as it was defined above? It must be evident that there can be no essential difference between

the two; for justifying faith is also the conviction of the reality of the invisible world. But while the object of faith in its general sense is the entire invisible world, including the revelation of God in word and deed, justifying faith lays hold upon a single fact, in which the revelation of God to man reaches its climax; namely, upon the redemption wrought by Christ. This definiteness of the object, and the clear and vivid apprehension of it, brings about a special kind and state of faith. Justifying faith is not only a conviction of the truth of the facts of redemption, but also an act of boldest trust, by which man, in penitent knowledge of his guilt and damnableness, lays hold upon the atonement made by Christ, and bases his hope of felicity solely upon God's merciful love and upon Christ's atonement. Thus faith comes to be a personal relation to Christ himself. (John vi, 29.) "He who has delivered himself, his whole being, and his former life, unto death, now casts himself wholly into the arms of Christ as his sole deliverer, and finds in Christ the salvation that he had sought in vain in his own person." (Ebrard.) This is faith, the faith that God counts to the sinner for righteousness—the faith for the sake of which he forgives his sins, and accepts him as his child.

After man, through justifying faith, has become sure of salvation in Christ, the light of glad, child-like trust is shed abroad over all remaining domains of knowledge gained through faith; and not until then does faith become, in the full sense of the term, what it should be according to Heb. xi, 1; namely, not only a conviction of the reality of the invisible world, but also "the substance of things hoped for." What was formerly hoped for, now comes to be a source of greatest comfort; future things come to be present; the far-away shore of his native land comes to be an anchoring ground (Heb. vi, 18, 19),

so that the believer lives, labors, and resides in the new world of his hope, as the apostle says: "Our conversation is in heaven; from whence also we look for the Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ." (Phil. iii, 20.) Now that filial conduct toward God has begun, which we designated above as the nature of faith.

That this definite, developed form of faith must follow repentance lies in the nature of things; for there must be a desire for redemption before a faithful acceptance of redemption can take place. This desire, however, is not the beginning, but the result of repentance. With regard to justifying faith, therefore, it remains thus: "Repentance first, then faith."

Remark 1.—"The object of all faith is pre-eminently God himself, the 'God Amen,' the firm rock of truth, of veracity, of omnipotence and grace; then, also, every word (threat or promise) and every deed of God is a single object of faith. God's words and deeds, however, culminate and are concentrated in the revelation and completion of the gracious decree concerning our salvation in Christ Jesus; and thus in the Old Covenant faith is concentrated to faith in the promised redemption, and in the New Covenant to faith in the completed redemption. Faith, therefore, as disposition, is always the same; but its object is more or less developed." (Ebrard, Christian Dogmatics II, p. 488.)

Remark 2.—Not till faith has developed to justifying faith does it come to be a source of comfort for the soul; for without faith in the promised or completed redemption, God is "a consuming fire" for the sinner, and the invisible world a kingdom of terrors. Above all else, the guilty conscience grasps the terrible truth that there is a divine compensation in the beyond, from which no man can escape. This thought casts its gloomy shadow over all domains of the knowledge gained through faith. The penitent, indeed, doubts the reality of heaven no less than the reality of hell; but his conscience tells him that he has a thousand times forfeited heaven and merited hell. He believes in God's love as well as in his justice; but he finds no comfort in this faith, because he knows that by his sins and trespasses he has trampled upon this love. When he has laid hold upon and appropriated the blessed truth that Christ died on

the cross for our sins, and was quickened from the dead for our righteousness, then, and not till then, that gloomy shadow vanishes, and, despite the consciousness of its guilt and damnableness, the soul, trusting in Christ, heartily enjoys the pardoning love of its Father, God.

§ 41. Faith—Continued.

(*b*) *The Moment of Freedom in Faith.*—As repentance, so also is faith a matter of free self-destination; not in the sense that for faith man does not at all need the influence of divine grace, but in the sense that, without the free self-destination of man, faith can never be brought about. Hence in the Scriptures faith is sometimes called a gift or work of God (comp. 2 Thess. iii, 2; Col. ii, 12, and other passages); sometimes demanded of man as his own personal act, and his eternal fate made to depend upon his meeting this demand (for example, Acts xvi, 31; Mark xvi, 16). How can these seemingly contradictory views be harmonized?

In regard to faith in its most general sense—as the conviction of the reality of invisible things—we know, from what was previously (§ 37) said about conviction, that in consequence of the influence of prevenient grace this conviction is forced upon man without his co-operation, but that he has the power to drown this dawning conviction by sinning anew, or to resign himself to it willingly. Hence, even in preserving the mere conviction of the reality of the invisible world, human freedom is employed. In a much higher degree does this occur in justifying faith, the positive appropriation of redemption through Christ Jesus. When a sinner tears away from his former sinful life, casts aside all props upon which he thus far based his happiness and his hope, boldly seeks refuge in the arms of Jesus, and confidingly intrusts his eternal fate to him, he has certainly done one of the

greatest and mightiest deeds of which the human will is capable.

But even in this act of faith, co-operating grace is not wanting. Most penitent ones are like the father of the lunatic boy in the Gospel. (Mark ix, 23, 24.) They want to believe, but they lack the power to do it; and however gladly they would with full trust grasp the rescuing hand of the Redeemer, doubt always frightens them back. Then they also must cry, "Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief!" And now, as then, the loving Redeemer helps struggling faith to conquer. But man must have the proper willingness. He who makes no attempt at appropriating by faith the redemption in Christ Jesus, but is quietly idle, hoping that in his time God will give him faith (since it is God's gift), will wait in vain. "Lord, I believe," the man in the Gospel cried; "help thou mine unbelief!" It is our duty to put forth all our soul-powers in the attempt to exercise faith; God then will grant the power to perform. In this sense it can be said of justifying faith, as well as of every act of faith by which we appropriate the promises of God, that it is not only an act of man, but also a gift of God.

But we should guard against overlooking the moment of freedom in faith. If faith were solely a gift which God grants one person and denies another, without considering their personal conduct, neither faith nor unbelief could be imputed to man, and God could never make our eternal fate depend upon our faith, as he does in the words: "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned." (Mark xvi, 16.) God, being just, can not punish man for his unbelief, unless the transition to faith is committed to man's free self-destination. But as this really takes place, as we saw above, it is not God's arbitrariness, but man's guilt, if he is lost in consequence of his unbelief.

2. REGENERATION.

§ 42. Relation of Regeneration to Conversion. Nature of Regeneration.

With conversion a change has taken place in the man's life of thought. His old view of the world, prejudiced by sensuality, has vanished, and a new one has taken its place, which is based upon the conviction of the reality of the invisible world. At the same time his emotional and volitional life have received a new direction and new impulses. With full consciousness man has recognized heavenly possessions as the only true and lasting ones, and has made them the highest end of his endeavors. Not only his free life of thought, however, is to be renewed and sanctified, but also the unconscious basis of his personality, his being. This necessitates a new creative divine influence. As the body of man, formed out of dust, came to be a living soul through God's breathing into his nostrils the breath of life, so must man, having fallen into the deadly powers of sin, be made a new creature through the impartation of the life-force of the Holy Ghost. This is done in the mysterious event of regeneration, which Christ plainly makes the condition of participating in his kingdom. (John iii, 3.) Regeneration, therefore, is not an act of man, like conversion, but an act of the Holy Ghost, who, as the spirit of Christ, changes the life-center of man into the image of Christ, and thus Christ is glorified in him. This is brought about through the impartation of the new life-principle of holy love, which conquers selfishness (Rom. v, 5); for Christ himself is the personal revelation of this love. This center of human personality, as it is renewed and filled with the Spirit of Christ, is the new man in Christ, or Christ in us. Hence the regenerated

person has, according to his innermost nature, no communion with sin. "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin;" that is, does not do it willingly and with pleasure—he no longer takes a liking to it. He can, indeed, whether it be through ignorance or whether it be through hastiness or weakness, be influenced to sin, (comp. 1 John i, 8–10; ii, 1); but even in this case he remains inwardly a stranger to sin; he suffers it more than he commits it; "for his seed [that is, the new life of regeneration] remaineth in him; and he can not sin, because he is born of God." (1 John iii, 9.) The new man, which after God is created in righteousness and holiness, has nothing in common with sin. If it is nevertheless possible that a regenerated person stumble and fall, the reason is that in regeneration there was a perfectly developed new life imparted, but, as it is in every birth, only a new beginning of life; a child in Christ has been born, which is now to wax strong, develop, and ripen to manhood.

The change, however, that takes place in regeneration is so great and powerful that it can impossibly remain hidden from man. Although he can not understand in what way it was brought about (John iii, 8), he knows of his own vivid experience that "old things have passed away, and all things are become new." To this certainty of experience, which the apostle Paul calls the "witness of our spirit," is added, according to Rom. viii, 16, the witness of the Holy Ghost, who, through his abiding presence in the heart, magnifies the penitent's feeble attempts at faith to a child-like trust in God as his Heavenly Father, and, by direct inner impressions, gives him assurance of his being a child of God. To possess this certainty is the privilege of every Christian; for it is the basis upon which alone the Christian life can develop soundly and vigorously. Wherever this certainty is want-

ing in individuals or entire Christian circles of society, there either true regeneration has not taken place, or the development of the consciousness of being a child of God has been forcibly arrested or suppressed by doctrinal prejudices or other obstacles. At all events, the condition of a Christian who is not certain of his acceptance by God is an abnormal one.

As we have already seen, regeneration is not an act of man (like conversion), but a result of the activity of the Holy Ghost. But this activity must not be supposed to be a magic one, which influences man directly without regard to his personal conduct. It is mediated by man through conversion. Christ enters only such hearts as turn to him in repentance and faith, and seek in him the strength for a new life.

Lutheran ethologists, who identify regeneration and baptism, or at least unite them, distinguish between a regeneration of the unconscious basis of life and a regeneration of the conscious life. The former, they hold, takes place in every person, even in the unconscious babe, with baptism; the latter depends upon the free self-destination of man, and consists in the sinner's turning away from the world and turning to God and Christ of his own conscious will, and henceforth seeking in him the source of his happiness. The regeneration of the conscious life would then coincide with conversion. This view is refuted, above all, by the fact that in the case of thousands of baptized Christians, who from early childhood lived in this world without God and hope, nothing at all can be perceived of a new life; and a change of the unconscious life-basis could impossibly remain so entirely without influence upon the development of the growing Christian child; and that regeneration, if it is unconditionally united with baptism, is divested of its ethical character. If all that is moral is free, and only

the free is moral, then regeneration, if it is fully detached from the self-destination of man, no longer belongs to the domain of morality. But Christ could impossibly make our participation of his kindgom depend upon a morally indifferent event, an event lying outside of the domain of the moral life. (John iii, 3.)

With conversion and regeneration, fallen man has returned to communion with God, and the activity of his life has again found in God its proper center of gravity. The mastery of selfishness is broken by the power of pure, divine love, which is shed abroad in the heart of the regenerated person by the Holy Ghost. (Rom. v, 5.) But this holy love is, as we saw above, the fundamental principle of all true, and hence of all Christian, morality. The beginning of the Christian life and the presuppositions of its vigorous development are now realized.

But before we pass over to the consideration of the Christian life in its progress, we must return once more to look at the obstacles and dangers that often prove fatal even to the beginnning of the Christian life.

3. DANGERS THREATENING THE BEGINNING.

§ 43. (A) IMPERFECT REPENTANCE (OBSTINACY.)

No sooner has the sinner begun to advance along the narrow path of conversion than he finds himself surrounded by many obstacles. Bad training, bad society, false prejudices, ridicule and persecution by relatives and former friends, and all kinds of harmful influences, combine to make conversion difficult. But the chief obstacle is his own evil heart, which in its obstinacy opposes God, and says, "Who is the Lord, that I should obey him?" then again, in its cowardly timidity, despairs of rescue, and wearies of the struggle of faith. Thus arise the two principal dangers of the beginning—imperfect repent-

ance, and weakness or weariness of faith. How many young Christians have, at the very outset of their Christian course, been wrecked on these two rocks!

Imperfect repentance occurs when man, overwhelmed by the feeling of his guilt and by his dread of divine punishment, wishes to be converted, and really abandons sin and the world, but yet retains some cherished inclination or favorite sin. The will's turning away from sin, therefore, is not complete, but is done with a conscious reserve. But man consoles himself with the thought that he has abandoned all else, and that this one small, favorite sin can impossibly exclude him from the kingdom of grace. But God is not satisfied with that; he wishes to reign alone in the human heart, without a rival. Hence, where there is imperfect repentance, there must also be imperfect appropriation of Christ. The favorite sin that has not been abandoned, remains in the heart as a ban, as a foreign power, opposed to God, which grows stronger imperceptibly, and smothers the new life. Though man may have received a faint impression of the glory of the Christian life—which is possible, for a partial turning away from sin is a step toward Christ, and hence better than perfect indifference—yet he does not attain to that mighty flight of faith, to that intimate life and love-communion with Christ, which gives him the strength to bear the contempt and self-denial belonging to the Christian warfare. "Therefore, if, in the later course of his Christian life, at the time of new crises and tests of faith, the question is put, whether for or against Christ, he goes back and apostatizes, like those followers of Christ in John vi, 66."

Strictly speaking, the beginning decides; for by knowingly retaining some favorite sin and trying to serve Christ with divided love, man serves two masters, which is impossible for any length of time. We can not at the

same time serve Christ and Belial. Sooner or later the hypocrisy and impurity of this state must be exposed, and the untenableness of this divided service come to light. Thus the germ of relapse often lies in the wrong beginning. This is clearly expressed by John, speaking in 1 John ii, 19, of the Corinthian Gnostics: "If they had been of us, they would, no doubt, have continued with us; but they went out, that they might be made manifest that they were not all of us." (Comp. Acts viii, 18, etc.)

The danger of this state does not lie in the fact that the turning away from the world and the turning to God are not yet all-embracing and complete, but in the fact that this incompleteness is conscious and volitional. It lies in the nature of things that both repentance and faith are incomplete in this first stage of Christian development; and every mature Christian knows that in the beginning Christ was not, by far, to him what he came to be in the course of time; that notwithstanding the fervency of love with which he surrendered himself to Christ, he did not belong to him as completely as he does now. But this imperfection was not based upon some conscious reserve. To the extent of his knowledge he consecrated all to the Lord, and placed himself fully at his disposal. Having done this, man has done all he could do, and the Lord does not require more. Therefore, he helps him through all trials and struggles. But whoever is not upright, and devoted himself to the Lord with half a heart, will in later crises the more certainly decide wrong, the more conscious and volitional his reserve was in repentance. "Therefore, let man in this first stage look after the inner posture of his disposition, and know that the Lord gives success to the upright alone." (Culmann.)

§ 44. (B) The Weakness of Faith (Timidity.)

As the obstinancy of the human heart is revealed in imperfect repentance, so his timidity is revealed in the weakness of his faith. The latter is often only the result of preceding imperfect and insincere repentance. Whoever turns to Christ with a divided heart, whoever wishes to retain some favorite sin in his service, may, as we saw in the preceding section, faintly perceive the glory of the new life; but he can not really grasp and appropriate Christ, for the Lord is very jealous as regards our love. He will not let another have his honor, and will not share our heart with a rival. The half-hearted and undecided must, therefore, if God shall help him, abandon all reserve, and turn to him with undivided heart. This done, his faith will conquer all obstacles of conversion in the struggle of prayer, he will receive forgiveness of his sins, and through regeneration will enter into personal life-communion with Christ. But if this is not done, he will either, in the first stage of Christian life, grow weary of the struggle of faith, and, before the goal is reached, abandon his striving for forgiveness, or he will content himself with the faint anticipation of what it is to be a child of God, which he has obtained despite his imperfect repentance, and will begin his Christian life with that weakness of faith, that imperfect acceptance of Christ, the inadequacy of which will manifest itself in falling away from Christ in later crises and tests of faith.

But even where repentance was sincere and the world was unreservedly abandoned, faith is often weak and wavering, and the danger of growing faint in the struggle of faith by no means excluded.

It lies in the nature of repentance that man recognize not only the greatness of his guilt, but also the fathomless depravity of his heart in the light of the divine law. It

easily happens, then, that feeling the wretchedness to which sin has brought him, and despairing of himself and his deliverance, he says, "My punishment is greater than I can bear," (German rendering: "My sin is greater than can be forgiven.") To this must be added the coldness and indolence of the renewed heart. The penitent perceives this state with deep regret. He ought to mourn and cry because of his sins, and yet is often so dull and void of feeling; he should be burning with longing for Christ and redemption, and yet his heart is so cold that he must almost force himself to pray. This perplexes him in regard to himself and the divine order of grace. Becoming discontented, he declares repentance and faith to be a chimera and regeneration a colossal self-delusion. He becomes negligent in prayer, and gradually sinks back again into the slumber of sin, from which conviction had awakened him. This growing faint in the struggle of faith, which wrecks many a young child in Christ, is very dangerous, for the deeper the conviction and the more earnest and sincere repentance and the beginning of faith was, the more discouraging and paralyzing will the bankruptcy of the new life be for the disappointed beginner. Hence here, if anywhere, it is necessary to continue in faithful prayer until the victory is gained. Let the penitent one feel what he has at stake; let him consider his divine destination, and the overpowering greatness of redemption in Christ Jesus, which is able to blot out every sin, even the greatest, and that this very dissatisfaction with himself, and the inner disquietude caused by sin, show that God's Spirit is influencing his heart. If, then, he succeeds in holding fast to faith and not despairing, he will soon learn to confide in God; as faith grows, confidence in God will steadily increase, till finally all doubt is lost in the blessed assurance of pardon and of being a child of God.

II.

The Progress.

1. SANCTIFICATION.

§ 45. Nature of Sanctification. Christian Character.

In regeneration, as we saw in § 42, the center of personality, the heart, was changed and sanctified; but in the unfree natural life sin has remained. Thence there arise, even after regeneration, manifold unregulated impulses, feelings, and ideas, which, being of themselves selfish and sinful, exert a tempting and seducing influence upon the will. (James i, 13–15.) This unrenewed remainder of the old sinful state is called in Scripture the "old man."

Therefore there is discord yet in the unregenerated heart. But this discord shall not and dares not continue. The Christian shall be of one cast. As Shakspeare says of one of his heroes, "Every inch a king," so one should be able to say of the Christian in the fullest sense of the term, "Every inch a Christian." In his own, Christ shall become all in all, so that they can truthfully say: "I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God." The new man, whom the apostle Paul calls "Christ in us" (Gal. iv, 19), shall, proceeding from the sanctified life-center, take possession of the whole of man, and penetrate and sanctify even the unfree natural life. This subjugation and mortification of the old man by the new is the real nature of sanctification.

But if we ask how sanctification is effected, we receive

various answers. Many distinguish strictly between a negative and a positive side of sanctification, and teach that the former—that is "the cleansing from inbred sin," or the mortification of the old man—must be completed before the latter, the positive filling with the Holy Ghost, can be effected. But how shall we picture that to ourselves? Sin is not a chemical contamination that can be washed away by the blood of Christ, like a stain is washed from a piece of clothing; or a plant, the root of which remained in the heart after regeneration, and must be torn out in sanctification. These designations of sin, however true and striking they may be, are only illustrations, and must be treated as such. In reality, sin is no more something material than the heart, in a religious sense, is the muscle whose contraction and expansion causes the circulation of the blood. It is an ungodly trend of our spiritual life; it is the mastery of selfishness over our will, by which our entire inner life is poisoned. And how could this mastery of selfishness be broken but by a new life-principle that conquers selfishness? This new life-principle, as we learned in § 6, is holy love, which in conversion is shed abroad in our hearts through the Holy Ghost. It is the Holy Ghost, therefore, who, as the seed of regeneration, gives us the strength to conquer sin. (1 John iii, 9; Rom. viii, 2.) If in regeneration (the beginning of sanctification) the power of sin is broken in no way but by the implantation of a new spiritual life, then certainly in sanctification, also, the old man will be mortified only in the degree in which this new spiritual life, or the "new man," increases in strength and fullness of love. The more abundant the outpouring of the Holy Ghost, and the more perfect love is, the purer will be our heart and our life. Hence the negative side of holiness can not be distinguished from the positive as regards time.

From this it follows that the simple exertion of our

own moral power is not sufficient for attaining to sanctification. The earnest moral struggle of the renewed will with the sin yet remaining is indeed the indispensable condition of sanctification, but the success of this struggle depends entirely upon the repeated and ever fuller self-impartation of Christ to the new man. This impartation, however, as we saw in § 40, is conditioned by faith. Hence, it can properly be said, sanctification is of faith.

But here, as in the beginning of the Christian life, repentance precedes faith, the "repentance of those that believe." This is distinguished from the repentance of the sinner by the consciousness of God's favor and love, by the absence of all feeling of damnation, which generally accompanies the first repentance. The repentance of those that believe is like the sorrow of a good child, which is pained because, despite its best resolutions and sincerest promises, it time and again grieves its beloved parents. Nevertheless this repentance can be as deep and intense as the repentance of the unregenerated, especially because, with increasing knowledge, besetting sin is more clearly recognized and more deeply felt than ever. The lament, "O Lord, it is my chief regret, that I love thee so little yet!" and the prayer, "From my heart pluck sin, I pray thee, though a thousand pangs it cause me," are the natural expressions of this frame of mind, the purpose of which is to impel the regenerated to an ever more complete surrender to Christ, and to an ever fuller claiming of his grace. Wherever this purpose is reached, and the soul turns to Christ with an unreserved and trusting surrender, and seeks in him the strength for a new life, there Christ, in his incomprehensible condescension, answers by a new self-impartation and by a more bounteous outpouring of his holy love, which is the fulfilling of the law and the bond of perfectness. Thus faith becomes the means of sanctification.

If this struggle for sanctification is faithfully persevered in, the old man is more and more tortured to death. One by one the favorite sins are revealed to the sanctified life-center, conscience grows more and more tender, knowledge clearer, judgment of self truer. The good comes to be a pleasure, the evil a torture. As formerly sin had become man's second nature, so his nature is now, proceeding from the renewed-life center, more and more sanctified and purified, and the good comes to be his second nature. Whether this is achieved by a gradual, quiet development, or is brought about more suddenly and by degrees through special outpourings of grace, is essentially the same, if only the end is accomplished.

The question whether sanctification can come to a definite conclusion in this life, we must answer affirmatively. Man's striving and struggling for perfection can not be without purpose and hope. What God requires of us, and what he promises, can and shall be realized through his power. There is a fullness of this new spiritual life, in which the sinful impulses of the old nature are completely bound and crippled—a state in which the "old man" is fastened to the cross, as it were, with nails of "perfect love," so that his "affections and lusts" can no longer put themselves forward. Then the inner discord, spoken of above, is destroyed; for the whole life is sustained and sanctified by the all-controlling power of the love of Christ, whose image is reflected by his disciples in unsullied brightness. That this state of "perfect love" can be reached is shown by the Holy Scriptures (1 John iv, 16–18), as well as by the experience of many Christians.

Of course, it can not be denied that this "conclusion" is only a relative one, and not the final perfection of holiness. That absolute communion with God, in which

"the divine and the human horizon coincide perfectly," and relapse has come to be an impossibility, is yet the end that we approach in gradual development, and that we do not reach till this state of trial changes to the state of glory beyond. As long as we live on earth the fight is not yet ended; it is yet possible that love grow cold again; and when this happens, the old nature awakes immediately. Therefore, even in the highest state of grace that can be attained to on earth, the words of our Lord should be remembered: "Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation."

Hence the purpose of sanctification, according to the above, is that the selfish will, or also the sin in the natural life, when it remains after regeneration as impulse or inclination, be conquered, so that henceforth holy love become the only destining motive power in life, and every conflict cease between the divine and the human will. Therewith the ethical consequences of sin are destroyed. God is again the end and center of all human thinking, feeling, and desiring; that is, man is holy. But redeemed man possesses this holiness which our first parents in their state of innocence possessed innately, as the fruit of his moral development, as the character that he gained in his moral struggle. As character in general (§ 13) is nothing but the natural disposition developed by free self-destination, it follows that by the Christian development of character, or sanctification, the innate peculiarities of the natural disposition are not destroyed, but only purified and glorified, and placed into the service of holy love. This explains the diversity of character found in different men of God, despite the unity of their Christian disposition. The Holy Scriptures designate the developed Christian character, Christian "perfection," "perfect love," or also perfect "manhood in Christ."

Before closing this section we will name three fundamental conditions, which it is indispensably necessary to meet in order that the end spoken of above be reached: (1) The Christian must have a more or less distinct ideal of the state that is to be attained to; (2) To this ideal must be added a deep longing after it, which is satisfied with nothing less than the perfect love-communion with Christ and the transformation into his image; (3) This longing must come to be a firm resolution of the will, that employs all means that are in its reach to gain this end, and prevails in the use of them, despite all obstacles and difficulties that get into his way. Whoever does not meet these conditions will never reach his divine destination, and is in danger of losing the grace he has received.

Remark 1.—An excellent illustration of the state of Christian perfection is given by Ph. Th. Culmann. He says: "If an inhabitant of our world could rise far enough above the earth that he were beyond the reach of the cone of the earth's shadow, he should then have passed beyond the region of the change of day and night, which is conditioned by rotation, and should find himself in constant sunlight. But the same would be true if he fixed sunlight in himself, so that he himself became a shining sun. Both together, an analogous height of ethical position and a fixed possession of life, love, and light has been obtained, when it can be said to the Christian: 'A new commandment I give unto you, because the darkness is past and the true light now shineth.' Where they stand, the light of heaven beams in unsullied brightness. The storms and tempests and shades of night, in which those that stand lower are buried, no longer reach up to them. The darkness of sin, which, like the dark, heavy earth, separates us from light and carries along into the rotation those who are yet imprisoned in it, is now completely vanquished. On account of the absolutely reigning, victorious presence of light in those that believe, this darkness is recognized and destroyed in its beginning. Where there is constant and open communion with the Son, darkness can not exist. The meridian altitude, from which the believer in his former stage of grace was always brought down again, is now forever maintained." (Christian Ethics, § 87, p. 347.)

Remark 2.—In regard to the diversity of Christian characters, Martensen says: "There are characters, the bent of which is chiefly contemplative-mystic, as that of the apostle John and many of the great teachers of the Church, whose energetic productions of thought and effusions of prayer are their peculiar deeds, while they seem in a lower degree to be called to an outward activity. Others there are that are constituted specially for an activity that reaches out into life and the world, like Peter and the whole line of Church-organizing characters. Others, like Paul and Augustine, are constituted for the union and mutual penetration of contemplation and practice. In the domain of the practical even, we meet a difference between the heroic characters—martyrs, missionaries, and reformatory personalities—and the characters exhibiting quiet, enduring patience and resignation; or a difference also between the heroic characters and those that develop and are exhibited in quiet works of love; as Spener, Hermann Franke, and many men and women who in our time have worked and are yet working in the cause of home missions. In consequence of psychological natural differences, we also find a difference between resolute, speedy characters, and cautious, prudent, and considerate ones. These general opposites, which shade off indefinitely, are to be found in both sexes, although to woman an activity in the sphere of family life principally has been assigned, of which Mary and Martha, both near and dear to the Lord, are lasting examples." (Martensen, Christian Ethics, General Part, p. 440.)

§ 46. Wisdom, Holiness, and Blessedness as Fruit of the Christian Life.

Having learned to know the Christian life in its inner development, we shall now consider briefly its influence on the intellect, the will, and the sensibilities. This influence consists in nothing else than the restoration of the normal conduct of these fundamental faculties of the human soul, which, according to § 17, have been deranged and perverted by sin.

(*a*) The intellect has, in the sinful state, been so degenerated by the predominance of sensuality over reason, that the natural man's entire view of the world is placed

topsy-turvy, as it were. For he considers only that real which he perceives with his five senses, while the eternal realities of the invisible world do not exist for him at all, or exist simply as hazy pictures of the mind, which have no influence at all upon his life. Conversion and regeneration end this harmful deception. The veil of sensuality is torn; the regenerated one perceives that the world is but a temporal, and hence transitory, exhibition of the thoughts of the Divine Creator; he knows that it does not exist of itself, but through the will of God, and that the fleeting things of this world can never satisfy the infinite longing of the human heart. But back of this world of appearances and semblance his faith sees the eternal realities of the invisible world. He sees in God the omnipotent, wise, holy, and kind Author of all things, the Fountain-head of all life and all blessedness; and in the light of his knowledge of God, he learns not only to judge properly the world and earthly life, but, above all, to know himself and his own divine destination; namely, that he is destined, through the knowledge of God and love for him, to be transformed into the image of God; that is, he attains to true wisdom.

(*b*) The will of the natural man is enslaved and perverted by selfishness. He makes himself, instead of God, the center of his life. But as he finds in himself no satisfaction for the infinite hunger of his soul, he makes some earthly thing his "idol"—that is, the final end of his volition—and to this possession, which he wishes to gain cost what it may, he subordinates all other life-purposes. Thus his whole life becomes perverted, sinful, ungodly. Now, as in conversion man learns to know the error of his way, and again makes God the center of gravity of his life, the will is freed from the "service of vanity." The regenerated one sees the end that he would reach in life, not in the possession or enjoyment

of things of this life, nor in the assertion of his own ego, but in God, whom he has learned to know as the loving God. Now God is again the ultimate, highest end of his life, to which he subordinates all other ends. To know God, to live in communion with him, and do his will, is his first and chief desire; that is, he loves God. However unlike the individuality of the unregenerated may be, however manifold their mental endowment or their position in life, they are all alike in one respect; namely, they are people of God, in whom the nature of of God—that is, the love of God—is reflected. But therein consists, as we saw in § 16, the normal constitution of the will, holiness.

(*c*) In consequence of the darkening of the intellect, which caused a wrong valuation of things, and the perverted bent of the will, the harmony of the emotional life of the natural man has also been destroyed. As he pursues wrong ends of life, his heart remains vacant and unsatisfied, despite the restless haste and greed with which he pursues them; for it is impossible to satisfy the infinite longing of the human heart with finite things. Hence, only the restoration of the normal conduct of the intellect and the will can restore the harmony of the sensibilities. As the regenerated makes God the ultimate end of his endeavors, and no longer seeks his happiness in the fleeting things of this earth, he finds the proper means for satisfying his infinite hunger for God; and as he perceives the world to be the product of the wisdom and the manifestation of the will of the Divine Creator, he refers everything he experiences and meets with in the outer world back to God, and knows that all that happens to him is thus ordained of God, and must serve for his good. Hence he enjoys peace that the world can not disturb. He is blessed. (Ps. lxxiii, 25 and 26.)

As the Christian life, however, is not perfect from its beginning, but develops gradually, the Christian does not from the beginning of his Christian life possess the attributes of wisdom, holiness, and blessedness, in their entire fullness; but they gain depth and compass in that degree in which he himself advances in sanctification; and, since sanctification does not reach its full consummation in this world, our wisdom, holiness, and blessedness also remain incomplete as long as we live on earth; especially in our knowledge we do not advance beyond "that which is in part." But what we now possess of these spiritual things is to us a blessed surety of what awaits us when we are brought home to our Lord. (1 Cor. xiii, 12; 1 John iii, 2.)

2. THE CHRISTIAN'S RELATION TO THE LAW.

§ 47. (a) The Binding Force of the Law.

We have already seen § 21, that the revealed law is destined to prepare the natural man for faith in Christ, by awakening a consciousness of guilt and a longing for redemption. But that is not the whole significance of the law. The Antinomian doctrine, that for the Christian the law is not valid and not binding, is an evident contradiction of the Bible.

Christ himself shows his relation to the law very clearly when he says: "Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfill. For verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law till all be fulfilled." (Matt. v, 17, 18.) When Paul says, "Christ is the end of the law," and when in various places he most emphatically declares that those who believe "are not under the law, but under grace," he does not intend to say that the law

is not valid for those who believe; for, in answer to the question, "Do we then make void the law through faith?" he says, in full harmony with the words of Christ: "God forbid: yea, we establish the law." (Rom. iii, 31.)

But how is Christ "the end of the law?" It is evident that this expression does not refer to the objective validity of the moral law, which can never cease. For the will of the unchangeable God must eternally remain the same. Christ can be called "the end of the law" only inasmuch as he was the ultimate end and the fulfilling of the Old Covenant law. In him the law in its spiritual essential import is fulfilled, and has appeared on earth in personal and amiable form. But just for that reason all that was pedagogical, typical, and symbolical in the preparatory law of the Old Testament, finds in him its end and its conclusion.

When the apostle further says that those who believe are no longer "under the law, but under grace," he simply wants to say that those who believe are no longer under the dominion of the law, which only worketh wrath—because it makes sin manifest and rebukes transgression, without being able to impart the strength for a holy life, and hence frightens and alarms the heart by threatening divine judgments of wrath—but under the dominion of grace, which for Christ's sake forgives sins. Therefore, the Christian is freed from the constraint and curse of the law, but not from his obligation to the moral import of the law. This moral import, as "the law of the Spirit" or "the law of Christ," has gained a new, a higher significance for him. For with the love for Christ he has accepted the law, as it appeared in person, in his heart. To him it is no longer strange and external, but dwells in him as free love-impulse; and its fulfillment is no longer a burden as it formerly was when he was subject to it out of fear, but a pleasure

and honor. Hence James calls the law of Christ the "law of liberty," which really is an oxymoron—that is, combines two contradictory ideas—but just in this it characterizes the "law of Christ" according to its innermost nature.

This also explains why the apostle says that the law is established through faith. As long as the law is only something external to man, and is not potent in him as a new life-principle, there can be no glad fulfilling of the law; this is made possible only when the law dwells in him as a new life-principle, a free love-impulse. Therefore the apostle says (Rom. viii, 2): "For the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death;" that is, from the dominion of the sinful lusts of the old nature, which work death. John says: "This is the love of God, that we keep his commandments; and his commandments are not grievous." (1 John v, 3.)

The question arises whether the Christian is really able to fulfill the law of God perfectly, so that not only in the eyes of men, but in the eyes of God, he is pure and sinless. To answer this question in the affirmative without further consideration, would be fanaticism. There have, indeed, always been persons that considered themselves sinless, and thought they were no longer in need of the fifth petition in the Lord's prayer: "Forgive us our trespasses." But whoever thinks and speaks thus, shows that he knows neither himself nor the holiness of God. It is true that with "holy love" the principle of joyful fulfillment of the law is implanted into man; it is true that, if he is in the proper state of grace, he does not sin knowingly and willingly (1 John iii, 9); but who knows how often he errs unknowingly? Although by conversion and regeneration the life-center of man is renewed and his fundamental disposition

changed, the enfeeblement and perversion of his psychical powers caused by sin, will never be fully remedied in this life. Out of this enfeeblement and perversion spring all kinds of mistakes and errors. Our ability to err is a fruitful source of such mistakes. We are deceived in regard to the character of others, their motives, the extent of their actions, as well as our own, or also in regard to the actual circumstances in which we are placed; and from these sources spring many errors in our moral conduct, despite our good-will. But aside from these sins that spring from ignorance, an upright Christian must confess that, if God should judge him with the full severity of his justice, he could not stand in his holy judgment. Who has not experienced that even his best deeds are not perfect in God's eyes; that, besides the chief motive of holy love, many wrong motives exist of which he must be ashamed; that, besides the pure love for fellow-man, there appear occasionally feelings of selfishness, vanity, envy, and malignant joy, which, although they may be instantly suppressed, mar the feeling of pure innocence; that, finally, despite all joyfulness of the regenerated heart in fulfilling the divine will, the good is not done without a struggle with the old man, and often is not done as perfectly as our conviction tells us it ought to be done? Although these faults and errors vanish more and more as growth in sanctification advances, even the most advanced Christians feel that they have by far not reached their model, Christ, and that, notwithstanding the sincerity and fervency of their love for God, they yet must pray: "Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us!"

"Nevertheless the relation of man to the law is totally different after regeneration from what it was before. Despite all the good deeds he may have done, the disposi-

tion of his heart before regeneration was opposed to God's will; now the opposite is true. Notwithstanding the weaknesses that beset him, and the errors that may yet be found in his life, the disposition of his heart is in full harmony with the spirit of the divine law. Therefore the apostle rightly says: 'Love is the fulfilling of the law.'" (Rom. xiii, 8–10.)

But it may yet be asked, whether or not the single commandments of the law lose their binding force by the implantation of the new life-principle, holy love, through which the law of the Old Testament is "established" according to its moral import. That they do, might be taken from the words of Paul (1 Tim. i, 9): "The law is not made for a righteous man, but for the lawless and disobedient, for the ungodly and for sinners." But it can not be taken from Paul's words; for in other places, speaking to those that believe, he refers to single commandments of the law of the Old Testament; for example, Eph. vi, 1–3. And it can not be otherwise; for there must be full harmony between the moral import (or the "spirit") of the law and its single moral requirements. Hence at different times Christ repeats, and thus sanctions anew, the commandments of the Decalogue. The single commandments, indeed, are superfluous and meaningless in the degree in which the "law of the spirit" gains strength and clearness in man's heart; and where the law obtains its full value, there is no need of external commandments. In this sense the apostle can say: "The law is not made for a righteous man."

But the Christian life is not complete from its beginning; the new man must contend with the old in the struggle of sanctification; and as long as this is the case it occurs too often that the knowledge of the divine will is darkened by the lusts of the flesh. Hence even the Christian needs the objective norm of the Old

Testament law, as a corrective for his moral knowledge, which is yet subject to error. The consciousness of obligation to the single commandments of the law forms a very salutary barrier against the danger of insubordinate Antinomian overestimation of self, which is directly opposed to the spirit of adoption.

§ 48. (B) The Individual Difference of the Demands of the Law.

The scholastic distinction between lawful commandments, which man is bound to obey, and so-called evangelic counsels (which, like the regulations of the monks, especially those requiring celibacy and indigence, contain directions for such only as have resolved, of their own free choice, to attain to a higher level of moral perfection), increases the delusion that man can do more than is required of him, and is in direct opposition to the Word of God (Luke xvii, 10; Rom. ix, 12; xi, 6; Gal. iii, 11), and to the spirit of the evangelic Church, which positively denies all meritoriousness of works. Hence it must be rejected as non-evangelic.

On the other hand, it can not be denied that, despite the essential oneness of the moral mission of all mankind, the difference of social position and vocation brings about a difference of duties. Man has duties that do not devolve upon woman, and *vice versa*; the ruler has duties that are not shared by his subjects; the preacher of the gospel, the servant, the lord—in short, every one—has certain special duties, which position and vocation impose upon him. These special professional duties, however, are not based upon "evangelic counsels," which the Christian can obey or disobey at pleasure, but upon divine commandments, which he must obey if he wishes to be a Christian at all. and the disobeying of which would be sin for him.

From the professional duties which are based upon definite commandments we must distinguish the domain of the allowed, which is important for Christian ethics. As allowed, we designate, in general, all that is neither demanded nor forbidden in Holy Scripture. Hence to this domain are assigned many social and æsthetic enjoyments (dancing, playing cards, the drama, banquets, smoking, dress, etc.), and artistic employments, the purpose of which is the adorning and gladdening of life. Although these things are neither demanded nor forbidden in God's Word, and hence are *adiaphora*—indifferent things in this sense—it does not follow that, because the law has left them indefinite, they lie beyond the domain of the moral, and hence are morally indifferent. The moral mission of man consists not only in obeying certain single commandments or prohibitions, but rather in his realizing, in his whole life, the idea of the moral. For this reason, every free action, even though it does not come under any definite law, must be good or bad, according as it is in harmony with the fulfilling of our moral mission, or in opposition to it. The Pietists, therefore, were certainly right when, in opposition to the lax view of the Lutheran Church, which considered everything that was not forbidden in the Holy Scriptures to be morally indifferent (indifferent things), and hence allowed, they taught that, in this sense, there are no "indifferent things" at all; that the entire life of the regenerated must flow from a new, holy source, since whatsoever is not of faith is sin. But they erred in applying this principle when, with too great an anxiety, they placed like limits of the allowed for all without distinction, and wholly ignored the individual difference of persons. The line between unfree anxiety and true conscientiousness is, indeed, not easily drawn; and, wherever there is uncertainty or doubt about a certain action's

pleasing or displeasing God, conscientious anxiety is certainly better than careless disregard of moral scruples.

Only unto the pure all things are pure. But the Christian has yet to battle with sin within and about him, and hence must deny himself many an allowed enjoyment, because it could serve as a temptation and harm his spiritual life; but even if this were not the case, his regard for others demands that he limit his liberty, in order that his unrestricted actions may not give them offense. (Rom. xiv, 15–23.) But as the character, the power of faith, the advancement of knowledge, as well as the social position of individual Christians is different, and the one would find dangerous and offensive what another, probably, without giving offense, can do in faith and full harmony with his moral endeavors, the domain of the allowed is sometimes larger, sometimes smaller. The decision, however, as to what is allowed or not in an individual case, is given by the divinely enlightened conscience of the individual. (Rom. xiv, 22 and 23.) Hence we should guard against using the criterion of our own conscience in judging others in the domain of the allowed; such action will only lead to "doubtful disputation." (Rom. xiv, 13.) The apostle says, "Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind;" "For whatsoever is not of faith is sin." There is nothing in the wide domain of the allowed that is allowable in all circumstances and for all persons; hence the morality of the allowed can be determined individually only.

For practical life, the following rule is to be remembered with regard to the allowed: "Be conscientious and severe toward yourself, lenient and cautious in your judgment of others." The apostle says: "Let not him that eateth, despise him that eateth not; and let not him that eateth not, judge him that eateth;" "Let us not judge one another any more; but judge this rather, that no man

put a stumbling-block or an occasion to fall in his brother's way."

§ 49. (c) Divine and Human Volition in their Relation to Each Other.

The Christian life, as we learned in § 36, is the result of the co-operation of two factors; namely, divine and human volition. There can be a fourfold relation of these factors: (1) God wills, and man wills not; (2) God wills, and man also wills; (3) Man wills, and God also wills; (4) Man wills, and God wills not.

The first relation obtains in the case of the impenitent sinner, who, despite all the gracious influences of the Holy Ghost, will not subject himself to God—God wills and man wills not. The second obtains in the case of the penitent sinner. Here also God has the initiative of volition; but man follows the directions of the Holy Ghost, and enters into the intentions of divine love with full earnestness—God wills and man also wills. The third relation obtains in the case of the regenerated Christian. The "new man," begotten in regeneration, and created after God in righteousness and true holiness, here has the initiative; but God strengthens and supports him from moment to moment in willing and performing the good—man wills and God also wills.* The fourth relation obtains in the case of the hardened sinner, when, frightened by the sudden awaking of conscience, he tries to escape the judgment of God in an ungodly, self-chosen way, while by his continued enmity toward

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*That we ascribe to the regenerated the initiative in willing the good, does not at all contradict Phil. ii, 13, where it is said that God worketh in us both to will and to do of his good pleasure; for the "new man" is himself begotten through God's Spirit; he is the life-center of man as it is renewed and sanctified by the Spirit of Christ, or as Paul says: "Christ in us." Hence the volition of the new man itself can be said to be wrought of God.

God he makes it impossible that God draw near unto him—man wills (not, indeed, in the proper way), and God wills not. The first and the last relation of divine and human volition are of such a nature that they exclude the Christian life, whereas the second and third mark the beginning and progress of it.

If we have said of the relation of human and divine volition in the case of the regenerated, "Man wills, and God also wills," one might easily conclude therefrom that it were impossible for the regenerated Christian to falter and fall, and that his life must be an uninterrupted victory. But this conclusion would be premature. If in regeneration a complete life-renewal had been given instead of a new life-beginning, if a perfect man in Christ had been born instead of a child, and if the regenerated one were not always struggling with the remainder of the old man, the co-operation of human and divine volition would, indeed, make all faltering and falling impossible. This, however, is not the case, as we saw in § 45; the new man is yet battling with the old, who is constantly troubling him with his lusts and desires, and seeking to make him waver in his moral volition; and only too often does he succeed in doing this, if the Christian is not diligent in watching and praying. This explains why, despite the co-operation of human and divine volition, the progress of the regenerated, as a rule, is interrupted by manifold hesitations and waverings. But the more perfectly he vanquishes and mortifies the old man in the struggle of sanctification, the more constant and undisturbed will he keep sight of the end of his divine life-purpose. Therefore the above formula for human and divine volition,—man wills, in firm, unswerving volition; and God also wills,—is in the full sense of the word valid only in the state of Christian perfection.

3 .THE DANGERS OF THE PROGRESS.

§ 50. (A.) Habitual Piety.

"Let him that thinketh he standeth, take heed lest he fall." These words of the apostle, spoken to regenerated Christians, remind us of the fact that not only in the beginning, but also in the progress of the Christian life, there are serious dangers that must be overcome if our faith shall not be wrecked. There are in the main five errors against which we would warn: Habitual piety, spiritual pride, and faint-heartedness, and, finally, wrong liberty, and conformity to the law.

Habitual piety. As the new life of the Christian in its beginning, and also in its progress, is connected with certain means—as prayer, the Word of God, and the sacraments, which we call "means of grace"—it may easily happen that, on account of the extraordinary importance of these means, the Christian loses sight of the much more important purpose of them, and makes the means themselves the purpose. But thus piety loses all inner support; it comes to be a mere form, habitual piety. The shell remains, but the kernel is lost; man yet has the form of godliness, but lacks the power thereof. And it must be so; for the means are given for the sake of the purpose only. If they are separated from their purpose and made the purpose themselves, they lose all value. If, therefore, the means of grace are no longer used as means of claiming and accepting divine grace, that is, God himself, they are perfectly useless.

Yea, more than that, the abuse of them is even harmful; for man now rests satisfied with the use of the means, and considers himself sure of his salvation. But this is a fatal error; for the wrong consolation with which he banishes all care for his soul's salvation also causes the longing after God to cease, which longing is the

basis of all spiritual growth. This formal service never grants true rest of the soul; the feeling of inner emptiness, however, no longer urges on to God, but only to greater diligence in observing the outer precepts of religion. The consequence is, that, separated from Christ, the new man gradually dies. The heart grows colder and colder, the soul fainter and fainter. Faith, lacking practice, grows weak; love, deprived of its object, grows cold; and the glad hope of eternal life gives way to a dull unconcern. This certainly does not happen at once, but gradually. The outward forms of piety are retained. One remains a diligent Church member, is always in his place at public worship, and at home family worship and grace are not neglected; but the soul of all this is wanting because the means have come to be the purpose, and one is satisfied with the mere form.

A usual consequence of formal service is self-righteousness. As piety is essentially sought in personal action, the *ego* becomes more and more prominent, and in the degree that it increases, the soul's life in Christ decreases; for where selfishness reigns, Christ must withdraw. Self-righteousness now takes the place of righteousness which is by faith.

To guard against habitual piety, one should always remind himself of the fact that the essence of Christianity does not consist in external forms, but in Christ's being formed in us, which can be brought about only by his personal self-impartation to us, and that, despite our most diligent observance of the means of grace, we shall be lost if we ourselves are not changed into the image of Christ Jesus. Hence we should never be content with the *opus operatum*, that is, with the mere observance of the means of grace, but should consider our entire service worthless if it does not serve to bind us more closely to Christ. Especially should we guard against making

prayer a mere form; for in prayer this sinking of the life of faith to habitual piety begins.

§ 51. (B) Spiritual Pride and Faint-heartedness.

The experience of regeneration and justification is so glorious that the Christian can not conceive its full import. From a sinner laden with curses he has been changed to a child of God and an heir of all the heavenly possessions. A new world has been opened up to him, the world of eternal, heavenly realities; and he feels himself most intimately united with this world. He communes with God, like a child with its father, and daily receives from him eternal life-forces. He perceives the great value that he has in God's eyes, and the consciousness of being a child of God fills him with joyful rapture.

In this consciousness there lies, on the one hand, a mighty incentive for striving after sanctification (1 John iii, 3); on the other hand, however, the danger of spiritual pride. How easily it can happen that, feeling the high state of grace to which he has already attained, the Christian forgets his dependence upon God, falls in love with himself, instead of giving all honor to God, and begins to boast of his own strength and moral perfection. But this is the essence of spiritual pride. This pride can assume various forms. But all these forms have one thing in common; namely, that in consequence of self-deification, the longing for God, the divine hunger, ceases, and hence, also, the assimilation (appropriation) of God. "This manifests itself at once in a certain aridity of the spiritual life, the perfect opposite of that fullness of life and fresh, bubbling originality of a soul that assimilates properly." (Culmann.) In this, the spiritually proud could easily recognize a symptom of the diseased condi-

tion of his inner life, if he were not hindered from doing so by his self-love; but as it is, he ignores these symptoms, and in proud self-satisfaction says with the Laodiceans, "I am rich and increased with goods, and have need of nothing," however wretched, miserable, poor, blind, and naked he may be. From this self-satisfaction springs disregard of the means of grace, which he considers superfluous in his case, although he does not deny their benefit and necessity for "Christians of the ordinary stamp." From the latter he withdraws more and more, because he thinks association with them will pollute him, while an inclination easily arises to unite with a few privileged ones in separatistic conventicles, in which those participating scatter incense to one another.

In consequence of his isolation from God and the enlightening influence of his Spirit, the self-estimation of the spiritually proud grows more and more false. As the chief error of their heart, pride, is concealed and palliated by the fig-leaves of vain excuses, instead of being recognized in the light of God, and humbly confessed, their blindness and self-delusion constantly increase, so that many, in the giddiness of their pride, fall into wildest fanaticism. One believes he is called to fulfill a very extraordinary mission in the kingdom of God; another considers himself as pure and sinless as Christ himself was; a third, in pantheistic self-deification, proclaims himself, as the Brethren of the Free Spirit in the fourteenth century and single fanatics at all times, a real incarnation of Christ, and thereby falls into the last consequence of spiritual pride—blasphemy!

The polar opposite of spiritual pride is faint-heartedness. We already met with this in the beginning of the Christian life. But, although it was conquered there, all danger in this respect is by no means past. Danger now returns, although in a somewhat different form.

This is especially true of those Christians who, in the beginning of their new life, overestimate the emotional part, yield to the joy of communion with God, and thereby forget that on earth we walk by faith and not by sight; that not religious emotions, but the energy of the sanctified will, the power of holy love, is the criterion by which we must judge our spiritual life. As long as the first blessedness of pardon thrills the heart, and joy in the Lord forces back all cares and temptations, there is no danger of faint-heartedness. But this danger appears when the life in God loses the charm of newness, and the excited emotions are gradually conducted into quieter paths, which must be done sooner or later, despite all new experiences of divine grace; for if the extraordinary enhancement of the emotional life, as it is found in the days of the first love, continued, it would destroy the normal development of the Christian life. Where would be the trials, struggles, and victories by which faith becomes perfect, if we could uninterruptedly remain upon the heights of Tabor, and revel in the feelings of undimmed communion with God? Therefore, after the first glorious revelations of his love, God seemingly withdraws again, and leaves the Christian to himself. And now there is danger that his feeling of being left to himself change to faint-heartedness, and he really believe that he is deserted by God; that he cast away confidence, and, in the consciousness of his weakness and imperfection, believe all to be lost, and give up the struggle for sanctification, the assimilation of God. In this consists faint-heartedness.

The extremes are contiguous. Pride and faint-heartedness are polar opposites, and yet the one easily changes to the other. The struggle of Christ in Gethsemane was essentially a temptation to faint-heartedness; but after overcoming this temptation, there was such a powerful

enhancing of his divine-human self-consciousness that the simple words, "I am he," threw the multitude of his enemies to the earth. In the case of the sinless Son of God, it did not advance beyond being temptation. Not so in the case of his disciples. When Christ, one stormy night, was walking upon the waves of the Sea of Galilee and came near to his disciples, they "were troubled, and cried out for fear." But this feeling disappeared as soon as they recognized him, and in Peter it gave way to a bold, daring faith, which, however, was not free from sinful overexaltation of self, as his words plainly show: "Lord, if it be thou, bid me come unto thee on the water!" But this changed again to faint-heartedness when, looking at the surging waters, he began to doubt, and, sinking, cried, "Lord, save me!" The change in him from pride to faint-heartedness is still more evident in the night of his denial, in which at first his overestimation of self prompted him to assure the Lord that if all others should leave him, he certainly would not; and, shortly after, his fear of a maid led him to deny Christ.

It is self-evident that spiritual pride and faint-heartedness, like every disease of the spiritual life, have various stages of development, from the first faint inclination till to complete falling away from God. It is important, therefore, to guard against the first beginnings. "Let him that thinketh he standeth, take heed lest he fall." The Christian should live in the spirit of self-examination as in the sight of God. He should examine not only his actions, but also his motives, in the light of God's Word, and should never forget that whatever he possesses of earthly goods is a gift of grace, and that his new life itself is sustained only by Christ's giving him daily new life-forces. (John xv, 4.) He should pray for the enlightenment of the Holy Ghost, who guides us into all truth, and should often consider the life of his

divine example, Christ Jesus, that in His holiness and moral greatness he may learn to know his own weakness and sinfulness; then the feelings of spiritual pride will die in the consciousness of his own unworthiness and in the humble acknowledgment of divine grace.

To guard against faint-heartedness, the Christian should, above all, remember that the essence of the Christian life is not emotion, but love to God and fellow-man, and that, therefore, even though all joyful emotions have fled, and he be obliged to walk in deepest darkness, he has no reason to doubt his state of grace as long as it is the chief desire of his heart that God's will be done in him and by him. If temptation to faint-heartedness spring from external sufferings and tribulations, he should remember that we must enter into glory through much affliction, and that in the fire of tribulation our faith is tried and purified; if it be the consciousness of his own unworthiness and sinfulness, he should not forget that "we are saved by grace through faith, not of works," but should not neglect to strive with all earnestness, that by continuous assimilation of God he become ever more perfectly sanctified and changed into the image of Christ, who of God is made unto us not only "wisdom and righteousness," but also "sanctification and redemption."

§52. (c) Wrong Liberty, and Conformity to the Law.

Another danger that threatens the Christian in the progress of his life of faith is wrong freedom from the law. The regenerated one, who through faith in Christ has received forgiveness of sin and a new spiritual life, is no longer under the law, but under grace. He no longer does God's will out of slavish fear, but out of free love-impulse, as a good child does the will of its par-

ents; and, in the blessed experience of grace which he has received in Christ Jesus, he knows that he is free from the curse and dominion of the law. (Gal. i, 1, 8; iii, 25.)

On the one hand the Christian finds great inner satisfaction in this consciousness; on the other hand, serious danger lurks here, if, namely, he gives way to the delusion that henceforth he needs to recognize no norm of his actions save the dictates of his own "enlightened" spirit; for even the regenerated needs the revealed law as a corrective for his moral knowledge and as a support for his conscience, which is struggling with sin, and is not able to resist the continued enticements of the old man, if it is deprived of its objective norm (§ 47). If, therefore, the so-called "spirit" is placed above the Scriptures, the flesh soon gains dominion again, and the mistaken Christian liberty comes to be a "cloak of maliciousness." Sin is excused or even justified; the "narrow way" is constantly made wider; conscience is weakened more and more, and finally entirely hushed. The Christian becomes more and more indolent in the struggle for sanctification; the mortifying of the old man is discontinued, and, as the self-impartation of Christ to the new man is conditioned by the mortifying of the old, the assimilation of God ceases. The necessary consequence is that the new man dies, and the Christian sinks back into the slavery of sin, from which he had escaped through regeneration. The last consequence of this erring is that "emancipation of the flesh" which, like a dark shadow, often appears at the side of great religious and reformatory movements, and was especially prominent in the form of Gnosticism in the first centuries, and of the pantheistic libertinism of Geneva, which considered "God and man to be identical, sin to be mere semblance, matrimony to be a restriction that should be

rejected, Holy Scriptures to be nothing, and the so-called spirit everything."

The polar opposite of wrong liberty is wrong conformity to the law, which is often to be found where the Christian life lacks a potent flight of faith. There it easily happens that, instead of rising to full certainty of grace and to a vivid claiming and accepting of Christ, the Christian sinks back to Pharisaic holiness through works, and puts conscientious observance of single precepts of law and ecclesiastical statutes in the place of inner divine life. All kinds of externalities, especially such, also, as belong to the domain of "indifferent things," are too much emphasized, and made the criterion for judging self as well as for judging others, while the principal part of Christianity, the disposition of the heart, remains unobserved. (Col. ii, 18–23.) Hence wrong conformity to the law usually goes hand in hand with the loveless judging of fellow-man. As in such conformity Christ and his redemption are more and more lost sight of, it is, as a rule, connected with faint-heartedness and anxious scrupulosity, if it does not degenerate to mechanical, habitual piety, in which the inner spiritual life perishes entirely. In all cases, however, the accepting of Christ is here also discontinued, and slavery of sin and spiritual death again take the place of the "liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free." (Gal. v, 1.)

To guard against wrong liberty the Christian should remember that the revelation of the Holy God in conscience can impossibly contradict the written laws of God; and hence the subjective dictates of our spirit must always be subordinated to the objective Word of God. Then he should remember that the ultimate end of redemption is the transformation into the image of God, and that this end can be reached only where the old man is unsparingly put to death. (Gal. vi, 7–9.) He should

further remember that the struggle with the old man is a struggle for life or death, and that every sparing of a known sin rests like a ban upon the spiritual life, which ban makes appropriation of Christ impossible, and hence causes the death of the new man. He should therefore guard against willful desires for emancipation, ever remembering that the strength for a life pleasing to God is to be found in Christ and the child-like confident union with him. (John xv, 5; Gal. v, 6.) To guard against wrong conformity to the law, he should carefully read the first four chapters of the Epistle to the Galatians, and consider well that, in God's eyes, even the strictest outward fulfillment of the law is worthless if faith in Christ and personal life-communion with him is wanting, and that the overestimation of our own moral achievements brings us into danger of forfeiting Christ and eternal blessedness. Paul writes: "Christ is become of no effect unto you, whosoever of you are justified by the law; ye are fallen from grace." (Gal. v, 4.) Above all things, one should therefore strive for a more and more intimate communion with Christ, in whom alone he can stand before God; and should not wish to be or do anything without him, but everything in him and by him; then, in free love-obedience, one will be able to maintain the proper relation to the law, as well as to evangelic liberty.

From the preceding it follows that all dangers which the Christian encounters in the progress of his life of faith, result in his growing faint in struggling for sanctification. The causes of their appearing are various; the effect is always the same. Hence we can make this statement: The perseverance of the Christian, and hence his eternal blessedness, is solely dependent upon the faithfulness with which the old man is put to death in the struggle for holiness, and with which Christ is accepted by faith.

Remark.—The remarks of P. T. Cullmann about the Church-historical significance of the opposites, wrong liberty and conformity to the law, are interesting. He writes: "Gnosticism in the second and third centuries, A. D., is essentially a product of wrong liberty. Indirectly it testifies to the glory of Christianity; for to Christianity the Gnostics owe the extraordinary power of spirit which is necessarily presupposed by the creation of their systems." "For like a millstone Christianity had fallen into the stagnant sea of nations, and its spreading wave-circles put an historically dead age into inner fermentation, ebullition, and agitation, which, without this extraordinary occurrence, must be an unsolvable enigma. The fructification by new spiritual forces that had just been introduced into the world, and were imparted to all that came in contact with it, could, on account of the selflessness of these spiritual forces, turn out as well for the good as for the bad. It turned out for the good wherever people approached the witness of truth with faithful obedience, and, in humble subordination to the Scriptures and the Church, applied themselves to the assimilation of the liquefied spiritual forces; it turned out for the bad wherever the winging of the individual did not strengthen him in constant devotion to his Christian vocation, but rather impelled him into self-willed, eccentric paths. The wrong conformity to the law is the polar double of wrong liberty, and is easily called forth by the latter It is a Church-historical fact that the old Catholic Church of the first three centuries was not able to conquer Gnosticism (which was spiritually emancipating itself), without erring to the other extreme, and emphasizing ecclesiastical custom with a certain severity and one-sidedness. It did not succeed in conquering wrong conformity to the law among the heathen, as Paul succeeded in doing among the apostolic congregations, ever keeping the proper mean. It did not rise into the realm of principle, but remained in the region of low opposites, and neutralized one evil by a second. In wrong conformity to the law, the power of faith's upward flight retires Hence its close relation to faint-heartedness, to anxious scrupulosity. It can not rise to an apprehension of the living God, and hence holds that the observance of Church customs and statutes is the essential part with which the higher, the end, is infallibly connected. The noble fire of divine hunger gradually dies, and the religious life degenerates to mechanical, habitual piety. The Greek and Roman Church stagnate in wrong conformity to the law. In Protestantism Pietism inclines toward it; orthodoxy, on the contrary, to the

absolutism of arbitrary decrees. Both in their Church-historical succession were again only the conquering of one evil by another." (Christian Ethics, p. 306, etc.)

4. THE MEANS FOR AWAKENING AND PROMOTING THE CHRISTIAN LIFE, OR THE MEANS OF GRACE.

§ 53. Significance and Purpose of the Means of Grace.

The Christian is far from linking his religion to definite places or forms of religious service. Since Christ spoke to the Samaritan woman of worshiping "in spirit and in truth," and especially since on the day of his death the veil of the temple was rent, we know that God's blessings are not restricted to particular places; that the dark chamber in which a disciple of Christ pours out his heart in longing prayer is just as holy as the most magnificent cathedral on earth. We also know that God is not bound to any form of religious service; that even if a Christian, by God's guidance, should be deprived of all Church service, he could yet enjoy the perfect gracious presence of his Lord. And yet it is true that, as a rule, God does not reveal and impart himself to man immediately, but employs special means in order to awaken man to a new life in Christ, and to promote him in it. These means, to which we count not only God's word and the sacraments, but also prayer and the fellowship of those that believe, we designate (using the term in a somewhat wider sense than it usually is used) means of grace.

As the means of grace are ordained of God, the use of them is a sacred duty, the willful neglect of which must be of fatal consequence to our spiritual life. For, as we saw in § 45, it is one of the indispensable conditions of growth in grace that man use all means that are given

him for reaching his divine destination, with inflexible energy and indefatigable perseverance. Hence no Christian whose spiritual life is sound—even though he were the most enlightened and gifted—should disregard the means of grace; it is rather a symptom of spiritual unsoundness, of fanaticism or pride, or also of wicked levity, if a Christian thinks that he is no longer in need of them, and wantonly neglects them. Such contempt of the means of grace ordained by God is contempt of God himself.

Two things, however, must never be forgotten in the use of the means of grace: (1) That they have no value of themselves, but are only means for accepting God, whereby it is explained that one can be a good "Church Christian" and yet be inwardly dead; (2) That they are not irresistible influences of grace, by the use of which the gift of the Holy Ghost is mediated in all circumstances, but only means of grace, the gracious influences of which are conditioned by the moral conduct of each individual, so that they can be to man a blessing or a curse, according as he uses them worthily or unworthily. For every rejection of the Lord, who offers himself to us in the means of grace, blunts and hardens the heart. Hence it is not sufficient that we use the means of grace; we must use them properly; that is, in that disposition of the heart, which fits us for accepting the divine gifts of grace—in the disposition of longing for God, which the Psalmist expresses in the words: "As the hart panteth after the water-brooks, so panteth my soul after thee, O God!" (Psa. xlii.)

§ 54. The Word of God.

As a means of awakening spiritual life, God's word is one of the foremost; for "faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God." Hence the gospel of the cross is called "the power of God unto salvation

to every one that believeth" (Rom. i, 16), and Peter says of the Christians that they are "born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of God, which liveth and abideth forever" (1 Peter i, 23). Not only the beginning of the new life, however, is ascribed to the word of God, but also the further development of it. Christ himself says in his prayer for the apostles: "Sanctify them through thy truth: thy word is truth." (John xvii, 17.) Here "sanctification" is definitely traced back to the word of God; the word of God, therefore, appears as the bearer of the life-streams of the Holy Ghost. Hence it is also called the "word of life," and the Lord says: "The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life." (John vi, 63.)

That the influence of God s word is not unconditional and mechanical, we have already seen; but what conditions man must meet in order that it should prove to be a power of God, Christ himself tells us in the words: "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself." (John vii, 17.) Hence the word of God becomes a means of grace to the truly upright only, who is willing to subject himself to the demands of God, of whatever kind they may be; but to the insincere and thoughtless the "word of life" comes to be a "savor of death unto death."

The conviction of the sinner may be brought about by the preaching of the word without his will (§ 37); but conversion, regeneration, and sanctification can not be effected, unless we subject ourselves willingly and with loving devotion to the influence of divine truth. "For if any be a hearer of the word and not a doer, he is like unto a man beholding his natural face in a glass; for he beholdeth himself, and goeth his way, and straightway forgetteth what manner of man he was. But whoso

looketh into the perfect law of liberty, and continueth therein, he being not a forgetful hearer, but a doer of the word, this man shall be blessed in his deed." (James i, 23–25.)

Therefore, where there is a proper susceptibility for the word of God, it is to us a mirror, in which we can behold ourselves in the light of truth; it leads us deeper and deeper into the knowledge of the divine will as well as of our own heart, and thereby awakens that "godly sorrow, which worketh repentance to salvation not to be repented of." From this sorrow there springs a hunger and thirst for righteousness, a divine hunger, that makes us worthy vessels of the Holy Ghost. But the word of truth not only creates in us this divine hunger; more than that, if we look deeper into this mirror, and look into the perfect law of liberty, we experience the saving power of the gospel. We learn to believe in Christ as our Redeemer, and receive, in the new life-principle of holy love which is shed abroad in our heart by the Holy Ghost, a new law, the "law of the Spirit," which makes us "free from the law of sin and death." This "law of the Spirit" is no longer external to us as a rigid command or prohibition, but it abides in us as the living power of love, which impels us inwardly to fulfill the will of God gladly. Hence James calls it the "law of liberty." Thus the word of God comes to be to us a means of regeneration and sanctification.

The Holy Scriptures are and must be the spiritual food on which the Christian subsists; and he is to be pitied if he can no longer relish the plain, nutritive diet that it offers him. He, who remains cold and indifferent when the word of God is preached, should not blame the preacher and the sermon alone; he should first ask himself whether he went to the house of God in the right spirit. "The natural man receiveth not the things

of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them because they are spiritually discerned." (1 Cor. ii, 14.) Who is spiritual himself—that is, in whose heart the Holy Ghost has created a hunger for God—he alone can hope for a spiritual baptism when he listens to the preaching of the word of God. But he who has previously satiated his appetite with other food, and has appeased his hunger with the husks that this world offered him, must not complain if he remains unblest in the house of God. The same is true of reading the word of God. One reads and reads, and finds nothing that suits him because he "knows it all." He reads, simply because he considers it his Christian duty to read his Bible; he reads, but finds nothing because he seeks nothing, and seeks nothing because he thinks he has it all. Another, however, needs not search long; on every page he finds what comforts him, because he comes to the divine word hungry and thirsty. The Holy Scriptures are to him an inexhaustible source of blessing; he reads as a child that has for years been far from its home reads a letter from home. Every word is precious to him, and in every line the loving heart of his Heavenly Father is opened to him. Therefore he never lays the precious book aside without having found true spiritual food in it.

§ 55. The Sacraments.

(*a*) *Holy Baptism.*—If, in accordance with the Augsburg Confession and the majority of the evangelical symbols, we consider the sacraments to be ordained of Christ, and not only badges or tokens of Christian men's profession, but rather certain signs of grace and God's good-will toward us, by which he doth work invisibly in us, and doth not only quicken but also strengthen and confirm

our faith in him,* they appear as means of grace in the real sense of the term, the significance and value of which lie in their being means for the acceptance and promotion of the godly life. In the old Church the sacraments were called the "mysteries" of the Christian service of God, because in them God draws near to man in a mysterious way, and imparts to the hungry soul the blessed influences of his Holy Spirit by these outward signs. Strictly speaking, only two Church rites answer to this character; namely, baptism and the Lord's Supper.

We shall next speak of baptism, and, first of all, of the baptism of adults; for in the latter we can most clearly see the nature and significance of this sacrament. Christian baptism, like circumcision in the Old Testament, is a covenant act. Circumcision was the outward sign of acceptance into the congregation of the children of Israel, and gave to the circumcised a right to all the blessings of the Old Covenant; baptism is the outward sign of acceptance into the congregation of the New Testament people of God, into the visible Church militant of Christ, and guarantees the baptized person his right to the inexhaustible riches of the New Testament blessings of grace.

If we try to establish the single moments of the significance of baptism, the following four points obtain: (1) Baptism is a confession of repentance and of faith in Christ. The baptized person steps out of sin and the world, and unites with those that believe. He has abandoned his old views of life and his old habits, and wishes now to begin a new life. Such a step from darkness to light can not and shall not be taken quietly. The congregation must have a confession from him who now unites with them; they must know to whom they

*Articles of Faith of the Methodist Episcopal Church.

are about to extend a fraternal hand. But confession is a necessity for him also, for it is a public decision that puts an end to all uncertain swerving. (2) Baptism is a significant symbol, a symbol of purification and regeneration. Paul plainly speaks of this significance in Rom. vi, 4: "We are buried with Christ by baptism into death, that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life." As Christ left all affliction that sin caused him, in the grave, so we also leave the pleasure and affliction of sin in baptism's watery grave; and as Christ arose to a new life, so we also arise with him to a glorified existence. Not man alone, however, is active in baptism, but God also. (3) Baptism is a gracious pledge, by which God assures the person baptized all blessings that proceed from the Trinity, provided certainly that the baptized person on his part meets all conditions imposed upon him by the baptismal covenant. But the outward assurance of grace is not sufficient to make baptism a real sacrament. According to the above definition of sacrament, there must (4) be an inner influence of God's grace connected with baptism. And this is indeed the case; but the question arises, in what these influences of grace consist.

That they can not, without further consideration, be designated as "regeneration," we showed in § 42. It is indeed not at all strange that in the primitive Christian Church regeneration often, perhaps usually, coincided with baptism, because those who were baptized were persons who had met the preliminary conditions of regeneration; that is, possessed repentance and faith in Christ. And yet this did not always occur. Many received the gift of the Holy Ghost and were regenerated before they were baptized; for example, the centurion Cornelius and his family (Acts x); others were baptized without being

filled with the Holy Ghost at the same time, as the Samaritans converted by Philip (Acts viii, 16). Dare we say that in the latter case baptism was ineffectual? Certainly not. No doubt even those Samaritans experienced something of the inner gracious influences of baptism, although they were not regenerated at the same time. Similar to this is the case of children which in their infancy are consecrated to God in baptism.

But, we ask again, wherein consists this gracious influence? Can we think of an influence of grace in baptism distinct from regeneration? We affirm this most positively. When Jesus took children up in his arms, put his hands upon them, and blessed them (Mark x, 13–16), that act of blessing was certainly no impartation of the grace of regeneration, much less a mere ceremony. And if pious persons struggle with God day and night in earnest, faithful prayer for the conversion of unconverted friends and relatives, such prayers also are certainly not spoken in vain. That presbyter who comforted Monica, the mother of Augustine, with the words, "Be quiet, a child of so many prayers can not be lost," voiced the conviction of all truly believing Christians, that the prayers of pious parents surround their children with almost irresistible influences of grace. Of these special influences of grace which surround man even before conversion and regeneration, and which we might designate extraordinary manifestations of the prevenient grace of God, a person is brought to partake in baptism. But as all these influences of grace definitely purpose the regeneration and renewing of man into the image of God, it is quite natural that truly penitent persons who have met the ethical preliminary conditions of regeneration, experience the blessed change of regeneration at the moment of baptism, so that symbol and original coincide, and the designation of baptism as the "washing of regen-

eration" comes to be true in a double sense. But where these ethical preliminary conditions have not yet been met, the result of baptism can be an enhanced influence of prevenient grace upon the one baptized, but not the self-impartation of Christ to him in regeneration.

The ecclesiastical practice of infant baptism has made no essential change in the original significance of this sacrament. In baptism the child also is incorporated with the visible Church of Christ; for the child also, baptism is a confession of repentance and faith, a symbol of regeneration, an assurance of divine grace, and an impartation of extraordinary influences of grace; the confession of repentance and faith, however, is not made by the one baptized, but succedaneously by the parents. This substitution is authorized by the intimate relation of parent to child in the complete unity of the Christian family, which is recognized also in Holy Scripture in numerous places, where it is said of fathers that they were baptized "with their entire house." Hence the blessing which a Christian child receives from baptism consists not only in its being incorporated in the visible Church and placed under the influence of the ecclesiastical means of grace, but also in its partaking of the extraordinary manifestions of prevenient grace, which purpose that regeneration, which was symbolized in the act of baptism, should come to be a reality. But this grace is not irresistible. The fatal right of choosing between life and death has once for all been given to man. "Thus indeed thousands who had taken the baptismal blessing as a gift out into life, have gone to ruin, and thousands will follow. But thousands will also be saved by virtue of their baptismal blessing and the prayers of their Christian parents." (Tholuck.)

Remark.—The objection can be raised to our view of the influence of baptism, that even in the case of persons that are

not baptized God will use all possible means for bringing them to conversion; for God is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance and live; and that, if this is admitted, there is no room left for that extraordinary manifestation of prevenient grace in the case of the baptized. Correct. But the same objection could be raised to prayer for the conversion of our unconverted relatives, even to prayer for the coming of the kingdom of God into the world; and yet no believing Christian would let such reflections keep him from praying for his unconverted relatives or for the conversion of the world. There is a veil, which we are not able fully to lift, hiding the relation of the workings of the prevenient grace of God to the activity of human freedom. But this much is certain, that the means of grace, which God himself tells us in his word to use (1 Tim. ii, 1; Matt. v, 44), are not insignificant ceremonies, and that God will do what he has promised, even though we are not able fully to comprehend the how.

§ 56. Continuation.

(*b*) *The Lord's Supper.*—While baptism, as the sign of acceptance into the visible Church of Christ and symbol of repentance, belongs, according to its very nature, to the beginning of the Christian life, the Lord's Supper, with its repeated observance, accompanies us throughout the whole of the Christian life, as a symbol of the life-communion of the believer with his Savior on earth and the type of perfect communion with him in heaven. But as baptism is not only a symbol and sign of regeneration, but also a potent means for its realization, so the Lord's Supper also is not only a symbol and type, but at the same time an act of real acceptance of Christ for the augmenting and perfecting of divine life.

Concerning the various dogmatic forms of the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, this is not the place to consider them; hence we restrict ourselves to the significance of the Lord's Supper for the development of the Christian life, and note the following points:

(1) The Lord's Supper is an actual proclamation of

Christ's death. "As often as ye eat this bread and drink this cup, ye do show the Lord's death till he come." (1 Cor. xi, 26.) This proclamation of Christ's death comprises a twofold confession—a confession of our sin, and a confession of our faith in redemption. (*a*) In looking upon the terrible sufferings that Christ bore out of love for us, the magnitude and abominableness of sin is revealed to us. How must the guilt of sin cry up to heaven, if it demands such a sacrifice! And our conscience tells us that this guilt is also our guilt. Therefore, the more we think of Christ's sufferings, the greater appears the guilt of our indifference and cold-heartedness. Not only the sins that we have committed against God directly, but also those against our fellow-men—fellow-men above us, about us, beneath us—now seem to us more and more sins against God's love and holiness, for which we need not only our fellow-men's, but also God's pardon. All this we humbly confess before God and man. But we also confess (*b*) our faith in Christ's propitiatory sacrifice. Christ said to his disciples: "This is my blood of the new testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins." Believing in these words, we kneel at the communion-table to receive the consecrated signs of propitiation. Here at the altar we confess before the Church of Christ on earth, and before God and his holy angels in heaven, that in Christ's death alone we hope to find salvation and life; that he is food and drink unto our soul, our strength in the struggle with sin, our comfort in affliction, and our hope in death.

It is thus that the Lord's Supper, as a mere "commemoration of his death," is a means of grace for us; for the sincere confession of sin and of faith always proves a blessing for him that confesses. (1 John i, 8–10; Romans x, 10.)

(2) If we designate holy baptism as the act of accept-

ance into God's covenant of grace, we can call the Lord's Supper an act of renewing this covenant, the object of which is to confirm it. We find this significance not only in the words with which it was ordained, "This cup is the new testament [new covenant] in my blood" (1 Cor. xi, 25), but also in the words of the apostle: "The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ?" "Ye can not drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of devils; ye can not be partakers of the Lord's table and of the table of devils." (1 Cor. x, 16, 21.)

In every covenant there are two parties interested. Even so in this covenant. On the one hand Christ, who offers us in his Supper a pledge of his pardoning grace, and thus succors our weak faith, which clings too much to the visible. In every observance of the Lord's Supper he calls to us by word and sign: "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. The bread that you eat and the cup that you drink be to you the pledge of my pardoning love. I have dearly purchased you to be my own. You are mine; and if you willingly permit yourselves to be led by me, I shall by the power of my grace keep you unto everlasting life." Thus Christ speaks. But we, the communicants, come with the vow to abandon all that is not pleasing to him, and to be fully and solely his own. What we already promised symbolically in baptism, that whatever in us is merely natural should perish in order that we might again receive it from Christ new and purified, that we vow anew in every observance of the Lord's Supper.

And hence on the other hand it is always an act of consecration and sacrifice in which we place ourselves

upon God's altar, feeling what A. Knapp so beautifully expresses in the words:

"I am thine! O graciously confirm it!
Precious Savior, thou art mine.
Let thy name be lastingly imprinted,
Burned upon life's sacred shrine!
One with thee in work and self-denials;
One with thee in life and all its trials;
This, till death my soul sets free,
Be my covenant with thee!"

(3) This act of consecration, however, prepares the way, that Christ through his Spirit can impart himself to our soul; for in the degree that man sacrifices himself—that is, dies to himself—Christ can be glorified in him. Thus the Lord's Supper is an act of Christ's self-impartation to the believer. "Christ in us, the hope of eternal glory"—that is the central thought of the whole New Testament. Death and life, heaven and hell, depend upon Christ's being formed in us or not. True, the first implantation of Christ takes place in regeneration (§ 42); but if the new man shall increase and grow strong, he must constantly receive new life-forces from Christ's abundant store, till Christ is all in all to him. Such a self-impartation of Christ also takes place in the observance of other means of grace, especially of prayer; but the observance of the Lord's Supper is the climax of the Christian service of God, the pearl of all ecclesiastical means of grace; and in the first Christian congregation all service of God was completed by the Lord's Supper. The moment in which our soul fully devotes itself to God is the moment in which God fully devotes himself to us; the moment of our greatest self sacrifice is the moment of the most perfect self-impartation of Christ to the believing soul.

(4) Finally, the Lord's Supper is a feast of the

mutual love and the fellowship of those that believe. "For we, being many, are one bread and one body; for we are all partakers of that one bread." (1 Cor. x, 17.) At the Lord's table all believers are assembled as members of a blessed family of God. Here all differences of birth or possessions or culture must vanish; here all are equal, all are poor sinners, laden with guilt, and having no hope but that of being saved through the merits of Christ. Here all discord should cease, every offense toward fellowman be confessed, and every experienced injury be forgiven. It is not a mere custom sanctified by habit, that in many places members of a family approach one another before communion, in order to ask and grant forgiveness. This custom is rather based upon Christ's words: "If thou bring thy gift to the altar, and there rememberest that thy brother hath aught against thee, leave there thy gift before the altar, and go thy way; first be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift." (Matt. v, 23 and 24.)

To the great significance of the Lord's Supper, as we have now learned to know it, corresponds the earnest admonition of the apostle: "But let a man examine himself, and so let him eat of that bread, and drink of that cup. For he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh damnation to himself, not discerning the Lord's body. (1 Cor. xi, 28, 29.) The question now arises wherein this "worthiness" consists, which we should find in ourselves upon self-examination. Where food is offered "for the forgiveness of sins," this "worthiness" can not consist in spotless purity and perfection, but only in the painful recognition of sin and in the hunger and thirst for pardon and cleansing. The self-examination that is necessary here, consists in our inquiring: (1) Whether we have the proper knowledge of our sin; (2) Whether we are perfectly willing to abandon sin, and rectify past errors

as far as possible; (3) Whether we firmly believe in the power of Christ's propitiation. If we can answer these questions in the affirmative, the consciousness of our sinfulness should not keep us away from the Lord's Supper; for thereby we should make the same queer mistake that Peter made, when, after the wonderful draught of fish (Luke v, 8), he fell down at Christ's feet and cried, "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord!" whereas he should have said, "Abide with me and help me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord!" for "to save sinners" is Christ's glorious office. Nor should the weakness of our faith keep us away, if we but do not lack the proper willingness to believe; for the Lord's Supper is not a reward for strong faith, but rather a comforting and strengthening means of grace for the weak. The thoughtless and worldly-minded, however, should not partake of this feast; for to him it will not prove a blessing, but a curse; for "he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh damnation to himself."

§ 57. Prayer.

The most direct expression of longing for God is prayer. But as longing for God, or divine hunger, is the fundamental condition of all self-impartation of God to man, and hence every means of grace, if it shall profit us, must be connected with prayer, we can designate prayer the soul of all means of grace.

Prayer is the heart's converse with God, or, more definitely, "it is the expression to God of all that moves the human heart." The Biblical demand, "Pray without ceasing," does not ask of us that we constantly pray in thoughts or words of which we are clearly conscious. That is not possible. Then even Christ himself had not prayed without ceasing, for he did not constantly utter the prayer of a high priest. It rather demands that frame of

mind by virtue of which all "that moves us inwardly or outwardly, as sorrow or as joy," is disclosed to God. In this sense prayer is a "continuous fluctuating and gravitating of the soul toward God, that has come to be natural to us" (Culmann); it is a state of mind, in which our soul lies open before God, and our entire thought, volition, and emotion finds repose in him. This prayerful disposition is not interrupted by our earthly professional duties, or at least should not be interrupted by them. Even though our powers of body and mind are demanded in other directions, this does not interrupt our being drawn toward God. As the magnet after every deviation seeks its pole again, so also does the loving soul turn from every earthly employment back to God, the source of its existence and the object of its love. Far from interrupting this prayerful disposition, our activity in earthly professions itself is rather lifted up to the higher sphere of life before God, to "walking in the light," and is transformed to a service of God.

This habitual prayerful disposition, however, must necessarily rise to definite acts of prayer, in which the Christian withdraws from the turmoil of his earthly professional life, and with conscious volition concentrates the entire activity of his soul upon God. In these acts of prayer man approaches God as a child approaches its father, and while his whole soul opens to the influence of the Holy Ghost, and with all he has he devotes himself to God, he ascends upon the ladder of prayer to the most intimate communion with the holy God, from which he returns strengthened and revived to the battle of life. The joyfulness and faithful courage with which the now fulfills the duties of his earthly calling and meets the vexations and temptations of sin and the world, show, as did once the beaming face of Moses, that he has conversed with God and drunk from his abundance of life and love.

This concentration of the soul upon God in single acts of prayer is not only a privilege for the Christian, but an absolute necessity, a condition of life, upon which his growth in grace is largely dependent. Whoever thinks that he does not need these acts of prayer, and, in the delusion that the inner prayerful disposition is sufficient, neglects prayer, will soon experience that his prayerful disposition itself decreases, if it is not again and again aroused and deepened by special acts of prayer. Even Christ did not consider it superfluous to devote special portions of his time exclusively to prayer. Having during the day wasted his strength in the service of humanity, he sought the stillness and loneliness of the night to commune with his Heavenly Father in prayer, in order to gain strength for fulfilling his difficult life-mission. If even the holy Son of God, the Master, thought it necessary at certain times to withdraw from the tumult of the world and commune with his Father in prayer, is it not pure presumptuousness if one of his disciples thinks he is not in need of such special acts of prayer as a means of strengthening his faith? It is advisable that a person fix certain times for prayer, which he should observe conscientiously (compare Dan. vi, 10), even though he feel no special impulse to prayer. Though a prayer that is offered out of a mere sense of duty is not the true, proper prayer, it nevertheless has an ascetic value that should not be underestimated; for when we do not feel disposed to pray, when we feel distant from God, we are most in need of prayer. Prayer is just the means by which the loosened tie of communion with God is fastened more firmly. Who, at such times of spiritual draught, wants to wait for the proper disposition before lifting his soul to God in prayer, runs the risk that this disposition will never be renewed, and that he will wander farther and farther away into that which is ungodly, till

finally the tie of communion with God is completely severed.

Prayer is possible wherever man believes in a personal God, and only then; for "he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him" (Heb. xi, 6); but true joyfulness in prayer is found only by trusting in the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ.

Isaiah says: "Your iniquities have separated between you and your God." Sin, which is as an insurmountable wall between us and God and deprives us of our joy in prayer, must be put away, if we wish to approach God with filial trust. This is done by a constant renewal of penitent acceptance of the merits of Christ. If the Bible tells us to pray "in the name of Jesus," the thought is thereby expressed that our prayer can not be truly pleasing to God unless it is based upon the propitiation of Christ; for without Christ God is a "consuming fire." Hence to pray in the name of Jesus is to pray upon the basis of the propitiation made by Christ, which presupposes that he who prays is himself united with Christ in faith, and hence prays in the sense and spirit of Christ and in harmony with his will.

Hence the "prayer in the name of Jesus" is given a special promise. (John xiv, 13; xvi, 24.) We easily err in regard to what is beneficial to us, and often ask foolish things of God, which he, as eternal love, can impossibly grant us. For if a human father give his children only good gifts (Luke xi, 11–13), how much more should that be true of our Father in heaven! But whoever prays in the name and spirit of Christ, will not only learn to know more and more what is beneficial or hurtful, but will always subordinate his own will to the will of God. The key-note of all his prayers will be that God be glorified in him and by him, and this prayer

will always be answered. But all other prayers, also, that we bring to God in Christ's name have a definite promise of being heard. "All things whatsoever ye shall ask in prayer [in Christ's name], believing, ye shall receive (Matt. xxi, 22); and James says: "The effectual, fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much." (James v, 16.)

Two things, therefore, are required: that we pray "earnestly" and "believingly." God would often be willing to hear our prayers and help us, but our indifference and our unbelief fetter not only us, but him also. (Matt. xiii, 58.) If our prayer is not truly earnest, how can we expect God to be in earnest in regard to it? "The kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force." The earnestness of prayer must in some instances increase to a real wrestling in prayer, in which he that prays wrestles with God, bringing all his powers into play, and saying, like Jacob at the ford Jabbok: "I will not let thee go except thou bless me!" Thus the saints have ever wrestled with God and conquered. To such continuous and earnest prayer Christ admonishes us in the parable of the poor widow and the unjust judge, which he closes with the glorious promise: "And shall not God avenge his own elect which cry day and night unto him, though he bear long with them? I tell you that he will avenge them speedily!" (Luke xviii, 1–8;) and he himself gives us the most striking example of such wrestling in prayer in the struggle of his soul in Gethsemane. But, however earnest our prayer may be, we must believe that God can and will help us. Unbelief prevents God's answering our prayer. Matt. xiii, 58, we read that in Nazareth Christ "did not many mighty works, because of their unbelief;" and James says: "He that wavereth is like a wave of the sea driven with the wind and tossed. Let no man think

that he shall receive anything of the Lord." (James. i, 6 and 7.) The faith of him that prays is founded on the one hand, as we have seen, on the propitiation made by Christ; on the other hand, on the demands and promises of the word of God. It would be presumptuousness and foolhardiness for sinful man to approach the holy God if he were not asked to do so by God himself. But since it is God's will that man ask of him, he can boldly bring his sighs and petitions to him in Christ's name, and "God will call his prayer power, and the power of God will yield to the power that he has put into a sigh that is of him." (Vinet.)

The contents of prayer should consist in thanksgiving, supplication, and intercession; this is shown by "the Lord's Prayer," which, not only on account of the grouping of its seven petitions, but also on account of its all-embracing contents, is a model prayer for all times. The address, "Our Father who art in heaven," calls to mind the fact that through Christ we are reconciled with God, and can converse with God in Christ's name, like "children with their loving father." Then follow three petitions which bear upon the honor and the kingdom of God; thence, by a single petition, the attention of him that prays is directed to his own bodily and earthly affairs—it is the petition for the daily bread; and in three petitions—for forgiveness of sins, preservation from temptation, and deliverance from evil—his attention is called to his spiritual needs. In these petitions, however, he that prays does not think of himself alone, but also includes others in his prayer, and thus they have the character of intercession also. The close of the prayer is a praise of God, from whom come all good and perfect gifts. In this model prayer our Lord shows us that when we come to God in prayer we should first think of his kingdom and his righteousness, and then of our own earthly needs.

We are indeed not forbidden to pray for earthly possessions, for we pray for our "daily bread;" but our care for God's affairs and our own spiritual welfare should precede our care for that which is earthly; and while we can pray God for spiritual possessions without any restriction, because we know that these petitions are in harmony with God's will, it is proper that, in praying for earthly things, we should always subordinate our will to the divine will, and say, "Not as I will, but as thou wilt!" For in praying for earthly things, we are often like a foolish boy who would ask his father for a stone, a serpent, or a scorpion; and we are fortunate in having a Heavenly Father who denies us all such petitions, the fulfillment of which would be detrimental to our soul's welfare.

Since prayer is so important for the development of the Christian life, we need not wonder that Satan presents all manner of objections and doubts, in order to prevent our observance of it. We can here silently pass by the objections springing from materialistic, pantheistic, and rationalistic presuppositions, that the development of the world and the natural course of affairs are regulated by definite laws, and that the interference of a supernatural power with these laws is utterly impossible; for where there is faith in a living God, who not only created the world, but also preserves and governs it, these objections vanish of themselves. But even the Christian, who knows by blessed experience that God answers prayer, is at times harassed by doubts and misgivings that deprive him of his joyfulness in prayer. These misgivings we can not pass by.

Even the thought that prayer is superfluous, since God knows our needs better than we ourselves know them, and that, even without our prayer, he would certainly do what is for our good, is fitted to make the exercise of prayer burdensome. But a Christian's growing

negligent in prayer is always a fatal retrogression. God wants to be asked. God acts toward us like a regent toward a faithful servant, whom he tells to ask of him some favor, promising to grant whatever favor the servant might ask, but only on the condition that he ask. Hence the promise, "Ask and it shall be given you," can be changed to, "If ye do not ask, it shall not be given you."

Just as unfounded as the misgiving mentioned above, is the objection that everything will come to pass as God has previously decreed it, and that our prayer, as the wish of a poor human being, can impossibly alter anything in the divine government of the world. God has taken prayer into the plan of his government of the world; hence, according to his will, it belongs to the powers that move God and the world, which we dare not leave unemployed, but must diligently use for our own welfare and God's honor. But if some one thinks he must abandon prayer, because it can change naught in the course of things as God has decreed them, we would ask him why he does not, for the same reason, abandon all other activities that tend to preserve and promote his life—for example, eating, drinking, and working—since everything must come to pass as God has previously decreed. But if our ordinary activities can change the course of our life, should it not be true of that highest, noblest activity, prayer? "We should therefore be diligent in prayer, though for the time being only as empirics, leaving it to God to settle his answering prayer with the wise dogmaticians."

One influence of prayer is not denied even by rationalists; namely, its subjective influence upon the one praying. But if this influence be admitted, the objective influence of prayer can not properly be denied; for every change in the subject himself changes his relation to God

and the outer world. During that nocturnal struggle at the ford Jabbok, Jacob was changed to another man, and thereby gained Jehovah's blessing and the new name Israel. Yet more manifest is the example of the woman of Canaan, upon whose petition that Christ might heal her daughter he answered, "It is not meet to take the children's bread and to cast it to the dogs," while to his disciples he said: "I am not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel." Shall we now suppose that it was all the while Christ's intention to grant the woman's petition, and that he rejected her at first in order to test her faith? That is the view of many commentators; but how could such dissimulation—for in that case we could not designate it otherwise—be harmonized with the character of Jesus? Or did he embrace the Jesuitic maxim, that the good end sanctions morally questionable means? Never. His divine mission was rather up to this time destined especially for the Jews, and that heathen woman had no claim to his Messianic activity. But with all her might she wrestled with God, as Jacob had done, and was victorious; by the power of her faithful prayer she broke down the barrier that separated her from the people of Israel, and, as a true Israelitish woman, she gained a claim to the blessings of God's people. Now, after the prayer of the pious heathen woman has brought about a change in the state of affairs, Christ can no longer deny his help, and he grants her petition with the joyful exclamation: "O woman, great is thy faith; be it unto thee even as thou wilt." Of the same import was the repentance and subsequent sparing of the Ninevites after Jonah's proclamation of God's judgment; and especially Jer. xviii, 7–10: "At what instant I shall speak concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdom, to pluck up, and to pull down, and to destroy it; if that nation against whom I have pronounced, turn from their evil, I will repent of

the evil that I thought to do unto them," etc., with which the Lord definitely says, that in his government of the world he permits himself to be destined by the conduct of man.

The same is true of other answers to prayer. The majority of earthly afflictions purpose the moral reformation of man; therefore Baader properly says that earthly affliction has gained its purpose as soon as it has awakened a necessity for God. If this has been accomplished, there is no reason why God should not put an end to affliction, which was only a means for a certain end. The awakened longing for God makes a way for the answering of prayer. Who has not experienced how the multitude of small cares of life vanish, as soon as the great care for our soul's salvation has once come to be important? But as far as earthly trouble is concerned, God will help him that prays believingly, out of every trouble; but he helps in three ways: "He either takes away the burden, or makes it lighter, or makes him that bears it stronger. (2 Cor. xii, 9.) One way or the other, but in any case it is help."

If it is a spiritual trouble that impels us to pray, an inner doubt or inner trial, the change in our circumstance is brought about by faith itself. Whatever hinders God's manifestations in our heart, religious half-heartedness or unbelief, is overcome by prayer; and when this is done, spiritual trouble is banished by the abundant revelation of God's grace. We are then raised to a higher level of spiritual life, on which doubts and vexations cease of themselves. As, when storms are raging in the mountain valleys, the eagle rises far above the summits of the mountains, where his plumage is bathed in unclouded sunlight, while down in the valley the thunders roll and lightnings play; even so he that prays, leaves the vexations and cares of life far behind, as he rises out of the

nether, misty atmosphere of earthly life to the blessed heights of unclouded communion with God.

Prayer is often called the soul's respiration. The comparison is not inappropriate; for as the physical life in its preservation and further course is conditioned by the process of respiration, even so the spiritual life is conditioned by prayer. This is Jacob's ladder, as it were, on which man ascends out of the night of sin to the light of the most blessed communion with God in glory. As the Christian life has various stages of development, there can be various rounds distinguished in the Jacob's ladder of prayer. With Culmann we enumerate five rounds: The first round is the prayer of one who was up to this time a stranger to God, for deliverance from earthly trouble. Here God is not sought for God's own sake, but only as a means for gaining an earthly end. The second round is prayer for forgiveness of sin. Here the earthly cares are lost in the all-important care for the soul's salvation; and as this is to be found in God only, God is now sought for his own sake. The third round is prayer in the struggle for sanctification, for strength to overcome evil, for deliverance from besetting sin. The fourth round is interceding prayer. The old man, with his lusts and desires, has been enervated in the struggle for sanctification, and nailed to the cross, as it were. Personal wants recede; the view is extended; care for others and for the general affairs of the kingdom of God becomes prominent. In its chief contents prayer comes to be intercession. The fifth round of the ladder of prayer is that of perfected communion with God.

Remark.—We can not leave this subject without giving a synopsis of Ph. Th. Culmann's striking presentation of this ladder of prayer. The lowest round of the ladder of prayer is the supplication for deliverance made by one who was up to this time a stranger to God, but, pressed by outward troubles of life, takes refuge to God. Here we do not pray for God's sake, but

for our own sake. God, the original end, is considered a mere means for getting out of trouble. In the meantime God seems satisfied with this view; for no humiliation is too deep for him where souls are to be saved. If man's faith is courageous enough to reach out toward God for help, the All-merciful is condescending enough to grasp the proffered hand, and help. By grateful conduct, by keeping his vow (if he made one), man is brought a step nearer to God, and God to man. He who originally was called upon merely as a means of deliverance from external trouble, having found access to the soul, begins to play the master and make known the holiness of his being. The terrors of the Omnipotent are manifested, and man learns to pray for forgiveness of sin.

With this he has reached the second round of the ladder. On this round immediately those inner natures begin, which need not first be led to God by external blows. There are honest persons who are, especially in youth, animated by a vivid desire for moral culture. They make good rules, do not easily act contrary to conscience, and watch themselves with anxious scrupulosity. If these persons can be directed to Christ, and begin to call upon his name, their prayer touches upon the inner affairs of their life, and they are soon apprised of the total derangement of these affairs. On this round man plainly feels that he has to contend with an inner impediment. Here prayer is made uncommonly difficult, partly by the unwontedness of the matter, partly by a kind of wrong sense of shame, and partly by an influence of the prince of darkness, whose soul-murdering, poisonous breath seeks to keep up in sin a wall separating God and man. Hence there is difficulty upon difficulty when one tries to burst open the gate of prayer, which is bolted sevenfold. On this round the fruit of faithful perseverance in prayer is the blessed experience of forgiveness of sin. Thus the third round of the ladder of prayer has been reached. After man has been brought by regeneration into communion with Christ, the prayer for acceptance of Christ and the molding of the new man begins. To this stage belong the "prayers for Christian virtues and Christian life" in our old Protestant prayer-books. As, on the one hand, the sense of the misery of sin, which formerly impelled man to pray, has here ceased, and, on the other hand, his sight is yet too much darkened to see the splendid glory of his Christian calling, his prayer is here threatened by a gradual relaxation, against which he must work by energetic, even mechanical, pursuit of prayer. He must make perseverance, faithfulness, and indefatigable diligence his duty. He

should force himself, should tyrannize over himself. He should pray, because he has resolved to do so, because he wills to do so, whether the mood comes or not. The capricious, wavering mood will soon yield, when it finds that it opposes a steely energy of the will. Here the reward of faithfulness is, that new fervency and power in prayer takes the place of the mechanical quantity of prayer. On this the fourth round, prayer first comes to be truly free, not only because here all constraint of duty has vanished and come to be a higher act of nature with which we satisfy a vividly perceived want, but also because now we have pursued the struggle of subduing our own nature so far that we become free with regard to ourselves. Now he that prays can care also for others and other things. Hence here the care and intercession for the welfare of fellow-man and of God's cause appears at once. We can therefore call prayer in this stage an interceding prayer. As all selfish motives of personal volition in the Christian are extinct, and he wishes to be a mere organ of divinity, the powers of the divine world can pass through him without being hindered by any turnpike of sinful volition. With this living and praying for God and his kingdom, man ascends to the fifth round of the ladder of prayer, which Arud, in his "Garden of Paradise," calls the prayer springing from "great, ardent love." Man has here come to be a magnitude whose exponent is God, and which, therefore, rises continually to the power of God. To him God is all in all; hence God can conceal nothing from them and deny them nothing. (John xiv, 21.) Beyond this fifth round there is no higher conceivable.

§ 58. The Fellowship of them that Believe.

As a means of grace we finally designate the fellowship of them that believe. But as we shall later speak of the Christian Church, its nature and its mission, we shall here limit ourselves to a presentation of the fellowship of them that believe as a means for promoting the spiritual life of individual Christians. Paul writes to the Ephesians: "Let us speak the truth in love, and grow up into him in all things, which is the head, even Christ: from whom the whole body fitly joined together and compacted by that which every joint supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of

every part, maketh increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in love." (Eph iv. 15, 16.) He speaks of that which every joint in the spiritual body of Christ supplieth to the others. These supplyings are the vivid manifestations of Christian fellowship, and these manifestations are so many "means of grace" for us.

As the individual member of the human body is nourished and sustained only by the co-operation of all members, even so the individual Christian is protected from many dangers and promoted in his life of faith by his association with like-minded brethren and sisters.

Let us consider, first, the mutual edification of the believers in public worship. There is a great blessing in the very fact that we have a Sunday that brings with it reverential emotions—a day of rest, in which the temporal is hushed and eternity begins to speak. But this blessing we owe to Christian fellowship; for what were Sunday without public worship and the chime of its bells, the empty streets and the filled churches? Indeed, just this joint confession of our faith in song, in prayer, and in hearing God's word calls forth that solemn Sunday mood which even the children of this world can not entirely evade, which is so truthfully expressed in the well-known Easter scene in Goethe's Faust. For these worldly minded people, every Sunday with its services is a reminder that they are not created for this world, but for eternity. But the proper, full blessing of public worship is enjoyed by him only who, with true longing for grace, takes part in it, and devotes himself to the influences of the Spirit of God, who reigns in the congregation.

But the blessing of Christian fellowship is not restricted to public worship. Where the believers are "of one heart and of one soul," as we read of the first Christian congregation in Jerusalem, their mutual asso-

ciation comes to be an invaluable means of grace. Even the exchange of religious thoughts and experiences, which is a necessity for the true believer (for "out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh"), is a source of rich blessing. Therefore the apostle says, Rom. x, 10: "With the heart man believeth unto righteousness; and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation." Joint labor, also, in the kingdom of God, in which one incites the other to self-denying deeds of love, as well as mutual intercession and joint prayer, to which Christ has given a special promise, are very potent means for the promotion of the Christian life.

This blessing of Christian fellowship will certainly manifest itself more powerfully, the purer and heartier the fraternal love is, and the greater the desire of the believers is to be a blessing to one another. The weak find a support in the strong; the babes and uneducated find guides in the mature and educated; the discouraged and faint-hearted are lifted up by the courageous faith of the tried Christian; and even the erring are often brought from the error of their way by loving admonition and friendly encouragement; and thus, by mutual assistance, the spiritual body of the congregation of Christ grows towards its glorious perfection.

Although the fellowship of them that believe is not an indispensable condition for sustaining the Christian life, yet there is an inexpressibly great blessing in it, and many a Christian should have fallen prey to the trials and temptations of Satan, if he had not been protected and kept from falling by the influence of the Christian community to which he belonged. It is true that at certain times, and especially in the beginning of his Christian life, the Christian often feels the necessity of withdrawing to some secluded place in order to be alone with his Savior. But if he gives way to this impulse for

isolation, and neglects for a longer time the association of them that believe, he is not only deprived of the blessings of Christian fellowship, but is also in danger that his spiritual life sicken and be stunted by one-sided development—a fact which is obviously corroborated by the biographies of hermits and mystics.

Therefore no one should think that he can do without Christian fellowship. It contains a blessing that we can find neither in secret nor in family prayer. If it were not so, why should our Lord have said expressly: "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them?" Though one may be more in need of public worship and of fellowship than another, nevertheless it is certainly very inconsiderate that a Christian say he is not in need of this kind of edification, that he can have that all at home.

"How many means of grace that can better and edify us! Whoever will make use of them, will not use them in vain. When Christ offers bread, it is not a stone; when he offers a fish, it is not a serpent." Therefore "let him that is athirst come; and whosoever will, let him take the water of life freely!"

5. THE EXTERNAL FORM OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE, OR THE CHRISTIAN VIRTUES.

§ 59. The Imitation of Christ.

In Christ the moral law appeared on earth in personal, amiable form, and the normal conduct of the Christian toward the law now consists (§ 47) essentially in loving him; and the fulfilling of the law comes to be the "imitation of Christ." Therefore Christ says to his disciples, "Follow me!" and the apostles also designate the imitation of Christ the proper life-mission of the Christian. Peter says, "Christ has left us an example, that ye should follow his steps;" and the apostle Paul

says to them that believe, "Be ye followers of me, even as I also am of Christ;" and again: "Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus." (Phil. ii, v; 1 Peter ii, 21, etc.)

Indeed, to every one that studies the life of Christ closely, he is the highest ideal of human perfection. If the sum of all commandments is to love God with all our heart, and with all our soul, and with all our mind, and our neighbor as ourself (Matt xxii, 37), then Christ fulfilled the law as no other man fulfilled it; for his whole life from the manger to the grave was an actual exercise and realization of this love. He came not "to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many." (Mark x, 45.) He alone could say in the full sense of the term: "My meat is to do the will of him that sent me" (John iv, 34); and his Father's will consisted in revealing the unsearchable riches of God's love by sacrificing himself for the good of man and saving him from eternal ruin by his death on the cross. This will of God he executed with unbending resolution. Never, not even for a moment, did he seek his own honor, his own interest, his own comfort. Infidels like Pecaut and Rênan have sought in vain to show up the stains of human errors in his life; in vain has he been accused of vanity; in vain has it been tried to stamp his holy wrath, when purifying the temple, a sinful passion, and to argue from his baptism in the Jordan that he, the best of all men, had to accuse himself of many errors, of indolence and hastiness. Only Rênan has found the friend of sinners and publicans to be vain; that righteous indignation was a divine virtue, and his baptism in the Jordan (and these baptisms according to Josephus, were not only connected with confession of sin, but also with vows of righteousness) he took upon himself, not for the sake of his sin, but as the holy "Lamb of God

which taketh away the sin of the world," for whose sake he afterward suffered death, the reward of sin. Therefore, even Th. Keim says: "Whoever studies not a single word, but the whole of the words and deeds of Jesus, will certainly get the impression that there is here a consciousness that does not feel the prick of sin. Here is not a lax moralist. He accused even the eye, the look, the mere useless word, and back of all deeds the impure heart, of sin; he reproved his age as a sinful one, he made his disciples ashamed of their weakness, and brought them to pray for forgiveness of their debts. But he, the man of the most taxing calling, who daily had to bury the eminence of his spirit in meekness and self-humiliation, never prays for forgiveness, not even in Gethsemane nor on Calvary; he enjoys the unbroken, eternally bright sunlight of Sonship, and attracts mankind to trust his pure virtue." Therefore the Father gave testimony in the beginning of Christ's public activity and also just before his passion: "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased; hear ye him."

As we said above, Christ is the highest ideal of human perfection—a human as humans should be. By his holy life the stern demands of the law are brought near to us, and we learn to love and reverence them in a way that would otherwise never have been possible. And who could study this holy example closely, without having the desire awakened in him to model after it?

But we must remember that the example of Jesus, like every human example, has an individual character; that there are traits in the life of Jesus which we can not and shall not imitate, either because we lack the necessary power, or because, in regard to time and space, we are in a quite different position, or because we can not share the singular calling of Christ as the Savior of the world. On the other hand, we must not forget that there

are circumstances in life in which Christ never was, and for which he consequently has not left us a model to pattern after. Hence Christ's being our example can not consist in his having given us for every special circumstance of life a model after which we should copy, but rather in his disposition of obedience, meekness, and unreserved self-sacrificing love, which is imprinted upon every trait of his life and his work. We should acquire this disposition by faithful and loving devotion to him; then, as our moral knowledge grows, our life will more and more come to be a complete, joyful fulfilling of the divine will. And certainly no one is to be blamed for imagining how Christ would have acted in his own special circumstances, and then selecting that mode of action which he believes to harmonize best with Christ's character. For in that way it may in difficult circumstances become clear to us what duty demands of us as Christ's disciples. Therefore we pray and sing with Chr. K. L. von Pfeil:

"Lord, at every word and action,
Let thy spirit counsel me;
Are my words as Jesus spake them?
Will the action Christ-like be?

Does my life prove me a servant
Ever faithful, Lord, to thee?
Canst thou sanction all my conduct?
Is thy will controlling me?"

§ 60. Holy Love as Fundamental Virtue.

The fundamental principle of all morality, and hence also of Christian virtue, we found (§ 5) to be holy love, which according to § 47 appeared on earth personally in Christ, and is shed abroad in the heart of the believer by the Holy Ghost (§ 42.) It is true that the idea of virtue, as the facility or the fit disposition for

accomplishing our life-purpose, presupposes that virtue has been acquired by exercising and employing it, and has come to be a lasting trait of character. But we know from § 45 that even holy love comes to be the Christian's property and "second nature" only by continuous combating and conquering the old man; and just this loving disposition, which is given us by God and strengthened and made a part of our nature by exercising and employing it, we designate the essence of virtue. The Christian idea of virtue, therefore, is related to that of Christian character.

Taking this view of virtue, we should, of course, not speak of a plurality of virtues, but only of one virtue. But if, nevertheless, Christian ethics retains the distinction of various single virtues (which the antique heathen moral traced back to the four cardinal virtues, temperance, valor, wisdom, and justice), we are not to think of different independent virtues, but only of various phases in which one and the same virtue is manifested. The same is true of the triple star of the Christian cardinal virtues, faith, hope, and love. We should here not think of three independent virtues, but of the fundamental virtue of holy love—its source, faith, which mediates God's self-impartation to us; and its end, hope, which strengthens love in its battle with resisting sin, and leads it on toward perfection.

After these general preliminary remarks we can pass over to the consideration of the individual Christian virtues. We shall consider them in their relation to the moral personality itself, to God, to fellow-man, and to the objective world.

a. THE CHRISTIAN VIRTUES IN THEIR RELATION TO THE OWN PERSONALITY.

§ 61. Christian Self-love, Sincerity, Self-knowledge, Meekness, Self-control.

The true Christian, whose life-principle is holy love, finds the center of his life—that is, his thinking, feeling, and willing—neither in himself nor in the world, but in God. The ultimate and highest end of his endeavors is that God's will be done not only in the world, but, above all, in him. In so far as the object of the Christian virtues is the own personality, they essentially appear as man's self-development toward the image of God by the power of holy love.

This is not incompatible with true self-love. The Christian, who knows himself to be an object of divine favor and an heir to heaven can not throw himself away. When Christ (Luke xiv, 26) demands of his disciples that they "hate their own life" (really their soul), this demand, as the connection plainly shows, is not to be taken in its absolute sense; for the "own life" is here placed in a line with "father, mother, brother, sister," etc. But the Lord can not possibly demand of his disciples that they "hate" their nearest relatives, in the literal sense of the word "hate." The sense of Christ's words is rather that we must "hate" and deny all inclinations of our own (psychical) life, as soon as they contradict the demands of God's kingdom. In this, true self-love is not prohibited. Christ himself considers true self-love justifiable, by making it the criterion of our love for fellow-man in the commandment: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul, and thy neighbor as thyself."

The Christian loves himself; but not in his sinful

perversion, but as object of the love of his Heavenly Father, as a child of God. In this consists the difference between Christian self-love and the selfishness of the natural man, that the latter strives to sustain and satisfy the sinful peculiarities, impulses, and inclinations of the natural heart, whereas Christian self-love endeavors to overcome the old sinful nature, and to restore the image of God, which was destroyed by sin.

Hence the chief essential of true self-love is that sincerity in judging self, which far from rocking one to sleep by false reasons for being at ease, or excusing known errors and sins, rather weighs the faintest emotions of the heart in the scale of God's word, and declares war against sin in whatever form it appears. In this war the Christian must constantly be mindful of himself, and watchful against temptations to evil. (1 Tim. iv, 16; Matt. xxvi, 41.) He can not quietly take his own course; he must examine every inclination or disinclination, every thought, and every emotion of his heart, in the light of God's word and Christ's example, in order that he may not deceive himself. Those fanatic errings of spiritual pride (which often increase to blasphemy), as well as that false Laodicean carelessness that says, "I am rich, and increased with goods, and have need of nothing," whereas it is "wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked," can develop only where the proper guard of self, where earnest and sincere self-examination, is wanting.

The fruit of conscientious self-examination is constantly increasing self-knowledge, which is the fundamental condition of all sound growth in grace. The well-known words of the poet,

"If thou wouldst know thy own nature, look at the actions of others;
If thou wouldst learn to know them, judge them by thy own heart,"

contain the important truth, that the observance of others often gives us the key to the knowledge of our own heart; but he who observes others only, and does not look into his own heart, will never attain to true self-knowledge. Observation of self is, and ever will be, the main point. Hence the great number of Scripture passages, exhorting to self-examination. (2 Cor. xiii, 5; Gal. iv, 5, and others.)

From true self-knowledge springs the Christian virtue, meekness, which is entirely unknown to the heathen; not that hypocritical meekness that consists only in words, and often is nothing but pride in the disguise of a Christian virtue; nor that faithless underestimation of self which, growing discouraged and fearful, forsakes the practical tasks of life; but that mind which the apostle Paul shows in the words: "Most gladly will I rather glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may rest upon me; for when I am weak, then I am strong." (2 Cor. xii, 9 and 10.) This meekness in which a sense of dependence upon God and a faithful trust in God are united is not a weakness, but rather the source of highest power; as Paul exclaims, despite the confession of his own weakness: "I can do all things through Christ which strengtheneth me."

With this mindfulness of self, the Christian must (on account of sin, which he is to combat) combine an uninterrupted watchfulness, in order that he may not be taken unawares by sin. Christ exhorts his disciples: "Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation." Through watchfulness we recognize temptation in its first beginning, and through prayer we gain strength to overcome it. It requires constant self-denial to overcome evil. Therefore Christ says: "Whosoever doth not bear his cross, and come after me, can not be my disciple." (Luke xiv, 26 and 27.) It is our duty to deny ourselves

not only in regard to "ungodliness and worldly lusts," but also in regard to those things which of themselves are good but are to us (in our individuality) or also to others an offense, that is, moral harm. It can come to pass that even life must be sacrificed to the moral purpose, as in the case of the Christian martyrs. To this, Christ's words refer (Matt. x. 39): "He that findeth [by unfaithfulness in God's service] his life (the temporal), shall lose it [namely, the true, eternal life]; and he that loseth his [temporal] life for my sake, shall find it [the eternal life]." By faithfully exercising self-denial, the Christian acquires the power of self-control.

In the Word of God the believers are called "kings" (1 Peter ii. 9; Rev. v. 10); and they truly are kings. *König* (king) is derived from *können* (to be able); the ablest is king. Those world-renowned conquerors who by sword and fire forced millions of their fellow-men under their scepter, but themselves were addicted to the lowest lusts and vices, do not deserve the name king. They were slaves, despite their crowns and purple robes. The Christians are the true kings of the earth. They who by the power of holy love conquer themselves and devote their lives to the service of God and fellow-man; who, lifted above the low aims of inordinate ambition, covetousness, and sensuality, as well as above the tormenting cares of the cowardly fear of men, can lift up their heads in fortune and misfortune, in honor and dishonor, because they find an inexhaustible source of comfort in God's approval and in the enjoyment of his love, and know that, at the worst, man can kill the body but can not harm the soul,—they are the true kings of the earth. Therefore those martyrs, whose heroic courage and joyfulness in death often defeated even their judges and tormentors, seem to us to be greater and kinglier than the crowned monarchs upon whose mandate they were put to

death. Even Cicero said that it is "kingly" not to be ruled by a single passion. But this kingly attribute is a chief trait of the Christian's character.

§ 62. Temperance, Chastity, Moral Self-culture.

The fruit of self-control is temperance and chastity.

Temperance—that is, keeping within proper bounds in the allowed enjoyment of all mental and material things, and especially in eating and drinking—is based upon the power of self-control. A true Christian can never be the slave of a vice. He enjoys the things of life with gratitude to God and constant subordination of the enjoyment to his divine life-mission; that is, he allows himself this enjoyment only so far as it does not conflict with fulfilling the duties of his earthly or heavenly calling. But if this is true, he is always ready to renounce the enjoyment for the sake of the higher purpose.

In regard to total abstinence from the use of spirituous drinks it is to be remarked that the Scriptures do not demand it generally, but only of special persons (for example, of the Nazarites) and at special occasions (the temple service, Numbers x, 9); but the Scriptures demand temperance of every one and at all times. The assertion that the Bible distinguishes definitely between wine proper and a drink (shekar) prepared from dates, barley, or other vegetable matter, and allows the use of grape wine, but prohibits the use of "shekar," can not be proven, inasmuch as "shekar" is mostly mentioned together with grape wine; and with the use of the one, usually the use of the other also is permitted or prohibited. (Num. x, 9; Prov. xxxi, 4, etc.) Nor is the view Biblically founded, that wherever the Scriptures allow the use of wine, unfermented wine is meant. If this view were correct, we could certainly expect that the

Scriptures would use a different term when they speak of "unfermented wine" from what they use when they plainly speak of fermented, intoxicating wine; but that is not the case. Hence it is not advisable to base the cause of total abstinence upon this unproved hypothesis. On the other hand, it can properly be claimed that the extraordinary spreading of the vice of drunkenness and the terrible devastation caused by it in families and in society, require extraordinary counter-measures, and that the inclination to drink can more easily be combated and overcome by total abstinence than by the attempt of a moderate use. From this the duty of total abstinence follows, at least for those who were once addicted to drink, or have to combat an innate inclination for drink (but see § 71).

Chastity, which is based upon the recognition of the sanctity of marriage and the association of the sexes, and consists in strict observance of the bounds of intercourse between the sexes as they are placed by God, is, strictly speaking, only a special phase of temperance. A true Christian, who considers his body a temple of God, recoils not only at unchaste views and actions, but also at unchaste thoughts, words, and expressions. Although lewd words and obscene language are usually considered harmless in worldly circles, and often form the so-called "spice" of conversation, the Christian feels that they are improper for him, and are in direct opposition to the high end of his divine destination. (Eph. v, iv.) It is therefore his duty to avoid not only personal, but also mental association with unchaste persons—that is, the reading of lewd papers and novels—as being unworthy of him and dangerous for his soul.

As all true culture consists in the normal development of all of man's psychical powers, the increase of the Christian's knowledge of God and the world belongs

to his moral self-culture. Of course, not every one can be a scholar; nor is that necessary. We do not demand of the Christian a certain amount of knowledge of truth, but a sincere love for truth and a lively interest in it. Therefore the saying is true: "To be ignorant of something is no disgrace; but it is a disgrace not to want to know what is worth knowing." Hence that stupidity of the vulgar masses that interest themselves only for that which affords them sensual enjoyment or social advantages, is incompatible with the idea of a true Christian. Having found in the knowledge of the proper relation of the visible to the invisible world the key to true wisdom (§ 46), he can no longer be indifferent toward the revelation of divine omnipotence, wisdom, and love in nature, as well as in history. And in both of these domains he finds the traces of divine direction at every step. Hence the Christian will always be concerned about the culture and adornment of his mind, and will especially profit by the bounteous source of knowledge given us in the literature of the past and the present, as much as circumstances permit him to do so.

But he must be cautious in the selection of his reading-matter; for the mass of irreligious and immoral literature with which the modern press is flooding the world ruins thousands of readers. Even the reading of harmless literature, which serves only for pastime, can become sinful, if the time that one should devote to his work proper is thereby taken up or shortened; for man is not placed on earth for his own enjoyment simply, but for work. Much worse, however, is the reading of literature, the contents of which are unchristian or immoral, and hence poisons and destroys the spiritual life. To this class belongs a great part of the present newspaper literature, and that which is to serve as entertainment, especially innumerable low novels, "which fill the mind with

morbid ideas, and the heart with foolish desires," and especially lead thousands of our youth to moral ruin.

The Christian should therefore look well to what he reads. For as the normal development of our bodily life depends upon our avoiding all injurious poisons, and accepting nourishing food, even so the normal development of our mental and spiritual life—that is, the development of our Christian character—depends upon the sphere of thought in which we move, and what kind of mental food we eat. Therefore the reading of bad—that is, of unchristian and immoral literature—is as corrupting and dangerous for the soul, as the reading of good books is salutary and beneficial.

Remark 1.—To the means of self-training, or the practice of asceticism, belongs the vow, by which man promises God, under oath, to do something which either is of itself a duty or has been made a self-imposed duty without divine command.

The vows of the first class are all contained in the baptismal vow, in which the entire life of the baptized is consecrated to the service of God, and which every Christian renews in conversion with consciousness and free self-destination. He that makes the vow assumes no new duty here, but solemnly acknowledges by a new, express promise a universally valid duty; as, for example, the promise of life-long faithfulness toward husband or wife in the matrimonial vow, or toward the government in the civic oath. Such special oaths, by which there is given to the transgression of a definite, universally valid demand the special character of a breach of oath, may, on account of human weakness, have a salutary influence in many cases, and even be indispensable to the welfare of society. But to the true Christian the duty of husband or wife, and of subjection to the government, would be no less sacred, even if he had not made a special vow; he fulfills his duty not for the sake of the vow, but out of love to God and his holy law.

The second class of vows, by which a definite action, that of itself is not duty, is made a self-imposed duty of him that makes the vow, belong to Old Testament rather than New Testament piety, and these had pedagogical significance, educating the people to obedience. (Numbers vi, 2, et.c; 1 Sam. i,

11; Judges xiii, 14, etc.) But even in the Old Testament it was not demanded to make the vow, but to keep the vow that one made of his own choice. (Lev. xxvii, 2, etc.; Deut. xxiii, 21, 23; Psa. l, 14.) As a remainder of Jewish custom these vows were retained in the Apostolic Church. Later on, however, they gained greater significance in degenerated monkery, and were especially abused in the so-called monkish vows, the vows of obedience, of indigence and celibacy, inasmuch as their observance was considered highly meritorious, and they were made the basis of a Pharisaic sanctimoniousness.

Since inconsiderate vows can easily bring about conflicting duties that are not easily discharged (compare Judges xi, 30, etc.; 1 Sam. xiv, 24, etc.), the Christian should not vow what is not duty of itself and in all circumstances. For every other vow may expose him to the danger of being compelled to leave a duty, springing from altered circumstances, unfulfilled for the sake of the vow. The vows of total abstinence, which in the battle against drunkenness have often proved to be a salutary support for the weakened will, should not be regarded as vows to God, but only as public declarations of an earnest resolution in the presence of men. If the latter view be taken, they can not be objected to from a moral point of view; on the contrary their pedagogical value for those who are yet under the law must decidedly be recognized.

Remark 2.—We must distinguish well between Christian self-denial and a self-selected wrong practice of asceticism. It is true that Christian self-training requires a subduing and restricting of our sensual life, in order that it may not hinder us in collecting our spiritual self and lifting it up to God. Upon this is based the fasting recommended by Christ himself. (Matt. xvii, 21; vi, 16.) But the unmerciful tormenting of self, as it is, for example, recommended by the mediæval moral of monkery, is directly opposed to the spiritual character of Christianity; for it puts physical self-torment in the place of the heart-repentance demanded by Christ, and expects that these self-chosen expiations can break the power of sensuality sooner than it can be done by the grace of God and the power of the Holy Ghost. Such asceticism is unquestionably better adapted to the moral of a Hindoo than to Christian ethics.

Remark 3.—The unchristian and immoral in the form of fiction are a more powerful allurement for weak souls than false doctrine is. Reading without choice and examination is in all circumstances spiritual-moral self-destruction; the most deleterious influence is exerted by novels that are calculated

for the degenerated desires of the great mass, and that fill the mind with morbid ideas, and the heart with foolish desires. The rage for reading novels, and likewise that for the theater, is related, according to its inner nature, to drunkenness, entangles man in a world of dreams, covers up reality, and makes him hate its earnestness. Youth and the female world show up the majority of victims of the mental and moral ruin caused by such foolish reading of novels; and he who knows the far-reaching ravages of this passion, will unhesitatingly declare it a duty of moral society to protect mental minors from such poison." (A. Wuttke, Christian Ethics.)

b. THE CHRISTIAN VIRTUES IN THEIR RELATION TO GOD.

§ 63. Child-like Mind. Keeping the Name of God Holy. The Oath.

In their relation to God the Christian virtues appear essentially as filial conduct. The fundamental trait in the life of the natural man is flight from God—that is fear of God and the desire of having as little to do with him as possible—because every sober thought of God awakens the sense of guilt. The fundamental trait in the Christian's life, however, is the desire for God and for communion with him. The Christian's motto is: "Nearer, my God, to thee; nearer to thee!" The most immediate expression of this desire is (§ 57) prayer. As a child feels most content in the presence of its beloved parents, even so the Christian finds his highest happiness in communion and prayerful intercourse with his Heavenly Father. (Luke ii, 49.) A true Christian without prayer would be a contradiction!

The necessary presupposition of prayerful intercourse with God is faith; and not mere faith in the existence of God, but faith in the redemption of Christ Jesus; for without Christ, God is a "consuming fire." Through faith in him we obtain power to become children of God, who can look up with confidence and say: "Abba, Father!"

Upon the consciousness of being a child of God is based the Christian's trust in God in all conditions of life—the trust in divine providence, by which his whole life is sustained. The Christian is fully convinced that God's thoughts toward him are thoughts of love and peace, and that his guidance is good, though strange. Hence he no longer strives to assert his own will and select his own way, but gladly lets the hand of his Heavenly Father lead him, even as a child consents to be led by its mother's hand. In his struggle with sin he is certain of divine aid. From this certainty the Christian's courage in faith springs, which, opposed to the enmity of the world, often increases to heroic courage in the fullest sense of the terms (for example, the martyrs in the early Christian Church, Luther in Worms, and others). Very intimately connected with the Christian's trust in God is his hope, which, supported by divine promise, rejoices in the future glory that God will give, though the Christian yet be in the midst of the battles and tribulations of this world. Therefore the apostle says (Rom. viii, 24): "We are saved by hope."

The Christian's filial conduct is further manifested in a holy reverence for God and all that is God's; that is, all that stands in close relation to our worship of God. On this is based the duty of keeping God's house, word, day, and, above all, his name holy.

The Old Testament people of God was strictly commanded to keep God's house (that is, the temple in Jerusalem) holy; and even Christ honored the temple as his Father's house, and kept it holy. Even as early as his eleventh year he spoke the wonderful words to his parrents: "Wist ye not that I must be about my Father's business?" And when later on he visited Jerusalem, and saw that the traders and money-changers were doing business in the court of the temple, he drove the buyers

and sellers from the temple, and said in his righteous indignation: "It is written, My house is the house of prayer; but ye have made it a den of thieves." (Luke xix, 46.) It is true that the Christian worship of God, as Christ himself taught the Samaritan woman (John iv), is restricted to a definite place no more than it is restricted to definite forms; and the true Christian, who "worships God in Spirit and in truth," knows well that God is omnipresent, and that, therefore, all places are of themselves alike holy.

Nevertheless he will consider those places which are devoted exclusively to the service of God holy above all others, and will feel every desecration of them by frivolous, worldly, and sinful doings to be an insult to his Heavenly Father. It shows little piety and filial love to God when a person acts in church as if he were at market or in a saloon; and the bad custom of making the Christian church a place for having evening socials, banquets, auctions, etc., which is becoming more and more general, is certainly not adapted to promote the cause of God's kingdom. It is supposed that by such means sinners can be redeemed from the world, and instead of that the doors are opened to secularization of the church.

The Lord's day is holy to the Christian, not only because it is commanded in God's Word to keep it holy, but, far more, because his love to God impels him to honor the day that God himself has set apart to be a day of rest from labor and of worship, as a gift of his loving care, and to use it for the good of his soul and for the enjoyment of communion with Christ. (We shall later on speak of keeping the Lord's day holy, and of religious solemnities.)

The word of God is holy to the Christian, because it is his Heavenly Father's word. As a good child away

from home esteems a letter from its parents above all things, and reads it with a glad heart, because on every line it finds an expression of faithful parental love, even so the Word of God is dear and holy to the Christian, because it reveals the faithful heart of its Father, God, and shows by making the divine will known how he can reach his eternal destination. (2 Peter i, 19.)

The name of God is holy to the Christian because the name represents the person. Hence a true Christian will always use the name of God with holy reverence, and never speak of divine things except with highest respect and pious awe. Even the thoughtless use of God's name in the frequent exclamations, "O God!" "O Lord Jesus!" etc., is not proper for a Christian, because it is not compatible with the grateful love and veneration that we owe God. But the intentional and impertinent abuse of the name of God in asseverations (swearing) or imprecations (cursing) is a blasphemous challenging of God, which in all cases shows a frivolous, godless disposition.

The question now arises whether all swearing, therefore also the reverential use of God's name to confirm the truth, is prohibited, as, for example, the Mennonites and Quakers believe, or whether an oath is justified and allowed in certain circumstances. If we examine the various statements of the Scriptures concerning the oath, the following result obtains:

(*a*) Christ himself says in his Sermon on the Mount, "I say unto you, Swear not at all" (Matt. v, 34); and James seems to corroborate this when he writes (v, 12): "But above all things, my brethren, swear not, neither by heaven, neither by the earth, neither by any other oath." The question now is:

(*b*) How are these statements to be understood? They must not be taken as an unconditional prohibition of the act of taking an oath, for neither James nor Christ (who

does not want to destroy, but to fulfill the law) could contradict the law of Moses; but this plainly demands, "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and serve him, and shalt swear by his name." (Deut. vi, 13; compare also Jer. xii, 36; xxiii, 7 and 8; Isaiah lxv, 16.)

(*c*) Therefore the prophets and the apostles often swear with a corroborating oath ("As the Lord liveth," "God is my witness," etc.); and in Rev. x, 6, a holy angel swears "by him that liveth forever and ever." Yea, even God, there being none higher to swear by, swears by himself in his Word. The powerful "As I live, saith the Lord," occurs twenty-three times in the Old Testament. And it is essentially the same when Christ, the Eternal Word of God, confirms his statements with a "Verily, verily, I say unto you."

(*d*) From this it is clear that not the oath of itself, but only the thoughtless, unnecessary, and false oath is sin. It is especially allowed to confirm the truth by an oath in court or when demanded by the Government to make "an end of all strife." (Heb. vi, 16.) Such an oath Christ himself took before the Council. (Matt. xxvi, 63 and 64.) This swearing, indeed, finds its justification in the sinfulness of mankind, which darkens truth and establishes a legitimate mistrust. But for that very reason the Christian must, with his Master, subordinate himself to the law on account of sin. The allowed oath, however, must not be restricted to the oath required by law, as it is usually done in catechisms; for the oaths of the prophets and apostles, as given in Scripture, are mostly such as were not required by law. As well as a lawful oath can often be required and taken thoughtlessly and for the sake of unworthy trifles, one can also in so-called "ordinary life" at the proper place, earnestly, and as in the presence of God say: "As the Lord liveth!"

(*e*) The most proper form of oath is simply calling on God as witness for the truth, as in 2 Cor. i, 23. It is self-evident that then the divine punishment for giving false witness is also thought of; but it is wholly left to the justice of God. Where this is not the case, where man dictates the punishment, as it were, or even pledges his blessedness in the case of lying, he encroaches upon God's office, who alone can save and destroy. Therefore such expressions as "I'll be damned!" or "God damn me!" are always shamefully impertinent curses.

§ 64. Testimony for God in Word and Deed.

If every abuse of God's name is an offense for a Christian, it is, on the other hand, his sacred duty to glorify the name of God by his witness in word and deed. Peter explicity says that it is the duty of the Christian that he "should show forth the praises of him who hath called him out of darkness into his marvelous light," and Christ himself says: "Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven."

The Christian is to be a witness for truth in the midst of a crooked and perverse nation. Hence it is his duty, whenever the honor of God or the welfare of his fellow-men requires it, to bear frank witness for God and his merciful love in Christ. He must not permit himself to be prevented from this by a wrong fear of men; for cowardly silence, where the honor of God demands an open testimony, is equal to a positive denial. If circumstances require it, he must even imperil and sacrifice his life in witnessing for his Lord and for truth, like the martyrs of ancient and modern times.

But this does not say that the Christian shall wantonly expose himself to danger. When in the persecutions of the early Christians many sought a martyr's death, this

was done not only on the basis of a wrong moral estimation of a martyr's death (to which was ascribed a meritorious influence), but also in opposition to the express commands of Christ (Matt. x, 23), and to the example of the apostles.

The purpose of our witness for God and truth is the glorification of God's name and the reformation of fellowman. Hence, where our witness can accomplish neither, we are not obliged to speak. There are even cases in which it would be tactless to witness for God and truth without being called upon to do so. If, for example, we are facing a mob of ungodly scoffers, of whom we know beforehand that our witness will remain ineffectual, that we will only expose that which is holy to the contempt and mockery of ungodly and blasphemous tongues, we must be silent, according to the words of Christ: "Give not that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine." In such cases a testimony of our personal Christian experience is specially ill-timed, because it will only be taken as self-praise, and thus will incite the more to opposition.

To decide when, in individual cases, a Christian should speak and when remain silent, is a matter of Christian wisdom and of his divinely enlightened conscience. In this regard the calling of individual Christians varies according to their personality; in like circumstances one may be called to speak, another to remain silent. If extraordinary personalities can step into the midst of a mob of rude despisers of God, disarm them by the power of his mighty spirit, and silence their blasphemy, it is his duty to do so; but for another, such an undertaking would perhaps be foolish wantonness, which would expose him and that which is holy to the mockery and laughter of the ungodly.

But the following fundamental rules are universally

valid: (*a*) Wherever in the presence of a Christian the honor of God is assailed and trampled upon, he must not look on quietly, not "howl with the wolves," but must witness against sin, even if it were only by silently leaving the company of scoffers. If he remain among them without defending the honor of his Heavenly Father, he becomes a participant in their sin. (*b*) Wherever he has a right to hope that his testimony of the love of God will benefit others, and his conscience urges him to speak, silence is sin. (*c*) In his association with the children of this world, the Christian must never intentionally conceal his relation to Christ. Whoever is ashamed of being known among the children of this world as a Christian, denies his Lord, like Peter, and shows that his heart is divided between God and the world; that God, who wants to be loved *not only besides* others, but above all others and all other things, is not the ultimate end of his thoughts, emotions, and desires; in other words, that he does not truly love God. Therefore Christ says: "Whosoever shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him shall the Son of man be ashamed when he shall come in his glory." (Luke ix, 26; Matt. x, 32 and 33.)

But this filial conduct includes not only words, but also deeds—deeds of joyful obedience. As we are justified in questioning the love of a child to its parents if it disregards their commands and causes them only sorrow and heart-grief, even so we must question the love of a Christian to his Heavenly Father if his life is not in harmony with the will of God. John writes: "Hereby we do know that we know him, if we keep his commandments. He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him." (1 John ii, 3 and 4.)

To the commandments of God, however, belongs that of actual love of fellow-man. In this the genuineness of

our love of God must be manifested. Therefore James properly calls the actual love of fellow-man an essential part of "pure and undefiled religion." (James i, 27.) We can not do God himself a service; he is not in need of us. Therefore our Lord directs us to our fellow-men, who are in need of us, and says: "Whosoever shall give to drink unto one of these little ones a cup of cold water only, in the name of a disciple [that is, because he is a disciple of Christ], verily I say unto you, he shall in no wise lose his reward" (Matt. x, 42); and, "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me" (Matt. xxv, 40).

Our pious life gives to our witness for God and truth its proper value. The reason why, in our day, the testimony of Christians profits so little, is in most cases the fact that their life contradicts their testimony. They call themselves disciples of Christ, and do not walk in his ways; they speak of love, the law of Christ, as the norm of their life, and serve selfishness. Why should it be surprising that the testimony of Christ calls forth the opposition and mockery of the world?

The great majority of the children of this world have lost faith in love. "What is love?" we hear them ask. "After all, every one loves only himself; there is no such thing on earth or in heaven as a love that is really unselfish, really free from self-interest." It becomes necessary to remove this prejudice, and, by an untiring manifestation of truly self-denying love, to convince the erring ones that there are yet persons on earth who do not live for themselves alone, but are able to sacrifice themselves for others. And when they are once brought to recognize an unselfish love among Christians, they will learn to believe again in the love of God in heaven.

These last thoughts bring us to the consideration of the Christian virtues in their relation to fellow-man.

c. THE CHRISTIAN VIRTUES IN THEIR RELATION TO FELLOW-MAN.

FRIENDLINESS.

§ 65. Reconcilableness. Brotherly Love.

The fundamental principle of all virtue, hence of the social virtues also, we have found to be holy love. With regard to fellow-man, holy love finds its practical expression in the golden rule: "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them." (Matt. vii, 12.) As love in general, so also does the love of fellow-man manifest itself in a twofold manner: *Receptive*, as forbearing, sympathizing, and pardoning love; and *active*, as fashioning, helping, and imparting love.

The manifold relations of the Christian to his fellow-men bring about an extraordinarily full development of Christian virtues; but all social virtues can be classified under the following chief virtues: Friendliness, veracity, justice, chastity, and benevolence.

Friendliness is the immediate expression of our love of fellow-man. As the Christian finds joy in the happiness and welfare of others, he not only avoids all in his association with them that could injure or grieve them, but also involuntarily manifests his good-will toward them by his attention to them and his tender regard of their feelings, wishes, and needs. This is the essence of friendliness. Inasmuch as friendliness passes beyond social bounds, and embraces all, without distinction of rank, it appears as affableness; inasmuch as it excuses the errors of others as much as possible, and covers them up with the mantle of love, it appears as forbearance, leniency, and patience; inasmuch as it tries to avoid all contention and strife, and rather suffers wrong than do wrong toward fellow-man, it appears as peaceableness, reconcilableness, and compliance.

The Christian's friendliness manifests itself as accessibility and sympathy in his taking an interest in whatever moves the heart of another, and in whatever the latter feels constrained to communicate to him. This interest differs from uncalled-for curiosity and idle inquisitiveness, in that love is its basis and it is connected with the wish to benefit fellow-man, whereas curiosity and inquisitiveness are wholly selfish in their character, and serve exclusively to satisfy personal desires.

A natural consequence of a friendly disposition toward fellow-man is intercession, to which not only the act of blessing in its more limited application belongs, but also that of greeting, by which, as we come and go in our mutual association, we constantly fasten anew the bond of love. It is true that the latter (greeting) has come to be a mere form of courtesy, which is often observed even when the friendly disposition is wanting, and that the forms of greeting have been weakened to general felicitations; but that the greetings of the Christians originally had a higher import is shown, not only by the apostolic greetings and benedictions, but also by the forms of greeting used in many Christian circles in our day, such as, "God bless you!" "The Lord protect you," etc.

The friendliness of the Christian, as already mentioned, extends to all mankind; even the impenitent sinner is not excluded from it. The Christian can not despise any of his fellow-men, or treat them coldly and lovelessly. He knows that Christ died for all, and hence loves everybody as an object of his Savior's love. He loves him for Christ's and God's sake, even though he find nothing amiable in him personally, even though his fellow-man's sinful and ungodly conduct be repulsive to him. He does not love sin—he can not and should not love it—but he loves the sinner, as also the holy God himself loves sinners, although he hates and abhors sin.

Toward personal offenses and injuries the Christian's friendliness, as said above, appears as peaceableness and reconcilableness. A Christian can indeed feel angry with his fellow-man, but he can bear him no ill-will; he rather tries to be reconciled with him as soon as possible. (Eph. iv, 26.) Even though he was not the fault of the existing discord, he gladly takes the first step toward reconciliation; for the thought "that his brother hath aught against him" is painful. (Matt. v, 23, 24.) Conscious of his own guilt before God, and of the pardon he has received and is daily in need of, he is at all times ready to forgive. (Matt. xviii, 21–35.) But he can accept only him that is repentant into external fellowship; for God also does not forgive unconditionally, but only upon true repentance. Christian forgiveness is not an actual forgetting of the received injury. Such forgetting is impossible; and if it were possible, it would weaken the moral value of forgiveness; for then the frivolous, who is not conscientious in his conduct toward God's demands in general, could more easily forgive than he who is morally serious. The Christian does not forget the received injury itself; but he as well as forgets that his fellow-man did him the injury, he bears him no ill-will on its account. Forgiving is not a forgetting, but a covering up of the received injury by love.

The question whether a Christian is permitted in certain circumstances to obtain his lawful right by a lawsuit, can not be negated without further consideration. In doubtful cases or in unimportant disputes a Christian will rather suffer loss than exasperate his fellow-man; and even in important matters he will not decide to take recourse to the worldly courts before all means of peaceable settlement, by confidants or by the congregation (Matt. xviii, 15–17), have failed. But there are cases in which his taking recourse to worldly courts is in-

dispensably necessary for the sake of the moral order of society.

From the general love of fellow-man, the expression of which is friendliness, Christian brotherly love is to be distinguished, which differs from the former in that it is not based simply upon the common destination of all men, which is eternal blessedness, but upon the relationship of the spirit; that is, of the disposition and the trend of life. The consciousness that the same faith, the same hope, and the same love fill their hearts, that they serve the same Master, and call upon the same "Father in heaven," binds the hearts of them that believe more closely and intimately than the ties of consanguinity. (Matt. xii, 50.) Hence brotherly love is not restricted to the mere friendliness, the general good-will and considerate sympathy that the Christian manifests toward all men, but it increases friendliness to heartiness, brotherliness, and unity of spirit. (Acts iv, 32.)

VERACITY.

§ 66. Uprightness. Concealing the Truth.

Love—that is, the devotion of self to that which is loved—is inseparable from self-revelation. But self-revelation is the essence of veracity. The Christian does not intentionally display his disposition and his life-maxims in order to attract attention—for a holiness that is intentionally displayed is hypocrisy—but he can not intentionally conceal them. All concealed and mysterious conduct, all hypocrisy and dissimulation, is repulsive to him, because they are incompatible with the love of fellow-man and make all moral fellowship with him impossible.

Toward fellow-man veracity manifests itself as candidness or uprightness. The true Christian can not make a "den of murderers" out of his heart; he conceals his

true disposition neither from himself (§ 61) nor from his fellow-man; he does not talk differently at different times, and does not "conceal his thoughts by ambiguous words, which are nothing but apparently decent lies." He does not wish to seem what he is not in reality.

In its opposition to sin especially, this uprightness requires great self-denial. Even the confession of his own errors is difficult for man, because his natural pride struggles against it; but it is far more difficult, especially for weak natures, to hurt others by revealing the truth, because such an exposure of sin seems to be contrary to love. But it only seems to be; for as a loving mother subjects her child to the painful operation in order to keep it from greater evil, even so Christian charity does not shrink from a passing wounding of fellow-man, if the true welfare of the latter require such a wounding. Our best friend is not he who always speaks well to us concerning ourselves, but he who calls our attention to our mistakes wherever it is necessary. But he who finds pleasure in "telling others the truth"—as he is wont to call it—and without a higher moral aim wounds their feelings, should not boast of it, and not call that "uprightness" and "love of truth" which is nothing but rudeness.

In revealing the truth to others the Christian must, on account of the moral imperfection and sinfulness of mankind, observe certain limits. "There is a time even for silence." In § 64 we learned to know a case in which the Christian must avoid witnessing for God and truth, in order to protect that which is holy from the mockery and blasphemy of the ungodly. In other cases love and wisdom demand the concealing of certain truths—that is, the keeping of a secret—because the revelation thereof would be of morally detrimental consequences.

(*a*) Thus, for example, love commands that we reveal our knowledge of the sins of our fellow-man only when our calling, the reformation of our fellow-man himself, or the moral order of society demands it, but that otherwise we should be silent, in order that we may not needlessly give the ill-disposed an occasion to scoff and ridicule.

(*b*) Further, wisdom demands of parents and educators that they should not speak to children and the mentally immature of their own sins (which they confessed to God and repented of), lest the detailed confession thereof not only undermine their authority over the children, but also be a seductive example for them. Parents who disregard this rule of prudence must not complain if — what happens only too often — when their son or daughter is taken to account, they are confronted with a "Father (or mother), you did that yourself when you were young!"

(*c*) We must often conceal also our thoughts and those of others from certain persons, when we have reason to fear that they will mistake our communications, or maliciously abuse them to the injury of ourselves and others.

However difficult such secrecy may be for the loving Christian heart, it is nevertheless necessary, in many cases, as long as we live in this sinful world, in which selfishness reigns instead of love.

But the question arises whether in any circumstances a Christian has a right to say anything but the truth; that is, to tell a conscious untruth, a lie. This question is not as easily answered as it may seem to be at the first glance.

At all events, it is not right to tell an untruth to children when, for moral reasons, they must not know the truth. It is true that there are cases in which the truth

must be concealed from children. But that does not give any one the right of telling them an untruth. If their curious questions can no longer be avoided, they should be answered with, "You can't understand that yet," or "I can't tell you that now; when you are older you will learn to know it." To tell a child an untruth certainly "cometh of evil;" for sooner or later it will learn the truth, and then take just offense at such deception, and lose confidence in the veracity of those who should be an example for it. In regard to the fictitious stories and tales that afford the child so much pleasure, the child's imagination is so vivid that the conceived world will lose none of its charm by the confession that this is not a true story, but only a fictitious one. In the same way we who are older read the works of our poets without being disturbed by the thought that we are not dealing with historic facts, but only with the products of poetic phantasy.

Jests (as, for example, April-fool jests), which purpose only a passing deception, if any at all, and as the expression of inner good-humor serve solely to cheer up society, are certainly not incompatible with veracity and the love of fellow-man; but they can be considered morally allowed only as far as they do not disturb the pious disposition of the heart, as they remain within the bounds of delicacy, modesty, and harmless joy, and exclude all wild pranks and mischief. Low jests, sports, or expressions, however, which are not the expression of inner joyfulness and love, but come from an impure heart, and pass beyond the bounds of delicacy and modesty, are, according to Eph. v, 4, morally objectionable, and incompatible with the Christian's sacred calling.

The forms of etiquette generally used in social intercourse say more, according to their literal import, than is felt or thought when they are used; but it must be re-

membered that, as a rule, they are not taken literally, but only for what they really are; namely, for conventional forms of social intercourse. Nevertheless it can not be denied that they are much abused at the expense of truth, that they often serve more to conceal than to reveal the disposition of the heart. The Christian can not and must not be guilty of such lying applications of the forms of etiquette; he must ever guard against deceiving his fellow-men in regard to his true disposition. And wherever this lying abuse of conventional forms of etiquette has become general in any social circle, it is the Christian's duty to co-operate with others in working against this abuse, and in bringing it back to its proper limits.

§ 67. Continuation. The Necessary Lie. Keeping One's Word.

More difficult than the question spoken of above is the question concerning the right of the so-called necessary lie (Ger. *Nothlüge*).

In treating this question we must, above all things, define well the idea of a necessary lie. It is altogether wrong to extend this idea to such cases in which recourse is taken to a lie to help one out of any kind of difficulty or dilemma whatever. Such mere shifts are in no wise to be excused. That in the Old Testament even pious men like Abraham, David, and others, were guilty of such lies, is no reason for justifying them; for even pious men can commit gross errors; and, besides, the Old Testament moral can not be authoritative for the New Testament dispensation. (We would only call attention to polygamy and slavery in the Old Testament.) The idea of a necessary lie must be restricted to such cases in which an untruth seems morally to be commanded by the exigency of the circumstances. Hence a

necessary lie, as Martensen puts it, is "a lie in the service of duty."* Is such a lie morally justified?

This question was answered differently by the fathers—Chrysostom and Jerome in the affirmative, Basil the Great and Augustine in the negative; and the latter even declared that, if the whole human race could be saved by a lie, we must let it be lost rather than tell a lie. Later on, Calvin held the same view, while Luther held that a necessary lie is allowed at least in certain cases.

If we consider the cases connected with our question, we find that all the various conceivable occasions for a "lie in the service of duty" can be put under two heads,—according as the lie seems to be justified, yes, even demanded, by our love of fellow-man, or by necessary defense (Ger. *Nothwehr*).

To the first class belongs the well-known case which H. Steffens presented to the philosopher Fichte, who was a decided opponent of the necessary lie. A woman, having given birth to a child, is lying dangerously ill; the physicians have declared that any violent emotion will cause her death. In an adjoining room her new-born babe has just died. The mother inquires after the child's condition. According to the physician's assurances, the truth will kill her. Should the truth be told? Fichte answers: "She should be refused an answer." But would the refusal itself not be an answer, and a very alarming one at that—one according to which the worst could be expected? Upon this Fichte answers: "If the truth kills the woman, let her die."

To the second class belong those cases in which we are to protect either ourselves or others from criminal attacks. Here the so-called necessary right (Ger. *Nothrecht*) comes in force, which we shall treat more minutely

* Compare Martensen II, pp. 258-269.

in § 69. As examples of this, the following cases are usually presented: (*a*) A young lady, who is at the mercy of a libidinous scoundrel, saves her life and, what is more precious to her still, her honor and innocence, by deceiving him with a lie. (*b*) An innocent person is pursued by a furious mob, and seeks shelter in my house. His pursuers ask whether he is in my house. If I refuse to answer, they will search the house, and the man is lost. Is it wrong in such a case, that, perhaps by risking my own life, I put the mob upon a wrong track by telling them a lie? Is it not nobler than to betray the man who has intrusted himself to my care?

In all of these and in similar cases, rigorism answers that a lie is a lie, whether it be in the service of selfishness or of sympathizing charity and justified, necessary defense; that the maxim, that one is allowed to take recourse to a lie in order to gain a good end, suits well to the Jesuitic moral, but not to evangelic ethics. And who would dispute that the principle of this view is correct?

Nevertheless we feel ourselves involuntarily repelled by the regardless severity of the practical application of this maxim. True, if I tell the truth in all circumstances, without being concerned about the consequences, I fulfill the formal duty imposed upon me by veracity, but do I act toward my neighbor as I should act—as I would have him act toward me in a similar case? In clinging faithfully to the letter of truth, do I not offend the higher truth of disposition—the duty of love and faithfulness? Are the words not valid here: "The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life?" Rousseau says: "The strictest moral costs nothing on paper." If, by regardlessly revealing the truth, I should bring about a fatal catastrophe, will I be able to overlook it and quiet my conscience in the practical reality, as well as I did in theory?

These questions are not as easily disposed of as some may think, especially as "the Lord looketh on the heart." According to Joshua ii, Rahab told a lie in order to save the spies who were in her house; and yet just this deed is lauded in the New Testament as a work of faith. (Heb. vi, 31; James ii, 25.) Some will say Rahab was a heathen woman; there must be more demanded of a Christian. But although we admit this, the question remains, Could the New Testament approve of Rahab's deed and praise it as a "work of faith" if the formal demands of truth were above the duty of love and faithfulness? (Comp. Ex. i, 15–21.)

We here confront a "collision of duties;" not a collision that lies in the nature of the demands of the divine law itself—for such a collision is inconceivable—but a collision that exists for a definite individual in a definite stage of Christian development. This collision can not be disposed of by an abstract rule, but only by elevating the respective person to a higher plane of moral life. For this reason (to which in most cases a second must be added, of which we shall speak in § 69) we do not consider ourselves justified in unconditionally condemning the so-called necessary lie, although we admit that this lie is not compatible with the perfect Christian character (James iii, 2), and that its justification can be derived only from the sinful derangement of the circumstances of human life on the one hand, and from the weakness of faith and the moral imperfection of the Christians on the other hand. Christ never made use of a necessary lie; neither did the apostles. But wherever that perfect trust in God and that power and enlightenment of the Holy Ghost is wanting, by which Christ and the apostles controlled the minds of people, we must ascribe to the necessary lie a relative justification, just as in the Old Testament, for example, divorce was allowed "because of the hardness of their hearts."

Of course, a Christian will only in the most extreme case agree to make use of a "necessary lie;" and in the degree in which he grows in knowledge, faith, and sacrificing love, and Christ is glorified in him, he will not be in need of a necessary lie at all, because in his faithful trust of God and in the power and enlightenment of the Holy Ghost he will at all times find the means of solving the collision of duties without deviating from the formal truth.

But veracity includes also the conscientious fulfilling of a promise, the keeping one's word. With every promise we make we assume a debt that we are obliged to pay. We can not free ourselves from this obligation without making ourselves guilty of breach of promise. Even though we should see later on that fulfilling the promise will be to our injury, we have no right to take back our word, unless he to whom we made the promise, and who therefore has a right to demand its fulfillment, consents to it. Keeping our word is indispensable to preserving mutual confidence, upon which is based the moral intercourse of mankind. If even the children of this world consider it unmanly and dishonorable that a man break his word ("word of honor"), how much more must the Christian consider it a sacred and conscientious duty to keep the promise he has made!

Only in the case of minors and children it may become necessary to leave a promise unfulfilled even without their consent, because they are unable to judge the state of affairs rationally. But as the non-fulfillment of a promise must necessarily lessen the confidence of a child in its parents or educators, it becomes the Christian's duty to be cautious in making promises. He should guard against making a promise which it is not in his power to keep; and when he does make a promise, he should not make it unconditionally, but only with the

definitely stated condition that no unforeseen impediment make its fulfillment impossible. (James iv, 13–15.)

An insolvable collision of duties occurs when a person has, in thoughtless levity, made a promise, the fulfillment of which would be a sin. In such a case he can, of course, not keep his promise; but he thereby brings upon himself the reproach of having committed breach of promise. That he has put himself into a position out of which he can not get without sinning, is a punishment for his thoughtless levity.

JUSTICE.

§ 68. The Justice of the Disposition. The Manifestations of Justice. Chastity.

Another trait of the Christian's character in his intercourse with fellow-man is justice in its various forms and branchings. Christian justice is not opposed to holy love, but rather is holy love itself, giving to every one that which is his (*suum cuique*); that is, keeping the right holy in every respect.

Inasmuch as justice is a moment of the Christian's disposition, we distinguish the attributes honesty, rectitude, and fairness. "Honesty (Ger. *Ehrlichkeit*) is that way of respecting the right which is naive, perfectly free, not destined by principles; whereas rectitude (Ger. *Rechtlichkeit*) is based upon principles, upon the conscious, self-given law of keeping the right holy even in little things." (Palmer.) Fairness, however, is the willingness to adjust differences by foregoing the assertion of one's formal right, when the stern severity of this formal right contradicts one's sympathy for fellow-man.

In practical life justice manifests itself in a kind regard of the character and the honor, as well as the material welfare, of fellow-man.

It is terrible how much the demands of justice are

disregarded, especially those bearing on the character of fellow-man. Hundreds who would not think of doing their fellow-man any bodily harm, do not seem to scruple in the least at blackening his good name by unkind judgment, backbiting, and slander, and at making his character questioned; and yet there is, in most cases, greater injustice done him in this way than by bodily mistreatment; for by being robbed of his good name, he is also robbed of his social position, and often even of the possibility of success in his temporal calling. Therefore our Lord warns so earnestly against judging fellow-man unjustly: "Judge not, that ye be not judged. For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged; and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again." (Matt. vii, 1 and 2.)

Though the Christian remains free from such gross injustice, every one must confess that he, too, has occasionally done his fellow-man injustice, at least in thoughts. Who has not experienced to his own shame that the opinion he had formed of others proved to be most unjust when he learned to know them better; and who has not in his own heart begged pardon of another in such a case, especially if he did not keep his opinion to himself, but occasionally expressed it? Justice demands that, even in our thoughts, we do unto others as we would have others do unto us. But this includes that we acknowledge the full value of the good that our fellow-man has or does. "Honor to whom honor is due" is a Biblical command, the fullfillment of which the Christian should make an inviolable maxim of his life. This is not self-humiliation or flattery, but simply justice. It is our duty willingly to acknowledge that which is good and laudable in fellow-man, even though, in general, he is not according to our taste. We must not judge others more severely than ourselves; or if we would at any time make a difference we should

be severe toward ourselves and lenient toward others. (Matt. vii, 3–5.)

In regard to the material welfare of fellow-man, justice manifests itself specially in business intercourse.

The world thinks it has met the general demands of justice when it does not pass beyond the bounds of formal lawful right. But even within these limits human selfishness finds ways and means enough of taking the advantage of fellow-man and cheating him, and often the greatest injustice is done by a loveless application of the formal right itself. The most dangerous swindlers are just those who know how to cheat without conflicting with the law, and hence are beyond the reach of civil justice. It is almost inconceivable how bad example and the ruling business practice can blunt and pervert even the conscience of respectable people with regard to business life. Every one seeks his own. The merchant demands the highest possible price for inferior goods, and the customer the best goods for a low price; the employer demands the best work for low wages, and the employee the highest wages for little work. Thus all parties chaffer and cheat as much as possibe. If one has taken the advantage of another in trade, he boasts of his cunningness; the so-called business lies and business tricks have become so general that many consider them absolutely necessary.

A true Christian, to whom his neighbor's right is sacred, can impossibly participate in such selfish actions. It is quite proper that buyer and seller, employee and employer, demand what is justly due them; but they should not demand more—they should not sacrifice the happiness of others to their own advantage. Whoever wishes to do unto his neighbor as he would have his neighbor do unto him in like circumstances, can neither subtly nor grossly defraud him and rob him of that which

is his own. Even though he must then forego many advantages, he is comforted by the consciousness of having done right in the sight of God and man, and by the promise that unto them that "seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, all these things shall be added."

As regards the sin of fellow-man, it is the Christian's duty to punish evil by his earnest reproof (§ 64). Holy love, indeed, suffereth long and is kind; it judges the faults of others with forbearance and gentleness; but it is not blind. It can not call black white; wrong, right; ignoble, noble. The Christian is therefore often brought into positions in which he must, for the sake of justice and the rescue of the sinner, earnestly reprove his sin. Thus John reproved Herod on account of his adultery; thus Nathan reproved David; Christ, his disciples on account of their unbelief; Paul, Peter (Gal. i), etc. To witness sin silently, where a testimony against it is possible, is to sanction it. The Christian must punish sin; but he does it in the spirit of meekness and gentleness. He does not withdraw his love of the sinner, but with sincere sympathy tries to lead him to repent, so that he who is punished feels that the punishment is not imposed by hatred, but by grieved love. But he must restrict himself to reproof, and at all events to temporarily avoiding association with his sinful fellow-man, unless a special calling in family, society, Church, or state justifies him in imposing a severe punishment.

Though it is the Christian's duty to punish the sin of his fellow-man, justice demands that, on the other hand, he defend his fellow-man as much as possible against slander and unjust accusations, and silence his slanderers by a positive witness for the truth. He can often do this best by asking the gossipers, who are trying to show him the dark sides of others, to go with him to the respective

persons and repeat his accusations in their presence. In most cases they will recall their slanderous statements rather than confront their victim. And even if this does not happen, they will be abashed, and perhaps bettered, by such love of truth and justice.

Closely related to justice is chastity in its relation, not to the sacredness of one's own personality (comp. § 62), but to one's intercourse with others. Viewed thus, chastity actually appears as keeping sacred the innocence and honor of fellow-man. The social sins of unchastity, from impure jests to actual fornication and adultery, do not spring from the mutual love of the interested parties, but from a want of true love, from mere brutish passion. Whoever really loves his neighbor, not only his sex, but himself according to his eternal nature as a being related to God, can impossibly degrade him to a mere means of appeasing his sensual lusts. To him who truly loves, the honor and innocence of those he loves are sacred and inviolable.

§ 69. Continuation. The Necessary Right. The Necessary Defense.

In consequence of sin and the derangement of social life caused by it, there can be cases in which the Christian must encroach upon the rights of others in order to ward off a threatening misfortune or prevent a purposed crime. Upon this is based the so-called necessary right (*Nothrecht*).

If, for example, I see a despondent person who is about to commit suicide, it is my duty to prevent the execution of his intention if possible, though it be by force. If I need the property or help of another in order to save some one's life, I have a right to use the former without the express consent of the owner; but I must afterwards apprise him of the fact, and, in case

he ask it, give him an adequate remuneration for the use of his property; and in regard to his rendering assistance, I have a right—when a life is at stake—to compel him to aid, if he foolishly or unjustly refuse to do it willingly.

Upon this necessary right is based the necessary defense (*Nothwehr*). The Christian has a right and is obliged to ward off a criminal attack upon his life (using force if necessary), not only for self-preservation, but in order to preserve the moral order of society. "He is here, not acting in his own name, but in the name of the government, and does only what the government itself would undoubtedly do and be compelled to do." (Wuttke.) When Christ says (Matt. v, 39 and 40), "I say unto you, That ye resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also; and if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also," he does not require us to fulfill the letter of this demand—for he himself did not fulfill it literally (John xviii, 22 and 23)—but to have the spirit underlying it. The Christian should, as far as he himself is concerned, allow himself to be beaten and stripped of his clothes, rather than quarrel and fight with his opponent in a spirit of discord and enmity. But even though, as far as he personally is concerned, he would willingly permit himself to be beaten and plundered, he must in many cases not leave such injustice unpunished, because thereby impudence and godless wantonness would only be fostered and reared. Where the Christian can heap coals of fire on his enemy's head, or can strengthen his surroundings in faith and love, he should literally turn the other cheek to him who smites him on one, etc.; but where the wheat would only be cast among tares, he should save the wheat for better soil, and demand his rights. If in such cases help can not be obtained from the law, necessary defense

is in place. And withal the Christian will find opportunity enough in every-day life patiently to bear injustice for the sake of Christ and the kingdom of God, and to commit the recompense to God, as Christ himself did in the days of his flesh.

In judging necessary defense, it must be remembered that it is not to be exercised against rational, moral persons, but against persons not in possession of sound reason (for example, lunatics or drunken persons), or against criminals, who are openly opposed to the moral law, and hence are beyond the bounds of moral society. With both classes a rational moral association is impossible; but it is our duty to keep such people, whether by force or by stratagem, from insane or criminal deeds. In such cases the necessary right justifies the necessary lie (§ 67). The use of stratagem and deception must be justified, especially toward criminals in a case of necessary defense, or where they are to be delivered up to justice; for a criminal has no claim upon our full self-revelation. Nevertheless it can not be denied that it contradicts the feelings of a Christian to use force or stratagem in dealing with fellow-man; hence he will have recourse to such means of defense only from a sense of duty, or where there is no alternative.

MERCY.

§ 70. Combating Temporal Need.

Christian love can not be indifferent to the sorrow of the world, but tries to alleviate the temporal and spiritual wants of humanity as much as possible, by compassionate sympathy and actual aid. In endeavoring this, Christian love appears as mercy, or (inasmuch as it does good to those that suffer) benevolence.

Benevolence is a fundamental trait in the character

of the Christian. It was this benevolence that caused the heathen people to wonder at the first Christians and exclaim: "See how the Christians love one another!" And it is not surprising; for the character of heathen antiquity was egotism. It was left for Christianity to make charity the highest law of life; and though the reign of egotism is not yet broken in the so-called Christian world, the principle of it is universally condemned. We are wont to call the spreading of humaneness the highest purpose of the present; but the essential trait of this humaneness is the exercise of universal love of humanity. The latter, however, springs from love of God, who created man in his own image, and in his infinite mercy redeemed him by sacrificing his only Son. Therefore humaneness must never be separated from its root, Christianity, or it will languish and wither.

The highest example of mercy was given by Christ himself, whose whole life, from the manger to the grave, was an uninterrupted manifestation of his infinite love and mercy toward fallen humanity—"who went about doing good and healing all that were oppressed of the devil." But the highest manifestation of his mercy, and at the same time the greatest benevolence shown us in the days of his flesh, consisted in his redeeming us by his death, and gaining for us the possibility of becoming children of God.

The Christian who has received forgiveness of sin and a new life by faith in this great act of God, possesses therein the most potent motive to mercy toward fellowman. "If God so loved us, we ought also to love one another."

The manifestations of mercy are as various as the conditions and circumstances of life in which one person is in need of another's aid. It often appears, as Martensen expresses it, "with veiled countenance, as in *incognito*,"

in order that it may the better render aid to them that suffer. And it constantly acts with a tender regard for the feelings of its clients; for often the real deed of mercy lies not in the deed of benevolence or in the gift tendered the unfortunate, but in the manner in which it is tendered. Finally, true mercy is free from all lust for glory. It follows the free impulse of love (2 Cor. v, 14), and scatters deeds of benevolence without ascribing any personal merit to them; it gives without "letting the left hand know what the right hand doeth." Those who shall be set on the Lord's right hand on the day of judgment, will ask, surprised: "Lord, when saw we thee a hungered, and fed thee, or thirsty and gave thee drink?" etc. (Matt. xxv, 37–39.) So little merit have they ascribed to their deeds of mercy that the Lord must remind them of the services rendered the "least of his brethren" as being rendered unto him personally.

It is very important for us to remember that the moral value of our good works is not dependent upon the outward appearance—for example, upon the size of the gift or the extraordinary character of the deed—but upon the disposition. In God's sight, that alone is valuable which we do in the name of Jesus; that is, out of love for him, because we would follow his holy example, and love our neighbor even as he loved him. Whatever does not spring from this source, does not deserve to be called a "good work." And yet how many aid the poor or the cause of God's kingdom for the sake of praise; and how many have their benevolent deeds intentionally and pharisaically proclaimed for the sake of applause! "They have their reward." Others think they can cover up their impenitent, worldly disposition with their "good works;" but, alas! they will eventually find that all self-righteousness will be blown away in the day of judgment, as chaff is driven away by the

wind. If we could view all our so-called good works in the light in which God sees them, how often we should have reason to pray: "O Lord, forgive us our 'good works'" also!

As the needs of mankind which were brought about by sin are not only temporal, but also spiritual, benevolence must naturally deal with both domains. Benevolence that restricts itself to combating temporal needs is insufficient; for spiritual need will always beget temporal need. Hence Elizabeth Fry was right, when, in agreement with all who have become famous in the domain of Christian benevolence, she said that pastoral care is the soul of all care for the poor. And, indeed, the spiritual misery in the world is as much greater and more fatal than the temporal, as the welfare of the soul is more important than the welfare of the body. "What shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?"

To the outward evils that Christian mercy must combat belong all kinds of afflictions, especially sickness and poverty. The means it uses vary with the wants of the suffering ones. Often mere sympathy, "weeping with them that weep," is benevolence. We can perhaps at present not comfort that widow who sits broken-hearted at the death-bed of her husband; we feel that she would be deaf to our words of consolation; the unhappy woman must first collect her mind and recover from the severe blow that has paralyzed her whole mental life, as it were; but we honor her grief by our silent sympathy, and the consciousness that others mourn with her does her good. In other cases we can dry the tears of the afflicted, and heal wounded hearts by comforting words. But to do this properly we must ourselves have become partakers of that comfort which the Christian finds through faith in the providential reign of divine

love. Hence prayer is a potent aid in the work of comforting. In other cases actual aid is necessary; and in such cases Christian love is revealed in innumerable manifestations of love. Even the mere presence of a genuine Christian oftens quiets the sick person that he visits; his cheerful trust in God brings light and sunshine into the gloomy sick-room, and the great and small services that he renders the sick person seem doubly beneficial to the latter, because he recognizes the reign of love in them.

Poverty imposes upon Christian love the task of alleviating the momentary need by assistance (alms) on the one hand, and on the other hand, of providing, if possible, a means of permanent support by securing work for the poor, or in some other possible way. As an unwise giving of alms often promotes begging and idleness, and thus injures the poor more than it benefits them, an organized care of the poor is to be recommended, in which the alms are not to be given directly to the poor, but to a committee, to which the poor are then to be referred, and which shall distribute the gifts among the worthy poor, after carefully inquiring into their circumstances. This organized care of the poor will still leave a wide field of activity for private benevolence.

The manifold benevolent institutions which have been called into existence by Christian love, as well as the institutions of spreading the gospel (as Bible and tract depositories), and the support of foreign and home missions, afford the Christian ample opportunity for employing charity. But here wrong motives are manifested even oftener than in private benevolence. Is it not true that, specially in America, it has become an almost universal custom to secure money for benevolent purposes in an indirect way, instead of by free donations? And this is done not only by the children of this world, who arrange

balls and theaters, in order to aid such as are suffering from great calamities (as floods, earthquakes, conflagrations, etc.), but also by the Church, which has concerts, fairs, lotteries, and suppers, to make money for mission or other Church purposes. This custom is excused by saying that it is all the same in which way people give, if only the necessary money is secured. But is that correct? Does the Church, by such perverse action, not sanction the wrong motives of desire for honor, enjoyment, etc., which so often poison deeds of benevolence and make them morally worthless? Is not all sense of pure, unselfish charity thus systematically undermined? It must be painful to an unbiased Christian, who has the cause of God's kingdom at heart, to see that such moral erring is not only tolerated, but even willfully promoted, by the Church.*

§ 71. Combating Spiritual Need.

As we remarked above, combating the inner misery—that misery which arises from sin—must go hand in hand with combating external misery. The Christian must not think that he has done his full duty when he has alleviated the temporal need of his fellow-men as much as possible; that their spiritual welfare is no concern of his. The less he considers the danger of damnation in which the natural man lives to be a mere bugbear of the imagination, the more he learns to look at it as a terrible reality, the more will he be impelled by that love of sin-

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*Rothe says in regard to the above mentioned bad custom: "This method is indeed a contamination of benevolence. It is a fatal inconsistency to coax a gift of love from a man by offering a bait for his egotism. Who thus exercises benevolence in good faith, may continue thus; but there are those who in this way could be benevolent only *mala fide;* and they should not allow the wrong fear of seeming to lack love to induce them to become untrue to their conviction, that the end can not justify the means."

ners of which Christ gave us such a sublime example, not only to remember the erring ones in his prayers, but also to look after them, and, with God's help, to bring them to Christ. It is true that this is principally the duty of the minister, but the layman should also endeavor, by word and deed, to save immortal souls about him. As to the manner in which it is to be done, there can be no definite directions given; in this respect the calling of the individual varies with his individuality and position in life. But it is the duty of every one to work for his Lord and Master in his manner, and if it be only by his intercession and his pious "conversation." (1 Peter iii, 1 and 2.) The witness of the works often does more toward convincing the world than the most earnest persuasions.

This work of love demands many a sacrifice and self-denial. Above all, the Christian must guard against being a stumbling-block to any one, by which the latter might become "worse;" that is, by which his soul might suffer harm. (Matt. xviii, 7, etc.) For his neighbor's sake the Christian must deny himself many otherwise allowed enjoyments—hence, voluntarily give up the use of his liberty. The apostle writes: "Take heed lest by any means this liberty of yours become a stumbling-block to them that are weak." "It is good neither to eat flesh nor to drink wine, nor any thing whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak;" for "if thy brother be grieved with thy meat, now walkest thou not charitably." (1 Cor. viii, 9; Rom. xiv, 21 and 15.) This tender regard which merciful love has of the weak brother, is the reason why Christians, who, as far as their own person is concerned, would suffer no harm, if, for example, they drank a glass of wine, can feel by conscience bound to renounce the use of spirituous liquors entirely—a duty imposed by conscience, which in our

country (not only on account of the terrible devastation that drunkenness causes in all classes of society, but also on account of the prominence which the question of total abstinence has gained everywhere, but specially in Church circles), every true Christian must consider of great importance.

The direct endeavors of winning unconverted persons for Christ, or of leading erring brethren into the right way, require not only great wisdom, patience, and perseverance, but for many, especially for timid and reserved natures, great self-renunciation; and this is the more true because, even to-day, such labor of love easily brings upon us the ridicule and contempt of the world. But in all this the Christian, who possesses in prayerful communion with Christ an inexhaustible source of strength, finds that the Lord whom he serves makes him powerful in his weakness.

Merciful, ministering love is the most obvious trait in the life of the Christian, as also Christ himself sums up his own life-calling by saying that he had not come to be ministered unto, but to minister unto others. Therefore the works of Christian mercy have a special promise. Even for the "cup of cold water" that we give a thirsting one in Christ's name we shall "in no wise lose our reward;" and we read of those "that turn many to righteousness," that they "shall shine as the stars for ever and ever."

d. THE CHRISTIAN VIRTUES IN THEIR RELATION TO THE OBJECTIVE WORLD.

§ 72. The Christian Virtues.

In regard to the objective world, the power of holy love is manifested in (1) that the Christian is inwardly free from the world, hence is no longer the slave of the world; (2) that he rejoices at the manifold manifestations

in the world as the creation of his Heavenly Father, and treats them with kind indulgence.

1. In § 16 we saw that selfishness changes to worldly lust, because man, who has torn away from God and made himself the center of his life, becomes inwardly unstable, and, striving to fill the vacancy in his heart by some finite good, makes this good his idol, which he serves the more diligently the less he finds in its service the satisfaction he seeks for. This devotedness to the service of the world is the essence of worldly lust. As by conversion and regeneration the Christian is brought into the proper relation to God again, and finds in God the center and the resting-point of his life, the finite things lose their charm for him, he becomes inwardly independent of the world. "He can be full and be hungry, can abound and suffer need; everywhere and in all things he is instructed." However thankfully he enjoys the gifts of his God, his inner satisfaction, the joy of his life is no longer dependent upon them. He can say with the psalmist, though often with tear-dimmed eye: "Whom have I in heaven but thee? and there is none upon earth that I desire besides thee. My flesh and my heart faileth; but God is the strength of my heart, and my portion forever."

2. But he is far from all wrong ascetic contempt of the world. He despises the sinful life of the world; but the world itself—that is, nature in its many manifestations—is to him a revelation of the glory of his God, and, as such, an object of wonder and pious indulgence. No one can feel the beauties of nature more deeply, and lose himself in a kinder consideration of it, than the Christian, who sees everywhere in the vast domain of creation the traces of divine omnipotence, love, and wisdom. Hence, the Christian, whom God has placed to be a ruler over nature, can use it for, and even sacrifice it to, the realiza-

tion of his moral purposes; but he can never wantonly and needlessly destroy its forms. Wanton destruction of plant-life, and the act of tormenting animals, are always a proof of moral rudeness, and are directly opposed to the piety that we owe God and his handiwork.

Blindness and malignity alone can accuse Christian ethics of containing no provisions for the protection of irrational creation, especially of animals. The groundlessness of this accusation would be evident if the Bible contained no more than the one beautiful verse: "A righteous man regardeth the life of his beast; but the tender mercies of the wicked are cruel." But in the law of Moses we find an abundance of the most delicate instructions for the treatment of animals. (Comp. Deut. xxv, 4; Ex. xx, 10; xxiii, 11; Lev. xxii, 24; Deut. xxii, 6 and 7, and others.) That these instructions are all contained in the Old Testament, and not in the New, is of no significance; for we know that Christ most emphatically acknowledges the ethical and religious import of the Old Testament. (Matt. v, 17–22.) But how delicately Christ himself considers the animal world is shown, not only by what he says concerning God's paternal care for animals (Matt. vi, 26; x, 29, and others), but also by Matt. xii, 11, where he plainly acknowledges the right of coming on Sunday to the assistance of an animal that has met with an accident. The words of Paul also, concerning the earnest expectation of the creation waiting for the manifestation of the sons of God (Rom. viii, 18, etc.), reveals an exceedingly kind and thoughtful consideration of nature. If Christ and the apostles did not plainly repeat the above-mentioned instructions of the Mosaic law, it was simply because they considered it self-evident that believers treat animals mercifully. The religion of love can impossibly permit severity and cruelty to animals; it would thus contradict itself.

6. THE CHRISTIAN IN VARIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES OF LIFE.

§ 73. The Christian in the Enjoyment of Temporal Things. The Inner Independence of the Christian.

As the Christian has found in God the source of true blessedness, and enjoys temporal things not only with a feeling of dependence upon God, but also with constant subordination to his will, he retains his liberty with regard to these temporal things, so that, as we saw in the preceding section, he can be happy in the enjoyment of heavenly possessions, even though he must forego earthly possessions. Paul presupposes that the Corinthians have this disposition when he writes that in all things they should approve themselves as the ministers of God "by honor and dishonor, by evil report and good report; as deceivers, and yet true;" "as sorrowful, yet always rejoicing; as poor, yet making many rich; as having nothing, and yet possessing all things." (2 Cor. vi, 4–10.) This inner independence regarding the vicissitudes of life, to which the natural man so easily succumbs, and in which he so easily falls prey to embitterment and discouragement, is, and has at all times been, a chief trait in the character of the true Christian.

Let us now see how this fundamental bent of the heart is revealed in the Christian's relation to the most important temporal things, to earthly possession, to honor, and to health.

§ 74. Continuation. Earthly Possession.

The opinion that, in his Sermon on the Mount, Christ prohibited his disciples to possess earthly things at all, is

based upon a wrong interpretation of the Lord's words, which are taken absolutely, whereas, according to his intention, they were meant relatively. The words, Matt. vi, 24, "Ye can not serve God and mammon," must evidently be interpreted like those immediately preceding it: "No man can serve two masters," etc. If, now, it is evident from Eph. vi, 5; 1 Peter ii, 18, and other passages of the Holy Scriptures, that in many cases it is not only the Christian's privilege, but even his duty, to serve earthly masters as well as God—only subordinating the service of the former to that of the latter—then the words, "Ye can not serve God and mammon," can not contain an absolute prohibition of possessions, but only the demand that mammon—that is, the earthly possessions—should be placed wholly into the service of God. The same is true of Matt. vi, 19, etc., "Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth," etc.; and of Matt. vi, 25, etc., "Take no thought for your life," etc. If the latter is to be taken only relatively, as prohibiting anxious, unbelieving care, then the former must certainly not be taken literally either. And the Lord himself presupposes his disciples to possess earthly things when he commands, "Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness" (Luke xvi, 9), which certainly is not possible unless they possess mammon. Therefore Paul also commands the Christian to "work with his hands the thing which is good, that he may have to give to him that needeth." (Eph. iv, 28.) Hence the Lord does not prohibit the possession of earthly things itself, but only the sinful disposition of the heart, in which man "places his trust in riches"—that is, makes money his god and seeks the happiness of his life in the enjoyment of earthly things. (Matt. v, 21; vi, 17; Mark x, 24.)

It would therefore be a wrong, monkish practice of asceticism, if one should demand of all Christian capital-

ists, without distinction, to give their goods to the poor. In certain cases this can be demanded, demanded even on penalty of losing one's eternal blessedness, especially in cases like that of the rich youth in the gospel, where the heart can in no other way break the reign of mammon. (Mark x, 17–24.) But this demand can not be made general, not even in the form of an "evangelic advice." For there are cases in which it would be wrong if a pious, devoted Christian should renounce his possessions in favor of the poor, and distribute his wealth among them now—which, perhaps, would not be of much more true benefit than if he cast it into the sea; whereas, under his faithful administration, it could for a long time be a source of richest blessing for the poor. Hence Christian ethics recognizes the right of possession, and demands only that it be placed wholly into the service of God. In regard to how this should be done, ethics can establish only the following general precepts, the exercise of which must in the single cases be left to the enlightened conscience of the individual:

1. The Christian considers earthly possessions, whether they be inherited or acquired by personal labor, a gift of God, a good; but not the highest good, in which he seeks the happiness of his life. He knows that thousands are inexpressibly unhappy despite the possession of great riches, and that only a heart content in God can make man truly happy. He is therefore not a slave of his possessions, like those who make the acquiring of riches the end proper of their endeavors, but remains inwardly free from them.

2. He never strives for the things of this earth with that rash eagerness shown by the children of this world; for he knows the dangers of covetousness, that they that will be rich "fall into temptation and a snare" (1 Tim. vi, 9), and that the acquisition of a whole world would

not balance the least loss sustained by his soul in striving for riches. Hence he will not listen to any method of acquisition, save that of honest labor, and never takes part in gambling, wild speculations, or swindling enterprises.

3. Nor does he give up to anxious care. He knows that God, who spared not his own Son, will with this highest gift freely give him all things that serve to his good and salvation. If he could destine his own lot, he would, with the wise Agur, choose "food convenient for him." (Prov. xxx, 8; 1 Tim. vi, 5.) If this is but scantily meted out to him, he is not made unhappy; for he knows that this also must serve for his good. If he has food, clothing, and shelter, he is content, even though he must forego many enjoyments of life which those who are richer can allow themselves. He is rich even in poverty; for in God's love he possesses an inexhaustible source of inner blessedness. (2 Cor. vi, 10.)

4. "The Christian possesses, as though he possessed not." (1 Cor. vii, 30.) He knows that he is not absolute lord of his possessions, but only a steward appointed of God, who will call him to account for the use of that which was intrusted to his care; and that the more God has intrusted to him, the more will be demanded of him. Far from boasting of his riches, therefore, he always feels that with his possessions God has laid upon him a great responsibility—that, with the gift, he has given him a task that he must fulfill or miss his life-purpose. With this the relation of the Christian to worldly possessions is essentially characterized.

Regarding the use of possessions, the Christian is not prohibited, but rather commanded, to use his earthly goods, first of all, for the support of himself and his own people; for "if any provide not for his own, and specially for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel." (1 Tim. v, 8.) In

what manner, however, one shall provide for his own house, and how great or how small the expense should be, must be dictated by his Christian tact and his conscience. But as in this domain the judgment of the Christian is easily biased by selfishness, which still besets even him, the question in how far the Christian is justified, in individual cases, in using his possessions for the acquisition of dispensable things and enjoyments, and hence for the brightening and adorning of his life, must be considered one of the most difficult that the Christian conscience has to decide.

The usual opinion, that wealth itself grants an absolute right for a splendid mode of life, is directly opposed to the Christian's view of earthly possessions. The children of this world may think that their senseless luxury is excused and justified if they can say: "My means permit it. We have the means; we can afford it!" But the Christian knows that he can never justify himself before God if he squanders the gifts which he has intrusted to him, in the service of selfishness and vanity.

But how is the Christian to conduct himself? Is he prohibited to use his possessions for the satisfying of other than the absolute necessities of life, or can he allow himself an expenditure beyond the necessities of life?

In answering this question we must first define the idea of "beyond the necessities of life." If we call all use of possessions that goes beyond the satisfying of the physical wants of life, such as the savage also has, as going "beyond the necessities of life," we certainly can not deny that the Christian has a moral right to it. Culture begets wants that are unknown to the rude savage, and the satisfying of which is yet morally right and allowed, because they are most intimately connected with the higher development of culture, which is an essential element in the moral purpose of man.

Upon this is based the right of the Christian to live according to his station and his means.

It is not a sin for him to furnish his home tastily; he is permitted to clothe himself and his family becomingly and in keeping with his outward position in life, and can otherwise also, according to his means, take the æsthetic wants brought about by higher culture into consideration; for the external surroundings of man influence his moral development. It is also proper to cultivate the sociable side of life. Thus, for example, the custom of arranging occasional family festivities, of giving presents to one another on Christmas, birthdays, etc., is by no means to be considered improper luxury. This custom springs from the mutual love of the members of the family, and is a natural expression thereof. Even the Lord himself acknowledged them to be proper, not only by being present at the marriage in Cana, which he glorified by his first miracle, but also by solemnly defending Mary's act of anointing him in Bethany, which act the disciples condemned as gross extravagance. (John xii.) It need hardly be mentioned that it is morally right and allowed to use possessions for the promotion and cultivation of science.

Moreover in the satisfying of his justified wants, the Christian will (1) never go beyond his means; (2) always remain thoughtful of the needs of poverty and of the demands of the spreading of God's kingdom; and (3) willingly forego otherwise allowed sumptuousness, where extraordinary distress demands this sacrifice.

But whenever the expenditure goes beyond the moral purpose of satisfying the wants begotten by culture, and serves the immoral purposes of vanity, of empty desire of splendor, of wishing to surpass others, there luxury begins; and wherever possessions are used purposelessly, extravagance begins. Political economy may consider lux-

ury allowed and useful, because it promotes industry and money-making; but from the stand-point of the Christian moral, luxury as well as extravagance must be called morally rejectable. The "pride of life," which John designates as one of the three chief forms of sinful "love of the world." (1 John ii, 16), is pre-eminently just this worldly luxury, in which one thinks he must surpass the other in the splendor and luxuriousness of life, and considers himself better than the other according as he can surpass him in apparel, food and drink, and all manner of luxury. But if luxury is a manifestation of sinful love of the world, it is just as incompatible with the true love of God as the lust of the eyes and of the flesh (covetousness and inordinate desire of enjoyment); for "if any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him." If, therefore, from the stand-point of Christian ethics we must call luxury sin in all circumstances, this sin is enhanced by the fact that we see about us thousands of our fellow-men suffering under the burden of want and poverty, whose needs we could at least partially satisfy by foregoing our sinful luxury. Therefore the Christian economist Dr. Gerstner says: "As long as need and misery cast a shadow upon the nation, no Christian has a right to live in luxury."

Remark 1.—"To buy classics, music, etc., is not luxury, but the satisfying of a want brought about by culture. To have them bound not only becomingly and tastily, but magnificently for the sake of show on a center-table, is luxury. Lucullus's order for a dish of singing-birds was extravagance. All of these ideas are determined by the relation of the means to the end, and by the moral nature of the latter. Quite distinct from these is the question concerning the relation of expenditure to the actual economic means. What goes beyond these is uneconomical, and therefore morally blameworthy, but need not necessarily be either luxury or extravagance. (One can, for example, buy more books than his means permit, even though it be for a good purpose.) On the other hand, an expenditure

may be entirely within the limit of the financial means, and yet be luxury or even extravagance." (Ebrard on 1 John ii, 16, 17, in Olshausen's Commentary.)

Remark 2.—As a practical rule of conduct we quote a passage from a small work published by C. Bertelsmann in Guetersloh, entitled "*Christliche Bedenken eines Sorgenvollen:*" "Be heartily kind, and abandon foolish pride. Fashion your life and that of your house, your conduct and behavior as simply as possible; let it be seen therein, also, that you are a Christian and not a worldly person. And begin with yourself, though others may do as they will. Be the simplest among those of your class. This is the nearest rule for those who may oppose what has been said regarding the honor of rank, considerations of rank, etc. And, further, pay no attention to scoffers and to those who turn up their nose."

§ 75. Continuation. Honor.

Honor—that is, the degree of respect and consideration that a man can claim in his special station in life—is most intimately connected with his calling and rank; hence is, as a rule, honor of rank. But this does not exhaust the idea of honor. Wholly aside from his social position, every man has a claim to being recognized as a rational personality, created in the image of God. He is such a personality even in his sinful condition, wherefore the apostle can properly apply the words of the poet Aratus, "We are the offspring of God," even to the heathen Athenians. Upon this is based the general honor of man, which every one has a right to claim, to whatever social circle he may belong. In the unconscientious disregard of this just claim the sinful degeneration of mankind is manifested; and when not only the slavery of former ages, but even the lauded culture of the present advanced century, can show up cases in which man is degraded to a mere beast of burden and labor, and is worn out by regardless selfishness, this is a glaring injustice, against which the Christian has a right to defend himself with all just means.

But he also has a right to defend the honor of his station or calling; it is even his duty to do so. For as the honor of station is acquired by faithfully fulfilling the duties of one's calling, it is an indispensable condition of a successful and blessed activity; with our good name we lose also our influence upon others, and therewith the capability of benefiting them. Therefore Paul defended himself most emphatically against the slander of his enemies who tried to undermine his apostolic authority (Gal. i, 2; 2 Cor. iii, 1); he even boasts of his unselfish and successful activity in the service of his Master (2 Cor. xi, 10.) That was not a sinful desire for honor, but a proper, yea, even necessary defense of the honor of his calling, the derogation of which would have endangered his influence and the success of his work.

If in John v, 44, the Lord accuses the Jews of receiving honor one from the other, he does not intend to say that a Christian must unconditionally reject all honor shown him by his fellow-men. Neither he himself nor his disciples did this. The sense of his words is seen, however, from the added opposite: "And seek not the honor that cometh from God." What Christ objects to is only that wrong, inordinate desire for honor, which values the honor that cometh from men more highly than the honor that cometh from God, and in the chase after the honor of men tramples even upon the will of God.

This brings us to the fact that, in the world, the idea of honor is manifoldly obscure and perverted, so that many seek honor even in their disgrace. There are social circles in which a certain degree of dishonesty, immorality, intemperance, etc., is not at all considered dishonorable, and other circles in which it belongs to good breeding to be Churchless and unbelieving, in which they deride Christians as "devotees" ("*Betbrueder*" and "*Betschwestern*"), and boast that they "will not be intimi-

dated by the nursery-tale of religion." What such a disposition leaves of the idea of honor is a mere shadow; or better, a caricature of true honor. But even where the natural man does not go to these extremes, he can not get beyond striving after the honor that comes from man.

The Christian on the other hand knows and seeks another, higher honor; namely, the "honor that comes from the living God." In doing this he must often bear, for God's sake, the mockery and contempt of the perverted and blinded world. This is the natural consequence of his quitting the world. Christ says: "If ye were of the world, the world would love his own; but because ye are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you." (John xv, 19.) The disciple is not above his Master; if they hated and persecuted the Lord himself, his disciples must not expect better treatment. But that should not trouble and alarm them; they should rejoice and be exceeding glad; for great is their reward in heaven. (Matt. v, 11; 1 Peter iv, 14.) The Christian, however, should not deceive himself. There are cases in which the scorn and derision of the world are his just deserts. Therefore the Lord limits his disciples' joy, when men say all manner of evil against them, by the word "falsely." Hence the cause of derision and contempt is not necessarily a contradiction between the judgment of the regenerated and the unregenerated. The natural man knows that Christianity claims to elevate man to a higher stage of morality. Even though he does not believe in the sanctifying power of the gospel, he takes the Christian at his word, and judges him according to his claims. And how keen is the eye of the natural man, when he is looking for the Christian's moral errors and weaknesses! And he rejoices secretly when he finds that a Christian's life contradicts his confession; for he finds therein a corroboration of his

opinion that Christianity is mere hypocrisy and deception. Therefore the apostles so earnestly exhort to a holy life and discreet conversation, that the gospel be not "blasphemed." (Titus ii, 5; 1 Tim. vi, 1; James ii, 7; Rom. xiv, 16.)

Remark.—The duel, as a means of defending personal honor, can in no wise be justified from a Christian stand-point. It is based upon a turbid mixture of Christian and heathen elements. The Christian element is the high value placed upon honor and personality; the heathen element is the thought that the duel decides the question of right and wrong—that it is a divine judgment. For the idea of the mediæval judgments of God is based upon the heathen presupposition, that the temporal fate of the individual always corresponds to his moral worth or merits. If this thought is no longer connected with the modern duel, if rather the far baser thought is entertained that the evidence of personal courage proves the attacked honorableness, the modern duel is the more immoral and unchristian. If the evidence of personal courage were a proof of a man's honorableness, we should be obliged to call the greatest scoundrels honorable men, for they often do not lack personal courage. (According to Wuttke.)

§ 76. Continuation. Health.

The Christian receives health also, as well as possessions and honor, from God, as an unmerited gift of his mercy.

We are wont to call health the greatest of all temporal blessings, and it is proper we should do so; for what profit all other possessions, power, honor, riches, etc., if a diseased body depresses our mind and makes life itself a torture! Health is the indispensable condition of the enjoyment of all other earthly possessions. It is, indeed, the highest temporal possession. But not the highest of all possessions.

We can understand why the materialistic person who has abandoned all thought of a beyond and knows no life but this clings to life with the anguish of despair, obeys the laws of health with the greatest exactness, and sacrifices everything in order to prolong his temporal life as

much as possible; but the Christian must not make the care of his health the foremost care of his life. He will certainly not wantonly undermine it, but will "provide for the body," as it is proper. But where the duty of love demands it, he will not hesitate a moment in hazarding his health. Whoever wants to evade all self-denial and all exertion that might be detrimental to his health will find little opportunity for being of use to the kingdom of God and to fellow-man. Here the Lord's words are also applicable: "Whosoever will save his life, shall lose it; and whosoever will lose his life for my sake, shall find it." Did the apostles ever ask whether the exertion made in their calling or the abuse suffered at the hands of their enemies could destroy their health? Never. They willingly spent their powers in the service of their Master, and quietly left the care for their health to Him of whom they knew that without his will not a hair could fall from their head. This faith in the reign of Divine Providence, in whose hands the Christian feels safe, keeps him from anxious care for his life, and gives him courage to do his duty, even where his life must be hazarded. The Christian's highest possession is not temporal life, but love of God and communion with him. "Whether we live, we live unto the Lord; and whether we die, we die unto the Lord; whether we live therefore, or die, we are the Lord's."

Thus holy love elevates the Christian to inner liberty and independence with regard to all temporal possessions.

§77. The Suffering Christian.

The Christian's sufferings are (1) such as spring from the imitation of Christ itself, hence sufferings for the sake of God and Christ; and (2) such as have come into the world in consequence of sin, and afflict the ungodly and the godly alike. Of the latter, to which belong all kinds

of bodily and mental evils, as poverty, sickness, etc., we may distinguish two classes: (*a*) those which we must bear without personal guilt, on account of our organic connection with sinful mankind; and (*b*) those which are brought upon us by our personal guilt. Hence most sufferings are, in the first place, to be considered (as death itself, whose precursors they are) as the "reward of sin," as punishment. But under the reign of divine love they are to become means of grace for man. Viewed thus, they appear as means of chastening (Heb. xii, 5, etc.), purifying (Mal. iii, 3), and trying (Job i; James i, 12). They had the last named significance for Christ himself, of whom the Epistle to the Hebrews therefore says that he was "perfected through sufferings" (Heb. ii, 10), and that "he learned obedience by the things which he suffered" (Heb. v, 8).

But suffering comes to be a means of grace for us only when we permit ourselves to be directed and influenced by the Spirit of God. Where this is not the case, they have the opposite effect. A pious man of God properly said: "In every natural human heart there dwells a dismal spirit of disobedience, obstinacy, and rebellion toward God. This spirit lies deeply hidden like a sleeping giant, that is, as long as the sunshine of a happy life is shed around us; but let days of suffering come, let the tempests rage, let lightnings play and thunders roll for months and years in the clouded skies of God's guidance, and the sleeping giant will awake and raise his hand against the Almighty in heaven." (Tholuck.) Where this is the case—where the proud, impenitent *ego*, believing itself worthy of a better fate, contends with God instead of submitting to his will—man withdraws farther and farther from God, whether in obstinacy, whether in timidity, and sinks gradually into a state of hardness of heart. Hence it is not always true that

"necessity teaches to pray." Necessity also teaches to curse—to curse God the Almighty, to whose chastenings man will not subject himself. One thing alone can disarm this giant, this rebellious *ego;* namely, the knowledge of our guilt in the sight of God and the consciousness, "I am a poor sinner, and receive what my deeds merit."

Every true Christian has this consciousness. Though he may not be conscious of some definite sin by which he has brought suffering upon himself, he knows that he is beset with many infirmities—yea, even sins of which he must be cleansed—and that, however upright his endeavors are to serve God, his life is by no means so perfectly pure that he need not daily pray for forgiveness. This knowledge makes him as humble as a child. But with this feeling of personal unworthiness is combined a firm trust in God, that even in the darkest trials of life his thoughts are thoughts of love and peace. Hence he can say with child-like submission:

"Continue, Lord, to scourge. I'll dare to suffer
A thousand pangs—e'en death itself to scorn;
For it is death unto my sinful nature:
Such death is but a resurrection morn."

Even in such suffering as is brought upon him by the malignity of man, or as springs from purely physical causes, or from the concurrence of external circumstances which he can not control, the Christian recognizes the hand of his Heavenly Father, without whose will (permission), as he is fully convinced, not a hair can fall from his head. Hence it is natural that the first question of the suffering Christian is: What does God wish to tell me by this suffering? What is his purpose in this new affliction?

But besides this pedagogical purpose of promoting the Christian in his spiritual life, suffering often has the pur-

pose of glorifying God by the courage his children show in their faith, and the faithfulness they manifest in witnessing. This purpose is prominent in those sufferings specially which Christians must bear for the sake of their faith—in the sufferings for the sake of Christ and the gospel. These also can serve as a means of chastising, purifying, and testing those that believe; but their foremost purpose, nevertheless, is the glorification of God. Therefore they appear specially as "martyrdom;" that is, as witness for Christ. To what degree the martyrdom of the primitive Church accomplished this purpose is shown by the well-known words of one of the fathers, who said: "The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church."

In our present condition, suffering is as indispensable to the development of the Christian life as storm and rain are to the growth and development of plants. Therefore there is no Christian that knows nothing of days of suffering. Suffering, and especially suffering borne for Christ's sake, belongs so essentially to the whole of Christian life, that it often appears in Holy Scripture as the condition of our future blessedness. Paul says: "If we are children, we are heirs; heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ; if so be that we suffer with him, that we may be also glorified together." (Rom. viii, 17 and 18.)

Our Lord himself plainly tells his disciples to expect all kinds of suffering and tribulation (Matt. x, 34–39), and in Rev. vii, the saints in glory are represented as having "come out of great tribulation." (Comp. 1 Peter iv, 1 and 2; 12–19; Heb. xii, 5–11.) The words of the poet are true:

> "Whom the crown of life adorns,
> Wore on earth a crown of thorns."

Suffering and tribulation, however, seem at present, even to the Christian, to be not "joyous, but grievous;" and out of this grief many sore spiritual trials spring,

especially if we justly deserve the suffering, because in that case the pain of repentance is added to the suffering, and we are easily led to doubt our state of grace. But even when we suffer without personal guilt, we need special grace from God in order that we may not doubt his love and the wisdom of his guidance. (Ps. lxxiii, 2–19.) Hence suffering is a touch-stone of the genuineness and perfectness of man's conversion. (Matt. vii, 26 and 27; xiii, 20 and 21.)

The principal means for overcoming the temptations caused by suffering is prayer. James says: "Is any among you afflicted? let him pray." (James v, 13.) Prayer serves not only to increase patience and faithful trust in God, but also to conquer suffering itself. Inasmuch as the chastising, purifying, and testing in suffering has a pedagogical purpose, there is no reason why it should not cease as soon as this purpose is reached. But for accomplishing this, prayer is the best means; for what could be better adapted to bring man to a knowledge of his sins and mistakes, to awaken hunger and thirst for God, and to promote the faithful claiming of divine grace, than prayer, the intimate interchange of thought between God and man? Hence, by prayer itself the way is opened for man's being freed from his suffering, and the answer to the prayer will follow as soon as the divine purpose of suffering is accomplished.

But there are cases in which divine wisdom pursues purposes that can not be reached at once, but only in a longer period of time—perhaps only in the course of the entire development of Christian life. Thus we can best understand the long years of suffering that many pious Christians must endure; for example, chronic diseases, life-long poverty, etc. Of the many cases that could here be cited, we mention only one, that of the apostle Paul, who, according to his own statement, was troubled for

years, and perhaps until his death, with severe suffering, which he called "a thorn in the flesh," and which he plainly traced to a "messenger of Satan to buffet him." (2 Cor. xii, 7–9.) Whether now we think of this "thorn in the flesh" as bodily suffering—for example, a disease of the eye (for which view there are many strong arguments), or some severe psychical affliction—this is certain, that the great apostle of the heathen, who healed so many sick, and even brought the dead to life, was not freed from this affliction despite his thrice repeated prayer, but received the answer from God: "My grace is sufficient for thee; for my strength is made perfect in weakness." And this answer is sufficient for this great man of God, so that he triumphantly exclaims: "Most gladly, therefore, will I rather glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may rest upon me." Here the true Christian mind is most beautifully revealed, the unreserved subordination of all personal wishes to the will of God. And it is further remarkable that the apostle now recognizes the divine purpose in his severe affliction, and definitely states it by saying repeatedly that this thorn in the flesh was given him, "lest he should be exalted above measure through the abundance of the revelations." But if the great apostle of the heathen needed such suffering to keep him from overexaltation of self, should we wonder if in the case of ordinary Christians God occasionally uses some long suffering in order to preserve and test their faith?

In what has been said, the answer has been indicated to the question that is debated so much lately, to what extent a Christian is justified in expecting a sure cure from sickness through faithful prayer (faith cure). To be brief, we sum up the answer in a few principal points.

1. Above all, we must adhere to the fact that God can suddenly, and without medical aid, cure the most

serious sickness, and that he often does it, even in this day, upon the faithful prayer of his children.

2. It can not be denied that the Christians of to-day often trust more in the ability of the physician than in God's help, and thus sin against God. (2 Chron. xvi, 12.)

3. On the other hand, the assertion that no Christian needs become sick, that all sickness is from the devil, and that Christ will cure all sickness of the body just as certainly as he will cure all sickness of the soul, is wrong and unscriptural.

4. Whoever believes that redemption in Christ Jesus includes the freeing of the believers from all sickness, even for the present course of the world, must consequently advance a step farther, and suppose (as it has often been done) that those who believe can even now be freed from death, of which sickness is a companion and precursor. For as long as Christians must die, there can, strictly speaking, be no thought of an abolition of sickness.

5. The opinion that a sound conversion and devotion of the sick person to God is the indispensable condition of all healing by prayer can not be proven by Scripture. Christ and the apostles nowhere placed this condition. They simply demanded of the sick one the faith in the possibility of their helping him. (Matt. viii, 2; Mark ix, 24.) But this faith did not necessarily include real conversion, as is plainly shown by the case of the ten lepers. (Luke xvii, 11–19.) Besides, according to Scripture, miraculous cures and miracles in general were destined to be only means for reaching the divine aim of man's conversion and sanctification. This divine order of salvation is reversed by the above-named opinion, inasmuch as conversion and sanctification are made the condition of convalescense, hence are degraded to mere means, while that which God intended to be the means, the recovery from bodily sickness, is elevated to the purpose proper.

6. The Christian must never forget that man's chief care is not the sustaining of temporal life, but the saving of his immortal soul, and that he who resignedly and trustingly bears the suffering and sickness sent by God, and even in the darkest hours can say with his Lord and Master, "Not my will, but thine be done," is unquestionably far above him, morally, who finds suffering unendurable, and wishes to force his recovery—which conduct in nearly all cases springs from a wrong valuation of temporal things, especially of health.

7. As there are cases, as shown above, in which God wishes to "perfect" his children "through suffering," the Christian has no right to pray unconditionally for the healing of a sick person, unless he is convinced by the Holy Ghost that in the respective case his petition is in harmony with the will of God. Where this conviction is wanting, it behooves him to subordinate his own will to the will of God, and to say: "Nevertheless, not what I will, but what thou wilt." This is likely the reason why Paul did not heal his co-worker Epaphroditus by the power of his faithful prayer, as he was wont to do in other cases, but committed the matter to God, and accepted his co-worker's recovery as a special gift of God's hand. (Phil. ii, 27–30.)

§ 78. The Christian in Temptations and Trials.

Before we pass over to the consideration of the temptations proper of the Christian, we must briefly mention the temptations to good which God sends to the pious in order to test, purify, and strengthen their faith. (Gen. xxii, 1.) These well-meant tests do not, strictly speaking, belong here, and hence are as a rule not called temptations, but "tests," although in certain circumstances they can be the source of real temptations. Thus,

for example, sickness sent by God is a test for me, but not yet a real temptation to evil. The latter takes place when in sickness the desire arises within me to become impatient, faint-hearted, or to murmur against God. The author of this temptation, however, is not God, but my own flesh or Satan. Therefore James says: "Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God; for God can not be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man; but every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed." (James i, 13 and 14.)

Temptation proper, therefore, consists in man's being drawn away and enticed to evil by his own lust (the flesh), the world, or Satan; and its purpose is no other than to precipitate man into ruin by sin. But the character of temptation can vary greatly. There are enticing temptations, in which man is cheerful; and threatening temptations, in which man is dejected. In the former he is drawn away and enticed to sin, laughing and arrogant; in the latter he permits himself to be frightened and alarmed to sin by misery, dejection, and faint-heartedness.

The manner in which sin is born by temptation is essentially the same in the case of the Christian as in the case of the natural man (see § 22); but temptation has even a more earnest import for the Christian than for the unconverted. The latter lives in estrangement from God, however blameless his character may be in the sight of men. A new actual sin may indeed make his conversion more difficult, and enchain him more firmly as the slave of sin; but the fundamental bent of his life and of his position to God remains the same as before. Not so in the case of the regenerated. He has returned to communion with God, and has in the very center of his being been changed by regeneration to a "new man," while the residue of the sinful impulses and desires of the "old

man" has been forced out to the periphery of the natural life. Temptation now appeals to the "old man" by exciting evil lust, and thereby trying to gain entrance again into the free personal life, to carry the will along to sin, and thus to ruin the new man, and, if possible, to kill him completely. But through the new spiritual life that he has received the regenerated person has the power to overcome temptation. John says: "His seed remaineth in him; and he can not sin, because he is born of God." But if he sin nevertheless, the guilt of his sin will for that very reason be the greater, and its effect the more fatal; for he sins against faith—that is, against better knowledge and conscience, and against the experienced gracious influences of the Holy Ghost. This explains why the sins of the regenerated bring about a state of hardness of heart, or of irremediable falling away, more rapidly and certainly than those of the unregenerated. (Heb. vi, 4–6.)

As the author of temptation, holy Scripture designates our own flesh (James i, 14; Gal. v, 17), the world (1 John v, 19), and Satan: the flesh, inasmuch as it tries through its lusts and desires to destine us to resolutions and deeds that are opposed to the will of God and the demands of holy love; the world, "inasmuch as men endeavor to make us companions in their sins—as the worldly customs and usages contain much that is not right, and that yet demand of every one that he observe them—and as the possessions, enjoyments, and pleasures of the world entice us; Satan, inasmuch as he not only employs the flesh and the world as his tools, but also in a special, mysterious manner causes thoughts, desires, and inclinations to arise in man, which can be explained neither as the impulses of the flesh, nor as the influence of the world." (Palmer.) The question whether an advanced Christian who lives in perfect love of his Savior

can yet be tempted by his own lust (the flesh), or only by the world and Satan, is of no practical import. For, in the first place, it is extremely difficult, except in extraordinarily satanic temptations—yea, even impossible—to know with certainty whether a sinful thought or desire is begotten in us by Satan directly, or rose to our consciousness out of the dark recesses of the natural life; and, secondly, it really matters little from where the temptation comes—the only practical question is, how we conduct ourselves toward it, whether we combat and conquer with full determination, or are overcome by it.

Trials which consist in the Christian's faith being threatened and shaken by doubt and distrust are a special kind of threatening temptation. Of these, two classes may be distinguished: (1) Trials in which the Christian is alarmed by doubts concerning himself and his religious experience. The question, "Are you a child of God?" which the tempter suggests to him (comp. Matt. iv, 3), disturbs him greatly. His entire past life seems suddenly to be clothed in night and darkness. He doubts the sincerity of his repentance, the genuineness of his conversion, his regeneration, his sanctification—in short, his whole state of grace. Such trials are frequent, especially in the beginning of the Christian life, but can also beset experienced Christians, and often serve to bring the Christian to a deeper knowledge of self, and to spur him on to greater earnestness in the struggle for sanctification. (2) Trials that are directed against faith in God; that is, in the existence of God, or also in the love of God and the reign of his providence. Trials of this kind are specially severe, because, when faith in God is shaken, the entire foundation of Christian life is made to totter. When the Christian doubts only himself and his state of grace, it is yet possible for him to take refuge to God in prayer, and gain peace again; but when he is robbed of

faith in God and his love, where is there a hold remaining to keep him from being precipitated into the abyss of despair? Therefore the sufferings of Christ reached their climax in that moment when the sin of mankind, which he had taken upon himself, robbed him of the possibility of looking up in faith to his Father; not till then the terrible cry was wrested from his troubled heart: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" Similar trials were experienced by pious men of God in the Old and the New Testament, although upon a smaller scale. Elijah, the mighty reformer of Israel, broke down under the burden of such a trial when he saw that even the wonderful revelation of God on Carmel had not been able to effect a lasting conversion of the erring people of Israel. (1 Kings xix.) John the Baptist experienced the dismal power of such trials when, from his cell in the castle of Machærus, he sent to the Lord and asked: "Art thou he that should come, or do we look for another?" (Matt. xi, 3.) It is generally known what terrible trials Luther had in the castle of Wartburg; and similar experiences have been made by the best and most pious Christians of all times.

Temptation, as well as suffering, belongs essentially to the sum total of Christian life. There is no state of grace, be it ever so high, that makes temptation impossible, although with the progress of Christian life they assume a more mental character, and temptation to gross sins vanishes more and more. But as long as we are in the time of our test, we must not expect to become wholly free from temptation. For Christ himself "was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin." (Heb. iv, 15.) Hence the petition in our Lord's Prayer, "Lead us not into temptation," is not to be considered as a petition for total warding off of temptation. The Christian has as little right to pray for total freeing from temptation as a soldier has to pray, "Lead me not into battle," or the

sailor, "Lead me not upon deep waters!" In explaining the petition, "Lead us not into temptation," it must be remembered, above all, that there is a difference between "tempting" and "leading into temptation." God may permit us to get into positions and circumstances in which temptation approaches us; but temptation itself can never proceed from him. "God led his Son into the desert, but the devil tempted him." The petition embraces only—(1) The confession that it is yet possible for us to be tempted and to be overcome by temptation; (2) The petition that God keep us from such positions, circumstances, and fates which could become perilous to us in our individuality by offering opportunities for sinning; in other words, that he keep us from temptations which we are not competent to overcome—a petition to which Paul specially encourages us with the words: "God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that ye are able; but will with the temptation also make a way to escape, that ye may be able to bear it." (1 Cor. x, 13.) (3) The promise that we will not wantonly enter into temptation ourselves; for we should contradict ourselves in a queer manner if we prayed, "Lead us not into temptation," and then sought opportunity for sinning, instead of avoiding all such opportunities.

The Christian overcomes temptation:

1. By avoiding the opportunity. "We should not imprison ourselves between four walls, thinking that back of these walls the world and the flesh are less powerful than beyond them; we should rather stand and fight where God places us by our office and calling. But thousands fall into sin because they do not avoid opportunity when they could avoid it." (Palmer.) When sin approaches us, however, on our path of duty, we should combat it.

2. By watching and praying for divine aid. Christ says to his disciples: "Watch and pray that ye enter not into temptation." It is of the greatest importance that we recognize and combat sin in its beginning; for the more firmly it seizes upon our soul-life, the more difficult will it be to crush it. In doing this, we must not forget to pray God for power to triumph; for "with our own power naught is done—we soon are lost completely." Nevertheless, we must not sit idly by and wait till God deliver us from temptation, but must co-operate with him in overcoming it.

3. By moral battle. James says: "Resist the devil, and he will flee from you." He alone can count upon divine assistance who strives for the victory with the full power of his will, faithfully using all possible means. (1 Cor. xxi, 3; Eph. vi, 13, etc.; Heb. xii, 14.) The Christian's armor for this battle is described by Paul. (Eph. vi, 13, etc.)

To him that overcomes temptations they are a means of strengthening his faith and promoting his spiritual life. For the good will grows stronger with every victorious battle, by the same law by which sinful desires increase in the degree that they are satisfied. Therefore James says: "Blessed is the man that endureth temptation; for when he is tried, he shall receive the crown of life." (James i, 12.)

§ 79. Work and Recreation in the Christian's Life.

Although seeking "the kingdom of God, and his righteousness" ought to be man's chief care in this life, every one, being a member of the great human family, has, besides this his heavenly calling, an earthly calling to fulfill, if he wishes really to meet his divine life-pur-

pose. The earthly and the heavenly calling do not contradict each other; they rather form a whole that must not be separated.

Thousands, indeed, are so completely absorbed in their earthly calling that they have neither strength nor time to seek the kingdom of God. To them their earthly calling is the grave of their eternal blessedness. But that exclusive devotion to the heavenly calling that we find, not only among the anchorites of the old Church and in many forms of monkery, but also in the idleness of many Protestant fanatics of the present day, is no less a gross error; for man is created to labor.

Labor has not come to be man's lot in consequence of the fall; even in Paradise God placed man into the garden "to dress it, and to keep it." And after the fall his laboring "in the sweat of his face" came to be not only a punishment, but a means of education. No one that has a sound body and can work has a right to lounge around, the millionaire no more than the day-laborer. Idleness is the beginning of all vices. Therefore Paul says: "If any will not work, neither shall he eat."

In ancient heathendom labor, especially taxing physical labor, was exclusively left to the slaves; the free man considered it a disgrace. It was left for Christianity to make labor honorable again. Christ himself worked up to his thirtieth year at his father's trade as carpenter; and Paul, the great apostle of the heathen, who during his apostolic labors earned a part of his livelihood working at his trade as a tent-maker, most earnestly exhorts the Christians in Ephesus "to labor, working with their hands the thing which is good, that they may have to give to him that needeth."

The Christian should place his earthly calling also into the Lord's service. "Whatsoever ye do, do it heartily, as to the Lord, and not unto men." Where this is done

the work in our earthly calling is also sanctified, and the faithful, conscientious fulfillment of the lowest duties of our calling comes to be a service of God. From this point of view the Christian does not consider the advancement of modern trade-culture a curse of our century, as it is often done, but a real progress. Machinery does not make him uneasy; he rejoices that man is able to bring the powers of nature into his service; for God destined him to have dominion over nature. And the contracting for labor of the present is to him morally higher than mediæval servile labor, for it corresponds better to the idea of Christian freedom. Even the striving for acquisition and trade opposition, the endeavors of the manufacturer to make his factory flourish, to produce cheaply, and to procure a wide market for his products—in short, the whole of modern business industry—seems to the Christian (leaving sin out of consideration, which clings to all human enterprise) to be the fulfillment of a moral life-purpose. And whoever strives uprightly to serve God by true diligence and conscientiousness in his earthly calling, is, as Luther expresses it, "on a straighter road to heaven than the monk in his contemplative life and with all his self-chosen holiness."

But as, in the economy of nature, God lets the stillness of night follow upon the tumultuous life of day, even so in the Christian's life professional labors must alternate with rest and recreation. This change is not only enjoyment for the Christian, but an absolute necessity on account of his sensual nature, which is unable to endure uninterrupted activity of the same kind. We must, therefore, consider also the Christian's recreation.

To this belongs not only total abstinence from all activity, but also recreation in its wider sense, which, by a mere change of activity, gives the organism opportunity to gain new strength for fulfilling the professional duties.

Of the various forms of recreation we mention, above all others, that of religious celebration, the purpose of which is not so much the strengthening of the outer, but rather of the inner man. The latter, as we know, is accomplished by claiming divine grace through faith. Religious celebration must, therefore, not be restricted to rest from earthly professional labor, but must at the same time be a lifting up of the spirit to God, an intercourse with God, a resting in God. To this end the Christian Church, since the day of its founding, has celebrated the first day of the week, Sunday, as the "Lord's-day." Even for the natural man, who knows nothing of a rest in God, it is a recreation, yea, an injunction of physical necessity, that after six days of labor there follow a day of rest; but for the Christian, Sunday has a much higher significance. He rejoices not only at having a day of rest from earthly professional labor, but rejoices far more at rest in God and the fellowship of them that believe. Sunday is to be a day of pleasure, not a burden, for the Christian. He should joyfully anticipate it, "as in the weary toil of every-day life one joyfully anticipates an evening's rest."

When Jesus said to the Pharisees that the Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath, his assertion contains, on the one hand, a decided disapproval of the externally lawful and Pharisaic observance of the Sabbath; but, on the other hand, the express and definite acknowledgment of the fact that the Sabbath was ordained of God himself for the good of man, and that man can, therefore, not desecrate and disregard it without harm to his soul. The Christian custom of celebrating Sunday instead of the Jewish Sabbath is justified, on the one hand, by the fact that God himself signalized the first day of the week by the most extraordinary facts of grace, as by the resurrection of Christ, and by pouring out the Holy Ghost; on the other hand, by the fact that the

establishing of the celebration of Sunday must be traced back to the divinely inspired apostles, as it can be shown that it reaches back to the apostolic age.

In regard to the question, what activities are allowed on Sunday, and what prohibited, it is impossible to draw a universally valid boundary-line; in numerous cases the decision must rather be given by the divinely enlightened conscience of the individual. Christ himself said plainly that works of love and mercy are allowed on Sunday. For the rest, the rule can be established that the more an action interrupts our own collectedness and prayerful mood, the more it disturbs our fellow-men in their quiet observance of the day, or the more it wrongs the conscience of the weak, the less is it allowed. (Rom. xiv, 5–7 and 15; comp. 1 Cor. viii, 10–12.)

Among the other forms of recreation, we mention play as the free manifestation of the physical and mental powers that does not immediately serve our calling or any other practical purpose. This belongs especially to childhood. But for the child, play is not only recreation but actual self-culture; for by play, in which the child tries to copy nature or to imitate the practical professional pursuits of grown people, it unconsciously, and in a most pleasant way, develops its dormant faculties. To prohibit a child to play is to deprive it of one of the greatest enjoyments of childhood. In youth play is more and more forced back by earnest preparation for the duties of life; but even here this form of recreation ought not to be undervalued, and is, at all events, preferable to doing nothing; for "idleness is the beginning of all vices." Even we who are grown and engaged in the full work of our life-calling are in need of play as a means of recreation and relaxation. In play "we grant those powers rest which were immediately taken into demand by our professional labors, and let those powers 'play' which

were latent and unemployed." The scholar uses a leisure hour to "play" the piano or the flute, or to "play" with his flowers, etc. In this change the enjoyment and the recreation consist.

From a moral point of view, therefore, there is no objection to play, even when indulged in by grown persons, in so far as it is made a mere means of recreation. On the other hand, it is decidedly to be condemned as soon as it is made one's proper object, and the time and strength devoted to it that belong properly to his professional labor. From this it naturally follows that play must never become a passion; for whatever I do passionately is not done merely for the sake of recreation, but comes to be the end proper of my actions.

But in judging play from the stand-point of morality, we must consider not only the time and strength devoted to play, but the character of the play itself. The question arises, which plays are compatible with a conscientious fulfilling of the Christian's life-purpose, and which must be shunned by the Christian on account of their unchristian character. But as this question will be treated in the last part of this book in speaking of "social intercourse," we shall defer a further consideration of it till later on (§ 90).

III.

The Consummation of the Christian Life.

§ 80. The Christian's Position to Life and Death.

The proper position of the Christian to life and death is described by Paul in the words: "None of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself. For whether we live, we live unto the Lord; and whether we die, we die unto the Lord; whether we live therefore, or die, we are the Lord's." (Rom. xiv, 7 and 8.)

Genuine Christian preparation for death is equally far from being a heathen, worldly fear of death, the reverse side of which is the morbid pleasure of life, and from being an ascetic, overly pious longing for death, the reverse side of which is a morbid weariness of life.

1. From a wrong valuation of the present life as the only real life, beside which the uncertain and unsafe future life is hardly considered worthy of notice, spring the anxious endeavors of the children of this world to sustain the temporal life as long as possible, and that haste in the enjoyment of earthly pleasures and possessions which is expressed in the Epicurean maxim: "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." In this consists the morbid pleasure of life. The natural reverse of this is fear of death.

For whoever expects all his enjoyment and happiness in this world must necessarily tremble in the anticipation of that moment in which he is to lose with life all that his heart clings to. We do not wonder, therefore, that many cling to temporal life with the anguish

of despair. Besides this, the dread of death is enhanced, as a rule, by a more or less distinct sense of guilt in the sight of God. For, however much a man may disregard the beyond, there are moments in which conscience makes itself heard in the midst of the dissipations of worldly pleasure, and adds to the natural fear of death the sting of the fear of judgment.

The Christian, on the other hand, regards the present life as a time of preparation for the life to come. He familiarizes himself to the thought of death, he looks constantly toward eternity, and is ready every moment for his Lord's coming. Therefore Paul calls the Christian's life, even on earth, a "conversation in heaven." But we do not say by this that the Christian disregards the present life; he rather considers it a special favor of God if he is granted a good old age, "because then a longer period of time is given him to mature for eternity." He also knows that he has a mission to fulfill on earth that no other person can fulfill for him; and although he considers the life beyond infinitely higher and more glorious than the present, yet he considers the present also to have a relative value, and properly rejoices at the sphere of activity that God has assigned to him among his own family and his contemporaries. Hence it is not wrong, but rather truly human, and therefore Christian, if, for example, a father wishes to live till he knows that his family is protected against the wants of life and brought into the paths of peace; or if a young man wishes that he may not be called away before he has accomplished his earthly life-purpose. "Take me not away in the midst of my days," is a Biblical prayer. (Psa. cii, 24.) Likewise a pious Christian may entertain the ardent desire to live on earth till he sees a fond hope fulfilled, or an idea realized for which he has perhaps labored for many years, like the pious Simeon,

who, after long and faithful waiting, held the infant Christ in his arms, and exclaimed: "Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace, according to thy word; for mine eyes have seen thy salvation." (Luke ii, 29, 30; compare Gen. xlv, 28.) Such a wish is fully justified; but the Christian must not and will not demand its fulfillment, but, fully convinced that God knows better than he what will be best for him and his family, will at all times humbly subject himself to God's decree, and say: "Not my will, but thine, be done."

2. The reverse of wrong dependence upon life, as we learned to know it in the morbid pleasure of life and worldly fear of death, is weariness of life and overly pious longing for death, which can spring from various physical and moral causes. (*a*) Weariness of life is often the consequence of a derangement of the nervous system, brought about by gross sensual excesses, or also by an unnatural mode of life, wrong practice of ascetics, etc. This is undoubtedly true of that condition of the soul which, in the mediæval ages, was called *akedia* (carelessness.) This condition (which was to be found especially among the monks who devoted themselves to a contemplative life without having the strength and the calling thereto) consisted in a total indifference and loss of interest in whatever otherwise is dear and precious to man, and often even in an actual aversion to life. Although to-day this appears comparatively seldom as a lasting condition of the soul, we meet with it often enough as a passing mood, not only in cloisters, but also outside them in the various social circles. As weariness of life is here based upon a disorder of the physical and mental organism (hypochondria), it is to be considered as a physical disease, and must be combated by dietetic means (wholesome food, systematic exercise, etc.), as well as by moral exertions. (*b*) Long-continued suffering, severe misfor-

tunes, etc., also may in certain circumstances be the cause of weariness of life. In this case, however, man is not really weary of life itself, but of life in the present circumstances. He would enjoy unclouded happiness in life, and because that is not granted him he is disgusted with life itself. He would rather die than forego the demands he makes of life. Hence in this case weariness of life is only another form of morbid pleasure of life. (*c*) But there is also a weariness of life and a longing for death that have an essentially religious character. The more clearly love of the world and the slavery of worldly lust are recognized as the dominant form of the sinful state of the natural man the greater is the danger of going to the opposite extreme of avoiding all contact with the world for fear of being polluted, and of feeling that life itself in this sinful earth is a heavy burden. On this is based that extreme aversion to the world and its ways that sentimental natures often manifest, who in their fanatic idealism misjudge the relative value of earthly life, and to whom the world is but a "vale of tears" out of which they longingly await death to deliver them. All these various forms of weariness of life and longing for death condemn themselves, inasmuch as they deprive man of all power and enthusiasm for pursuing his earthly calling and his moral purpose in the world, and thus make him unfit for this life.

Between these morbid appearances of weariness of life and longing for death and the Christian preparation for death, there is an infinitely great difference. It is true that to every true Christian the life beyond seems infinitely greater and more glorious than this life, and that the burden of work and the many battles and adversities of this life may occasionally awaken in him the longing for heaven which Paul expresses by the words: "I have a desire to depart, and to be with Christ, which is far better." (Phil.

i, 23.) But this longing for heaven, which is the source of many of our most beautiful hymns, does not make the Christian indifferent to the duties of this life; it rather spurs him on to greater faithfulness, even as also the apostle immediately turns his eyes away from heaven again to earth and its duties, saying: "Nevertheless, to abide in the flesh is more needful for you." And who has ever pursued his earthly calling with greater faithfulness and self-sacrifice than he? Such a longing for heaven, which does not spring from a faithless weariness of life, but from the vivid hope of eternal life, the incomparable glory of which makes this life with all its pleasures and enjoyments seem poor and empty, must not be called sentimental fanaticism; it is rather the natural expression of a sound, Christian life of faith. As it would be unnatural, if a young man who has for many years been far from his home, should not occasionally long for home; or if a soldier, who has served for months in the enemies' country, should not long for the moment when peace shall be declared, and he shall return to his home circle: even so it would be unnatural if a Christian could live in this cold, loveless world, year after year, without ever feeling a desire for being with Christ and in his eternal home, to rest from the battles and troubles of this life. This longing for heaven can hardly be separated from that vivid faith that sees in the invisible world the eternal realities, of which this world is but a faint shadow.

§ 81. Death and Eternal Life.

In § 35 it was shown that the Holy Scriptures have a more comprehensive idea of death than the mere separation of body and soul, which is ordinarily the import of the term death; to them death is the separation of man from God, the source of all true and eternal life. According to the Biblical view, therefore, the power of death

is broken in conversion and regeneration. Christ says: "He that heareth my word, and believeth on him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation, but is passed from death unto life." (John v, 24; comp. John vi, 47, viii, 51; xi, 25 and 26.) Spiritual death is conquered by the Christian life, and eternal death can have no power over him that is one with Christ. (Rev. ii, 11; 1 Cor. xv, 54–57.) Only the death of the body—that is, the separation of soul and body, and the decomposition of the latter—retains an earnest significance, even for the Christian, as the tribute that he must pay to sin.

Even though to him death is not a transition from spiritual to eternal death, as it is for the unregenerated, but a transition from the state of trial and preparation to that of consummation and glorification, we must guard against the delusion that the death-bed of every Christian must be a place of glad triumph without a struggle. "Death is not child's play," not even for the Christian. Death is, even to him, the "last enemy" that he has to conquer. There are, indeed, cases in which Christians joyfully anticipate the hour of death, like a child its return home, and depart from this earth in the full triumph of faith. But this is to be considered a special favor of God that is not granted to every Christian. Not only lukewarm, undecided Christians, to whom the death-struggle is to serve as a purifier, but such also whose life witnessed that they loved the Lord with all their heart, are often disturbed in the hour of death by terrible tortures of anxiety and doubt, brought about by certain bodily conditions, which, by means of the nervous system, call forth anxious emotions and moods. It seems that Christ has vanished; they can not find him. "Anxiety about their sin mingles with the psychical feeling of anxiety, and partakes of the strength and dreadfulness of

the latter." It seems that the prince of darkness brings all his power and skill into play, in order to drag the dying Christian into the depths of despair. Therefore we find in most Church liturgies prayers for aid and preservation in the hour of death, and the prayer is fully appropriate: "O Lord, I humbly pray of thee, grant that my death triumphant be." But however great the Christian's struggles may be in the hour of death, temporal death can be but a transition to eternal life, if Christ has been born and formed in man through his spirit. For as damnation, or hell, even so is eternal life, or heaven, not only a definite abode for departed spirits, but also a quality of character to which man develops in the course of his earthly life (§ 35). And as the Christian possesses eternal life even on earth (John v, 24), but limited and bound by his corporeality, the destruction of this limiting element by death can result only in the unhindered, glorious development of this life in immediate communion with God.

Hence it can properly be said that to the Christian death signifies not only a punishment, but also a redemption. For not until then is the new man freed from corporeality, which was weakened by sin, and in which the old man finds his last hold; now temptation, and hence the possibility of falling, is past; now the glorified spirit is taken away from this sinful world and its afflictions, and received into eternal rest, where, in perfect, unclouded communion with God, it enjoys the entire fullness of blessedness, which his finite nature was not able to grasp. Not until then does the Christian life reach its ultimate consummation. The Christian is fully transformed to the image of God, and Christ's words in his interceding prayer are now literally fulfilled: "That they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us." "And the glory which thou gavest

me, I have given them; that they may be one, even as we are one: I in them and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one." (John xvii, 21–23.)

"An absolute communion, an unbounded commingling of divinity and humanity, is expressed in these words. There is such intimacy expressed that, like in two coinciding triangles, there can be no point in the divinity found that does not most intimately coincide with man, and no point in man that does not most intimately coincide with God, in position, feeling, and recognizing penetration. Here is that perfection desired by Paul in his hymnic praise of love: "Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as also I am known." (1 Cor. xiii, 12.) Here there is nothing obscure and enigmatical to unravel; here the hidden and secret truth appears, being evidenced by purest light. The divine and the human horizon coincide completely."* This is eternal life.

* Culmann, Christian Ethics, p. 342.

Second Division.

THE MOLDING OF SOCIETY BY THE CHRISTIAN LIFE.

SOCIAL ETHICS.

§ 82. Summary.

Each individual is a member of the great organism of humanity, and each individual human life is, as it were, a link in the wonderfully interwoven history of mankind. No one brings himself into existence; and, since the creation of the first parents, no one goes forth from God's hand as a self-conscious personality. Every one owes his existence to the parents that gave him birth, every one develops as a member of a whole (of the family and of society in the wider sense of the term), from an unconscious babe to a self-conscious free personality. Every one has from earliest childhood an uninterrupted, intimate reciprocal relation to the whole of human society; a reciprocal relation without which a general normal development of his dormant powers and faculties would be utterly impossible. The various social organisms (family, Church, State) must not be traced back to the mere caprice of an individual, or considered to be the product of an agreement by contract; they are rather based upon an order of nature established by God himself. Paul says: "There is no power but of God. The powers that be are ordained of God." (Rom. xiii, 1.)

This is true above all of the family, as the beginning and fundamental form of the entire social life. It can

be shown that the larger social organisms, Church and State, developed from the family. And the family is ever the basis of all social education for State as well as Church life. Hence the derangement and moral corruption of family life must necessarily result in the corruption of Church and State, while, on the other hand, it is possible to reform and build up a corrurpted nationality, as long as family life remains relatively pure and sound.

As every individual for himself, so every social organism has a moral mission to fulfill. Hence the various social organisms can be considered moral collective subjects, the general purpose of which is realized by the individuals, upon whom, as members of the family, the Church, or the State, devolves the duty of co-operating in the moral elevation and glorification of the whole of human society, in the meantime never losing sight of their own moral perfecting.

As we saw in § 27, not only the life of the individual, but also the social life, has been perverted and generally deranged by sin. And just so in the social intercourse of mankind, sin, in the form of selfishness, celebrates its most dismal triumphs. It is the mission of Christianity to lift the fallen human race out of its moral degradation, and lead it toward its divine destination. How this is accomplished in the individual was shown § 36–80; it now remains to show what form the social life in the family, in the State, and in the Church shall assume on the basis of the Christian life of the individuals and under the influence of the Christian Spirit.

I.

THE FAMILY.

1. MATRIMONY.

§ 83. IDEA AND NATURE OF MATRIMONY.

MATRIMONY is conditioned by the natural oppositeness of the sexes, which, in their peculiarity, are mutual complements, inasmuch as "it seems that the productive endowment and greater self-dependence peculiar to man, combined with the receptive and dependent nature of woman, is intended to present man entire." Upon this relation, which is not improperly called the relation of polarity, is based not only that instinctive desire of each sex for completion by the other sex, but also that fervency and that happiness of conjugal love, the intensity of which can never be equaled by friendship.

When spiritualistic rigorism finds a desecration of conjugal love in the fact that it contains a sensual moment; when it ignores the natural side of conjugal love, and places the significance of marriage solely in the pure spiritual (*gemüthlich-geistig*) association of husband and wife—as if sexual connection did not properly belong to matrimony, or were only to be tolerated for the sake of propagating the race—it not only suspects God's order of nature (Gen. i, 28), but entirely misjudges the specific character of conjugal love. "So-called Platonic love between man and woman has a character entirely different from conjugal love, the peculiarity of which is based upon the unity of the spiritual and the natural." (Martensen.)

But it is more improper still to ignore the spiritual

side of matrimony entirely, and to restrict it to the natural sexual association, thus placing human sexual love upon a plane with the animal instinct for propagation, whereby the possibility and duty of a moral regulation and control of sexual relations is made doubtful. This view of naturalistic cynicism, which lowers man to animal, and wholly divests matrimony of its moral character, places itself beyond the domain of the moral, and hence does not deserve further consideration.

According to what has been said, we designate matrimony the lawfully sanctioned exclusive life- and love-association of two persons of opposite sex. (Matt. xix, 5.) The moral character of matrimony is based upon the fact that the mutual devotion and love of husband and wife are moral; that is, that they are based not only on a sensual liking, but on the knowledge of the moral worth of the person loved, upon the harmony of related souls. Such love does not, like mere sensual passion, vanish with the youth and beauty of husband or wife; it is rather of eternal duration, and the longer the relation exists, the purer and stronger does this love grow. Casual dissonance in the thoughts, feelings, and wishes of husband and wife disappear more and more in the course of time, mutual esteem increases with closer acquaintance, love is purified and tested in the school of life, the lives of husband and wife approach each other more and more, and they finally come to be of "one heart and of one soul" in the full sense of the term, as we often find it the case with old people, who, after a happy married life of many years, are, in the evening of their life, attached to each other with a love so tender and devoted, so true and pure, as it could impossibly have been in the first days of their married life.

Such matrimony is necessarily monogamous; that is, it can exist between two persons only. As it consists in

the mutual devotion of the whole personality of husband and wife, it excludes every other similar relation. "If you desire a whole heart, give a whole life." Polygamy is a sinful distortion of matrimony. The esteem of woman, which is essential to true love, is incompatible with it. The wife is a slave, and takes the position of a prostitute toward the husband. The idea of the mutual faithfulness of husband and wife is almost without meaning here. Naturally man also distrusts his wives; therefore their seclusion in harems. The development of a healthy family life also is made impossible by jealousy among the wives, and the emnity among the half-brothers and half-sisters, the children of different women. Hence it is not surprising that the custom of polygamy was removed wherever the spirit of Christianity gained dominion. For although it is nowhere in the New Testament expressly and generally prohibited (1 Tim. iii, 2 and 12, and Tit. i, 6 refer only to bishops), it is vanquished and made impossible by the fact that Christianity brings matrimony, which was deranged by sin, back to its true moral significance, and lifts woman up to the enjoyment of equal moral rights with man, which is due to her as a joint heir of eternal blessedness. (1 Cor. vii, 4.)

The sinful degeneration of mankind is revealed in the undermining and decomposing of the domain of matrimonial and family life by the various forms of unchastity, by adultery, fornication, rape, pederasty, and all the various forms of sexual excesses, which feed like cancers upon the heart of social life, because they poison its source, the family, from which all other social organisms proceed. Christianity tries to check this process of decomposition (which manifests itself not only in actually existing unchastity, but also in the doctrine of "free love" voiced by socialistic and materalistic

benefactors of the world), by opposing the virtue of chastity to the sin of unchastity.

Chastity does not consist in the ascetic rejection of all sexual communion, but in recognizing the sacredness of the divinely ordained sexual relation, and in placing the bodily impulse under the dominion of the moral will, and making it subservient to the moral idea. As opposed to the actually existing carnally selfish degeneration of the sexual impulses chastity in "thoughts, words, and deeds" can develop only in connection with the sense of shame which instinctively shrinks from all contact with that which is impure and unchaste. In association with fellow-man this is manifested as modesty in clothing and in conduct. Upon the chaste disposition of the individuals depend "good manners," as well as the keeping matrimony and family life holy in Christian society generally, and therewith the possibility of gradually conquering the sinful degeneration of the sexual relation, and of opening a way for a truly moral view and mode of matrimonial life.

Every page of the history of the Christian Church bears witness to this fact. Wherever Christianity has become a life-controlling power, there unchastity and shamelessness give way to pious modesty and customs; there matrimony is restored to its rights; there we meet with those noble women and mothers that were admired even by their heathen contemporaries, and those holy families that have properly been called habitations of God with man—a heaven upon earth. On the contrary, wherever the spirit of Christianity was not admitted into the hearts of its confessors, we meet with manifestations in the midst of Christian civilization which remind us of the state of things in the heathen world; and these manifestations multiply according as the falling away from faith increases and the dominion of materialism spreads.

Remark 1.—It is true that the Mosaic law tolerates polygamy (Ex. xxi, 9, etc.; Deut. xxi, 15, etc.; Judges viii, 30), which was at that time a wide-spread custom, and is several times mentioned as an object of pomp with kings (1 Sam. xxv, 24, etc., and in other passages); but after the time of the kings, monogamy became the almost exclusive custom, and at the time of Christ polygamy had disappeared from the national life of the Jews. Nor did the law contain an express prohibition of concubinage, which is related to polygamy, and was at that time already a valid custom, but only warded off the imminent dangers by limiting provisions. (Ex. xxi, 7, etc.; Lev. xix, 20; 2 Sam. iii, 7; Deut. xxii, 30; comp. Gen. xxxv, 22; xlix, 4; 2 Sam. xvi, 21, etc.) Moreover the fact must be taken notice of, that polygamy, which was tolerated in the Old Covenant on account of "the people's hardness of heart," is nowhere approved of and sanctioned in the Old Testament, but is rather intimated as being wrong. Abraham had much domestic discord on Hagar's account; Esau's two wives caused his parents much sorrow (Gen. xxvi, 35; xlvii, 46); the envy of Jacob's wives was a source of much domestic trouble (Gen. xlix, 32; xxx, 1, etc.), and he furthermore was obliged to vow to Laban that he would not take other wives (xxxi, 50); and it is distinctly disapproved of, even in the case of kings, that they take many wives (Deut. xvii, 17). Thus even the Old Testament opened the way for that loftier view of matrimony which was to be brought to its full value through Christianity. (According to Wüttke, Manual of Christian Ethics.)

Remark 2.—He who finds the center of his endeavors in the satisfying of his sensual lusts instead of in God, is at the mercy of his own impulses and desires, and comes to be a slave of his lusts, because his life's center of gravity is not in God. Unchastity, which consists in the selfish and perverted satisfying of the sexual impulse, is only a manifestation of this slavery. But what dark shadows the sins of unchastity cast upon the pages of the history of human society in all ages! How far the process of the decomposition of matrimonial and family life had gone in the heathen world when Christianity began its triumphant course, is shown by the old Greek and Roman authors. At the time of the Roman emperors matrimony was a mere mocking-stock, and divorces were such a common and frequent occurrence that Tertullian said of his contemporaries: "They marry, only to be divorced again!" Infanticide was the order of the day, and was not considered a sin, because, according to heathen opinion, the father had full power over his

children. That parents, as such, not only possess rights, but also have duties toward their children, did not enter the minds of people.

Unfortunately the trend of the modern materialistic mind has brought about a similar state of affairs in the midst of the Christian civilized world. The chapter on "Matrimonial Lies" in Max Nordan's book on "The Conventional Lies of Cultured Humanity" presents a truly terrifying picture of the derangement of matrimonial and family life in the modern civilized world. The author of said book is a pessimist of the worst stripe, and hence his statements must not, without further consideration, be accepted as truth. When, for example, among other things, he makes the regardlessly bold and, in its generality, untrue assertion, that in civilized countries men live in a polygamous state in spite of lawful monogamy, that there is hardly one man among a hundred thousand who could swear upon his death-bed that he had never known more than one woman, etc., he speaks of the social circle in which he himself moves, and, in his pessimistic view, applies what has unfortunately come to be the rule in this circle of godless infidels to the entire modern civilized world. That reveals the pessimist. Nevertheless it is not to be denied that he discloses the dark sides of our age with terrible clearness, and, despite his exaggeration, there is so much truth in what he says about the sexual relations of modern society that we can not help being painfully conscious of the fact that, in spite of the great blessing which the gospel and the Christian Church have proven to be, they still have, even in Christian civilized countries, an enormous work to do.

§ 84. Marriage.

As in the spring of the year nature, which seemingly has been dead, awakes again to new life; as plants and flowers develop, and disclose themselves to the rays of the sun: even so there awakes with beginning maturity that mysterious affection of the heart that we call love, in every sound youth and every rightly feeling maiden. This affection may remain unsatisfied because it does not gain its end; it may be that it must be struggled against and suppressed; but it will arise. It would be against the divine order of nature, if it did not arise.

As we saw in the preceding section, the divinely appointed sphere for the activity of the morally justified mutual love of the sexes is matrimony. As matrimony joins two persons for life, the selection of a husband or a wife is a step of the highest moral significance, a step upon which depends not only the temporal but often also the eternal welfare of man. Therefore,

> "Consider, ye who join your hands,
> If hearts are twined in mutual bands."*

When we think how thoughtlessly in our day most people enter upon married life, how all possible things are thought of except that which is really the basis of matrimonial happiness, we wonder that the alarmingly large number of unhappy marriages and divorces is not larger still. Martensen says: "In many marriages luck evidently plays a more important part than sense." But it is unjustifiable thoughtlessness to trust to luck, and, upon a transient impression, without due consideration, to enter an agreement that can be invalidated only by death. Hence a Christian, whose whole life is imbued with the thought of God and his own divine destination, can never take a step so important in its consequences as the choice of a husband or a wife, without prayer and serious self-examination. This choice must not be determined by beauty of form, by wealth, or by social position, not even by a harmony of disposition and bent of life, although these are essential to matrimonial happiness. It must be determined by the question, "if hearts are twined in mutual bands;" that is, whether, upon the basis of the harmony of the temperaments, we can hope to gain that happiness through love in connection with the woman or man of our choice which will outlast youth

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* From Schiller's "Song of the Bell," by S. A. Eliot.—F. W. S.

and beauty, and accompany us through all the vicissitudes of life, till death separate us.

According to social custom, marriage is preceded by betrothal, which contains the morally valid promise of future marriage, and establishes the state of betrothal, the significance of which consists in its granting the more intimate association of the betrothed, a socially recognized form. The bad custom in our country of keeping the betrothal secret is not only opposed to the nature of the state of betrothal, but also favors a loose view of betrothal itself, inasmuch as, even after the mutual promise, the betrothed can without restraint court others, and allow themselves to be courted by others. This bad custom contributes much to the circumstance that in our country betrothments are not only much more unhesitatingly made, but also much more easily broken, than in those countries in which the prevailing custom is to announce them publicly. Even though betrothal has not the full, indissolvable significance of marriage, the dissolution of it is always a serious and delicate matter; for it deeply influences the development of the life of both parties interested, but especially that of the bride. Therefore it is a sacred duty not to undertake such a dissolution, except for the most pressing moral reasons, and not for mere external, civil reasons. And even where the dissolution of betrothal is morally necessary, it contains grave guilt, at least the guilt of having been hasty in betrothal, and is, as Wuttke properly says, always "a weighty misfortune."

Let us briefly sum up the conditions of a moral marriage.

To such a marriage belong, first of all, the bodily and mental maturity and moral full age of the participants. Children and minors, who have no consciousness of the purpose and significance of matrimony, are not capable of making a rational choice, nor of fulfilling the duties

that devolve upon them as husband and wife, and as parents. The betrothal of children and the marriage of persons that are yet near childhood must therefore be designated a sinful misuse.

The second and most important condition of a truly moral marriage is personal love, based upon the harmony of the individuality as well as of the character of husband and wife. To enter upon matrimonial life without love, on the basis of a mere general kindly disposition, or even on the mere calculation of external considerations, contradicts the moral nature of matrimony. So-called convenience- or money-marriages are decidedly rejectable as immoral from the stand-point of Christian morality; even obedience to the will of parents can not excuse a marriage without love.

To a truly moral marriage belongs also the consent of the two families, especially the consent of the parents. The latter have the right to watch over their children's choice, and to demand that the moral spirit or the peace of the family be not undermined by wholly foreign elements. But they must never assume the right to choose a husband or wife for their children, and demand that this choice be unconditionally obeyed; nor have they a right to exercise parental authority in such a way that, in their selfish willfulness, they make the free choice of husband or wife, and hence marriage itself, impossible for their children. But when this is done, nevertheless, it may happen that children of full age are justified in marrying even without the consent of their parents, which case is inconceivable in a truly Christian family.

Christian matrimony is further impossible without harmony of the husband's and wife's moral-religious way of thinking. As matrimony is the most intimate life-communion conceivable on earth, there can be no thought of true matrimonial happiness where husband and wife

do not agree in regard to the highest spiritual* interests and possessions. Between persons, of whom the one clings with all his life-forces to the domain of the invisible, the other to that of the visible world, a mutual understanding, and hence also a personal life-communion, as matrimony requires it, is absolutely impossible. Therefore the words of the apostle are applicable also to marriage: "Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers." (2 Cor. vi, 14–18.)

To the Christian the nuptial benediction is not only an old, venerable custom, but also a deeply felt want. Fully conscious of the seriousness of the great task that is imposed upon him by the founding of a domestic state, he feels more than ever in need of divine grace and succor Therefore he will not enter upon matrimonial life without having assured himself of the Lord's blessing; for if the Lord is not the third party in the conjugal union, it lacks not only the divine consecration, but also the surety of lasting happiness.

In all cases marriage remains an act of confidence; but where the right kind of love exists it is an act of joyful confidence. When at the marriage altar the loving bride enters upon a life-long union, her feelings are about these: "Now I have found him whom I can love above all others, to whom I will belong as long as I live;" and with this mind she believingly and confidingly places the fate of her life into the man's strong hands, and says: "Whither thou goest, I will go; and where thou lodgest, I will lodge; thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God; death must part thee and me." But believingly and confidingly the bridegroom also joins the fate of his life to the bride, to whom he henceforth belongs as exclusively as she to him. Trust-

* As opposed to material. F. W. S.

ing to find in her love his highest earthly happiness, he shares with her all that he possesses—fortune, position in life, even his name. In this undivided, mutual devotion of husband and wife lies the reason why matrimony is so often used in holy Scripture as a symbol of the relation of Christ to the believing soul, or to the body of believers as a whole. Of such matrimony, in which husband and wife consider each other a gift of God, it can truly be said they were wedded in heaven.

§ 85. The Pedagogical Significance of Matrimony. Celibacy. Morally Prohibited Marriage.

Matrimony is a divine institution. God himself established it by giving man woman as a helpmate, and blessing them with the words: "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth." Hence matrimony is a duty from which we should not withdraw without reason.

For our own sake we should not; for matrimony, like all natural regulations of life, has a pedagogical import. First of all we call attention to the words of the apostle, 1 Cor. vii, 9—"It is better to marry than to burn"—according to which matrimony serves as a preservative from unchastity, which is so prevalent in the world. It is indeed a low point of view for judging matrimony, but nevertheless it is justifiable in the case of sinful humanity.

But aside from this, matrimony proves to be a means of education. Even the exchange of thought between husband and wife animates and enriches the whole emotional and spiritual life, in consequence of the polar opposition of the two sexes. The wife helps the husband, and the husband helps the wife to approach the ideal of man. Besides, matrimony is connected with a manifoldness of moral purposes and duties, the blessed influence of which can not

be replaced by anything; for in the fulfilling of them there lies a constant summons to self-denying sacrifice for the sake of the other party. Since egotism, which makes the *ego* the center of life, is the source and essence of all sin, an institution like matrimony, in which happiness is conditioned by the one party seeking and finding his highest joy in making the other happy, must be especially adapted to conquer the selfish disposition through love.

It is therefore to be regretted that in our day there are so many old bachelors, who remain single, not out of moral motives, but out of mere conveniency and of dread of the cares and burdens of family life, or even for worse reasons, whereby a corresponding number of the opposite sex are naturally forced to remain single. And such "old bachelor Philistines," as a rule, reveal the want of the educating influence of marriage, in that habits and views of life are developed in them which show only too plainly that they have not learned to sacrifice their own convenience and wishes in every-day life for the sake of others.

In the Roman Church we meet with the peculiar circumstance that matrimony is designated a sacrament, hence a means of grace; whereas, on the other hand, celibacy is recommended and lauded as a specially high stage of morality. This apparent contradiction is connected with the low view of matrimony taken by the Catholic spirituality, and appearing even in the writings of noted Roman theologians, that it is only a sensual life-communion. If this view were right, the state of celibacy would indeed be morally higher than that of matrimony, and yet the latter could be recommended as a means of preventing unchastity for those who are satisfied with a lower stage of morality. But this view is not correct; and we have previously (§ 48) shown the presupposition to be

unevangelic and unbiblical, that besides the ordinary morality (obedience to the commandments, which is demanded of all Christians), there is a higher morality; namely, the observation of the so-called "evangelic counsels" (especially the monkish vows of indigence, of obedience, and celibacy), which are not commanded, but only recommended to those who wish to strive for a higher moral perfection. In this very particular, that Christianity makes morality, as well as truth, the common possession of all, it is distinct from antique morals and philosophy. It knows only one moral end for all—likeness to God. Whatever is not for all, is not the ideal of Christian morality. While celibacy can not establish a higher morality, the history of the Roman Church plainly shows, on the other hand, that its introduction has had the most fatal consequences for the morality of the Catholic clergy, and has become the source of the saddest errors and carnal sins.

When, in 1 Cor. vii, Paul prefers celibacy to married life, it is not because he thought slightingly of matrimony and considered celibacy as morally higher—for in that case how could he in Eph. v, 22, etc., speak of matrimony as the symbol of the communion of Christ and his Church, and in 1 Tim. iv, 1–3, say of the doctrines of those who prohibited marriage, that they are lies and doctrines of devils?—but, as he himself says, on account of "the present distress;" that is, on account of the coming persecutions, in which "the unmarried could stand more easily than the married, who were involved in all kinds of family cares." Hence there may be times and circumstances in which one's regard of his temporal welfare makes a renunciation of matrimony seem advisable. (Compare Matt. xxiv, 19.) But even in this case the apostle does not make such renunciation the duty of Christians; that is, he does not command it, but

only recommends it, in order to save them bodily tribulation. (1 Cor. vii. 26–28.) He even acknowledges plainly, that where the natural gift of chastity (as it had been granted to him himself) is wanting, matrimony is preferable to the unmarried state. (Verses 7–9.)

But even aside from such times of general tribulation and danger, a temporary or even a lasting renunciation of matrimony may, in certain individual cases, be commanded. To these belong external social distresses, as poverty and incapability of working, which make it impossible for a man to provide properly for a family. It is unquestionably one of the dark sides of our social condition that, in consequence of the progress of culture in our age and of the general education of the masses, the necessaries of life increase daily, and the number of those who lack the means of subsistence necessary to the support of a family is growing alarmingly to the detriment of public morality; for from these very distresses, by which so many are forced to an unmarried state, spring innumerable unhappy marriages and impoverished and ruined families, out of which the proletariat, with all its misery and immorality, is constantly recruited.

Finally, subjective personal hindrances—as disease or vocation in the world, as well as in the kingdom of God—can make an unmarried state seem necessary to the Christian, as it was the case with Paul and many other men of God, who felt called to devote their full, undivided powers to the work in God's kingdom.

However difficult such renunciation may be for the Christian in all these circumstances, he will find comfort and strength to bear his lot with child-like resignation in the thought that "all things work together for good to them that love God."

Remark.—With regard to the morally ennobling influence of matrimony Culmann says: "One needs but to think of the

lustful fancies of many bachelors who move in a veritable puddle of unchaste desires if he would learn to value the morally ennobling influence of matrimony. By it the entire phantasmagoria that Satan presents to his soul, is torn down. The Tantalus-flame of his unsatisfied impulse cools off to a mild organic act of life which is performed just as harmlessly and naively as breathing or eating and drinking."

§ 86. The Consorts.

The Christian home is a place of peace and quiet happiness, where the Word of God dwells abundantly, and the incense of prayer rises to heaven daily from grateful hearts; it is the safe haven in which he who is fatigued by his arduous professional labors, finds rest, and forgets the cares and troubles of life in the circle of his loved ones; it is the place where the Christian woman, more than in any other place, attends to her beautiful calling, and twines "heavenly roses into earthly life." But it is the mutual love of the members of the family, and especially of the consorts, who find their highest earthly happiness in making one another happy—a love sanctified by their joint love of God, that makes the Christian home an abode of happiness. The woman who, after marriage, sits quietly down to wait for her husband to make her happy, will have a long time waiting, as O. Wildermuth says, and likewise the man that expects the same of his wife. True love finds its blessedness in giving, not in receiving.

Between truly Christian consorts there can therefore be no contention as to who shall command and who obey. It is true that, according to the natural order established by God, the husband is the head of the wife (Eph. v, 23); it is true that Paul says wives shall be subject unto their husbands in everything (Eph. v, 24); but he adds immediately: "Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ also loved the Church, and gave himself for it." Where this devoted, self-sacrificing love to his wife abides in the

heart of the husband, the wife is not his servant or slave, as in heathendom, but his helpmate, who is about him, and completes him like another *ego*, and in whose happiness he himself finds his highest earthly happiness.

Though even the happiest married life is not without imperfections, and though its usual sunshine and peaceful happiness is in many ways beclouded, yet an understanding is the more easily effected, and a lasting disappointment and estrangement the more powerfully averted, the more clearly the consorts are conscious of their heavenly calling, and the more earnestly they strive to become like their Lord and Master in their entire life. For all true love is based upon mutual respect, and the latter increases in the degree that we perceive in one another a truly pious heart, and the sincere desire to do God's will. Then, even though many an ideal that we brought over into married life vanish, even though many a defect be disclosed that was formerly unknown to us, these disappointments are more than balanced by the abundance of mutual love, fidelity, self-sacrifice, and patience that is revealed to us day by day. A faithful heart is the greatest treasure that we can call our own on earth, but we learn to know the full value of this treasure only in the course of the many trials of married life.

But the greater the value of faithful conjugal love is, the more carefully must Christian consorts avoid all that strives against this love. And, after all, it is nothing but selfishness or sin in its various manifestations that strives against this love. Therefore we must never cease battling against sin, which besets even them that believe. "Great experiences, especially those made in suffering, have great uniting power; but every-day life, with its many aggravations, easily brings about a coldness and an estrangement, if we are not on our guard."

We must guard especially against too great a sensitiveness, against carelessness and reserve, which latter is always a sign of decreasing love, as love consists in an open impartation of self.

In this battle with sin the consorts must mutually assist each other by encouragement, exhortation, warning, and intercession. Love, which out of a wrong tenderness does not reprove the sins of the other party, is not the right kind of love; nor either that which can not bear such reproval, but only returns an answer that shows wounded feelings. This must, of course, be done in love and meekness, in order that one may not overlook the beam in his own eye while trying to pull the mote out of the other's eye. Christian consorts, conscious of their own imperfection, will gladly forgive mistakes that have been made, and patiently bear with the weaknesses they observe in each other, as each gives the other enough to bear. Thus Christian consorts, should become to each other "helpmates toward eternal blessedness." For this they need grace and wisdom from above, which they must obtain by prayer.

The difference in their spheres of labor is determined by the sexual character of the consorts. Man, in whom the active, outwardly directed side of life predominates, finds his sphere of labor outside of the house in public life; woman, on the contrary, finds her sphere in the house, corresponding to her inwardly directed, molding, and sustaining character.

The emancipation of woman—that is, the endeavor to take woman out of the calling that is assigned her by nature and by custom, and to introduce her into man's sphere of labor, especially into political life, and to secure her the right of voting and make her eligible to political offices—mistakes the difference in the sexes which is based upon the divine order of nature, deprives

woman of her most beautiful ornament, her tender womanhood, and makes her incapable of fulfilling the duties of her highest calling, that of wife and mother. Hence the emancipated woman easily becomes an object of man's ridicule; at all events, he will feel indifferent toward her; for a woman who wishes to play the part of man ceases to be the complement of man's character, and therefore he loses the interest in her that he otherwise feels in the weaker sex. The power that woman exerts over man lies not in her bold advance, but in her modesty and chaste reserve. An old adage says: "Woman controls man by obedience." Hence it is not surprising that just the best and noblest women want to know least of such desires for emancipation.

Christian consorts consider the fulfilling of their earthly calling as a task imposed by God. Hence they devote themselves to it with conscientiousness and faithful diligence, and rejoice at their success with child-like gratitude to their Heavenly Father, from whom all blessings come even in our earthly calling. But they never disregard Christ's words: "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you;" and this seeking the "things above" protects them against vanity, luxury, inordinate desire for pleasure and extravagance, as well as filthy stinginess and heartless covetousness.

"O blessed home, where man and wife united
Are one in spirit, one in love divine;
And, being to a common grace invited,
Are one in faith unswerving and sublime!
In which the heart of each toward Thee is beating;
In which the eyes of each are turned to Thee;
In which they both are Thy commandments seeking,
And list'ning for Thy beck'nings constantly."

Remark 1.—A striking description of the different callings of husband and wife is found in Schiller's "Song of the Bell," in

the well-known lines: "The man must go forth into hostile life," etc.

Remark 2.—We would not leave the impression that we would have woman excluded from all professional activity outside of the family. Although the quiet home is the most appropriate sphere of her activity, it can not be denied that not all women can find an adequate sphere of activity in the family, and hence many are compelled to find employment elsewhere. And there is no lack of positions that agree with woman's character. To these belongs especially the vocation of teacher and governess, which is closely related to that of a mother. In factories and business-houses women also find suitable positions as clerks, book-keepers, etc. Work in a family, however, is preferable especially to work in a factory; and it is to be regretted that in our day so many young girls consider it a disgrace to be servant-girls, and prefer to follow some other vocation, even though it is much less adapted to their health and character.

§ 87. Indissolubility of Matrimony. Divorce. Second Marriage.

According to its nature, matrimony is indissolvable. "What God hath joined together, let no man put asunder." (Mark x, 9.) Every thought of separation and of a change is a blow at the moral idea of matrimony as an exclusive communion of sexes. "Whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her already in his heart" (Matt. v, 28); and "whosoever shall marry her that is divorced, committeth adultery" (verse 32).

The socialistic gospel of "free love," which looks at matrimony as an agreement for mutual happiness, which, if it no longer answers its purpose, can at any time be dissolved and replaced by another, destroys the moral nature of matrimony and lowers it to mere concubinage.

It can not be denied that, in consequence of existing sin and selfishness, the conjugal happiness, even in Christian marriages, may be essentially and lastingly disturbed, whether it be that in the choice of a consort a mistake

was made, or wrong motives existed, or whether it be that after marriage defects in the character of the one or the other appeared that make cohabitation a heavy, almost unbearable burden. In such a case a temporary separation, mutually agreed to, can be justified (1 Cor. vii, 11); for where the communion of the souls of husband and wife has ceased, a continued matrimonial association would lack the moral basis. But in this separation all thought of a marriage with other persons is excluded, while the reunion of the separated consorts should be the desired end to strive for. Truly earnest Christians will, of course, never find such a separation necessary; a reconciliation will always be possible with them, and if they have erred in the choice of a consort they will patiently bear what they have taken upon themselves through their own fault.

Lingering sickness and inability to work may, under certain circumstances, make matrimony a heavy burden; but they must never be used as an excuse for separation. If it does not occur to a mother to reject her sick or crippled child; if she cares for it with so much greater love and self-sacrifice: one consort should not withdraw his love from the other when the latter is visited with sickness and suffering. True love will strive to make the hard lot of the suffering one easier by doubling its attention to him. Even though the burden of such a visitation is heavy, the Christian will patiently bear it. If the necessary strength is wanting, it must be prayed for. But God will not be implored in vain.

Although the dissolution of matrimony is morally impossible, it can wickedly be actually destroyed and abolished by adultery or so-called lasting, malicious abandonment, which is essentially equivalent to adultery. (1 Cor. vii, 15, etc.) In these cases the separation proper of the consorts is not an act of the (Church or State) authorities; they only give the previous actual dissolution of

matrimony a legal expression; wherefore Christ himself expressly permits divorce in case of adultery. (Matt. v, 32; ix, 6, etc.) "But even in this case a normal marriage with some other person is conceivable only of the innocent party." (V. Oettingen.)

Although the Christian State is compelled in its legislation to remit these stern precepts of Holy Scripture to some extent on account of the hardness of people's hearts (Matt. xix, 8), it remains the sacred duty of the Church to strive with all earnestness and love to reconcile the separated consorts, and to redeem more and more the value of the Biblical view of the indissolubility of matrimony, which must be absolute authority for their actions.

But, however decidedly Christian ethics must emphasize the inner indissolubility of matrimony upon the basis of Scripture, it does not consider it to be, according to its sensual nature, an eternally lasting relation. So far as matrimony is conditioned by the oppositeness of the sexes, it is binding for this life only; for "in the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven." (Matt. xxii, 30.) Hence the death of the one consort can, according to God's decree, morally dissolve matrimony. Conjugal love, according to its spiritual nature, will outlast death and the grave; but this spiritual love is not exclusive, like the sexual, and hence does not prohibit a second marriage. (Rom. vii, 1–3.) It is, however, a moral duty to keep the memory of the departed consort sacred.

2. THE MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY.

§ 88. Parents and Children. Masters and Servants.

Wherever two consorts establish a domestic state, a family, or, according to Biblical terminology, a house, is founded, although for the time being it is yet in an unde-

veloped form. By the addition of children and domestics the family circle is extended, and now domestic life reaches its full development. Upon the basis of the parents' mutual love and unity of will, the cohabitation and co-operation of the members of the family for the promotion of domestic happiness develops the family spirit, which passes over from the parents to the children and domestics. From this family spirit springs family custom, the norm for the personal conduct of the individual members of the family. Family spirit and family custom prove to be for the family one of the most potent preventives of moral error, and one of the most important factors in the training of children.

"Children are a heritage of the Lord," a precious treasure which God himself has intrusted to parents that they might care for and preserve it. Hence it is a sacred duty, that parents must not withdraw from, to bring up their children "in the nurture and admonition of the Lord." It is frequent that in unchristian families parents are not concerned about the training of their children, that they will not make great sacrifices for them. Rousseau, whose precepts for the training of children have become so important in pedagogics, placed his own children in a foundling hospital; and our modern socialists have long ago erected in their minds the large training-schools of their future state, into which all children shall be placed as soon as they are weaned, so that father and mother need no longer be concerned about them.

Such indifference is not conceivable in the case of Christian parents. They have the welfare of their children at heart more than anything else. Hence they are not content with furnishing them food, clothing, and shelter, and, perhaps, the necessary education for getting along in this life; they desire to do more for their children—to bring them up not for this world alone, but for

God and heaven. But in order to gain this end, children must, above all, be brought up to be pious persons, truly Christian characters.

It is self-evident that in this endeavor both parents must work together harmoniously. What the father directs must be binding for the mother also, and *vice versa.* If parents differ in certain points, they must talk them over privately, and, if possible, come to some agreement; but a contradiction must never appear in the presence of children. When the mother takes the children's part against the father, or the father against the mother, it is not surprising that the children lose all respect for parental authority and follow only the dictates of their own willfulnesss.

The two factors that must co-operate in all good education of children are authority and love.

Even on account of their physical connection with their parents, children are under obligation to subject themselves to the will of their parents. Toward the child, father and mother are the representatives of God, and child-like reverence and love of the parents is the first form of child-like piety. Wherever the authority of the parents is not recognized; wherever each member of the family does as it pleases, and children and servants want to rank equally with parents and masters, there the very foundation of family life is dissolved. It behooves parents to command, children to obey. A chief purpose of training is to break the sinful self-will of children, which is manifested in rebellion against the authority of the parents; where this can not be accomplished by kindness, it must be done by severe punishment. The child's obligation to obey its parents ceases only where their will positively contradicts the will of God; for in this case the apostolic maxim is valid: "We ought to obey God rather than man."

Moreover, the subjection of children to the authority of parents must never become servitude, never slavery. There must be left to every child, even the smallest, a sphere of liberty, even though it be only in its plays. But this liberty is limited by the family spirit and family custom which emanate from the parents; it is not unbridledness. The latter would be the death of all training, and must not be tolerated in a family, least of all in a republic. It is a dangerous error to think that the greater the political freedom of a people is, the greater liberty must be granted its youth. The reverse must be true. "The freer a people, the stricter must the training of its youth be. If there were a people that consisted solely of slaves, youth might riot to its heart's content. Later years would place the necessary damper upon them; the trees would not grow into the heavens. But the freer a man is to be, the more necessary that he previously have been prepared for it in the school of strict obedience."

But love must go hand in hand with authority. As Luther expresses it, together with the rod we must always offer children the apple. Authority must be so asserted, and strictness so exercised, that children feel it is not mere caprice, but love that prohibits, reproves, and punishes. There is much complaint in our day that children care so little for home that they would rather run about on the streets in bad company than seek entertainment in the family circle. But is the reason of this not often that, through pedantic severity, incessant fault-finding, and scolding, they are made to dislike home? Whoever wishes to keep his children at home, must make home a haven of rest and happiness for them, and not a bed of nettles. In training, nothing is gained by mere fault-finding, scolding, and punishing. Only love can train, and parental love best of all.

But even parental love can make gross mistakes in the training of children, if it is not purified and enlightened by the love of God.

How many parents there are who, in their sentimental tenderness or idolizing love, are afraid to bring their children under strict discipline, and hence let them have their own way in all things, or perhaps, like Eli, do not even seem displeased at their rudeness and sins. Love that is blind to the faults of one's own children, or even finds them nice—because coddled pets are always nice—will have little success in training children.

Not better than this idolizing love of children is that apish love that many parents display, especially many mothers who ridiculously trick up their children to look like trim dolls, in order to show them; thus they scatter into the receptive hearts of the little ones the seed of vanity, and poison the tender bud of childish simplicity and innocence ere it can develop to a blossom.

Genuine Christian parental love makes children neither a toy nor an idol. It always remembers that they have an immortal soul, upon the development of which their eternal blessedness or damnation depends. Hence the whole work of training is connected with the thought of eternity.

Christian parents, therefore, are not content with a mere intellectual refinement of their children. In our day the opinion is, indeed, gaining ground more and more, that the happiness of mankind and the welfare of the future lie in the culture of the intellect. Acquired knowledge and skill are to do everything. But that is vain folly. One can have a highly cultured intellect, and yet a very bad heart. The culture of the heart must go hand in hand with the culture of the intellect if man is really to be ennobled and brought nearer to his divine destination. A Catholic bishop said that mere culture of the intellect makes devils of men. That is

strong, indeed; but it is certain that culture of the intellect without culture of the heart is like a two-edged sword, and often does more harm than good, and that a morally noble and pious Christian with defective intellectual culture fulfills his divine purpose better than the most celebrated scholar, if he is at the same time an unprincipled man.

A Christian training of children therefore requires, above all, that they be brought to a vivid experience of grace; for without this experience it is impossible that a Christian character be developed.

For this it is not sufficient that parents be concerned about the spiritual welfare of their children periodically—perhaps during a revival in the congregation — and for the remainder of the time let them quietly follow their own course. The mission of Christian training is infinitely higher. It demands of parents a kind self-sacrifice and a never-tiring perseverance, which, without intermission, tries to scatter the seed of Christian principles into the tender hearts of their children by word and example, and to awaken a higher disposition, that aims at heavenly things.

In this the good example of the parents is of the greatest importance. The unchristian behavior of many parents tears down what their Christian teachings and exhortations have built up. Children are close observers. A contradiction between the profession and the life of parents will not remain hidden from them; and the fact that they observe the parents' ill-hidden worldliness and emptiness of faith, and the lack of uprightness thus manifested, is as a harmful mildew, poisoning and killing their religious life. On the other hand, the pious example of the parents, their faith and trust in God, their child-like resignation in affliction, their self-denying charity—in short, their godly, devoted life—is the most potent

means of winning the children also for the Lord and the service of holy love; for we are involuntarily incited to imitate the example of those that are dear to us.

As the formation of character is the purpose of proper training, it is the duty of the latter to lead the children gradually from moral minority to full age and moral self-dependence. In the degree in which this is done, parental guidance must step back and give the children a greater sphere of free self-destination, until, upon reaching their moral majority, they have outgrown the authority of their parents. When this period of life has come, the duty of obedience to the parents ceases to be binding for the children who have reached their majority; but the duty of regard, love, and gratitude has not ceased. And as a normal development leaves parents far more experienced in life and its ways than their children, the latter, even after they have reached their moral majority, will often find opportunity to ask the advice of their parents, and to be guided by their judgment. The grateful love and esteem shown by grown children toward their parents is one of the most beautiful fruits of Christian training.

The relation of brothers and sisters to one another is that of mutual love and social equality; but so that by virtue of their spiritual superiority the older ones exert a molding and educating influence upon the younger ones; while, on the other hand, the kind regard the former must have for the latter affords them ample opportunity to exercise self-sacrifice. Hence the living together of brothers and sisters is an important moral means of culture in the family. Children who have no brothers or sisters about them easily become stubborn and selfish; not only because, as a rule, they are spoiled by their parents, but more because they lack the influence of living together with brothers and sisters, which necessarily brings with it a mutual yielding and renouncing.

To the family belong not only the parents and the children, but also the other persons living with them, especially the servants. In a Christian house these are not considered merely a laboring force, but are received into the union of family association, as such who are also redeemed and purchased by the blood of Christ. Therefore Christian masters or mistresses feel it their duty to care not only for the temporal, but also for the eternal welfare of their servants; and the latter, far from forgetting their subordinate social position, gratefully acknowledge the kind interest taken in them, and willingly allow themselves to be advised and guided by those who have authority over them. In the interest of society in general, and especially in the interest of the Christian Church, it is to be regretted that in our day this relation of mutual love and confidence is being reduced to a mere relation of contract, and that even Christian masters and mistresses view, and wish to have others view, their relation to their servants only from a business point of view. For this, too, reveals the derangement of social life by selfishness, which seeks only its own advantage, and is concerned as little as possible about fellow-man. The Christian spirit never can and never could be content with this view; it is satisfied only with the above-mentioned relation of mutual love and confidence. (Philem., verses 12 and 16; Matt. viii, 6–13.)

II.

SOCIETY.

§ 89. Friendship.

According to § 82, the human race is a great whole, a spiritual organism. We have learned to know the family as the fundamental form of this organism. This increases to the circle of relatives, in which the family spirit and family custom live on in manifold modifications. But this does not fully satisfy the desire for society which the Creator himself implanted into every man's heart; hence all kinds of associations and unions are formed besides the family, so that each individual enters into the most manifold reciprocal relation to the whole. Thus society arises.

The bridge between the family and society is friendship, the nature of which consists in that, upon the basis of an inner elective affinity of the peculiarities of their natures, like-minded persons enter upon a mutual relation of esteem and love, of fidelity and confidence, of devotion and service, and seek and find in their intercourse with one another a complement of their own personality. This is done most easily in youth, "where ideals present themselves to the youthful mind, and a common love of the ideal attracts and joins soul to soul." Hence youth is the time of friendship covenants. In later years, when vocation and family press their claims, it is seldom that new relations of friendship arise; and even friendships that were formed in youth are easily loosed, especially in consequence of the restriction of the

intimate association of friends demanded by marriage, although such loosing is not always, and, in the right kind of friendship, only seldom the case.

As friendship is based upon a mutual elective affinity of natures, it can not be commanded any more than love can. It would be foolish and unjust if I should blame an acquaintance for choosing some other instead of me as his bosom friend. The choice of a friend is not a matter of caprice; a friend is found even as a husband or wife is found. But friendship is not exclusive, like matrimony. One may have several friends at the same time.

Even in ancient times friendship was considered an essentially moral relation, wherefore Cicero said that true friendship is possible only "among the good." "Friendship that uses its object as a mere means for gaining a personal end is egotism." Our motive in friendship must not be personal advantage, not even the gain that friendship offers us in intellectual development and enrichment; what we seek in friendship is communion, intellectual intercourse with our friend himself, with whom we feel united by love, and whose welfare we have at heart as well as our own. Hence it is essential to true friendship that the one friend encourage and strengthen the other in his moral endeavors, and, if necessary, reprove him for his faults without fear and wrong forbearance. A relation that can not endure such reproof does not deserve the name of friendship. Such friendship can exist only where there is a harmony of disposition; that is, of the moral-religious trend of life. A lasting, intimate friendship can never exist between the good and the bad, between the Christian and the unbeliever or worldly-minded. The unavoidable conflict of their views of life and their life-purposes must either soon be adjusted by a change in the disposition of the one friend or the other, or it must bring about a dissolution of their friendship.

Friendship is a purely natural relation, and hence independent of Christianity. The latter has even been accused of not being able to appreciate friendship, which played such a prominent part in the antique world. But this accusation is unjust. Christianity knows friendship as well as heathendom does. Christ himself calls his disciples "friends," and the history of the Christian Church tells us of many friendship covenants which are not surpassed by those of the antique world in tenderness and ardency of feeling. But it is indeed true that in the antique world friendship occupied a more prominent position than it occupies in the Christian world. In the former the few isolated relations of friendship appear as refreshing oases in the desert of selfishness and uncharitableness in social life, whereas in the latter, friendship is only a member in the total organism of the Christian life of charity. For Christianity has not only thrown the bond of universal charity around the whole of mankind, but has also restored to honor its high moral significance, and has united the multitude of believers to a large family of God. To this higher love Christian morality subordinates also the love of friend to friend. But "what the latter thus seems to lose in significance, it gains in intrinsic value through the consecration given it by the spirit of Christianity;" that is, through the love of Christ common to friends, and their joint labor in his service.

One of Greece's sages said: "Show me your friends, and I will tell you who you are." These words are based upon two facts worthy of notice: (1) Upon the fact that harmony of disposition usually determines our choice of friends, according to the common saying, "Birds of a feather flock together;" and (2) upon the fact that an existing difference of disposition necessarily disappears gradually, if friends continue in intimate association, as one friend adopts the other's mode of thinking. The

Scriptures say: "He that walketh with wise men shall be wise; but a companion of fools shall be destroyed." (Prov. xiii, 20.) From this the rule obtains, which is especially important for youth: Be cautious in the choice of your friends; for "evil companions corrupt good manners." (Compare 2 Cor. vi, 17 and 18.)

§ 90. Society and Social Amusements.

Friendship includes sociability. Friends meet for social intercourse. This intercourse, however, is not restricted to the small circle of friends, but is also extended to those of our fellow-men who are inwardly more distant to us. We must not be indifferent to them. Each of them is called unto blessedness, and contains a part of the manifold abundance of human nature, at which we are to rejoice; for the cultivation of this wider social relation, which originated on the basis of friendship or vocation, not only affords us abundant enjoyment, but adds essentially to the symmetrical development of our natural endowments and our character. The form of this manifold free intercourse is sociability; the peculiar attraction consists in ministering to one another as every man has received the gift. The purpose of sociability is simply enjoyment, and the recreation or the refreshment of man's spirits, which is afforded by mutual intercourse and the exchange of thought.

The fundamental form of social enjoyment is conversation in the circle of friends. In many cases it can and will be instructive; but instruction must never be its real purpose, or it will lose its peculiar charm. Whoever uses a pulpit style in social conversation becomes tedious. "He is preaching again," they say. Conversation must be a free exchange of thoughts, a mutual giving and receiving, in which every one is to take part. He that takes no part at all in the conversation can by his silence

injure and insult as well as he that tries to monopolize the whole conversation.

The moral value of conversation is determined by the character of the persons taking part in it; for "out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh." In worldly circles, therefore, the spice of conversation is often not sought in the exchange of noble and intellectually stimulating thoughts, but in loveless slander, or in frivolous and unchaste jests and obscenity, so that the conversation does not afford the participants recreation and moral nourishment, but is rather a curse and means of ruin for them (§ 61). Hence the apostle exhorts (Eph. iv, 29): "Let no corrupt communication proceed out of your mouth, but that which is good to the use of edifying, that it may minister grace unto the hearers." To the sanctifying of life belongs also the sanctifying of social conversation, of the free exchange of thought in the circle of friends. A Christian who finds pleasure in frivolous or even immoral conversation is not living in the proper state of grace, and is in great danger of losing his spiritual life. (Eph. v, 4; 1 Cor. xv, 33.)

Another form of social enjoyment is play, of which we spoke in § 79; and here we shall consider which plays are compatible with a conscientious fulfilling of the Christian's moral mission, and which must be avoided by the Christian as morally rejectable.

In answering this question, we must remark, first of all, that what we said in § 48 about the domain of the "allowed," is also applicable to play in general. But there are plays, the peculiar character or pernicious influence of which gives rise to serious moral doubts, even though they are nowhere expressly prohibited in the Scriptures.

Considering, firstly, games of chance, which depend solely upon luck, and leave no room for the employing of

reason, we must concede Dr. Frank's view, that games of chance "designate a very low stage of entertainment, fit perhaps for mental imbeciles." Although of themselves they are harmless, they become decidedly rejectable morally, "as soon as their lack of attraction is supplied by a striving to gain money;" for money gained thus can never be considered as honestly acquired possession. Superior to real games of chance are those games in which (as for example, in certain table-games and cards) the position, the deal, etc., is chance, but the farther development of the game is determined by the sagacity of the players, who compete in a friendly contest. These games, and especially the pure so-called "thinking games" (in which, as for example, in chess, all chance is excluded), are less to be objected to, so far as they are engaged in simply for amusement, and not for gain. "But the more the passions are aroused in these games the more the time for work is wasted, and the faithful fulfilling of professional duties endangered: the more the filth of vulgarity clings even to these games in consequence of their abuse, and the greater the danger of being brought into bad company by them, the more will the earnest Christian ask whether he can take part in them without injuring his conscience and his Christian calling." (Frank.)

Turning, and those plays belonging principally to youth, the attraction of which consists in employing the powers and dexterity of the body, are morally justified, so far as they remain within the bounds of decency and good manners, and do not degenerate to rudeness. Dancing, so far as adroitness and rhythm in the movements of the body are concerned, is related to turning, and morally not rejectable; so that, from a Christian stand-point, it could be called allowable for persons of the same sex to dance together. Not thus with the modern dance, the

chief attraction of which is the mutual approach of the two sexes, and which, therefore, is connected with grave moral dangers. If it is advanced, in justification of the modern dance, that it is better "to permit the mutual approach of sexes within definite limits drawn by good manners than to restrain it from the beginning, and thus conduct it into wrong channels" (Frank), we answer that for the greater part there is but little of "good manners" in the dancing-room, and that there are certainly other opportunities for the mutual approach of the sexes under far more favorable circumstances; for even the vanity and coquetry that are almost unavoidably nurtured by the dance are dangerous, especially for the female sex. To this must be added that the excitement of the dance too easily arouses evil desires and impure carnal lusts, which war against the soul; furthermore, the society of the dancing-room is often composed of elements with which the Christian can not associate without injuring his spiritual life; and, finally, it is a fact that, despite the so-called "good manners," dancers take liberties that a decent girl would never allow under other circumstances, and that the dance has ruined thousands of Christian young men and women, not only religiously, but also morally. Under these circumstances we are justified in asserting that the modern dance—even aside from its unchaste and offensive degenerations, in public displays, equestrian performances, ballets, public balls, etc.—is an amusement in which a Christian, who has made it the chief care of his life to save his immortal soul, can not well participate without coming in conflict with his conscience.

Concerts, and theatrical performances also, which, as the execution of an artistic activity, belong to the domain of æsthetics, actually come under the category of public amusements. Here they are, on the one hand, to

be judged according to the precepts of Christian criticism of art (§ 91); on the other hand, they come under the judgment of the divinely enlightened individual conscience, as "adiaphora," or "indifferent things."

We consider concerts and dramas, to which operas also belong, to be of themselves adiaphora. For as far as concerts—that is, the rendering of selections of music with orchestra accompaniment—are concerned, it is well known that there are sacred concerts, as the great oratorios of Sebastian Bach and Georg Friedrich Händel, which are often rendered in churches, and to the frequenting of which even the strictest rigorist can not object. Whether a Christian may help or be present at a concert must, therefore, be determined principally by the character of the concert itself. The theater, also, or the dramatic presentation of life on "boards that signify the world," is not to be called morally rejectable of itself, but only in its present degeneration. Even Ph. J. Spener, who certainly was strict in questions of conscience, says: "In regard to theatrical performances I have never been able to satisfy my own conscience. As they are generally conducted, they are undoubtedly a sinful thing (which, however, is rather due to the circumstances), and I classify them among worldly vanities, like dancing and others of that kind. But if I were required to prove to the conviction of conscience that of themselves they are sinful, I confess that I would not undertake to do it, although, on the other hand, I would not undertake to maintain them."

Although the drama itself is, therefore, not unconditionally to be condemned, there arise for the Christian, especially in the present day, unconquerable scruples against his participating in it, whether it be as a co-operator or as a spectator. A conscientious Christian can not thoughtlessly disregard even the question whether his frequent-

ing the theater is compatible with the Biblical demand to redeem the time (Col. iv, 5), and whether the æsthetic enjoyment he finds at the theater makes him more capable to fulfill his professional duties; for the purpose of all morally justified recreation is to give strength for new activity in one's heavenly as well as his earthly calling. If this purpose is not gained at the theater; if the latter rather hinders spiritual watchfulness, arouses passions that are opposed to holy love; if it disturbs and chills the Christian's prayerful communion with his Lord—and this can be done by the performance of comparatively good dramas—then the question is already decided for a tender Christian conscience against the theater. But when the theater has entered the service of a morally degenerated spirit of the times; when it presents only a bad, sentimentally degenerated moral, and, by an enticing representation of evil and seductive pictures of unchastity, drops the poison of sin into the hearts of the people, as is mostly the case in the modern theater: then every one that lays claim to the name of a Christian must unconditionally forego frequenting theaters. This is necessary in order that he guard against personal contamination; but it is also necessary for the sake of others, who might justly take offense at his conduct, or be misled by his example and induced to sin.

Hence the decided position taken by the old Christian Church (which strictly prohibited its members to frequent the heathen plays—partly because they were connected with the religion of the antique world, partly because the nature of certain plays, for example, the combats of animals, created a rudeness of disposition, which Christianity must abhor) was quite correct; and the more the moral earnestness of the Christian moral has disappeared from the modern theater, and the shallow, lustful, and frivolous spirit of the ungodly masses has become preva-

lent, the more imperative is the duty of Christianity to keep away from such amusements, and not to "be conformed to this world." (Rom. xii, 2.)

With this we can close this section. We have mentioned only a few of the multitude of social enjoyments. But this is sufficient, as it will not be difficult for the reader to apply the precepts that were authoritative in judging the given examples to other social amusements.

§91. The Cultural Purposes of Society.

"Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth." (Gen. i, 28.) These words, spoken in Paradise by the Creator to the first parents, designate the cultural purpose of mankind. All earthly creation is to be man's possession. He should learn to know nature, its forces and laws, and thus have dominion over it, and make it subservient to his moral purposes. He is to be God's representative on earth, and, imitating God's creative thoughts, to transform the earth corresponding to its progressive development.

The fulfillment of this purpose is not possible to the individual, but only to society. The contemporaries of a generation mutually assist one another, and later generations build ahead upon the achievements of preceding generations. Thus one scientific advance is added to the other, one invention to the other, one triumph of the human spirit over the rude forces of nature to the other. In this constantly growing knowledge and control of nature and its forces consists the nature of the progress of culture.

Cultured man controls and claims the earthly creation in a twofold manner: in intellectual manner in science and art, and in material manner in the various branches of industry.

1. The purpose of science is the investigation of truth. It embraces the entire domain of the universe—God, the world, and man. From this the various branches of knowledge obtain. As that God who revealed himself to man in Christ is also the author of the universe, its forces and laws, and the ruler of its destinies, the result of science can impossibly contradict the truths of Christianity. In consequence of the clouding of human knowledge by sin, science may stray from truth, the paths of human investigation may diverge, systems of human wisdom may decay, a gulf may yawn between knowledge and faith so deep and wide that it seems almost impossible to bridge it over (James iii, 15; 1 Cor. i, 19 and 20; iii, 19); but this gulf will disappear as soon as science returns from the path of error; for the ultimate end of all science, truth itself, is one, and this one truth can impossibly be at variance with itself. What Bacon of Verulam says concerning philosophy is true also of science in general; viz., that, superficially nibbled at, it leads away from God, but thoroughly investigated, it leads to God. Superficial knowledge, which lacks truth and contents, puffs up, while true knowledge, earnest, genuine investigation, makes humble, gladly acknowledges the imperfection of human cognition, and at the limit of knowledge offers faith its hand. Luthardt says: "The ultimate and highest object of knowledge is God, the key-stone of the structure of existence." This God, whom science seeks along the manifoldly entangled paths of its investigation, has been revealed to us by Christ. Therefore Christianity has exerted a promoting and vivifying influence upon all domains of knowledge, and has elevated science in general to a height never before anticipated. Unbelieving science lacks the key-stone of its structure; the highest and most important problems remain unsolved. (Du Bois Reymond's *Sieben Weltraethsel.*)

This solution is found, however, in the vivid experience of Christian life, by which we obtain a new understanding of the connection and course of the world (§ 46). In this sense Paul declares that "in Christ are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge." (Col. ii, 3.)

The purpose of art is not the investigation of truth, like science, but the presentation of it in the form of the beautiful. It is therefore an imitative activity, in which man presents the spiritual world of ideas and emotions in a form perceptible to the senses. This is done in the various so-called "fine arts," architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and poetry, through various means—stone, colors, sound, and words. Through the pleasure that art calls forth in us by means of the harmony of form and thought, it exerts an inciting and culturing influence upon the development of society. A certain kind of artistic activity is practiced in general social intercourse by every intellectually and morally developed person. We involuntarily present abstract thoughts in pictures—that is, in forms apparent to the senses—and try thereby to awaken the attention and the interest of society. Hence every scholar is susceptible of the enjoyment of art, while a real cultivation of art presupposes a special natural endowment and an education in art.

Art, like science, is closely related to religion and morality; for in striving to present the ideals of perfection present to his mind, the artist rises above the level of the common reality surrounding him, and thus reveals the nobility of his likeness to God. Nevertheless it is not the chief object of the artist to pursue religious or moral purposes; and the value of a production of art is, therefore, not to be judged from a religious or moral, but from an æsthetic point of view. Not the good, but the beautiful, is the domain of art. Hence a person can be a great artist (for example, painter or poet), and yet be

immoral; while, on the other hand, the highest moral perfection is conceivable together with a total absence of art talent.

From this it follows that art can also follow wrong paths, that it can enter the service of immorality and vulgarity, and can exert a morally pernicious, instead of a morally educating and ennobling influence, which unhappily is often the case. This is especially true of poetry and the plastic arts of sculpture and painting. Christian ethics, therefore, can neither approve of all and every artistic activity, nor is it justified in demanding that art present exclusively moral and religious objects. It must rather exercise an earnest and chaste criticism of art.

All that is human is the object of art. Without injury to the moral consciousness, all mentally moral, as well as the natural domains of life, even the bad and the ugly, and in plastic arts the "nude," can be presented artistically; that is, in "a manner full of character, pleasing and elevated." We would simply call attention to Shakspeare's character of Richard III; to the Laocoön group, in which the "nude" appears in a morally quite harmless manner, or to the productions of Michael Angelo. But where the bad, the ugly, or the "nude" is presented in a sensual, carnal manner, so that it exerts a lust-awakening and seductive influence upon the sensuality and the imagination of the people, there the limit, within which artistic activity can be approved of from the stand-point of Christian ethics, is passed. It ceases to serve the higher and nobler purposes of art, and sacrifices the moral and intellectual culture of the people to the carnally selfish endeavor of winning the applause of the masses by aiming at effect and tickling sensuality.

Moreover, it can not be denied that a certain mental and moral maturity is the necessary condition of a harmless enjoyment of art, and that a tactless and premature

introduction of youth to the various domains of art can easily be of detrimental consequences, wherefore Christian parents and educators must exercise special prudence and wisdom in this direction.

2. The material subjection of the earth is accomplished through the various branches of industry. Industry has never played such an important part in the world as in modern times. "The factory has become the symbol of our day, and steam the ruler of the present." Man is ever more completely bringing the forces of nature into his service. The wind drives his mills and ships, steam takes the place of beasts of draught and burden, and carries the greatest burdens across land and sea with a rapidity formerly not anticipated. The place of arduous manual labor is taken by the giant power of innumerable machines, which are working with restless activity at the enrichment and embellishment of human existence. Man has even chained the lightning of the heavens, and compels it to bear his thoughts along the electric wire with a rapidity that scorns distance, while the printing-press scatters the news of the day over cities and through the country in millions of papers. All this witnesses that mankind has comprehended its purpose of having dominion over the earth. In the achievements of modern industry the divinely related spirit celebrates its triumphs over nature. But there is a reverse side of this progress of culture. It easily begets a spirit of independence and arrogance that discards God and the invisible world—reckons only with this life, and thereby makes covetousness and inordinate desire for enjoyment its idol. This estrangement from God, however, is not a necessary consequence of progress in culture, but only a danger that is connected with it, which, however, is to be conquered by the influence of the Christian spirit and by the activity of the Christian Church.

III.

The State.

1. Nature of the State.

§92. Idea and Origin of the State.

From the extension of the family, people and nations (*natio* from *nasci*) arise, the members of which are united by the ties of a common language, national tradition, national custom, and national spirit. A people includes the foundation for forming a State; but a people is not necessarily a State. The latter is formed wherever a people (or peoples) organizes as a regulated whole, under the protection of which the individuals, as well as society, realize the various purposes of their existence. According to its nature, therefore, the State is an association regulated by laws, the purpose of which consists in protecting every citizen in the enjoyment of his rights, and in promoting as much as possible all endeavors that aim at the material, intellectual, and moral elevation of the people; the method of promoting these must, of course, vary with circumstances. To the so-called "inalienable rights of man" belongs, above all, the right of existence, or of life, with which the right of an unrestrained development of his innate faculties, hence the right of culture and education, is connected. A second primitive right, which is based upon the nature and dignity of human personality, is the right of equality in the eyes of the law, which, however, must not be considered a social equalization, as such an equality would destroy the organism of society. A third primitive right is liberty, which is based upon the personality's

capability of free self-destination, and which finds its necessary limit in the moral order of society. The right to the possessions (social position, property, etc.) gained by personal moral exertion can be designated a fourth primitive right. In protecting its citizens in the enjoyment of their rights, and securing their life, liberty, property, and possessions against the wantonness and power of the wicked, the State affords the individuals, as well as society, the opportunity of devoting their undivided power to the fulfillment of their cultural purpose.

The first beginnings of the formation of States date back to obscure antiquity, and avoid our observation. This much can plainly be seen, that the development of the idea of the State progressed gradually from incomplete elements to greater and greater perfection. It has therefore been attempted to explain the origin of States in various ways.

The supposition lying nearest at hand was, that the States proceeded from the family in consequence of a natural, and hence necessary, development. This view, however, is opposed by the circumstance that there is an essential difference between State and family. In the latter confidence, loving devotion, and free obedience reign; in the former we find the earnest, strict law reigning, and demanding and exacting obedience to its commandments by force. From the family the patriarchal union of tribes proceeded, which, however, are not real States, and never become such without the addition of another element; but this does not explain the origin of the State organisms, which are regulated by laws.

Others trace the origin of States to crude force. An individual who excelled all others in courage and extraordinary talent is said to have subdued the latter by stratagem or by force, and to have compelled them to obey laws which he himself imposed—a view that seems

to be confirmed by the Biblical presentation of the founding of the first State. (Gen. x, 8–10.) But the arbitrary ruling of power vested in a single individual does not sufficiently explain the formation of States. Slavery is based upon mere power; but the State, the purpose of which is to regulate social life by laws and to limit power and caprice, must rest upon another basis. A State organization based solely upon power would necessarily assume a different character.

A third attempt to explain the origin of States is that which, through Rousseau, reached a wide-spread acceptance—the theory of mutual agreement, according to which the transition from lawlessness to the lawfully regulated conditions of State life was made in that, by mutual consent, people laid down laws and rights, and elected a government to enforce them, which accordingly derived its authority wholly from the will of the people. This theory is based upon the presupposition that the founding of States was preceded by a natural condition in which (1) there were no laws and rights, and (2) people were socially equal. Both views are incorrect. Even in the primitive history of mankind we meet with the difference of masters and servants; and rights and laws are evidently not a product of human caprice, but were in the world long before single tribes united to form States. They originate in the domain of ethics, which, in turn, leads to the domain of the religious. The founding of States regulated by law can be effected only because God himself has implanted into the conscience of individuals and the whole of mankind (§ 20) the idea of right and justice, and willed the development of State organisms of right as a limit for sinful caprice.

Thus the State originates ultimately in the sphere of the religious, and is "vested with the authority of the divine will." It is not indeed a divine institution in the

same sense in which the family and the Church are, but the product of an historic development. But this historic development rests upon a divine basis. Hence a proper valuation of the State is possible only where the "God in history" is acknowledged.

As the State is formed of tribes that have a definite national character, it must necessarily be a national State. Even where different nationalities unite into a State organism, the influence of a common government and of local circumstances forms, as a rule, a new, independent national character, in which the peculiarities of the various nationalities are blended into a unity. Hence there is no universally valid model, no form of State organization that is equally suited to all States; and only narrow-mindedness and want of judgment can wish to force the organization of one State upon others that have developed under different historic influences.

Upon the national peculiarity of States is based the special mission that each has in the history of mankind; and this in turn forms the basis of the morally justified national pride and the patriotism of the individual citizen. It should not be supposed that these civil virtues are incompatible with true Christianity. The Christian is the true patriot. Though he is neither blind to the faults of his own people, nor repulsive and unjust to others, he, of all men, is best qualified to exercise that unselfish and self-sacrificing devotion to the welfare of the State that constitutes the essence of true patriotism. On the other hand, he is kept from the morbid national pride that looks down upon other nations with contempt, and in vain conceitedness boasts of the greatness and glory of its own nation, by his higher moral knowledge and the spirit of brotherliness, which originates in the consciousness of the common descent and the common moral destination of all men.

§ 93. The Christian State.

Every State is based upon the idea of an association regulated by laws; but this idea is not everywhere presented in like manner. For the people that constitute the State are different not only as to their natural endowment and national peculiarity, but also as to their moral character. In the lives of peoples, as well as in the lives of individuals, a fundamental moral decision often determines the entire later development of character. Although in most cases we can not historically prove this fundamental decision, the consequences of such a decision are evident in the national virtues and vices. There are peoples that are distinguished for a noble bent of mind, susceptible to all that is great and beautiful, and others there are that plainly reveal a process of moral decay and decomposition. This difference must also influence the formation of States, as the idea of right is presented more or less obscure, or even distorted. As the people, so the State; and so also State legislation. "Righteousness exalteth a nation; but sin is a reproach to any people." On account of their sinful degeneration, many peoples have to the present time not reached a healthy development in culture, nor a State organization, and others present a wretched caricature of a State, that we are hardly able to recognize in it the idea of an association regulated by law; the laws which were to protect the rights of the citizen are unjust, the authorities are tyrannical, and the government is an inconsiderate reign of unlimited caprice. Christianity therefore has a great mission in this domain also.

A Christian State, in the full sense of the term, would have to be a theocracy, like the Old Testament Israel, but founded upon the basis of holy love, regulated according to the laws of New Testament revelation, and ruled by

persons having the spirit of Christ. Such a theocracy is not yet existing on earth, and is not at all conceivable in the present condition of Christian peoples. Nearest to this ideal were the Christian States of the mediæval age, in which, as is well known, all (that is, divine and human) right was referred to God, and spiritual as well as worldly princes were considered God's feudaries, who were to judge according to the commandments of God contained in holy Scripture. But it soon became evident that the sinful degeneration of the people and the authorities made it impossible to maintain this view of a State, wherefore the Protestants abandoned the mediæval idea of a State. The modern Christian State does not base its organization and its laws immediately upon the records of Christian revelation, but upon Christian nationality; that is, upon the Christian spirit and custom of a people. A State can be called a Christian State so far only as the people itself is Christian; that is, as far as it formally adheres to Christianity, and is more or less influenced in its views and customs by Christian ideas.

It will be objected that by this view the Christian State is placed at the mercy of the swerving humor of the masses, which can at any time introduce or abolish a Christian State organization, as it was done in France toward the close of the preceding century. But Christian nationality, as the product of an historic development, will not be abolished by the transitory vacillations of public opinion, and hence can not be destroyed by the decision of a national convention. Pre-christian times have created customs and views of life that we can not at once abandon, even if we would. Therefore it proved to be a complete failure that the revolutionary Government of France attempted to abolish the Christian religion. The French would have been obliged to give up the basis of their entire culture if they had wished to

carry out this idea consequently and successfully. This is not to say that it is impossible to dechristianize Christian States. On the contrary, we admit this possibility; not, however, as the result of a sudden swerving of public humor, but as the result of a gradual antichristian degeneration of the people itself.

According to what has been said, the peculiar character of the modern Christian State is restricted to the following: (1) That God is acknowledged the King of kings, and the Ruler of the destinies of nations; (2) That, although the laws and regulations of the State are not taken directly from holy Scripture, they are controlled by the spirit of Christianity; (3) That the Christian Churches of a country are protected in their activity, and that the Christian national life is promoted by the maintenance of Christian customs and usages, especially that of keeping the Christian Sabbath holy; but this promotion must not restrain non-christian members of the State in the exercise of their religious cult; for "religious freedom is demanded by Christianity itself: it lays stress upon the right of personality, free self-destination in matters of conscience and eternal blessedness." Only when those of different faith advocate principles that are immoral or dangerous to the State, and when the public peace and morality is endangered by them, does the duty devolve upon the Christian State to limit their actions by legal interposition.

Such a Christian State can, of course, not be the ultimate end of the divinely willed development of mankind, but only a condition of transition and preparation, by which the establishing of God's kingdom is to be promoted and made possible. The latter is the ultimate end of God's ways with mankind. But although the kingdom of God in its consummation is the higher glorification of State life, it is no longer a State in the usual

sense of the term; for the basis upon which the association of the saints in glory rests is not State law, but holy love.

§ 94. Authorities and Subjects.

The Christian view of the relation between authorities and subjects is clearly laid down in Rom. xiii, 1–7, and in a manner that surpasses in depth all political theories of modern times as much as it differs from them. Verse 1 says: "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God." According to these words, neither the form of a State power existing at any time, nor the character of those vested with this power, alters the duty of obedience to the authorities. To the Christian the chosen President of a Republic, as well as the monarch who inherited his right to rule, are in authority "by the grace of God." For human choice does not abolish divine authorization. Even a minister of the gospel is none the less called of God because a Christian congregation has chosen him to his position. Nor does the incapability and moral unworthiness of a ruling State power release the Christian from the duty of obedience to it. For the apostle commands the Christians at Rome to be subject to the heathen authorities of the Romans, "not only for wrath, but also for conscience' sake;" and, according to the criterion of the Christian moral, these authorities certainly came far short of their divinely willed purpose. It belongs to the greatness of the Christian view of the world "that, in the midst of the sinful development and constitution of earthly things, it perceives the ruling and regulating hand of God, and therefore, even in the case of the authorities, distinguishes between regard for the human person himself and the person as officer." (Frank.) However clearly a Chris-

tian may recognize the faults of an existing form of government, he will thereby not be induced for a moment to swerve from obedience and faithfulness to it.

To the Christian thought of authorities "by the grace of God" and according to God's regulation, the modern unchristian political wisdom opposes the thought of a reign of caprice, in which the authorities base their right either upon rude force, or upon a majority of the votes of the people, but which does not at all recognize a divine right or regulation in the State. This view of a State glaringly contradicts the Christian moral view of the world. Hence a true Christian can never agree with the modern maxim that the majority of the people is the highest authority in the State; he will ever maintain that above all human authorities there is yet the authority of divine right, which does not always coincide with the will of the majority of the people. Just where the highest and most sacred interests of mankind are in question, a small minority often stands up for right and truth, while the majority, ruled by blind passion, takes the part of falsehood and injustice. The saying, *Vox populi vox Dei* (The voice of the people is the voice of God), is not generally valid of our sinful, degenerated race, as is most strikingly shown by the history of all nations, and especially by the history of the people of Israel. (Deut. xxxii, 6; Numb. xiv, 10; John xviii, 40.) This modern, godless political wisdom contains the germ of the overthrow of all social order and of the annihilation of the very idea of a State. For where God is no longer acknowledged the author of right; where the latter is traced to the will of shifting majorities; "where the rude masses have the power, and power courts the favor of the rude masses: there justice and all that is sacred is trailed in the dust, and between the Jacobins parading their rags, and the autocrat courting the favor of the people,

there is only the difference of external appearance, not of inner nature." (Wuttke.)

From what has been said, there can be no doubt as to how revolutions—that is, the violent rebellion of the people against the existing authorities—is to be judged from a stand-point of Christian morality. In consequence of arbitrary perversion of rights on the part of the authorities, or in consequence of the progressing development of the people toward full age in State life, circumstances may arise that are almost unendurable, and make a change seem absolutely necessary. In such cases revolutions frequently take place according to the same law that nature obeys in volcanic eruptions and earthquakes; that is, as a reaction of a national life that has been checked in its development, upon the restricting limits of an unjust or antiquated form of government. But this does by no means justify a people in its rebellion against authorities; and the Christian will therefore, for the sake of God and conscience, avoid all revolutionary movements. He will strive as much as possible toward the legal abolishment of prevalent abuses of government; but he will at all times most decidedly oppose the use of violent measures. If the authorities pervert right, and oppress the people, instead of protecting and supporting it in fulfilling its purpose, they are accountable to God. The Christian is to witness for right and truth; but where his witness is not regarded, it is his duty to endure quietly, to pray and to hope that God's guidance and providence will bring about a change of affairs.

But if a revolution has taken place in a State, he must not stubbornly refuse obedience to the new authorities, but must accept the altered state of affairs as a divine destiny, which indeed has been brought about in an ungodly way by rude force and unfettered sinful passions, yet not without divine permission. The new political

power must now be to him the authority ordained of God, to which he can render obedience with a good conscience, and without detriment to his fidelity and attachment to the former government, since he knows that the "existing" authority has the divine sanction, and that scarcely one of the existing governments would stand the test if it were judged according to the human mode of its organization. For it is a fact "that those who have authority hardly ever, of their own free will, renounce the power received (as, for example, the constitutional restrictions of a monarchy frequently seem introduced under greater or less constraint), much less is the change from a monarchy to a republic wont to be peaceful." (Frank.)

From a revolution, as a violent rebellion of a people against its own authorities, we distinguish (although this is frequently not done in the prevailing usage) a suppressed people's struggle for liberty, of which we will speak later on in the discussion of War (§ 100.)

Remark 1.—"Where kings and powers no longer reign 'by the grace of God,' and subjects no longer obey 'in the name of God,' the best form of government will be corroded by the spirit of lying selfishness, and the ruler that says, 'I am the State,' will be succeeded by the other extreme of lying, namely, 'the sovereign will of the people.' On the other hand, that people is well situated in which ruler and subjects are reminded, by right and by law, of the fact that the object of its regulations is to secure the members of the commonwealth the possibility of jointly serving their common (divinely pointed out) calling, in the spirit and love of Christ." (Harless, Christian Ethics.)

Remark 2.—"In a legal State a revolution, viewed in the light of what transpires in man, is a rebellion of the desires against the will. At the bottom of every revolution there is injustice on the one side or the other, in the government or in the people. Every revolution sins against the fundamental idea of a State; for the part tries to supersede the whole, and the law of reason is changed back to club-law." Trendelenburg.)

2. THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY.

§ 95. Castes.

As long as a people has no fixed habitation, supports itself almost exclusively by the chase and by breeding cattle, and engages little, or not at all, in husbandry, life moves in its simplest forms, and the organization of tribes is but a repetition of the circumstances met with in the family. But this is changed as soon as a people occupies fixed habitations, builds cities, devotes itself to agriculture, trade, and commerce, and exchanges the patriarchal system of tribes for that of States regulated by laws. The multitude of formerly unknown wants that now arise, and the great manifoldness of the domains through which the industrial activity of civil society branches, make a division of labor an absolute necessity. But from the division of labor spring the various professions and castes. Hence it can properly be said that the social organism acquires the full manifoldness of its organization only in a State regulated by laws. Without the protection that the State affords individual persons, corporations, property, and various professional activities, the regulated exchange of interests and the social grouping of modern cultured society were inconceivable.

The latter, as we have already intimated, is not only a union of individuals, families, and communities, but a union of various castes, which in their co-operation fulfill the cultural purpose of mankind; that is, learn to know nature and its laws, and make them serve the purposes of the human spirit. (Gen. i, 28.) The various castes are based upon the various professions with which, as a rule, a difference of culture, interests and life-purposes is connected.

The choice of a profession is a matter of self-destina-

tion. But this self-destination is not an unconditional one. Every one is rather referred by his social position, his financial circumstances, and especially by his natural endowments and inclinations, to a certain professional sphere, within which he must select a sphere of labor corresponding to his individuality. As a mistake in the choice of a profession is not seldom of the most detrimental consequences for the entire future development of life, it is the Christian's duty not to make this important decision without prayer and earnest self-examination. For although every honest profession is compatible with the divine life-purpose of man, and hence is morally justified, the Christian must consider not only whether his natural disposition and his training fit him for a special professional activity, but also whether he is equal to the temptations and moral dangers peculiar, perhaps, to this special profession in consequence of the sinful degeneration of society. "If, according to a humorous paper, a peasant designs his son for a lawyer because he (the son) had never spoken a true word, it would, from a moral point of view, be a most striking reason for not making him a lawyer." (Palmer.)

That the various castes originate in the various professions need not be proven. But attention must be called to the fact that the members of a family participate in the caste of its head. Hence it can be said in a certain sense that castes, like possessions, are hereditary. On this is based the inherited nobility in monarchies. If any one sees injustice in the inheriting of castes as well as of possessions, and wishes to have both abolished in order that no one be placed higher than his personal services merit, we would ask him "whether he is able to abolish the difference of innate personal endowment by which our services are principally conditioned?" As long as this is not possible, there is no thought of an original

equalization of individuals. The difference of castes, like that of possessions, is evidently founded in the divine order of the world itself. Nor can it be denied that castes exert a considerable influence upon the moral life of man. He that belongs to a higher caste, and knows that he is observed by many, will thereby be impelled to avoid all that might be objectionable; while a low caste is a preventive of pride and a potent motive to meekness. Thus even the natural castes are to promote the spiritual life of the Christian.

According to an old usage there are three different castes or classes distinguished: The nourishing class (*Naehrstand*), the instructing class (*Lehrstand*), and the defending class (*Wehrstand*).

The nourishing class comprises all professions that purpose to procure the manifold material wants of life—hence the profession of the husbandman, the mechanic, and the merchant. The instructing class represents the purely mental endeavors of mankind, and its purpose is the knowledge, dissemination, and application of truth. To the instructing class, therefore, belong not only the educators of the people in the more limited sense of the term, but also scholars in general, as well as the officers in the State, in the Church, and in other spheres of life, who are intrusted with the practical application of the knowledge of truth. Even the profession of the artist, whose purpose is the presentation of the beautiful, belongs to the instructive class. To the defending class belong not only the militaries, whose duty it is to defend the country against external enemies, but also the protectors of the law, who are intrusted with forcibly combating crime and criminals—hence the police. The nourishing class and the instructing class are employed with the immediate fulfillment of the cultural purpose of mankind, as the former strives toward the material, the latter toward the

spiritual subjection and appropriation of the world; whereas the defending class cares for the maintenance of public order, and protects the other two classes in their manifold activities. Hence this class exists only on account of sin. But as long as selfishness reigns in the life of peoples, instead of love, and as long as the order of society is threatened by crimes and criminals of all classes, its averting and protecting activity is indispensably necessary.

"The proletariat, living from hand to mouth and lacking a secure livelihood, is not to be considered a separate caste, but as a cancerous affection of modern society, found in all professional spheres," which is to be healed and conquered by the influence of the Christian life.

Remark.—To the professional activities that a Christian never can choose because they lack a moral foundation, the profession of an actor unquestionably belongs, of which A. Wüttke makes the following striking remarks: "What can be called moral as a passing artistic recreation, is such no longer when it is made the life-purpose. Here a moral self-satisfaction is impossible; a life of play can not suffice a morally earnest person. Comedians play a sad part in actual life. That public consciousness distrusts the moral character of actors is well founded; he whose profession it is constantly to present strange peculiarities of character will finally lose his own; the face of an actor can not make an agreeable impression. No profession can show up so conspicuously many cases of insanity and suicide as that of the actor. It is not necessary to prove that mere displays of skill that serve only to amuse idle curiosity, as rope-walking and similar base arts, are not moral professions, but sinful abuses of life.

§96. The Difference of Castes Perverted by Sin to Inimical Opposites. Socialism.

In consequence of the sinful degeneration of society the divinely willed differences of caste come to be irreconcilable opposites. In heathen antiquity this ap-

peared principally in the generally prevalent institution of slavery. All mankind was divided into two chief classes—free citizens, and slaves who had no legal rights at all. The former class alone had the privilege of participating in public life; the latter were simply a laboring force to their masters, or a means of dissipation or pleasure. Through the influence of Christianity, slavery has been conquered and abolished in the Christian cultured world. But the spirit of Christian love is yet far from having abolished the reign of selfishness in general. The great mass of so-called Christians has scarcely been touched by the saving power of the gospel. Hence conditions have developed in Christian cultured countries, especially in modern times, which are almost as directly opposed to the spirit and demands of Christianity, as slavery is. Aristocracy and commonalty, rich and poor, educated and uneducated, are separated by a wide gulf. This is especially true of the large cities, where the rich are richer and the poor are poorer than anywhere else. Here we find the most refined luxury, the most senseless extravagance, the filthiest avarice of the rich side by side with the indescribable want and misery of the poor.

This glaring disparity has again conjured up the so-called red phantom of social revolution, which celebrated its dismal triumphs in the terrible days of the French Revolution, 1792 and 1871, and now again "lurkingly peers forth from the dark future," and fills the mind with dread forebodings. The precursors of this phantom are the dismal appearances of socialism, anarchism, and nihilism. These three names really designate the same dismal power of negation, the one purpose of which is the annihilation of the existing order of society, the overthrow of present governments, the abolition of Church and religion as well as of private possessions and of matrimony, and the erection of a socialistic republic that is

to put an end to all the misery of earthly life, and introduce the millennium of universal happiness and enjoyment. But this socialistic republic is a fancy that can never be realized, and that, even if it were realized, would be the greatest misfortune that could befall mankind. Private possession, matrimony, the family, religion, the Church would be abolished—the State would be all, the individual nothing, or, rather, he would become a mere cipher. The world, as Bismarck once truly said, would be like a prison in which the prisoner loses his name and therewith his character as free personality, and is regarded only as a number. But what motive would there be left for man to work and strive? He would no longer be working for himself and his family, but for others, and just for the idle and indolent. For the latter the future socialistic State would be a veritable paradise, a Utopia; but it would hardly pay a diligent, assiduous man to live, as he would be deprived of the freedom of developing his personality.

With regard to these socialistic endeavors it becomes the duty of the State, above all, to combat, and, if possible, to remove the social needs that serve them as a basis and give just reason for complaint, and energetically to oppose the unlawful actions of the Socialists, and to check the spread of their ideas by strict laws and the vigilant care of the police. This is the more necessary since the Socialists are, by their abundant literature and the burning addresses of their leaders, openly, and (as is shown by the increasing outbreaks of public rage in our great cities) not unsuccessfully, inciting to murder and rebellion. If the State prohibits and punishes such incitements to riot, no one has a right to complain about violation of the freedom of speech and of the press; for even freedom has its limits, and the State must never permit an individual or a number of citizens to abuse

their freedom to the detriment or the destruction of the entire social order. Fr. Von Logau truly says:

"If this be liberty, that each do as he will,
The freest people are the swine that wallow in the swill."

True liberty is liberty to do the good, not a liberty to do the bad. Wholly unrestricted liberty would be lawlessness. But lawlessness is incompatible with an organized state. For where "lawlessness reigns, the club-law reigns, and one becomes the suppressor and tyrant of the other; the strong tramples upon the weak, and the dreadful condition of a war of all against all arises."

Remark.*—Very truthfully Robert Ingersoll says, in an essay on Socialism published in the *North American Review:* "Socialism seems to me to be the worst form of slavery ever known. Nothing in the world could retard and destroy all ambition, all noble rivalry, all struggle for the higher and better, all cultural progress, like socialism would do. In ordinary slavery some at least are masters, the others slaves; in the socialistic state all would be slaves. If the Government is to furnish work for all, it must also decide what each one is to do; it must determine who is to chisel out a statue, who is to paint a picture, who is to mend shoes and sew pantaloons. But is a Government conceivable that can care for all this? Further, in the socialistic future State the Government must determine what every product of labor is to cost, and what the laborer is to expend. It must determine what every laborer is to eat and drink, how and wherewith he is to clothe himself, in which house and which hut he is to live. Finally, the Government must also establish values. It must determine not only who is to sell, but also who is to buy, and at what price. The Government must determine the value not only of all labor, but also of every product of labor. Who can believe, after due consideration, in the possibility of realizing such an idea of a State? And who can fail to see that such a State would, indeed, be nothing but—a prison?"

§ 97. The Labor Question.

In this day of progress, in which peasantry loses importance for public life in the same degree that industry

*This quotation from Colonel Robert Ingersoll's essay is translated from the German rendering of it. F. W. S.

and commerce, which are concentrated in the large cities, absorb public interest, the opposition of castes reaches its climax in the conflict between capital and labor, the adjustment of which is one of the most important and most difficult problems of modern political economy.

Let us, first of all, consider the state of affairs. Formerly every mechanic, even with modest means, was able to gain an independent livelihood; but this has been completely changed in consequence of the introduction of machines and of the principle of "division of labor," on account of which the individual laborer learns to make only fragments, but not a whole. The trades have ceased to be an art; machinery has taken the place of human skill, and in the degree that this has been done the social position of the laborer has lost firm hold and significance. The husbandman has a firm footing in his landed property, but the modern laborer is entirely dependent upon the wages of his labor for a livelihood. A single factory often employs thousands of persons, who are all dependent upon the will of the owner of the factory and the standing of his business. The relation between the employee and the employer is purely by contract, and not personal; hence in most cases the tie of piety that, for example, is wont to unite the servant and the master or mistress is wholly wanting here. The employee sells his laboring strength to the employer for a certain time, and, as a rule, the latter considers the former a mere living tool. The employee is not a slave; neither is he a free man. "If the manufacturer is compelled to close his factory to-day, the employee is without employment to-morrow. He is at liberty to look for other work; but if he finds it the same may be repeated. And if he finds none?"—

We must confess that this station of the modern laborer is hardly compatible with the dignity of man, who is created in the image of God, and it can not be denied

that the oppressed condition and the above-mentioned uncertainty of a livelihood must exert a detrimental influence upon the moral life of the laborers. It is not astonishing, therefore, that they try to defend themselves against the superior power of capital.

This conflict between the poor laboring classes and the noble and wealthy classes is not new; but while in former times it appeared only at certain places and at certain times, the labor question has to-day become the great question of the world. In all cultured countries of the Old World and the New we meet with the same appearances—on the one hand immense wealth, powerful monopolies, stock companies, and trusts, that kill all competition, and make it impossible for smaller independent business men to rise; on the other hand, oppressive poverty, wide-spread labor organizations, labor papers, strikes (that are most injurious to industry), etc., so that no Government can longer leave this movement of the times unregarded.

Moreover, the cause of this disagreement between employees and employers does not lie merely in the vast contrast between their outward conditions of life, in the wealth of the one and the poverty of the other, but more in the lack of Christian disposition and love on both sides. The pride and the extravagant luxury that the employers display in their families, while they try with regardless severity to use their employees to the best possible advantage for themselves, must necessarily arouse the envy and hatred of the laborers, who become more discontented the more the requisites of life have been enhanced by the increasing general culture of the masses, and the more the child-like trust in God, and the hope of a better lot in heaven has vanished from the lower classes.

The cure of this sad conflict that has spread over the whole Christian cultured world must therefore be a two-fold cure. *Firstly*, the condition of the laboring classes

must be ameliorated as much as possible; and *secondly*, the mutual relation of employee and employer must not be controlled and regulated by mere selfish regard to personal advantage, as it unfortunately is the case almost generally, but by the principles of Christian charity.

In regard to the former, it is the duty of Christian society to help the laborer to a livelihood "that does not essentially differ from that of the middle class," and makes a real family life, the basis of all truly moral personal life, possible for him. To this end the labor of women and children must be restricted, Sunday labor (which deprives the laborer of his time for recreation and for the cultivation of the religious spirit in his family) must be prohibited, and the laborer must be afforded the necessary protection against unjust extortion on the part of selfish capitalists, as well as the possibility of a future that is in some degree secure. In this respect good services are rendered by aid societies for the benefit of such as are unable to procure the necessities of life, by funds for the sick, by provisions made for times when it is impossible to get work, provisions for the support of old laborers and those that are no longer able to work, as well as of their families, and by similar institutions. But if these measures are really to be successful, they require the co-operation of the State. It is to be considered a gratifying progress of the times, therefore, that law-giving bodies are beginning to bring the social question within the reach of their jurisdiction, as it is lately done, especially in Germany, where the improvement of the condition of the laboring classes is made an object of special social-political legislation.

But, however gratifying these facts are, and however much has already been done toward relieving the wants of the poor, a real reconciliation of the opposition between the rich and the poor can not be expected from legislative

measures or external provisions; for the deepest-lying reason for the disagreement of the various castes is not the contrast between their external conditions, but their estrangement from God, and their worldly mind, from which the generally prevalent dissatisfaction springs. Hence a real solution of the social question is possible only through the influence of Christianity and the power of holy love, which make the rich humble and communicative, and the poor contented and resigned to God's will. Where this love fills the heart, opposition of castes must vanish of itself, as is clearly shown in the description of the primitive Christian congregation at Jerusalem. (Acts iv, 32–37.)

A. v. Oettingen therefore properly says: "This social problem of modern times can never be solved unless the idea of the Christian State be realized." Christian social ethics "sanctifies labor as a personal moral service, and thus secures it a lasting productive value. It maintains the idea of possessions, and preserves him that possesses from a narrow-hearted drain or a wanton use of it. It establishes confidence, or that credit that is the basis of all industrial intercourse. It makes the means of intercourse, which are the condition of trade and commerce, easier. It places capital, as saved and accumulated labor, into the service of the community. It abhors usury, as a loveless taking advantage of the immediate necessity of fellow-man. It brands money speculations and fraudulent stock companies as an egotistic draining of society, and makes conscience acute in regard to the excesses of luxury." "It places labor into the service of God, who called mankind to have dominion over nature, and through redemption qualified it anew for this purpose. In a word, it resists disorganization and makes a morally healthy division of labor and disposal of property possible." (Christian Ethics, p. 707.)

Remark 1.—The conflict between capital and labor is not new, and the means by which the laborers try in our day to gain their end, the strike, was successfully applied in ancient times, although under quite different circumstances. As early as the year 494 B. C. the plebeians—that is, the laboring class of the population of Rome—gained the right to have tribunes to protect the common man against the caprice of the patricians, by ceasing work, like one man, and going out to the Sacred Mount, leaving the noble patricians to themselves. By his well-known parable of the members of the human body rebelling against the stomach, and thus bringing the entire organism to the verge of ruin, the wise Menenius Agrippa succeeded in inducing the angry plebeians to return to the city. This parable is worthy of being brought to the minds of the laboring classes in our day. For there can be too much even of a good thing, and strikes, which might effect an improvement in the condition of the laborers if conducted prudently, effect the opposite if, conducted without tact and plan, they ruin business. The injury that has already been done our industries by the frequent strikes, many of which had from the beginning no prospect of success, is enormous. And, after all, who suffers more by the decline of business than the laborer? The moral right to form societies in order that they may unite their efforts toward an improvement of their condition, can not be denied the laborers; but in doing this they must not pass beyond the bounds of the law, and take recourse to violent measures. Where the latter is done; where they begin to undermine the divinely instituted order of society; where they oppress their fellow-laborers and force them to take part in the strikes, or demand of the employer what he can impossibly grant without making himself the toy of his employees; where they demand of him, perhaps, that he comply with their will in employing his laborers, or that he pay an indolent and unapt workman the same wages that he pays the diligent and apt: moral right ceases, and they are on the straight road to socialism and anarchy.

The proposition to adjust the difference between employers and employees by arbitration is well meant, but will in many cases prove insufficient as long as the arbitrating bodies lack the power to enforce obedience to their decision if necessary; and, moreover, even if the office of arbitration be conferred upon the legal authorities, who would have power to enforce their decision, the moral unreliableness of the officers would give rise to many justified doubts.

Remark 2.—Not only the capitalists, but also the laborers themselves, are to a great extent the fault of the prevailing misery. In times of prosperity they do not save, but squander their means. The wages gained by hard work go into the pockets of the saloon-keeper, or are spent for useless luxury and social enjoyments, concerts, balls, etc. In many cases the laborer's hatred for the capitalist is unjust. The laborers do not consider the capital, buildings, machinery, and, above all, the time, knowledge, and experience the capitalist devotes to conducting his business, and yet they are evidently more important for the development of industry than mere hand-labor. What would become of the industry of a country if it were not for the capital and the enterprise of the capitalists? The laboring classes can not be helped by hostility toward those who have possessions, or by abolishing all right to possessions, but only by the mutual aid and harmonious co-operation of capital and labor. But the capitalists also must contribute their part to this. Where the capitalist considers the laborers mere means for his enrichment, and otherwise takes no note of them, it is not surprising that he is the object of their hatred, envy, and bitterness, and that they consider him their enemy. If this mutual disagreement is to be put away, not only the employers, but also their families must learn to consider and treat the laborers as their equals; that is, as persons who are called to eternal blessedness as well as they themselves. They must be interested in the weal and woe of the laborers, and not only encourage them to frugality—for example, to join aid societies and to make use of the funds for those that are left without support, etc.—but also instruct them by word and deed to a domestic and Christian life. This presupposes, of course, that the employer and his family are themselves filled with the spirit of Christian love; and thus we reach the result that a real solution of the labor question is possible through Christianity only.

3. THE STATE AND PUBLIC MORALITY.

§ 98. State Legislation.

As in the Christian State not all citizens are true Christians, but the great majority make only an external profession of Christianity, and some are even hostile to it, it is natural that the precepts of Christian morality are much less perfectly and clearly presented in the life of

peoples than in the life of individuals. Every people has national sins and vices, as well as national virtues; and the ratio of the two determines its public morality.

In judging public morality, the following questions are principally to be considered: What is the religious character of the people? Is religion a power in social life, or have the masses sunken into religious indifference, frivolity, and unbelief? How are the various domains of moral life? Do industry, temperance, and frugality, or indolence, intemperance, and sensuality reign? Are the ties of matrimony and the family kept sacred, or are marriages thoughtlessly contracted and just as thoughtlessly dissolved? Do good discipline and chaste habits reign, especially in the large cities, or are the sins of unchastity and prostitution current? Are the laws and the authority respected in general, or does each one do as he pleases? Is the number of criminals great or small in proportion to the population? etc.

Of course, there is much in this domain that the State can neither command nor prohibit. But this does not relieve the State of the obligation to work as much as possible by wise legislation for the elevation and maintenance of public morality. It is the duty of the State, as Gladstone once said, "to make it as easy as possible for the citizen to be good, and as difficult as possible for him to do evil." Where this is done conscientiously, the unchristian and undisciplined masses will certainly complain about outrage and unjust restriction of personal liberty. But the State can take no regard of that. As we showed in § 96, unrestricted liberty is absolutely inconceivable in a community regulated by laws. The caprice of the individual must be subject to the will of the community. He who lived alone on some island might do as he pleased; but he who wishes to live in a State and have intercourse with his fellow-men, must consent

to have his personal liberty restricted by the customs and laws prevalent in society, which, after all, are but the crystallized expression of the public conscience of the community.

In guarding public morality, the State has (1) not only a right, but it is its duty, to restrict the freedom of speech and of the press as much as the welfare of society requires it, by punishing gross blasphemy and derision of religion, as well as all provocation of the masses to rebellion and opposition against the authorities, and by prohibiting public offenses; as, for example, the exhibition of unchaste pictures, the rendering of immoral or frivolous plays, etc. (2) The right to restrict or entirely prohibit such business as is either morally rejectable of itself, or endangers the public welfare by its harmful influence. To this class belong the brothels, gambling-dens, and saloons. In favor of the State's tolerating and licensing brothels under the supervision of physicians, the argument is advanced that they are indispensably necessary to protect respectable women and girls against violence and seduction, as well as to prevent the spread of contagious diseases. But where does the Christian State get the right to sacrifice a part of the population, and commit it to a life of sin and disgrace, for the protection of another part? And by whom is the duty imposed upon the State to protect the vicious against the consequences of their debauchery? The licensing of these brothels on the part of the State, which is really nothing but a public declaration of the honesty of unchastity and an invitation to it, is so directly opposed to Christian morality that a Government that tolerates such dens of vice can not be called a Christian Government. The same is true of gambling-dens, by which an inordinate desire for play—that is, the immoral desire—is awakened and fostered in a people of gaining property and wealth

by way of lotteries and games of chance in general, instead of by honest labor, whereby the gain of the individual is made possible only by the loss of many. The immoral character of games of chance, more still their demoralizing influence and the poverty and misery they bring upon many families, impose upon the Christian Government the duty of legally prohibiting public gaming-places, to which general usage has not unjustly given the name "gambling-hells." The State must also take regard of the liquor-traffic; for no vice is so widespread and, in its consequences, so fatal to society as drunkenness. It fills our prisons with criminals of all classes, ages, and sexes, and is the cause of the misfortune of innumerable families. Hence it is the State's duty to oppose this vice with all available legal means. To these means belong not only severe punishment of all excesses springing from drunkenness, but also the restriction of the liquor-traffic by high license and close inspection, or, where it is demanded by the public conscience or the majority of the population, by prohibition, not only of the traffic, but also of the manufacture of intoxicating liquors. (3) The important task of framing proper matrimonial laws for keeping matrimony and the family sacred; for the dissolution of matrimony and the family will soon bring about the decomposition and the moral bankruptcy of society. Even though, on account of the hard-heartedness of its non-christian or not truly Christian subjects, the State must remit much of the strict precepts of Scripture, as we saw § 83–87, it must guard against making thoughtlessly too many concessions. It must, for example, never go so far as to make an unmerited misfortune—such as insanity, or a loathsome sickness, or even a mere mutual agreement—a valid reason for divorce; it must grant a divorce only where a real moral condition makes it impossible for husband and wife to

live together longer. And just this loose legislation in things relating to matrimony is partly to blame for the great number of unhappy marriages, as in some measure it exempts husband and wife from the duty of self-denial, and makes way for wantonness.

§ 99. The Executive Power of the State. Capital Punishment.

The executive power of the State is closely connected with its duty of guarding public morality; for its legislative power would be a mere farce, if it had no right to enforce obedience to its laws, and to punish the transgressors thereof. Hence the State must have a right to punish. "Rulers," according to Rom. xiii, 4, "are the ministers of God, revengers to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil."

The purpose of punishment is not merely to reform the criminal—if so, the truly penitent could not be punished; nor merely to deter from crimes, and to protect society from the caprice of evil doers—if so, the most deterring, that is, the severest punishment, would have to be placed upon every transgression: but it is rather to satisfy the law for the injury done the legal order. Punishment, therefore, is actually a requital. From this it follows that punishment must be properly proportioned to transgression; in other words, that great crimes must be punished severely, and lesser crimes less severely.

In the properly regulated State the exercise of executive power belongs exclusively to the legal authorities. Private retaliation and private revenge, which are hardly possible without the passions of hatred and anger, are considered encroachments upon the legal sphere of the authorities, and punished accordingly. As is well known, Lynch law—which term is derived from a certain John Lynch, who, toward the close of the sixteenth century,

was chosen as judge and vested with unrestricted power in civil and criminal affairs, for the protection of citizens against the violence and crimes of escaped slaves in South Carolina—consists in that private persons unite for the maintenance of the social order of society, and punish criminals. Such conduct can be justified as an organized necessary defense (§ 69) where there are no legal authorities; but where there are legal authorities, all meting out of justice on the part of the people must be considered a violent encroachment upon the rights of the authorities, and hence as rebellion against God's order. The conviction of a number, or even the majority of the citizens, that in certain cases the authorities do not do their duty, does not give them a right to take the administering of justice into their own hands. If they have reason to complain of the authorities and the course of the regulated administration of justice, they may seek redress by lawful means, but not by violence or riot.

As the exercise of executive power on the part of the authorities is not an act of revenge, but an act of retaliating justice, it must avoid all unnecessary cruelty. The inhuman horrors of mediæval inquisition, the chambers and instruments of torture by which a confession of heinous crimes was extorted even from the innocent, show in a most striking manner how much the administration of justice can err from right through the influence of a perverted public opinion, and the passions of a superstitious people. These barbaric forms of mediæval penal legislation have vanished, and modern enlightenment abhors these dismal products of a dark age. Times have changed. The present distinguishes itself from that inhuman severity by a humane treatment of criminals, as well as by suitable and considerate prison regulations. The latter we owe in a high degree to the activity of Christian private persons (Howard, Elizabeth Fry, and

others), and of philanthropic societies, who justly requested that even imprisoned criminals be humanely dealt with, and be brought under the influence of Christianity (Matt. xxv, 36), although prisons are not pre-eminently destined to be reformatory but penal institutions.

Side by side with these endeavors of genuine Christian charity, however, we meet with many appearances that are not to be considered as manifestations of the Christian spirit, but as manifestations of a deep moral degeneration, laxity, and weakness in judging criminals. Although the materialistic view—that sin is but a disease or an erring of reason, and that the criminal should be brought to a physician and not to a judge—is restricted to narrow circles, we meet everywhere in the present administration of justice with an evident inclination to excuse crime; and with this inclination there is connected, as a rule, an exaggerated idea of humaneness, according to which all persons, regardless of their character and conduct, must be treated with equal respect and equal indulgence to their human dignity. The fact is entirely ignored that human dignity is connected with moral conditions, and that a low criminal, who "behaves like a tiger or a hog," deprives himself of his human dignity, and of his claim to being treated according to the deserts of human dignity.

One consequence of this wrong tendency toward humaneness is the circumstance that modern enlightenment has abolished nearly all modes of punishment except imprisonment, which, as the most humane mode of punishment, has been extended in an unprecedented degree. Corporal punishment, and the pillory especially, are considered quite improper in our enlightened age, "because they wound one's sense of honor." But that is also done by the prison clothes, as Wuttke properly says, and a dishonorable knave can not be treated like an honorable man. If they were properly applied, fines, corporal

punishment, and punishment touching the sense of honor, would in many cases be far more appropriate than the present almost general practice of imprisonment. The latter is evidently too severe for lesser crimes, as it takes the criminal away from his business, and causes the ruin of his innocent family; for great crimes, especially for murder, it is too mild. In the latter case justice demands that the guilt be atoned for by the death of the guilty one.

From the stand-point of this wrong humaneness that has come to be in vogue, even the right of capital punishment has been assailed; and in many States of modern times capital punishment has been legally abolished. Hence it is proper that we discuss the position of Christian ethics to this question.

That the Old Testament acknowledges the right of capital punishment can not be denied. "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." (Gen. ix, 6.) This is the fundamental law of all earthly penal retribution. Later the Mosaic law, upon the express command of God, placed the penalty of death upon many grave offenses against fellow-man—for example, premeditated murder—or also against Jehovah. (Deut. xix, 21; Ex. xxi, 23; Num. xxiv, 17, 20, 22.) In the New Testament the right of the authorities to inflict capital punishment is retained, as is clearly shown in Matt. xxvi, 52: "All they that take the sword, shall perish with the sword;" Rom. xiii, 4: "He beareth not the sword in vain; for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil;" Acts xxv, 11: "If I be an offender or have committed anything worthy of death, I refuse not to die;" and in other passages. But, even aside from these passages of Scripture, the right of capital punishment follows from the Biblical Christian view of legal punishment as an atonement or retribution demanded by the

authorities, as the representatives of God, for a committed crime. If this retribution is to be just, and correspond to the greatness and the character of the crime, the greatest crime—namely, the wanton destruction of human life—can be atoned for only by the death of the murderer. Whoever has premeditatedly committed murder has thereby forfeited his life; he has committed self-murder, the blood that he shed is upon his own head, and society does but execute the demands of divine justice by putting the murderer to death.

According to this fundamental view of the executive power of the State, all the objections made to capital punishment seem void.

The most weighty objection is, that by capital punishment the criminal is deprived of the possibility of reforming, or his time therefor is at least curtailed. We answer—(1) That the purpose of punishment is not only the reformation of the criminal, but also the atonement of the crime, which in the case of premeditated murder can be made only by the death of the guilty one. This truth is corroborated by condemned criminals themselves, who, when they have come to a true knowledge of self, as a rule, find their execution perfectly just, and often even desire to suffer death, because they feel that their crime demands this atonement. (2) In regard to the reformation of the criminal, it is a fact that the certainty of the impending execution often makes the most thoughtless sinners serious and penitent, whereas an imprisonment of many years, or even life-long imprisonment, leaves them indifferent, and often even makes them more obdurate and hard-hearted.

Another objection deserving attention is, that the error of condemning an innocent person can never be rectified after capital punishment has been inflicted. This objection is not without weight; but it proves only that

death-sentence must not be executed unless the guilt of the criminal is established beyond a doubt. But in regard to the impossibility of rectifying a "judicial murder," the same objection could be raised to imprisonment; for the years that an innocent person languishes in prison can never be compensated by a later declaration of his honorableness or in any other way.

But the punishment of crimes has another purpose; namely, to deter others from like deeds. This purpose is unquestionably far better gained by the execution of a death sentence than by the life-long imprisonment of a criminal, of which the public in general hardly take notice. Moreover, imprisonment, as a rule, has little terror for criminals, who, for the greater part, have always been loungers, and are perfectly indifferent to loss of time. Hence we agree with Goethe when he says: "If death could be abolished, we should not object; to abolish capital punishment will be difficult. If it is done, we shall by and by call it back again. If society divests itself of the right to inflict capital punishment, self-help will immediately step forth; revenge for blood knocks at the door." The truth of these words is corroborated not only by the fact that in many States in which capital punishment was temporarily abolished it was found necessary to introduce it again on account of the increasing number of crimes, but also by the circumstance that the slow and lax administration of justice in our country often incites people to wrest criminals from the hands of the authorities and hang them to the nearest tree. The Nation demands that the profligate, deliberate murderer, ravisher, etc., shall suffer the merited penalty; and that is, death.

Although we insist on the right of the State to inflict capital punishment, we must, on the other hand, emphasize most earnestly that capital punishment should be

inflicted only as the penalty of premeditated murder, and other crimes of like import; but not of lesser crimes, as larceny, fraud, etc., for the reason that life is the chief right of man, the possession with which he loses not only all other earthly possessions, but also the possibility of preparation for eternity. For that very reason capital punishment, as we have already said, should be inflicted only where guilt is established beyond a doubt. If this is not the case, or if other mitigating circumstances appear, life-long imprisonment is certainly to be preferred to capital punishment. In such cases it is appropriate that the ruler or governor make use of his right of pardoning the criminal, and hinder the execution of the death sentence.

Remark.—With regard to the general practice of punishing criminals with imprisonment, as is customary at present, attention is properly called, not only to the enormous expenses it causes the State, but also and especially to the fact that in many cases imprisonment does not at all correspond to the character and kind of crime to be punished. "If capital punishment, corporal punishment, fines, and punishment touching the criminal's sense of honor are not abused, they are in the great majority of cases far preferable to imprisonment. A man steals in upon him who has for many years been his benefactor, and kills him in order to rob him. He is sent to prison for life. Would it not be more reasonable to behead such a vile fellow? An apprentice, knowing that the law will not permit his master to inflict corporal punishment on him, insults his master; he is locked up for a month or a few months. Would it not be more reasonable to give him twenty-five stripes, and let him quietly and modestly continue his usual employment?" "A saloon-keeper, a wine-dealer, etc., poisons the drink; a baker robs poverty by giving wrong weight, etc.; they are locked up; no one knows anything of it. Would it not be more reasonable to set all such dangerous cheats in the pillory?" (Menzel, Kritik des modernen Zeitbewusstseins, pp. 218 and 219.)

4. THE STATE AND PUBLIC EDUCATION.

§ 100.

The obligation of the State to care for having its subjects educated to good citizens and able members of society is acknowledged to-day by the entire civilized world. From this obligation arises the necessity of compulsory education, which, however, is morally justified only so far as the State demands by law a definite degree of education for its youth, leaving it to the parents where and in what manner they wish to let their children acquire it. The chief means of public education are the public schools.

In regard to the character and scope of the instruction to be imparted in the public schools, opinions differ.

In view of the great difference in the natural endowment and social position of the pupils, it is most natural and proper that the public schools be restricted to the necessary, that is, the moral-religious training, and to instruction in the elements of education. Children can not and must not all become scholars; but they should become good and useful men and women, having the knowledge they need in practical life as plain citizens and members of society. As essential branches of instruction, this view of the purpose of the public schools requires religion above all—that is, sacred history and the catechism—then the mother tongue, reading and writing, arithmetic, geography and history in general outlines, and singing.

To this view there is another opposed, which, arising from the leveling system so much advocated in our day, purposes to raise the standard of the ordinary man's education and lower that of other classes, in order thus to bring about an equality of all. Those who advocate this view

find the safest guarantee for the welfare of the State in the greatest possible enhancement of what the public schools can offer in the sciences. Therefore the number of branches is increased from year to year, whereby thoroughness often decreases as much as the scope increases. But the worst of all is, that the number of branches of general knowledge is increased at the expense of the moral-religious character of the public schools. As the time for mastering the constantly increasing task is too short, religious instruction is restricted more and more, or even wholly banished from the public schools. In the Protestant States of Europe, in which, till a few decades ago, the public schools were under the supervision of the Church, this movement proceeded from men who were hostile, or at least indifferent, to positive Christianity; whereas in our country even Christianly-minded persons defend the banishment of religion from the public schools, because of the equal rights of the various Church denominations and creeds in the State. These persons proceed from the presupposition that religious instruction is impossible without denominational coloring, and hence demand that all religious instruction be abandoned in the public schools, since the State has no right to prefer one denomination to another.

From the stand-point of Christian ethics this view must be designated a fatal error. A Christian people—and such we boast to be—dares not and can not forego the moral-religious influence of the public schools without denying its character and hazarding its most sacred interests. The purpose of the public schools is not so much the enlightenment as the training of the people; and only when this is kept in view the public schools appear in their proper light. But a real training of the people is impossible without religious-moral influence. What does it profit to educate children to enlightened and in-

telligent men and women, if they are permitted to grow irreligious and immoral? Is instruction in sacred history less important for the future citizen of a Christian State than instruction in geography or general history; is he less in need of moral-religious principles, in fulfilling his duties as citizen, than of the rules of grammar? Is not a healthy, religious public mind the best safeguard of freedom from youthful error, as well as from the various sins that undermine the national welfare? Intellectual education in the possession of evil persons is not a blessing to a community. The public schools must not consider their duty done when they have merely imparted secular knowledge to the children; they must, at the same time, endeavor to awaken religious life, and to implant truly moral principles into the hearts of children, which becomes the more necessary since, even in so-called Christian States, many children are unfortunately not surrounded by religious influences in their homes.

The hope of supplying the lack of religious instruction in the public schools by the Sunday-schools is a vain deception; for, aside from the fact that the activity of the Sunday-school is restricted to a single day of the week, it lacks the possibility of extending its influence to all children, which is possible for the public school in consequence of compulsory attendance. It is not without good reasons, therefore, that many able educators designate the lack of religious-moral training the Achilles-heel of our celebrated American public-school system. The injurious effects of the want of religion in our public schools are already to be seen in the frequent complaints about the increasing impiety of "Young America," and about the increasing number of juvenile criminals. But the worst is not yet, unless the wound of our public education is healed; for wherever religion is ignored in the public schools, or considered a mere side issue, the Chris-

tian disposition of the youth must vanish and make way for sin and vice. Therefore the celebrated statesman Gladstone says: "Every system that considers religion a secondary matter is a pernicious system;" and Cousin says: "Without religion, schools would perhaps harm more than profit."

As the public schools must restrict their instruction to the elements of education, there must be institutions of higher learning, of various grades, up to the university, established in order to afford talented pupils opportunity to acquire a more comprehensive education, which shall enable them by independent investigation to open new paths for industry, art, and science, and to serve society and the State as intellectual leaders of others. To these higher institutions we owe principally the astonishing progress of modern civilization, and especially, also, the almost miraculous development of our country. What would be the condition of our agriculture and mining, our industries and commerce, our means of intercourse, and the material prosperity of our country, if the achievements of physics, chemistry, technics, etc., had not given us the means of taming the crude forces of nature and making them serve our cultural purposes?

In these higher institutions the purpose of public education must naturally make way more and more for that of the higher education of individuals for special spheres of activity. Nevertheless the Christian State must see to it that, even in these, the instruction that is imparted is governed by Christian fundamental views, and that positively antichristian tendencies and such as endanger the State are warded off. This does not abolish the right of liberty in academic education. Science can prosper only in a free atmosphere; and the State must trust that in the battle of minds truth will conquer without the State's interfering, and hindering free investigation. But

the liberty of academic education has its limits. The academic chair must not be used for the purpose of open hostility to the religion of the people or of undermining their religion, nor for the purpose of revolutionary and communistic agitations, the purpose of which is to overthrow the existing order of society. Wherever this is done the State must not remain indifferent, but it must protect itself, as well as its learning youth, from all such attacks.

Moreover, it can not be denied that the condition of public education in general, and especially the circumstance that religious instruction is being crowded out of the public schools more and more, is a humiliating proof of the deplorable state of "Christianity" in the so-called "Christian" States, and of how little the influence of true Christians who value the eternal welfare of their children far more than their temporal success, and the spiritual welfare of the Nation more than the show of mere external prosperity, is felt in public affairs.*

REMARK.—Properly honoring the significance of religion in public education, Dr. Thomas Hill, ex-president of Harvard University, recently said: "Whatever may be the theoretic relation of religion and morality, practically it is certain that the children can in no other way be kept as pure and upright as by fostering their innate reverence for religion."* From this he concludes that religious instruction in our public schools is "not only a matter of policy, but rather a political necessity." But when, for the sake of preserving the undenominational character of our public schools, he thinks religious instruction must be restricted to the appointing of good, religiously minded teachers, to the careful selection of good reading matter, and to brief devotional exercises, in which a passage of Scripture is read, a prayer is offered, and, perhaps a song sung, he stops midway; for if religious instruction is of as much importance in public education as he himself ascribes to it, it must have a more prominent position in the public schools than that which

*Translated from the German rendering of it. F. W. S.

he assigns it. It is true that in our country, the country of free Churches, religious public schools meet with important obstacles. An inspection of the schools on the part of the Church is altogether out of the question; nor can religious instruction well be imparted by the regular teachers of the public schools, on account of denominational differences. But must the schools therefore be without religious instruction? Is it impossible to remedy this misfortune? If religious instruction in our public schools is once acknowledged to be a "political necessity," there must be some way found of giving it its proper position in our public education. The easiest and most suitable way of doing this under our circumstances would be, that about two afternoons of the regular school-time be devoted to religious instruction, and be given to the clergy of the various denominations. Of these the related confessions could easily decide upon a teacher, whereby the execution of the plan would be essentially simplified. This religious instruction should then be considered an essential part of our public school, and put into the system thereof.

The objection, which may be made that by curtailing the time for the secular studies it would be made impossible to master the various branches contained in the present course of study of our public schools, becomes null as soon as the necessity of a religious education of the people has been conceded. It is better that we train Christian-moral characters with less scientific knowledge in our public schools, than highly educated scholars without religion and moral principle. Parents must, of course, be permitted to have their children excused from this religious instruction; but as experience teaches that even unbelieving parents, as a rule, do not wish their children to grow up without religion, it can be expected that only a comparatively small number of children would remain excluded from religious instruction. Whoever sows the wind shall reap the whirlwind! Our Nation will go to moral ruin, if in our public education we do not devote more attention to the development of character in the youth of our country than has been done so far.

Hence a general reorganization of our public-school system, in the direction indicated above, should be one of the chief ends of the united efforts of the Christian citizens of our country. Where this end can not be gained, it becomes the duty of the various Christian Churches, to a greater extent than ever before, to remedy the lack of religious instruction in our public schools by Christian parochial schools.

5. THE STATE IN ITS RELATION TO OTHER STATES.

§ 101

Every State has its special place and its special purpose in the development of the world of peoples. Commerce, which from the beginning of the world's history mediated the material intercourse of peoples, mediates their spiritual intercourse also, and awakens and fosters the feeling that they are in need of one another. But selfishness, which separates individuals, separates even peoples, changes their friendly intercourse to envious hostility, and incites them to bloody feud. "National hatred is the fundamental sin in the life of peoples."

Christianity has revived the consciousness of the unity and connection of the entire human race, and has thereby called into existence the right of nations that is now recognized by the whole civilized world. According to this, the mutual relations of States are not regulated by rude force, but by law, and each State must acknowledge the independence and the rights of the other States—a precept, the principle of which is valid also in regard to uncultured and heathen peoples, although it is sinned against in innumerable cases. The presupposition that every State has certain rights that must be regarded by the other States, finds a Biblical foundation in the statement of Paul, that to all nations God "hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation." (Acts xvii, 26.)

From the difference of interests or the complication of the general situation, difficulties in the intercourse of nations often arise, the adjustment of which constitutes the purpose of diplomacy. With this word we usually connect the morally doubtful idea of cunningness and wile; and we apply the well-known expression of the French minister, Talleyrand, that speech is given to man

for the purpose of concealing his thoughts, almost involuntarily to the official intercourse of diplomates principally. But are lying and fraud therefore inseparable from diplomacy? Certainly not. If diplomacy has a moral purpose in national life, it must be possible to fulfill this purpose in a moral manner. "Honesty is the best policy," even in diplomacy. This is shown by the work of many truly Christian statesmen. Bismarck's diplomacy was signalized from its very beginning by openness and honesty, and yet it celebrated the greatest triumphs.

The end that diplomacy strives for is the peace of all nations, and the joint co-operation of all for the promotion of the happiness and welfare of mankind. This end is the more earnestly striven for, and will the sooner be reached, the more the spirit of Christianity, as that of true humaneness, finds way in the mutual intercourse of States. Hence it reveals progress in the Christian sense of the term, that in our day differences in regard to insignificant questions, which formerly often gave rise to bloody wars, are nearly always adjusted by peaceful compromise. There is, of course, not much gained by this; for there are yet so many complications in the life of nations that can be settled only by the sword, and the danger of war is almost constantly hovering over the Christian world of nations like a menacing thunder-cloud. The hope of the modern apostles of peace, that war can be abolished and an eternal peace introduced in the present, pre-millennial period of the world, is but a beautiful dream. As long as, even in the Christian world, the majority of people remain untouched by the renewing grace of God, and selfishness wields the scepter on earth, there will be and must be wars, which, like a thunderstorm, occasionally purify the political atmosphere, and solve the complication of the untenable situation of the

world by the power of the sword. We therefore consider war necessary under the present circumstances; but a necessary evil. That it can at the same time be a school of virtue, and open a way for real progress in the history of mankind, does not justify it. "God takes even the sins and passions of men into his service."

Viewed from the stand-point of Christianity, as the religion of love, war appears as the most terrible revelation of sin in the world, as an organized massacre that unfetters the lowest passions, and overwhelms humanity with a whole army of affliction and misery of all kinds. Hence there is no greater crime than that a ruler or a nation, out of mere ambition or lust for dominion or revenge, conjures up a war that must bring death and distress to thousands of families. (Rom. xii, 18; Matt. xxiv, 6, etc.; Rev. vi, 4.) On the other hand, from a Christian point of view, it is the privilege and the duty of every State to maintain its peculiar national character and its independence, and to defend them against all attacks from without. Hence it belongs, as Oettingen says, "under the category of necessary defense, when a State takes up arms against attacks upon its [physical or moral] integrity and independence." From this point of view we can therefore speak of a justified war. (Comp. John xviii, 36; Rom. xiii, 4; 1 Sam. xxv, 26, etc.; Psa. xlvi, 10.) We consider a war justifiable in which a free people defends its national possessions and independence against an atrocious attack, or also one in which a subjected people is denied representation, and is cruelly held in subjection, and hence is not opposing a regulated government but a despotic reign, shakes off the foreign yoke, and fights for its liberty and national independence. Religious wars also, defending the most sacred spiritual possessions, are morally justified, at least where there are regulated authorities at the head of the threat-

ened people, whose duty it is to protect the people in the enjoyment of its national possessions. Where this is not the case, it behooves believers to fight with the spiritual weapons of prayer, of bold witness, and of resignation in suffering. With such weapons the Christian Church in former times vanquished Rome, the then mistress of the world.

The question whether a Christian soldier has a right to take actual part in a battle is positively denied by various denominations (Mennonites, Quakers). But whoever recognizes his earthly calling as a member of a people, will not withdraw from his duty of taking part in a justified war, as a "national collective necessary defense," for the protection of his country. In this sense Luther writes: "Christ prohibits us to use the sword; but if the authorities demand of us to go to war, it is our duty to go and strike vigorously and courageously; for then it is not our hand that strikes; for we do not do it ourselves, but the authorities do it through our arm. We act then, not as Christians, but as subjects." The question whether a Christian soldier has a right to take part in an unjust war is answered thus by Martensen: "It is not his concern whether the war is just or unjust. The responsibility rests upon those who have declared war." But it is doubtful whether this consideration will be sufficient in all cases to quiet the scruples of one's conscience; at all events the Christian will participate in a war for his country with bold faith, only when he is convinced that the war is necessary and justifiable.

Although even in the present period of the world war appears as a necessary evil, the influence of the Christian spirit has been made felt, especially in the mode of conducting it. All unnecessary increase of the sufferings of war, especially all useless destruction of life and property is considered unjustified. The personal hatred of indi-

viduals steps back more and more; the cruel system of plundering, of laying waste the enemy's country, has made way for a humane treatment of the defenseless citizens. The prisoners of war are protected from mistreatment, and the life of the wounded saved, if possible, by careful nursing and medical assistance. The mode of warfare itself is regulated by international law, and the sufferings caused by war are mitigated as much as possible by an extensive system of nursing the sick and wounded on the field and in hospitals, which often bears the most beautiful blossoms of sacrificing love. In this and many other traits that distinguish the modern warfare of Christian peoples from that of the heathen, the influence of the healing, saving, and keeping power of holy love is revealed in the midst of the horrors of war.

IV.

The Church.

1. Origin and Idea of the Church. The Church Denominations.

§ 102.

After the atoning sacrifice of Christ was made, the Christian Church was founded on the day of Pentecost by the outpouring of the Holy Ghost; through the preaching of the gospel it has been extended farther, and, despite all persecutions and storms from within and without, it has been preserved till to the present day. The Church, in the strict sense of the term, is therefore a divine institution.

According to its nature, it is, on the one hand, an organized salvation-association formed by persons who through faith in Christ partake, or wish to partake, of the Christian life; on the other hand, a salvation-institution, the purpose of which is, through word and sacrament, to awaken and foster the Christian life in individuals, and, by a moral regeneration of society, to open the way for the coming of God's kingdom on earth. The Church is really the humanly imperfect, visible shell in which the invisible kernel of the kingdom of God on earth is hidden, and in which it ripens toward its ultimate revelation in visible form. In a certain sense, therefore, the kingdom of God is in the world now, and was in it even at the time of the Old Testament dispensation. At the present time, however, it does not exist in an externally visible form, but only in the new spiritual life of truly pious,

believing souls that belong wholly to God. (Luke xvii, 21; Rom. xiv. 17; 1 Kings iv, 20; John xviii, 36; Mark i, 15.)

The visible Church and the kingdom of God are certainly not co-extensive. To the Church, as a visible salvation-association, belong not only truly converted, regenerated persons, but also many unconverted, even hypocrites and ungodly persons; to the kingdom of God, on the contrary, belong only truly regenerated children of God. The kingdom of God is in the Church; but the Church is not the kingdom of God. The latter can, in its present form, be called identical with the so-called "invisible" Church.

As a divine salvation-institution the Church is to proclaim to the world the unsearchable riches of God. In the imperfection of human knowledge and human efforts, however, this is done only by a division of the Christian Church into various separate Churches, each one of which emphasizes especially a particular side of the gospel, so that the evangelic truths of grace are presented on all sides through the different Church denominations, even as in nature the Divine Creator's thought of genus is not expressed in one, but in numerous species.

The bond of unity among the various Church denominations, and at the same time the test of their orthodoxy, is the faith that Jesus is the Christ promised and sent of God as the Savior of the world. The apostles demanded this faith wherever they went, and John says definitely: "Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God." A Church that abandons this basis, no longer deserves the name of a Christian Church.

This prismatic division of the one Christian Church which God has permitted on account of people's hard-heartedness, and taken into the plan of the development

of his kingdom, keeps the Church from falling asleep and from spiritual death, and spurs it on to more earnest activity in building up God's kingdom. What would have become of the old Church had it not been for the Reformation? And what would have become of the Protestant Churches (for example, the Church of England), and of the conversion of the heathen, if the various Church denominations had not branched out from the old trunk of the Reformed Churches? But as these separate denominations are finally to vanish, according to the prophets and to Christ himself, and all the redeemed are to be united to one fold, under one shepherd,—as this division of the Church, therefore, is not the normal, but an abnormal condition, the endeavors toward alliances and unions that try to bridge the gulf between the various denominations are to be considered quite justifiable. "The priestly mind of the Christians inclines toward union (John xvii), and the true priest is a bridge-builder (pontifex).

2. CHURCH POLITY. CLERGY AND LAITY. CHURCH DISCIPLINE.

§ 103.

Although all true Christians are priests in the New Testament dispensation (1 Peter ii, 9), and are to do their part to building up the congregation, and to converting the world, the Church can not fulfill its mission in the world without a definite organization of its work. Therefore Christ himself established the office of spiritual shepherd by selecting and commissioning his disciples, which office has the special calling of saving and caring for souls. Hence the ministry is not based upon a mere resolution of a congregation or a majority, but upon divine institution. (Mark xvi, 15; 1 Cor. iv, 1, etc.) This is not true, however, of the regulation of the rank

of the clergy, and the various forms of Church government. These are the product of the historical development of the Church, and hence are not based upon divine, but upon human laws. Nevertheless it is just as wrong to consider the polity and cult of the Christian Church to be accidental and indifferent as to suppose that the apostles gave definite legal instructions concerning a hierarchy, agendum, etc., to be instituted. The polity of the Apostolic Church was very simple. Besides the apostolate, we meet with only two Church offices—the presbyterate and the deaconry. There is no record of an office of bishop in the apostolic time that was superior to the apostolate. The names "bishop" and "elder" are used synonymously, as is shown in Acts xx, 17, where Paul calls the presbyters of Ephesus to Miletus, and then tells them (verse 28) that the Holy Ghost had made them "bishops." The further development of Church polity, as well as that of the cult, belongs to the post-apostolic times, and progressed according as the inner law of necessity demanded it, but in such a way that a wrong development of polity and cult, a development contradicting the spirit of Christianity, was not excluded.

Such wrong development appears in the two extremes of ecclesiastical democracy and hierarchy.

The former contradicted the divine institution of the Church by considering it a free religious association, which elects its representatives itself by the mere decision of a majority, and demands of them that in their public labor they express solely the will of the congregation, even where the latter is religiously and morally degenerated. It is self-evident that in such circumstances the minister becomes wholly dependent upon the congregation. He can no longer be an "ambassador of Christ," but only the "prolucutor of the congregation," who must preach to please their taste. The other extreme is hierarchy,

which is characterized by the direct opposition of office and congregation, and the unbiblical exaltation of the "priesthood" above the laity. In contradiction to the Christian idea of a general priesthood, it tries to maintain the Old Testament thought of a mediation of communion with God by a special priesthood, from which that unendurable tyranny and guardianship over the individual conscience springs that we find in the Catholic Church.

The correct view avoids both extremes. Spiritual office and laity are not opposites, but belong together, and represent the spiritual body of Christ only in their organic unity. (Eph. iv, 11 and 16; 1 Cor. xii, 25, etc.; Col. ii, 19.) The minister of the gospel has his office not only from the congregation, but from Christ; hence he is not to preach and act according to the will of the congregation—which may possibly be wrong—but according to the will of his Master. Paul says: "If I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of Christ." But the believers among the laity also are priests of God. (1 Peter ii, 9.) The clergy and the laity have the same relation to God, they are subject to the same moral demands, and have the same moral purpose to fulfill. The only difference between the two is, that the salvation and care of souls, and hence the preaching of the gospel and the administering of the sacraments, is intrusted to the clergy as their special calling, while the duty of the believing laity is to assist him by their intercession, as well as by their personal influence and their active co-operation.

In consequence of the official position of the clergyman, he is observed not only by the congregation, but also by the world, and it is expected of him that he, above all others, prove himself a servant of Christ in all his actions. Hence it is his duty to avoid all appearance of evil, to forego many enjoyments otherwise allowed, in order that he may not be a stumbling-block to the weak

in faith, and that the gospel may not be blasphemed; it is his duty to be a shining example to his congregation in sanctification and good works. (1 Peter v, 2 and 3; 1 Cor. iv, 16.) As to the performance of his official duties, he must, as an "ambassador for Christ," preach the pure Word of God, as it has been given to him by Christ and his apostles (Gal. i, 8 and 9; 1 Tim. vi, 3); as a spiritual shepherd, or a pastor, he must care for the individuals as well as for the whole flock that have been intrusted to him (Acts xx, 28), and feed them, not for filthy lucre, but of a ready mind (1 Peter v, 2), not as having dominion over their faith, but as a helper of their joy (2 Cor. i, 24); the thoughtless and impenitent, however, he must exhort and rebuke with all authority (Tit. ii, 15). Such Church discipline is necessary, not only to save the erring brethren (1 Cor. v, verses 5, 9, 11, and 13), but also to guard the congregation against offense and against errors dangerous to the soul (2 Thess. iii, 6; Tit. iii, 10; Heb. xii, 15). But in order to prevent arbitrariness in exercising Church discipline, it should not be left wholly to the clergyman to decree Church penalties, especially that of expulsion from the congregation. He should be assisted in this by a regulated, advisory representation of the congregation (leader-meeting, presbytery), and in doubtful cases a higher ecclesiastical court of appeals should decide. (Matt. xviii, 15–18.) As to the Church penalties themselves, they must correspond to the spiritual character of the Church of Christ. All external measures of police restraint and punishment are excluded; for true religion is not based upon legal restraint, but upon free self-destination; and the Church is not a rigid law-association, like the State, but a free love-association based upon harmony of faith. Hence the chief ecclesiastical means of discipline are exhortation and rebuke, exclusion from the means of grace, es-

pecially from partaking of the Lord's Supper (lesser excommunication), public penance before the congregation, expulsion from Church offices, and, in case of grave transgressions, complete expulsion from the Church association (greater excommunication).

3. RELATION OF THE CHURCH TO THE STATE.

§ 104.

In considering the relation of the Church to the State we can distinguish two classes of Churches: (*a*) Those independent of the State, like the Churches of our country, and (*b*) those connected with the State, or State Churches, which are supported by State means, and form a part of the State organism; as, for example, the Greek Church in Russia; the English Episcopalian Church, in England; the Roman Catholic Church, and the Evangelical Established Church, of Germany.

As, despite the constitutional rejection of State Churchship in our country, there are not a few American Christians that silently admire the European State Churches, and envy them their "preferred position," we must look more closely at the dark side of State Churchship.

(*a*) Above all, we must mark that the Bible knows nothing of a State Church. The Apostolic Church, as well as that of the martyrs of the first centuries, was independent of the State. In the fourth century, as is well known, Constantine made Christianity the State religion in the Roman Empire, instead of heathenism. In the heathen world every State had its own religion and its own gods, whom it worshiped as its protectors. It was self-evident, therefore, that it was the duty of the State authorities to care for the worship of these gods of their country. Upon the basis of this heathenish view, Constantine, having become sole ruler in the Roman

Empire, made Christianity the State religion, although, on account of its universal character, it is not suitable for a State religion, but is destined for all States and nations, and, besides, can never in truth be the religion of all citizens of a State, but only of those that are capable of receiving it. (John xviii, 37.)

(*b*) State Churchship leads to secularization of the Church, and effaces the difference between Church and world, since every citizen, as such, is considered a member of the Church, and besides the Church discipline demanded by Christ and the apostles (Matt. xv–xvii; 2 Thess. iii 6; 1 Cor. v, 5, 11, and 13) can impossibly be exercised effectually in a State Church.

(*c*) The clergy also is corrupted by State Churchship. As the State makes theological education, and not a personal experience of grace on the part of the candidate, the condition of his being employed to serve the Church, it can not be avoided that many worldly minded or even unbelieving men enter the cleric office; and as the clergy, being State officers, are vested with the authority of the secular powers, they easily develop a domineering and hierarchal disposition that is manifested in that intolerance and persecution of those differing from them in faith, of which the history of State Churchship has so much to report.

(*d*) Finally, the State Church lacks the possibility of a free development inwardly and outwardly. It is either the mistress of the State, and is involved in all kinds of secular quarrels (like the mediæval Roman Church), or the servant of the State; but in no case the pure bride of the Lamb, joined to no one save Christ, her invisible Head, governed by his Spirit alone, and able to boast that the weapons of her warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God to the pulling down of strongholds. Connected with the State, and received into the State

organism, the Church necessarily sinks into spiritual stagnation and into secularization.

Hence we designate State Churchship a misalliance that will be of the saddest consequences for the development of the Church. The Church must be free and able to develop freely in doctrine and polity. It must keep itself unsullied by the world through strict Church discipline, and must fight with no other weapons than the weapons of the Spirit, with prayer, and the witness of the truth. "Not by might, nor by power, but by my Spirit, saith the Lord." Hence the free Churches have ever been the bearers of spiritual life, and the hearth of mission-work, while the State Churches were content with cold, formal service.

4. THE MISSION OF THE CHURCH.

§ 105.

Although the work of the Holy Ghost is not dependent upon any form or surroundings, we must consider the Church as the mediator of grace ordained of God, by the activity of which the gracious streams of the Holy Ghost are made to flow for the world. Individual believers come and go, but the Church is always recruited anew, and through its means of grace offers to every individual the opportunity of finding the way to salvation in Christ Jesus. "It opens the door of God's house, in order that every one may hear God's word, as Scripture as well as explanation; it places the Bible into the hands of the youth and its teachers, in order that, reading, they may hear God's voice; it sends its servant to the sick, the poor, the sorrowing, the fallen, in order that out of God's treasure of truth he may give to each what he is in need of." (Palmer.) Thus the Church proves a means of awakening and promoting the Christian life in all who do not withdraw from its blessed influence.

But the Church makes its influence felt, not only in the individual, but also in the family, in society, and in the State, in the most manifold manner.

It accompanies the family in its total development, blessing, protecting, and promoting it. It preserves the religious character of matrimony by its nuptial benediction, which it denies antichristian unions, even where the State finds itself compelled to permit them; by baptism it consecrates the children to the service of God; it promotes the Christian education of the youth by pastoral assistance and religious instruction, and fosters the Christian family's life of faith by the blessed influence of the means of grace that it administers.

In society the Church is to support the humane movements of the State and the various benevolent societies (whose purpose is the mitigation of the material need and the intellectual elevation of the poorer classes), by its participation, and to glorify them by fostering a genuine Christian disposition of love; for holy love alone gives to these movements their higher consecration and their lasting strength and vitality.

A peculiar mission is opened to the Church by the antichristian bent of mind spreading more and more in the so-called Christian cultured world. The Church of the present is opposed, not only by an unconverted, worldly minded majority of the population, but by an evident falling away from Christianity, a clearly conscious, unbelieving trend of the age, which is fostered and spread as if by a mysterious demoniac power of the antichristian spirit, and the spokesmen of which try, through the press, through labor and trades unions, socialistic and anarchical emissaries, and in a hundred other ways, to inoculate the masses that are not yet Christians with the poison of hatred of Christ. This appearance has called into life that peculiar form of Church activity that we

are wont to designate "home mission." Hence it is the purpose of the latter to oppose the unbelieving trend of the age, and, although it can be hoped in only few cases to save the antichristian deceivers, it is to remove at least the unconverted masses, who are exposed to deception or already infected by the antichristian lie, from the influence of the deceivers, and, if possible, to win them for Christ. Its work is therefore directed especially to the following four points: (*a*) To the training of the neglected and morally endangered youth (asylums for homeless and neglected children, reformatories); (*b*) To the temporal and spiritual care of the poor, who are often a prey of temptation on account of their poverty (shelters, societies for the aid of the poor, the support of the sick, and those without employment, etc.); (*c*) To looking up the deceived or those liable to be deceived (appointment of traveling ministers or colporteurs for railroaders and mariners, young men's associations, popular lectures on Christianity, tract societies, etc.); (*d*) To the conversion of criminals (visiting and caring spiritually for prisoners, providing for pardoned criminals, Magdalen institutions, asylums for drunkards, etc.) In these domains the Christian societies and the work of the laity for the spread of God's kingdom has the widest scope. Although home mission often can lean upon humane movements on the part of the State and parties outside of the Church, it is essentially distinct from these in that its real purpose is not the material and the intellectual lifting up of the poor classes, but the Christianizing and converting of the neglected, unchristian, or perhaps even antichristian masses.

While in home mission the Church tries to defend itself against the dangers by which it is threatened at home on the part of the spirit of falling away, it must not forget Christ's command: "Go ye and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and

of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you." (Matt. xxviii, 19.) With these words God conferred upon his Church the great work of foreign mission (mission among the heathen), the fulfillment of which is inseparable from a healthy development of the Church. Hence it is quite natural that, together with the reviving of the Protestant Churches through Pietism, Moravianism, and Methodism, activity in mission-work was revived. Indeed, foreign missions have disclosed an entirely new energy in the last century, and an activity that calls to mind the spreading of Christianity in the apostolic age. Although there are many objections to modern mission practice; although many achievements of recent mission-work may seem questionable, the zeal and sacrifices with which the work of converting the heathen is conducted by the various Church denominations, voice that glad certainty of victory entertained by Christendom and expressed by the poet in the words:

"Peace can not be complete
Till love has conquered all,
Till at our Savior's feet
The earth shall prostrate fall."

Finally, the Church has a mission to fulfill toward the State; for although it is not organically connected with the State, it must not be indifferent to the national welfare of the people. On the contrary, it is to be the salt that preserves the State from moral decay. It is to exercise in the State the office of a spiritual watchman, and witness freely and boldly against national sins, give warning of impending dangers, and point to the proper means for meeting them. In a word, in its whole work it should try to make the spirit of Christianity felt more and more in the legislation of the State, as well as in the life of

the Nation. This, however, is not to be achieved by carnal and worldly means, but solely by the bold witness of truth and right, against error and injustice.

CONCLUSION.

§ 106. The Consummated Kingdom of God.

The Christian's faith and trust in God's government of the world makes him confident, not only of the ultimate triumph of the truth and the kingdom of God, but also that, despite all retrogression and all defeats, there will come a time of victory for the Church of Christ before the end of the world, a boon never before reached, in which the thus far invisible kingdom of God will reach externally its full earthly presentation; he believes in a "millennium." (Rev. xx.)

Not only the Scriptures, however, but also the development of the kingdom of God up to this time, and the present state of affairs in the world, indicate that the millennium can not be brought about by a quiet, gradual development of the Church, but only by an extraordinary interference of Christ, and with powerful agitations of social and civil life.

It is a law of the kingdom of God that the apparent victory of evil is really a defeat, and the apparent defeat of the good is victory. This law, which is verified by the history of divine revelation in the Old and the New Testament, as well as by the history of the Christian Church (Christ's death gives life to the world—the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church), is valid, according to the plain prophecies of Christ and his apostles, for the future history of the kingdom of God also. (Matt. xxiv; 2 Thess. ii; Rev. xvii–xx.) Here, too, the victory is gained only by earnest battling.

An unbiased view of the present state of affairs in the

world will corroborate this. However great the progress of mission-work, and however glorious the fruits that Christianity can show up in the life of families, of society, and of the State, there is besides these gratifying manifestations, as we have seen, a dismal spirit of falling away that is spreading over the entire Christian civilized world, and in the form of anarchy is disturbing the very foundation of the social order of the world. That these powers of negation are manifestations of the antichristian spirit needs not to be proven to him that believes the Scriptures. (1 John iv, 3; 2 Thess. ii, 7.) Their enmity and hatred of the existing governments, the organs of which they call "brutes of order," are surpassed only by their hatred of religion, of the Church, and the clergy.

The sin with which the gospel has to contend in many social circles of the Christian civilized world is, as we said in the preceding section, no longer the comparatively harmless unbelief or superstition of the heathen world, but rather that of conscious hatred of Christ, hatred of God. Wherever this sin rules the masses, there is little hope of their conversion through the witness for truth; on the contrary, the hatred of the good must be enhanced the more gloriously the power of the gospel is revealed. As the Church of Christ develops on the one hand, so the church of Satan, the antichristian church, develops on the other hand. In spite of the most extended activity in the domain of home and foreign mission, the variance between these two directions grows greater, the opposition more intense, the hatred and bitterness of God's enemies more menacing, with every decade. The time of the "falling away," and of the "revelation of that man of sin" which Paul designates as precursory to the coming of Christ (2 Thess. ii), is constantly approaching.

These facts plainly show that an earnest crisis, a decisive battle with the antichristian power, must precede the

establishing of the millennium. According to the definite teachings of the Scripture, this battle will be decided by a "coming of Christ," who will reveal himself in an extraordinary manner, "found" a new era by a new exercise of power, and establish the millennium. (Rev. xvii, 9–14; xix, 19; xx, 4; 2 Thess. ii, 7 and 8.)

Now the sublime descriptions given by the prophets of the earthly grandeur of the Messianic kingdom will be fulfilled; Satan will be bound (Rev. xx, 2, etc.)—that is, "the antichristian principles will be discarded from public life, and held in their impotence; Christianity alone will reign in public life and its institutions." (Martensen.) The kingdoms of the world "are become the kingdoms of our Lord, and of his Christ." (Rev. xi, 15.) Now that era of peace ensues in which "swords are beaten into plowshares, and spears into pruning-hooks," and "nation shall not lift up sword against nation" (Isaiah ii, 4); the gospel develops the full power of its blessings, and the social and national life of nations reaches a degree of moral purity that was never before attained to. Christendom becomes one flock, with one Shepherd, and "the ideals, entertained by the humane, of a Christian family and State, of Christian art and science, are most perfectly realized."

Nevertheless, this so-called "millennium" is but a faint, finite, advance presentation of the consummated kingdom of God. The order of the world, disturbed as it is by sin, is not yet abolished; the law of perishableness and death yet reigns; Satan is indeed bound, but not yet cast out; evil is forced back, but has not yet disappeared from the earth; hence the possibility of a second falling away is not excluded. (Rev. xx, 7, etc.)

But such a finite kingdom can never be the ultimate end of the divine reign of the world. The consummated kingdom of God can not appear until the sinful disturb-

ance of the divinely willed order of the world is abolished by the destruction of the world, the universal judgment of the world, and the glorification of the world; for not until then are "old things passed away and all things become new." (Rev. xxi, 1 and 5.) The glorified earth now becomes heaven; that is, the eternal abode of redeemed mankind and its glorified head, Christ. "He will dwell with them, and they shall be his people, and God himself shall be with them, and be their God." The sad consequences of sin have disappeared; "God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain: for the former things are passed away." (Rev. xxi, 3 and 4.) Throughout all eternity the redeemed now live in unclouded communion with God, while evil and evil persons are forever excluded from the domain of the revelations of God's love. (Rev. xxii, 15.) What in § 2 we designated the end of the divine reign of the world is now reached; each individual of the redeemed is a perfect image of God, and all humanity a kingdom of God, in which the blessed saints do the will of God as gladly and as perfectly as it is done by the angels of heaven. The law of this kingdom is holy love in its greatest glorification. Divinity and humanity are joined in an undisturbed, blessed unity. As we previously said of the single blessed ones, that no point can be found in them that does not most intimately coincide with God in contiguity, sympathy, and recognizing permeation: even so there is no point to be found in the consummated kingdom of God that does not perfectly correspond to the idea of the Divine Creator and his holy will. God himself is now, in the fullest sense of the term, "all in all." (1 Cor. xv, 28.)

Remark.—We could refer to many authorities for our assertion that the present state of affairs in the world points to

coming powerful agitations of social and civil life. But we restrict ourselves to the testimony of the late historian, John Scherr, whom no one can accuse of having his historic view clouded by Christian revelation. In the introduction to his publication, "*Das rothe Quartal*," he says: "In our day the avalanche of social revolutions is rolling rapidly. Reforms will be but dust in their path. The giant tragedy will be produced on the stage of the world's history. You turn away from this dismal prophecy, unbelieving, indignant, even mocking? —Ah, you are right! For it is folly to tell deaf ones the truth, or to try to make blind ones see. Mankind has everywhere, and at all times, set unpleasant warnings at naught. When, in the sixties and seventies of the preceding century, men like Voltaire and Rousseau, endowed with the sad gift of prediction, foretold the coming of the Revolution, thoughtlessness, which can not see beyond the point of its nose, laughed at them as pessimists, hypochondriacs, and fancy-mongers. Later on, of course, these ridiculers ceased laughing, thoroughly cured. Those of to-day will also, some evil day, be most thoroughly cured. For the logic of history demands its rights, and fates must come to pass."

Later on he wrote to the editor of the "*New Yorker Schwaebisches Wochenblatt*," who published his letter, as follows: "There is a social revolution preparing slowly but surely, and I rejoice that I shall not live to see the outbreak of this the most terrible catastrophe, undoubtedly, that the world has seen since the migration of peoples." This social revolution may pass by, may only be the beginning of the end, not the end itself. But can we expect that the dismal spirit of negation, which, in spite of the grand achievements of the gospel, and in the very lap of so-called Christendom, developed to such a terrible power, will be vanquished by the quiet, gradual development of the Church? Does not an unbiased view of the state of affairs in the world—to say nothing of the prophesies of Scripture—force the conviction upon us, that the dismal forces of antichristianism can not be vanquished, nor the so-called millennium be established, save by a new revelation of power, an extraordinary interference on the part of Christ in the course of the development of history? And the latter is most definitely predicted by Scripture, according to the above quoted passages. It must and will come to pass on this our material earth that the kingdoms of this world are the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ. (Rev. xi, 15.)

INDEX.

A.

Abandonment, malicious, as reason for divorce, 324.
Abstinence, § 62.
Actor, 361.
Adiaphora, 170, 171, 340
Æsthetic enjoyments, 170, 269, 344.
Affableness, 237.
Alliance, Christian, 394.
Alms, 259.
Anarchism, 362.
Antichristianism, 401, 405, 408.
Antinomianism, 169, § 52.
Art, Christian criticism of, 344.
Associations, 333; Christian, 402.
Authorities, § 94; ordained of God, 354; modern conception of the relation between authorities and subjects, 355.
Avarice, 100.

B.

Bachelors, 316.
Baptism, § 55; a symbol of regeneration, 190; infant, 193.
Belly, serving the, 100, 102, Rem. 3.
Benevolence, 255; wrong forms of, 259; institutions of, 259.
Betrothal, 312.
Blessedness, as fruit of the Christian life, 263; eternal, 301.
Blessing, 238.
Brothel, 372.
Brothers and sisters, 331.
Business life, honesty and dishonesty in, 249, 250.
Business lies, 251.

C.

Calling, earthly and heavenly, 289; duties of, 169; sphere of man's and woman's, 321-323; as source of caste, 358.
Capital and labor, § 96.
Capitalist, 266, 370.
Cardinal virtues, 218.
Cards, playing, 338.
Care, for relatives, 270; anxious c. for earthly possessions, 267.
Caste, § 95; heredity of, 359; differences of, 362.
Celibacy, 316.
Certainty of acceptance with God, 148.
Character, 52; sexual and national, 53; Satanic, § 32; Christian, as fruit of sanctification, 159; manifoldness of Christian c., § 45, Rem. 2; formation of Christian c. the purpose of education, 329-331, § 100.
Chastity, 224, 308, 253.
Children, heirs of heaven, 76; training of, § 87.
Choice, freedom of, 56; approaching real freedom, 57; remainder of freedom of choice in natural man, 73.
Christ, as ideal of human perfection, § 59; as our example, § 59; hatred of, § 32.
Christian, his position to life and death, § 79.
Christian life, The, 14, 39.
Church, The; nature of, 392; distinct from kingdom of God, 392; mission of, 393, § 104; denominations, 393; polity, 394; discipline, 397.
Churches, separate, 393.
Classes (in society); instructing c., 360; nourishing c., 360; defending c., 360.
Clergy, position and mission of, 396.
Comfort, words of, 258.
Concert, The; moral judgment of, 339; for benevolent purposes, 260.
Concubinage, § 83, Rem. 1.
Conscience, § 15; as barrier to sinful development, 80; public c., 80; as the preserving element in business life, 81; drowned, 82; erring, 83.
Consorts, § 86; temporary separation of, 324.

Contempt, of man, 19; of nature, 101, 102, Rem. 4.
Conversation, in the circle of friends, 337.
Corporal punishment, 376, 380.
Counsel, evangelic, 169.
Covetousness, 99.
Cultural mission of mankind, § 91.
Cultural needs, justified, 269.
Culture, intellectual and æsthetic, as vain attempt to rescue mankind, 106, 107; c., without religion, insufficient to rescue mankind, 103, 382, 383; c. as the Christian's duty, 224; one-sided intellectual c., 329, § 100.

D.

Damnation, eternal, 129.
Dancing, 338.
Dangers in the beginning of the Christian life, §§ 43, 44; in the course of the Christian life, §§ 50, 51, 52.
Death, conception of, 126; spiritual bodily, and eternal, 127; significance of, for the Christian, § 81; preparation for, § 81; fear of, 295; agony of, 300; morbid longing for, 297; sentence of, 376.
Decalogue, 85.
Defense, necessary, 254; war as necessary defense, 390.
Deification of man, 105.
Democratism in the Church, 395.
Derangement of man by sin, § 17, 77, Rem. 3.
Determinism, psychological, § 5; religious, 79.
Diplomacy, 387.
Disposition, the heart as seat of, 51.
Divorce, 324,
Doubt; doubting our acceptance with God, God's existence, and providence, 286; the efficacy of prayer, 202.
Drama, The; moral judgment of, 340.
Drunkenness, 223. 373.
Duel, The, § 74, Rem.
Duty, 21, 170; conflicting duties, 22, 25, 227, 249; conflicting duties on account of thoughtless promises, 248, § 62, Rem. 1.

E.

Education, institutions of higher, 384; liberty in, 384; compulsory, 381.
Emancipation, of the flesh, 115, 181; of woman, 321.
Emotions, overestimation of, 178; deranged by sin, 71; influenced by the Christian life, 163.
Employer and employee, relation between, 365.
End of the development of the human race, 17, 407.
Ethics, definition of, § 1: Christian, 14; practical value of, 14; its relation to the doctrine of faith, § 10; evangelical e. does not paralyze moral power, 40; position of e in theology, 41; as science of felicity, of duty, and of virtue, 34, 35.
Eudemonism, 18, Rem.
Evil, 31, 33; radical, 107.
Example of Christ, 15, 216.
Expenditure, allowed, 269-271.
Extravagance, 271, Rem. 1; 102, Rem. 4.

F.

Faint-heartedness, § 51.
Fairness, 249.
Faith, in general, 141; f. and repentance, 142; justifying f., 142; influence of justifying f., 143, 144; moment of freedom in f., 145; f. a gift of God, 145: f. as presupposition of prayerful communion with God, 228; weak f., § 44.
Faith cure, 281,
Fall, The, § 16; course of, 89.
Falling away from God, by abusing or neglecting the means of grace, 174, 177; on account of imperfect conversion, 151, 153; in consequence of habitual piety, 174; in consequence of spiritual pride or faint-heartedness, 177-179; in consequence of wrong liberty or conformity to the law, § 52; possible with the sanctified, 159; irremediable falling away, § 33, 277; the spirit of f. a. in the end of time, 405.
Family, § 87; festivities, 270; spirit, 54; members of, § 87; custom, § 87.
Fanaticism, of the spiritually proud, 177.
Fasting, 227.
Fate, The eternal, determined on earth, 127.
Fellowship of believers, § 58; the Lord's Supper a means to, 196.

Flesh, The, 69, 72, Rem.; as source of temptation, 284; emancipation of, 115, 181; lust of, 68, Rem. 3, 95, 96.
Flight from God, 99.
Freedom, of the will, as the form of the moral, § 5; denied, 26, 79; false and true, 363; with regard to the world, § 72; wrong freedom from the law, 180; religious, 353.
Friendliness, § 65.
Friendship, § 89.
Frugality, 101, Rem. 2.

G.

Gambling dens, 372.
Games of chance, 337.
Genius, worshiped, 105.
Ghost, the Holy; sin against, § 33; witness of, 148.
Good, 56; the highest, 35.
Good, The, moral and Christian, 32, § 9,
Grace, prevenient, 134, 193, 194; means of, § 52; disregarding means of, 177.
Greetings, as expressions of friendliness, 238.
Guilt, 123; relation of g. to punishment, 123, 130; sense of, 123; Richard III as illustration, 124.

H.

Hardness of heart, 121, 285.
Hatred, of God, 116; of Christ and Christians, 116, 117.
Haughtiness, spiritual; h. and faintheartedness; preventives of h., § 51.
Health, § 75.
Heart, The; the center of personality, 51, 54; the seat of sin 107, 156.
Heathendom, worshiping nature, 99.
Heaven, not only a place, but also a state, 128; longing for, 298.
Hell, not only a place, but also a state, 128.
Hierarchy, 395.
Holiness, as fruit of the Christian life, § 46.
Honesty, 249.
Honor, § 75; of station, 273.
Humaneness, 256; in war, 390; humane movements, 401; exaggerated idea of, 376, 377.
Hypocrisy, 111.

I.

Ideas, fundamental, § 7.
Image of God; man as, 47, 48.
Imitation of Christ, § 59.
Immortality of man before the fall, 129, Rem.
Imprisonment, 376, 378–380.
Impulse, 55; worldly, 55; religious, 55.
Imputability of the natural man, § 18; differs under different circumstances, 74.
Inclination, sinful, 36, 65, 90.
Indeterminism, Pelagianizing, 77.
Individuality, 50; its influence on repentance, 139.
Industry, as cultural purpose of man, 346, 290, 291.
Inheritability of certain sins, 74.
Innocence of childhood, 112.
Intercession, 204, 209, 211; blessing as, 238.

J.

Jests, 243.
Jewishness, not sufficient for the redemption of man, 37,
Justice, administration of, 375, 379.
Justification, 142, 143, 144, Rem. 2.

K.

Keeping holy God's house, 229; the Lord's-day, 230; God's name, 231.
Kingdom of God; the end of the history of mankind, 17; distinct from the State, 353; consummated kingdom of God, 406.
Kingdom of Satan, 36.

L.

Labor, the duty of each individual, 289, 290; ennobled by Christianity, 290; in the kingdom of God, 260, 261; l. question, § 97.
Laborer, The, § 97.
Law; moral l. as norm of the moral, § 4; the natural l. as barrier to sinful development, § 20; agreement of the natural l. with the Decalogue, 82; the revealed l. as barrier to sinful development, 84; contents of the revealed l., ritual and ceremonial l., § 21; moral significance of the revealed l., 86; binding force of the l., § 47; imperfection in keeping the l., 166; single com-

mandments binding for the Christian, 168; individual difference of the demands of the l., § 48; the l. in our members and our mind, 138; the l. of liberty, 165; the l. in the course of conversion, 137; wrong conformity to the l., § 52; lawsuit, 239; lynch-law, 374.
Leveling system, 381.
Libertinism, 181.
Lie, to children, 242, 243; necessary l., 244–247, 255.
Life, spiritual and personal, as opposed to natural life, § 13; morbid pleasure of l., 295; weariness of l., 297.
Literature, as means of self-culture, 225; atheistic and immoral l., 225, 363.
Lord's Supper, The, 194–199.
Love; holy l., 33, 35; holy l. as the central idea of Christian ethics, 35; as the principle of the morally good, § 6, 38; as fundamental virtue, § 59; natural and moral l., 68; perfect l., 159; Platonic l., 305; ministering l., 262; l. of fellow-man, 235; brotherly l., 240; free-love, 323.
Lovelessness, 103.
Lust; the inherited evil lust, 65, 66.
Luxury, 270, 271.

M.

Machine-labor, 365, 366.
Majority of the people not the highest authority in the State, 355.
Mammon, 266; m. worship, 99, 100.
Man, as the image of God, § 12; twofold or threefold division of, § 12, Rem.; as natural being and personality, § 13; the new m. in regeneration, § 42; the old and the new m. after regeneration, 155, 156.
Marriage, § 84; second m., 325.
Masters and servants, relation between, 332; serving two masters, 151.
Matrimony, idea and nature of, § 83; perversion of, § 83, Rem. 2; symbolizing the relation of Christ to the believers, 315; pedagogical significance of, § 85; insolubility of, § 87; legislation on, 373; hindrances to, 317, 318.
Mean, golden; moral of, 114.
Meekness, 221.
Mercy, 255–262.
Millennium, The, 404.
Mission, home, 402; foreign, 403.
Monogamy, 306, 309.
Moral, morality, 15, Rem.
Moral, its relation to religion, 42, Rem.; m. law, 85; m. statistics, 28.
Moral law, The; as norm of the moral, § 4; the divine character of, 21; universal validity of, 24; its relation to religion, § 10.
Morality, public, 371.
Motive to moral action, 56.

N.

Name, The good, 250.
Nation, The, § 91.
National pride, 350.
Natural disposition, The, 50.
Natural law, The, 17.
Natural life of man, 49; its moral significance, 52; needs renewing, 133.
Nobility of birth, 359.
Novels, 226, 227, Rem. 3.
Nuptial benediction, 314.

O.

Oath, 230.
Obedience, as witness for God, 235.
Obstinacy and timidity, 98.
Obstinacy in imperfect repentance, § 43.
Offense at Christ, 117.
Optimism, § 3
Overestimation of self, 97.

P.

Passion, § 23; genesis of, 90; a disease, 91; a self-imposed disease, 91.
Patriotism, 305.
Peace, apostles of, 388, 389.
Peaceableness, 239.
People, its relation to the State, § 92; sovereignty of, 355.
Perfection, Christian, 158.
Perseverance, 183.
Pessimism, § 3.
Piety, habitual, § 50; of children toward parents, 327; want of p., 383.
Pillory, 376, 380, Rem.
Play, morally justified, 337, 341; as recreation, 293.

Politeness, forms of, 243; their abuse, 244
Polygamy, 307, 309.
Poor, The; care of, § 70.
Possessions, temporal, §§ 73, 74, 75, 76.
Prayer, the language of the soul, 199; definite acts of p. necessary, 200; p. in the name of Jesus, 202; p. as expression of a filial disposition, 228; conditions to answerable p., 203; the Lord's Prayer, 204; objections to p. refuted, 205; p. a ladder, 209; p. as means of overcoming trials caused by suffering, 280; prayerful disposition, 200, 209.
Press, The; freedom of, 372.
Pride, haughtiness, vanity, 97.
Principle, fundamental; of the morally good, 31; of the morally bad, 33.
Prohibition of the liquor-traffic, 372.
Proletariat, 361, 318.
Promise, duty of keeping, 248; toward children, 248.
Public schools, § 100.
Punishment, divine, 124; its connection with sin, 125; natural penalty of sin, 125; p. as reproof, 252; Church p., 397; executive function of the State, § 99.
Purpose; the moral p. of man, §§ 1, 2; of the Church, § 104.

Q.

Quietives, 56.

Reading R 225

Reconcilableness, 239.
Recreation, 291.
Regeneration, a work of the Holy Ghost, § 42; a new beginning of life, 148; r. in baptism, 149; r. necessary to fulfill our moral mission, 37; the regenerated has no communion with sin, 148.
Religion, its relation to morality, 41; a means of education, 382.
Religious instruction in the public schools, 383, 385.
Repentance, § 38; imperfect, § 43; of believers, 157.
Republic, socialistic, 362.
Rescue; vain attempts of the natural man to r. mankind, § 28.
Reserve; conscious r. in repentance, 15.
Resignation, in suffering, 277.
Reverence, for God, 229, 230.
Revolution, 356; social, 362.
Right as the correlative of duty, 23; necessary r., 245, 253.
Righteousness, as virtue; as regards the honor of fellow-man, § 68; valid before God, § 40; according to the law, theocratic, 109; self-wrought r., 39.
Rights, of man, 347; of nations, 387, 389, 391.
Ritual law, 84.

S.

Sadness, divine, 138.
Safety, carnal, 112.
Saloons, 372.
Salvation of souls, § 71; the mission of the Church, § 105.
Sanctification, nature of, 155; by faith, 157; relative completion of, 158; conditions of attaining to, 160.
Sanctimoniousness, 111.
Science, as cultural purpose of man, 343.
Secrets, duty of keeping, 240.
Self-contempt, 97.
Self-control, 222.
Self-culture, intellectual, 225; moral, 223, 224.
Self-deception, 96.
Self-denial, 221; for the salvation of others, 261.
Self-destination, 23; as the form of moral action, § 5.
Self-examination, 220; before the Lord's Supper, 198.
Self-impartation of Christ in regeneration, 147; in sanctification, 157, 182; in the Lord's Supper, 197.
Selfishness, the principle of the bad, 33, 35; its decomposing influence on society, 105.
Self-knowledge, as fruit of self-examination, 220; want of it in natural man, 96; as condition to conversion, 137.
Self-love, Christian, 219; wrong, 96.
Self-redemption, shown impossible by the history of Jews and heathen, 37; vain attempts at, § 28.

Self-respect, 97.
Self-righteousness, 175.
Self-will, as rebellion against the Divine will, 38.
Sensuality, not the source of sin, 66.
Servants, 332.
Sickness, a means of grace, 280.
Shame, sense of, 308.
Silence, sometimes duty, 234, 241, 242.
Sin, 66, 67, 68; individual sin—genesis of, § 22; differences of, § 24; measure of, 93; inbred s., § 8; s. against the Holy Ghost, § 33; misery of s., combating it, § 71; servility to s., 90, 92, 112, 113; mortal sins, 94, Rem.
Sincerity, 220.
Sinful state, § 17.
Sinner; love of the s., 256, 260.
Slavery, 362, 272.
Smoking, 170.
Sociability, § 90.
Social needs, 363.
Socialism, anarchism, nihilism, 362.
Society, § 82.
Speech, freedom of, 372, 363, 384.
Spirit, or living soul, 48, Rem.; s. controlling an age or a people, 36; s. of the times, the modern antichristian, 118.
State, The; idea of, 347; origin of, 348; national peculiarity of, 350; Christian, 351; modern Christian, 352; s. in its relation to the kingdom of God, 353; s. and public morality, § 98; future socialistic, 362, 364, Rem.
State-churchism, § 104.
Strikes, § 97.
Struggle; the moral as vain attempt at rescuing man, 108; s. for sanctification, § 45, 182.
Subjects and authorities, § 94.
Suffering; the Christian in s., § 76; temptations caused by s., 280, 287.
Suicide, 98.
Sunday, 212; keeping S. holy, 230; observing S., 292.
Superstition, 99, 101, Rem. 1.
Sympathy, 238; as manifestation of mercy, 258.

T.

Temperaments, 50, 52, 53; morally indifferent, 76, Rem. 2.
Temperance, 223.
Temptation, as manifestation of evil lust, 87; from Satan, 88; t. and sin, 88; difference between t. and trial, 283; significance of t. for the Christian, 284; t. from the own flesh, the world, and Satan, 285; temptations of the sanctified, 285; t. necessary to Christian growth, 287; means of overcoming t., 288.
Theater, The, 339.
Theory of mutual agreement as explanation of the formation of State, 349.
Timidity, 98.
Tolerance (see Religious Freedom).
Torturing animals, 264.
Trade, 365, 366.
Trials, 286, 287.
Trust in God, as source of Christian courage and hope, 229.
Turning, 338.

U.

Unbelief, 69; its relation to superstition, 99, 101, Rem. 1.
Unchastity, sins of, 105, 309, Rem. 2, 307.
Understanding, darkened by sin, 70; enlightened by the Christian life, § 46.
Uprightness, 240; want of, 103; in repentance, § 43; as reason of weak faith, 153.
Unrighteousness, of man toward man, 104.

V.

Vanity, pride, haughtiness, 97.
Veracity, 240.
Vice, 91, 92.
Viciousness, 91, 113.
Vigilance, 221.
Virtue; civil v. not worthless, 108; but not sufficient, 109.
Virtues, The, § 61.
Volition, relation of human and Divine, § 49.
Vote, plurality of, 355.

W.

War, 105, 388, 389; for liberty, 357, 389; the Christian's participating in w., 390; influence of Christianity on w., 390; religious wars, 389.
Watchfulness, over self, 220, 225.

Will, perverted by sin, 69; sanctified by the Christian life, 162; will-power enfeebled in natural man, 98.
Wisdom, as fruit of the Christian life, 161.
Witness, of the Holy Ghost, 148; of our spirit, 148; for truth, 233; fundamental rules for witnessing for the truth, 234; w. reproving sin, 252.
Woman; woman's rights (see Emancipation of woman).
Word of God, § 54.
World, The (creation); the Christian's position toward the w., § 72; physical, or mechanical, and moral view of the w., 16; love of the w., 69; worldly lust, 95, 262; contempt of the w., 263.
Worship, Divine; public, 212.

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